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PREFACE 
Th?rc jx~phlet  contains a  short history of  the preparation 
0:'  +.he  Manual for Courts-Martial,  United States,  1951, 
%%other with brief  discussions of  the legal and legislative 
;onsiderations involved in the drafting of  the book.  With 
&nor  exceptions,  the discussions of  the various subjects 
were  written by  the officers who  prepared the initial drafts 
of  the comparable portions of  the manual. 
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MANUAL  FOR  COURTS-VWt!lTAL,  UNITED  STATES,  1951 
Colonel Charles L.  Decker 
The  history of  the drafting and  processing of  the Manual  for 
Courts-Kartial,  1951,  is one of  careful preparation  followed by 
many  careful reviews of  each-  draft. 
On 21 February 1950,  the Judge Advocates  General of the 
Amy,.Na~y,  and Air  Force met with the General Counsel,  Office 
of  the Secretary of Defense,  and  decided to proceed  on  a  joint 
basis in  the preparation of a Manual  for Courts4iartial to 
implement  the then proposed  Uniform Code  of  Military Justice. 
Colonel William P.  Connally,  Jr.,  Assistant Judge Advocate 
General for Military Justice,  Department  of  the Amy,  was 
instructed to direct the preparation of  such a manual-. 
Colonel Connally assigned to the Special Projects Division, 
which was  under his  supervision,  those officers of  his office 
who  had  prepared the bbnual for Courts-Wrtial,  U.  S.  Army,  1949. 
Assigned  were  Colonel Charles  L.  Decker,  Chief  of Division,  Lt. 
Colonel Waldemar  A.  Solf,  Executive Officer,  Major  Gilbert G. 
Ack~oyd,  Major  Kenneth  J.  Hodson,  and  Major MKllia~  H.  Conley. 
A  Navy  legal officer,  Comander ;Tilliam  A.  Collier,  and  an Air 
Force judge  advocate,  Lt.  Colonel Jean F.  Rydstrom,  were placed 
on  duty with the Division,  and  each not  only acted as a liaison 
officer but performed  a  full share in  the actual drafting of 
the book.  Subsequently,  Major  Roger  Currier was  assigned to 
the Division to  augment  the Army complement. 
The  actual initial drafting was  divided into 30  separate 
projects,  which were apportioned among  the officers of  the 
division so that each was  drafted by  an officer considered 
expert in  the particular field.  The  plan required  completion 
of  the initial  draft of  the entire book,  less index,  by 15 
September 1950.  The  draft was  completed  according to  plan. 
Each  of  the 30 projects consisted of  four parts:  the 
proposed  draft for the Manual  for Courts-Martial,  United States, 
195'1;  a  file of those parts of the Manual  for Courts-Martial, 
U.  S.  Amy,  19&9, Naval  Courts and  Boards,  1937,  and  of  the 
Manual  for Courts-Martial,  U.  S. Coast  Guard,  19b9,  which 
treated the subject of  the project;  a table of  legal authorities 
and  relevant legislative history;  and  a brief supporting memo- 
,  randum  explaining the reasoning which  underlay the draft itself. As the draft of  each project was  approved within the 
division, it was  forwarded to  Colonel  Connally.  Copies  of 
the draft as approved  by  him  were sent for review to a 
representative of each  Judge  Advocate  General.  These repre- 
sentatives were  Colonel John  E.  Curry,  USMC,  Brigadier  General 
Herbert  M.  Kidner,  USAF,  and  Colonel Connally.  After the 
drafts were reviewed  by the representatives,  they or their 
designated  representatives  reviewed  each project in  conference. 
The  draft as finally approved  by them was  reproduced  and  for- 
warded  for review to  the three Judge Advocates  General and  the 
*neral  Counsel,  Office of  the Secretary of  Defense.  The  Judge 
Advocates  General  and  the Ceneral Counsel held numerous  personal 
conferences in  which differing views were thoroughly scrutinized 
and  resolved.  The  draft of  the text and  appendices  of  the 
manual,  as finally approved  by  the Judge Advocates  General, 
was  reproduced  and  cleared through the various agencies in  each 
department  having  an  interest therein.  Final depa rtmenta 1 
clearance was,  of  course,  indicated by  the Secretaries them- 
selves. 
After  clearance within the Department  of Defense,  Colonel 
Decker was  designated  as Department  of  Defense representative 
to  effect clearances with  the other interested governmental 
agencies.  In addition to the normal study made  by the Bureau 
of  the Budget,  that office also retained special counsel to 
make  an independent  study of  the draft..  Thereafter the draft 
was  reviewed  and. cleared by  the office of  the Attorney General. 
This  review consisted of  a  study by  three experts in  criminal 
law and procedure,  as well as further  review by  other attorneys 
in the Department  of  Justice.  Thereafter the work  was  reviewed 
by  the Director of  the Archives  and transmitted to  the becutive 
Office of  the President,  where,  after due study,  the Manual  for 
Courts-Martial,  United  States,  1951,  was  duly promulgated  as 
Executive Order  10214 on  8 February 1951. Conference No.  1 
MILXTARY  JURISDICTION;  JURISDICTION 
OF  COURTS-IdAFiTIAL;  HABEAS  CORPUS 
Conducted by 
LT .  COL.  WALDSMAR  A.  SOLF 
References:  Chapter 1,  Paragraphs 1,  2 
Chapter 2,  Paragraphs 3,  bg  - 
Chapter 3,  Paragraph 5 
Chapter 4,  Paragraphs 8-16 
Chapter  29,  Paragraphs 214-218 
CHAPTER  I - MILITARY  JURISDICTION 
This  chapter will look familar to  Army  and  Air Force personnel-- 
but it may  look a little  abbreviated to  the Navy  and  the Coast Guard. 
It differs from  the first chapter of  NC  & B  in that its scope is 
linited to sources of military jurisdiction;  not the broader subject 
of  sources of  military law.  It was  felt that the discussion in 
Chapter I of  Naval  Courts and  Boards  relative to the sources of 
military law was  extremely useful and much  of it was  incorporated 
in other parts of  the Manual.  For  example,  Section 4,  "Knowledge  of 
Naval  Law  required,"  may  be  found  in  paragraph l%a(b).  A  discussion 
of  the legal effect of  custom is to  be found  in  paragraph 213a  -  which 
discusses the general Article (134). 
Sources.--This  paragraph  states that the sources of military 
law include the Constitution and  International Lam.  One  fairly 
obvious  point is stressed; namely,  that the law of war  is included 
in international law.  See Ex parte Quirin 317,  U.  S.  1.  Inter- 
national law,  apart from thrlam of  war,  is also a source of military 
jurisdiction.  Among  the classes of cases in  which military juris- 
diction is affected by  international law other than the law of  war 
'are  the cases involving offenses committed  in a friendly foreign 
)  country  where  ar, arned force is by  consent quartered or in passage. 
This will  be discussed in greater detail in connection with paragraph  1  12. 
If you wish to  make  a note of  some  of  the Constitutional sources 
of  military jurisdiction,  the following are most  frequently cited: 
I 
 rants to Congress: Grants to  the President: 
Article 11,  Section 2,  Clauses 1  and  2 
Section 3 
lliscellaneous Grants of  Power: 
Article IV,  Section 4 
Fifth hendment. 
2  Exercise.--The  first subparagraph restates the classic ins%an 
7- 
of  the exercise of  military jurisdiction enumerated by Chief  Justi 
Chase in his dissenting opinion in --  Ex  parte Milligan,  4  Kall 2; 
18  L  Ed  281,  267.  To  the three examples enumerated in  that case; 
namely,  military government,  martial-  law,  and  military lax,  there 
been added in the text a fourth category--the  exercise of  military 
jurisdiction by a government with respect to offenses against the 
of  war.  This does not fall  under any of  the categories enumerated 
by Chief  Justice Chase although it has existed as an exercise of 
military jurisdiction for years.  For  instance,  Captain Wirtz,  the 
Confederate  Commandant  of  Andersonville Prison was  tried and hange 
for  war crimes conlmitted against Union prisoners of war.  See also 
the modern  cases, --  ?!x  pate  Quirin,  317  U.S.  1; --  In re Yamashita, 
327 U.S.  1, and  the various war crimes cases which Kere not inci- 
dents of  military government,  martial  law,  or military law proper. 
As for the exercise of  military jurisdiction by the war  court 
military commissions,  and  provost courts--it  may  be recalled that 
the 1949 Manual  provided: 
"These  tribunals are summary in  nature,  bat so far as 
not otherwise provided have usually been  guided by the 
applicable rules of  procedure and of  evidence prescribed 
for courts-martia1.n 
The  1951 Manual  on  the other hand  provides: 
tf Sub  ject to any applicable rule of  international law 
or to any regulations prescribed by  the President or by 
any other competent authority,  these tribunals will  be 
guided by the applicable principles of  law and rules of 
procedure and evidence prescribed for courts-martial.  11 
This change was  made  in  anticipation of  the ratification of  the 
Geneva Convention  of  August  12,  1949 which will alter to a materia 
extent the procedures  heretofore applied by military commissions, 
partic-&.rly  with resi>ec-L  to tine  trials of  war  criiinals.  Under  t 
preumt 3eneva Convsntion  military war criminals are not entitled 
be Weated as prisoners of  war.  However,  Article 85  of  the new  Gs 
Convention ~elative  to the Treatment  of  Prisoners --  of  War  providez "Frisoners of  war  prosecuted under the law of 
Detaining Powers  for acts committed prior to capture 
shall retain,  even if convicted,  the benefits of the 
present Convention. " 
bong  these benefits is Article 102 which  provides: 
"A  prisoner of  war can be validly sentenced only 
if the sentence has been  pronounced  by the same  courts, 
according to the same procedure as in  the case of  mem- 
bers of  the armed  force of  the Detaining Power  and,  if, 
furthermore the provisions of  the present chapter have 
been  observed ." 
1t  m~uld  thus appear that unless we  are willing to try our own 
personnel who  commit  war  crimes by military commissions under a 
more  summary  procedure than that provided  for courts-martial  and 
under  civil law rules of  evidence--we  will  have  to try  enemy prisoners 
of  war  accused  of  war  crimes under the same  procedure  as that pre- 
scribed  for courts-martial. 
Irrespective of whether  we  use our .own  court-martial  procedure 
or a  more  sumnary one,  certain of the safeguards afforded by the 
convention  exceed those prescribed by the Code  and  the Manual. 
Under  Article 87 a prisoner of war  cannot be 
deprived of  his rank nor can  there be any 
mandatory punishment  prescribed. 
Escape may  be treated only as a  disciplinary 
infraction treated under the Articles of  the 
Convention pertaining to disciplinary punish- 
ment. 
Article 101 prescribes a  substantial waiting 
period before a death penalty may  be  executed. 
Article 103 makes it mandatory that an accused 
be  credited with pretrial confinement on  the 
execution of  any sentence to confinement. 
krti  cle' 105 prescribes considerably longer time 
for a prisoner of war  to prepare for trial  than 
accorded under the code. 
These conve~tions  have not yet been  ratified,  but their ratifi- 
:ation in  some  form is likely.  For  this reason the text of  this 
Iaragraph was  so drafted that it will  not become  obsolete and 
lisleading if and when  the new  conventicns are ratified. In the event the conventions are not ratified,  the President 
other competent  authority may  prescribe other procedures  consisten 
with the present Geneva  Convention.  In the absence of  regulations 
by the President or other competent  authority the trial  procedure 
before military commissions will  be that prescribed in  the Manual. 
Existing regulations promulgated  by military governors  will  not be 
affected until the conventions are ratified. 
The  n&  two agencies through which military jurisdiction is 
exercised--courts-martial  and  commanding  officers--will  be the sub 
of detailed discussion in  other conferences . 
The last agency discussed is Courtsof  Inquiry.  In this subpa 
graph the President has  delegated the power  to promulgate  regulati 
dealing with courts of  inquiry to  the several Secretaries. 
CHAPTERS  I1  A.ND  I11 
Article 16 and this paragraph  will give very little  pause for 
reflection to  Army  and  Air  Force personnel.  We  have the same  thre 
kinds  of  courts-martial.  The  Navy  and  Coast  Guard  will note immed 
ately that the term "deck  court" has  disappeared.  The  deck  court 
has been redesignated the flSunsnary C~urt-Kartial.~~  This may  cause 
some  confusion for a while as that term has  heretofore been  applie 
in  the Naval  service to  the intermediate court which is now  known 
the "Special Court-Martial."  The  compcsition of these courts-mart 
will  be covered in  a later conference. 
Our next topic is---Who  may  convene these courts. 
Convening  authority of  General Court-Kartial .--At  the outset 
muld like to  point out that the term  "appointing authoritytt is  nc 
longer used  and the statutory language of "convening authorityn is 
used throughout the book.  Similarly,  the old Army  term  "reviewing 
authorityn has  acquired an entirely different meaning  and  now  pert 
to  all  authorities who  review courts-martial;  it is not limited tc 
the officer who  convened  the court or his successor in  command. 
Under  Article 22 both the President and the Secretary of  a 
Department  are empowered  Lo  convene. genera  1 courts-martial  (Arti  cl 
22a (1)  (2)).  Both  are empowered to authorize commanding officers 
otEer than those enumerated in  Article 22 to convene general court 
Although  existing authorization by  the Presidept to appoint Genera 
Courts-Eartial  will  remain  effective after 31 May  1951,  it is con- 
templated by each armed  force that new  orders will be promulgated 
empowering  commanding  officers of  certain commands  to convene  such 
courts.  Army  and  Air Force personnel will  note that the power  to 
convene  general courts-martial  is no  longer vested in  a commanding 
officer simply because there is assigned to his staff, a staff jud advocate,  as was  heretofore provided under Article of i%r  8. 
In paragraph Sa(2) it is provided  that when  general court-martial 
jurisdiction is coserred on  a  commanding officer because he is 
empowered  by the President or designated by the Secretary to  convene 
general courts-martial, the convening order will cite such authori- 
zation.  This is a new  provision for the Army  and  Air  Force which was 
taken from  Section 329,  Naval  Courts and  Boards. 
It is to  be emphasized that this is a procedural requirement 
for the convenience of  those charged with the review of  court-martial 
records.  Its omission does not affect the jurisdiction of  the court, 
although such an omission would  be a  violation of one  of  the President's 
procedural regulations.  a 
In this connection it is to be noted that the Manual  contains 
no  provision,  similar to that now  found  in  Section 327,  Naval  Courts 
and  Boards which  provides: 
"As  Naval  courts-martial  are courts of  limited 
jurisdiction,  their records must  show affirmatively 
that they have authority to hear and  determine cases 
coming before them  for tria1.I' 
This provision was  not used in  view of the Supreme  Court's  Decision 
in Givens  v.  Zerbst,  255,  U.  S.  11,  wherein it was  held that as long 
as a jurisdictional  fact exists it may  be proved  upon  collateral 
attack even though  such jurisdictional faci may  not appear in the 
record  of  trial  by  court-martial.  As a matter of  fact one of  the 
points in  Givens v.  Zerbst was  the failure of  the record or convening 
order to show that a post commander  had  been  empowered by the Presi- 
dent  to convene  general courts. 
The  Navy  has applied the rule of  Givens  v.  Zerbst  in a  case 
where  a jurisdictional fact which  in fact existed was  omitted from 
the record (0  No.  1,  19b2,  page  124).  The Army  has  long applied 
this rule (Chi  195867,  Jones,  2  BR  307). 
Paragraph sa(3) and  (4) bring us to a  discussion of  the accuserls 
ineligibility to-convene  a  c0ui.t-martial  for the trial  of  an accused. 
The  Arqy  and the Air Force will  find that the term  flaccuser,  If  as 
defined in  Article l(11) apparently combines  the former  concept of 
'laccuserll and  nprosecutor,M  as used  in Article of  Yar  8. 
Under  the code an accuser is: 
(1)  A  person who  signs the charges;  or 
(2)  A person who  directs that charges nominally be 
signed and  sworn  to  by another;  or (3)  Any  other person who  has an interest,  other 
than an official interest, in  the prosecution 
of the accused. 
This will  not effect any radical change in  Army  and  Air Force prac- 
tice, but it will  affect, to sone extent,  the mast  procedures  of  a 
commanding  officer of  a  Naval  vessel.  Major  Hodson &ll  discuss 
these matters further at  a  later conference. 
rn 
In  paragraph  5a(4) it is stated that whether a  parson who  has 
not signed the charges is the accuser,  is a  question of  fact. 
Purely official action is not,  ordinarily,  sufficient to  make  a 
canmander  an accuser.  For  example:  A  commander may without, 
becoming  an accuser direct a  subordinate to  investigate an alleged 
offense with a  view to formulating such charges as the result of 
the investigation may  warrant.  He  cannot,  however,  without becoming 
an accuser,  order a  subordinate to prefer certain specific charges. 
Paragraph 5a (6) carries over the provisions  of  paragraph Sa, 
MCM,  19h9 relatiqe to  the control which  a  c0nveni.n~  authority may 
lawfully  exercise vrith respect to courts.  See Article 37.  It is 
to  be noted that the convening authority's power  to withdraw charges 
from  a  court at  any time prior to findings is unlimited.  However, 
if he withdraws charges after evidence on the merits has been 
received,  he is likely to  find that jeopardy has attached unless the 
proceedings are terninated on motion of  the accused  or for manifest 
necessity in the interest of  justice.  See Article 44c;  -  paragrsph 
56,  and paragraph 68d.  - 
5b  Convening  authority of Special %urt-Martial .--The  first 
subparagraph invites attention to Article 23a  which lists the com- 
inanding  officer eli.gible to convene  special courts-nartial.  The 
reference to llofficers  in char~e"  as used  here and elsewhere in 
the Manual  has no  application to  the  Army and the Air  Force and 
pertains exclusively to  the Naval  service and the Coast  Guard. 
If you  have had  occasion to read the House  hearings you nay 
remember  that there was  much  discusslon about preserving the 
authority of  Coast  Guard  xarrant officers and petty officers who 
are "officers in charge"  in that armed force.  The  legislative 
history shovs the intefit of the House  Corninittee to  include such 
warrant and  petty officers within the term "officers in  charge" 
in  view of the fact that many  isolated stations are comanded by 
such noncommissioned  officers in charge.  Of  course such person 
will  not be authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury to convene 
any kinds of  courts-martial.  Obviously there is no  occasion for a 
petty officer to convene  a  court-martial  congosed  of  commissioned 
officers.  However,  the Coast- (Guard may  authorize such petty 
I'offizers  in charge" to exercise limited powers  under Article 15. Article 23a (3) confers special court-martial  jurisdiction on a 
cornminding  offizer of  a  "detached battalion" or corresponding unit 
of  the Army.  Article 23a(4)  confers such jurisdiction on  a  com- 
manding  officer of a  "sesrate squadron"  of the Air Force;  and 
Article 23a(6)  confers such  jurisdiction on the commanding  officer 
of  any "separate or detached  comaand  or group of  detached units of 
any of  the araied  forces placed under a  single commander  for the 
purpose."  In paragraph Sb(3) there is a discussion of what  is  meant 
by the terms  "separate1?  aFd  "detached.If  It is  made  clear that these 
terms are used  in a disciplinary sense,  not in  a tactical,  adminis- 
trative,  or physical sense.  Thus,  a  detached  cornnand  for the purpose 
of  convening special courts-martial may  be physica1l.y located across 
the road  from  a higher headquarters and still  Se considered detached. 
Sonversely a  uvft may  be  detayhed  fos tacti  cal purposes,  be located 
miles away  and still not be a  detachment in  the sense of  Article 23. 
In  the Army  and  in the Air Force any question as to  whether a 
unit is or is not a  detached  command  will be finally determined by 
the officer exercising general court-nartial  jurisdiction over the 
comnand.  In the Navy  and  the Coast  Guard  any such question will  be 
finally determined by the flag or general officer in commend  or bjr 
the senior officer present who  designated the detachment. 
Sc  -  Convening  authority of  Sumary ::ourt-Martial.  --Paragraph  5c 
does not effect any substantial change for the Arniy  or the Air  Force. 
As was  heretofore the case,  an accuser is not ineligible to  convene 
'  a summary  court-martial  or to act as a  summary court.  However, 
unless the convening authority is the only officer with a  command, 
he must  appcint a  subordinate as a  summary  court.  This is a  depar- 
ture from the present Naval  practice.  Section 692,  Note  2,  NG & B, 
provides  in  part: 
"An  officer empowered  to order deck courts may  at 
his discretion designate himself as deck court officer, 
irrespective of his rank,  if  commissioned,  and irrespec- 
tive of the rank of other officers attached to his 
command. 
The provision of  Article 24,  which was  derived from Article of Ear 
10,  permits the convening  authority to  designate himself  as the 
summary  court only when  he is the only person present with the com- 
nand . JURISDICTION  OF  OWI'S-PvURTIAL 
8  Source,  nature,  and  requisites of  courtaartial military juris- 
di  &ion.--The  scope of  this paragraph  follows generally that of 
paragraph  7,  Mad  1949.  The  matters covered in Section 329,  NC  &  B, 
as to Convening Authorities are found in  paragraph 5; matters dealinF 
with the composition  of  courts and  their personnel  (section 330, 
NC  &  B) are discussed in  parzigraphs  4 and  6.  The  Statute of Limita- 
tions (which  is not  a jurisdictional matter), noss discussed in  sectic 
332,  NC  ?L  B  will  be  found  in paragraph 68. 
You  will  note that the familiar quotation from Grafton v.  United 
States appears in the third subparagraph of  8.  This expresses the 
doctrine that court-martial  judgments  are not  subject to review by 
civil tribunals except on  the sole question of  whether  the court had 
jurisdiction.  In the last 5  or 10 years there has been  a concerted 
drive to enlarge the scope of collateral review on  the theory that a 
deprivation of  due  process  during the proceedings  divests a  court- 
martial of  jurisdiction. 
Among  the lower  court cases which  have applied this theory to 
the extent of  granting relief are Eclts v.  Eatt, 64  F.  Supp.  328 
and  Shapiro v.  U.  S.,  137 Ct C1 650;  69 F.Supp.  205.  This theory 
is difficult to square with the established doctrine that jurisdic- 
tion to decide includes jurisdiction  to nake  a wrong  as well as a 
fight decision,  (Fauntlero~  v*  Lums  210  U.  S.  230,  234,  235;  Pope 
v.  U.  S.,  323  U.  S.  1, 4).  As pointed  out by the Supreme Court  in 
Carter v.  McClaughry,  183 U.  S.  536: 
It*  k * the sentences of  court-martial,  when  affirned 
by.  the military tribunals of last resort,  cannot be 
revised by the civil courts save only when  void because 
of  an absolute want  of  power,  and  not merely because 
voidable because of  the defective exercise of  the power 
possessed." 
It would,  therefore,  appear that a court which  initially has 
jurisdiction does not  lose jurisdiction by making  an error.  The 
sound view in the Grafton and  Garter cases was  reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court on  13 Karch  1950 in  Brown  v.  Hiatt,  339  U.  S.  103, 
110 wherein Mr.  Justice Clark stated for the court: 
"The  Court  of  Appeals  also concluded  that certain 
errors comqitted  by the military tribunal and  reviewing 
authorities had  deprived  respondent  of  due  process.  l!ie 
think the court was  in error in extending its review, 
for the purpose of  determining ccmyliance with the due 
process  clause,  to  such matters as the propositions of 
law set forth in the staff judge  advocate's report,  the sufficiency of  the evidence to  sustain respondent's  con- 
viction,  the adequacy of  the pretrial investigation,  and 
the competence of the law' member  and  defense counsel.  * * * 
It is well settled that 'by habeas  corpus the civil courts 
exercise no  supervisory or correcting power  over the pro- 
ceedings of a  court-martial. . .  The  single inquiry, the 
test, is jurisdiction.'  --  In re Grimley,  137,  U.S.  147,  150 
(1890).  In this case the court-martial  had  jurisdiction of 
the person accused  and  the offense charged,  and  acted 
within its lawful powers.  The  correction of any errors it 
may have  committed is for thq military authorities which 
are alone authorized to review its decision." 
This is strong language,  but lest we  be inclined to relax too much 
in the security of  our citadel, I must  invite your attention to 
the language of  Mr.  Justice Douglas  in  lfihelchel v.  McDonald, 340  U.S. 
122,  decided  on  December 4,  1950 in  which  he said: 
"We put to  one side the due  process issue wEch 
respondent  presses,  for we  think it plain from the law 
governing court-martial  procedure that there must  be 
afforded a defendant  at some point of  time an oppor- 
tuni-ty to  tender the issue of  insanity.  It is only a 
denial of  that opportunity which  goes  to  the question 
of  jurisdiction.  That opportunity was  afforded here. 
Any  error that may  be codtted in evaluating the evi- 
dence tendered.is beyond  the reach of review by the 
civil courts ." 
This seems  again to  open  the door of the citadel to the assault 
of  those who  believe that a  procedural deviation of a court-martial 
might  affect the jurisdiction of  the court and  deprive it of  juris- 
diction.  The moral seems  to be that so long as the military  services 
accord accused persons a  fafr trial  according to military due process, 
the Supreme  Court rill adhere to its traditional view as to the scope 
of  collateral revim of  court-martial  judgment;  but if it finds a 
series of  cases which  shocks its conscience, it  may  adopt another 
approach to  the problem. 
In the last subparagraph the provisions of  Article 76 with 
respect to finality of  court-martial  judgments  are restated.  .  Ws 
is comparable to the language of  Article of  ?ar Soh  -  and the last 
provision in Article of War 53. 
The  Army  and  Air  Force have never taken the view that the 
finality of  court-martial  judgments  as provided  in the Articles of 
War  operates to preclude collateral attack on  jurisdictional grounds. 
This view has  recently been  specifically affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gusik  v.  Schilder,  340 U.S.  128,  decided on  4  December  1950. 
The  Gusik  case also stands for the proposition,  which  you  will  find  - 
in  paragraph 24b, to  the effect that the Federal courts mill  not 
entertain petitions for a writ of habeas  corpus  until the accused 
has  exhausted his military remedies  for an appeal and  for a petition 
for a new  trial. 
In the fifth subparagraph it is stated that jurisdiction does 
not in general depend  upon where  the offense was  committed.  To  this 
proposition there is an apparent qualification.  If an offense were 
triable by  court-martial  only under the Crimes and  Offenses not 
Capital clause of  Article 134,  such offense must  have been  committed 
within the boundaries  of  the jurisdiction in which  the act is a crime.. 
In this paragraph it is also stated that jurisdiction as to 
offenses against military law is not affected by the place where the 
court sits.  Thus  a court-~artial  does  not have to sit or remain 
within the Territorial command  of the convening authority.  See 
Durant  v.  Hiatt,  81  F.  Supp.  948,  affirmed 177 F.  2d  373.  It might 
also happen that the personnel of a court vrill be transferred from 
the comrca~d  of  the officer who  convened  the court after a case had 
been  referred to it for trial.  This  also does not divest thescourt 
of  jurisdiction.  See WI  316193,  Holstein,  65 BR  271,  275. 
A  different problem may  be presented in  those cases in  which  a 
general court-martial derives its jurisdiction under the law of  war 
as a substitute for a military commission.  Such a tribunal,  particu- 
larly when it sits as a substitute for a local court in enforcing 
the law of  occupied territory, is generally required to sit in  such 
occupied territory.  If it enforces the law of  war it is generally 
required to sit in  the theater of  war  or in the country in  which  the 
offense took place.  This rule will  be perpetuated by Article 66 of 
the Geneva  Convention of 12 August  1949 relative to the protection 
of  civilians.  Compare,  however,  with Ex  parte Wrin, 317,  U.  S.  1. 
Before  going to  the next  subject, I would  like to invite the 
attention of  the Navy  officers to the omission  of the provisions of 
Section 327,  NC  & E,  which  provided: 
Ilk  particular court-martial  has  authority to try 
men  specifically ordered by it and  has no  authority to 
try  a man  ordered tried before another court." 
The  Boards  of  Review have consistently held that approval of  a 
sentence by the proper convening authority effects a ratification of 
the trial  by a  court other than one to  which  the case had  been 
referred.  Thus  if charges are tried by Court  B,  although they had been referred to the trial counsel of  Court  A,  appointed by the same 
convening  authority,  the error of trial  by the vrrong  court is  cured 
by the convening authorityls ratification.  This error,  moreover,  is 
one of  those procedural  errors dealing with references for trial 
which  are waived  by failure to object prior to plea  (paragraph 69). 
Jurisdiction as to  persons.--Time  does  not here permit a detailed 
discussion of  each  category of  persons  subject to the code  under 
Article 2. 
It is to be noted that Article 2  is not the only statutory pro- 
vision which  confers jurisdiction of the person.  Many  of  these 
additional provisions will be discussed in connection with para- 
graph 11. 
Termination  of  jurisdiction.--Paragraph  lla  -  states the general 
rule as to termination of  jurisdiction,  namely: 
"The  general rule is that court-martial  jurisdiction 
over officers,  cadets,  midshipmen,  warrant officers, 
enlisted persons,  and  other persons subject to the code 
ceases on  discharge from  the service or other termination 
of  such status and  that jurisdiction  as to an offense com- 
mitted during a period of  service or status thus terminated 
is  not revived by reentry into the military service or 
return into such  status." 
This is consistent with the Army precedents of over 100 years standing 
and with the opinion of the United  States Supreme Court in  U.  S.  Ex 
re1 Hirschberg v.  Cooke,  336  U.  S.  210  (1949).  To  this general rule 
there are many  exceptions: 
Under  Article 3a  persons who  have been  discharged or separated 
from their military gtatus but who  have  committed  serious offenses 
against the code while they were in  a status subject thereto,  and 
for which  they cannot be punished  in a state, territory,  or Federal 
court,  remain  liabie  to trial  by court-martial. 
As you  can see,  jurisdiction in  such a  case depends  upon  so many 
factors'and is subject to such serious impact  on the civilian popula- 
tion that it should not be  exercised without the serious legal 
consideration of the Judge Advocate  General and  the policy consider- 
ation of  the Secretary of  a Department.  Accordingly,  the President 
has  directed that jurisdicti.on under Article 3a  will not be exercised 
aithout the consent  of  the Secretary of a  ~e~aFtrnent. Perhaps the most  difficult single jurisdictional fact to  be 
established under Article 3a  mith respect to offenses  committed 
overseas,  is that the offense is not punishable by  a civil court. 
If the offense can be punished  by any civil court of  the United 
States,  any of its States,  Territories,  District of  Columbia,  a 
court-martial  lacks jurisdiction. 
Many  offenses  against Federal law have no  territorial limita- 
tion.  You  will  find a discussion of  such offenses in  paragraph 
213c under the Crimes  and  Offenses  Not  Capital Clause of Article 
1347  In general it may  be said that offenses directly injurious to 
the operation of  Government,  such as various frauds against the 
Government,  counterfeiting,  treason,  etc.,  are punishable by a 
.  Federal court without regard to where  committed.  See U.  S.  v. 
Boman,  260  U.  S.  94,  in  which it was  held that a U.  S.  District 
Court  had  jurisdiction over an alleged conspiracy to  defraud the 
United  States which took place in  the city (not the harbor) of 
Rio  de Janeiro.  Then,  too,  various offenses are applicable in  the 
Special Maritime and  Territorial Jurisdiction of the United  States 
as defined in 18 USC  7. 
Another  exception to the general  rule is that all  persons in 
the custody of  an armed  force serving sentences imposed  by  courts- 
martial renain subject to  military law  (~rt.  2  (7)).  If you  compare 
this with ~rticle  of !G$r  2e you ell note that a prisoner with an  . 
executed puetive discharge who  is comitted to a Federal institution 
ceases to be subject to military law. 
A  third exception involves persons who  have obtained their 
discharge by  fraud (drticle 3b).  But before the person alleged to 
have  obtained his discharge by fraud may  be tried for an offense 
committed prior to his fraudulent discharge under this exception, 
he  must  be tried and  convicted of a violation of  Article 83(2). 
Therefore,  the code  requires two  trials in such a  case. 
The  fourth exception to the general rule involves deserters who 
have  obtained a  discharge after a fraudulent enli.stment (Article 3c).  - 
The  fifth exception stated in  the Manual  is  a somewhat  detailed 
discussion of  the proposition that uninterrupted status as a person 
subject to  military law in one capacity or another does not terminate 
jurisdiction.  One  reason for this elaboration over the 1949 text was 
the tendency  of  some lawyers to read  into the Xerschberg  case a 
proposition which was  not before the Supreme Court.  In the Hirschberg 
case there mas  a definite,  although brief,  hiatus.  The  examples  in 
the text are cases where  there is no  hiatus but merely a  change in 
particular status within the general status of  being  a person  subject to  military law.  The  case of  persons discharged for the conveni- 
ence of  the Government  for the purpose of reenlisting and  of  persons 
going from the status of being members  of  the armed  force to that 
of  persons accompanying  the armed  force without the territorial 
jurisdiction  of the United States were  distinguished  from the 
Herschberg  case by the Army  Board  of Review and  by the Judicial 
Council in CM 337089,  Aikins,  Seevers,  5  BRJC 311. 
I would  also like to speak briefly about the jurisdiction of 
courts-martial  upon  a new  trial under Article 73 or Section 12. 
A  person who  petitions for a new  trial  after jurisdiction has  other- 
wise terminated voluntarily submits himself  to the jurisdiction of 
a  court-martial  in accordance with an act of  Congress.  If after a 
court-martial  has  been  ordered,  the petitioner should  change his 
mind  and  decide that he does not wish to stand trial, he  may  never- 
theless be picked  up  by military authorities and  held for trial as 
though he were a person  subject to military law under Article 2. 
lc  '  -  Effect of  voluntary absence from trial.--The  comparable 
paragraph of El$  1949 stated that escape after arraignment would 
not  divest the court of  jurisdiction.  This  language  caused  some 
difTiculty  in cases where the accused was  absent  . without authority 
from  trial althou~h  not  under  circumstances amounting  to escape. 
In Sp  134 1213,  ~oilin~s,  5  BR-JC  465  the accused went  absent kthout 
leave after '  arraignment.  An  overly na.rrow construction of  the word 
I1escape" would  have  resulted h  an- absurd  situation.  The  Boar? of 
Review  construed paragraph  10,  MCM 19b9,  consistent1.y with Rule 43 
of  the Federal rules of  criminal procedure which  provides in  part: 
'I*  * * in prosecution for offense not punishable 
by death,  the defendant's voluntary absence. after the 
trial  has been commenced  in  his presence shall not 
prevent continuing the trial  to and  including the 
return of the verdict." 
It is to  be noted that Rule 43 does  not permit the trial  to continue 
in the absence of the accused  in a  capital case.  In military; prac- 
tice,  however,  no  such distinction between  capital and  non-capital 
cases has been made.  Ninthrop  in a note on  page 393  cites the trial 
by -military comission of  H.  H.  Dodd  in Indiana in  1864: 
"Upon  trial  by military commission  of    odd  and 
others in Indiana,  1864,  the court,  in  the absence of 
Dodd  who  had. escaped,  sentenced him  to death and  its 
action was  duly approved by the reviewing authority." 
The new  portion of  the text dealing with this subject is patterned 
after Rule 43  except that no  distinction is made  between  capital and 
non-capital  cases. 12  Elxclusive and non-exclusive  jurisdiction.--In  the first 
subparagraph it is stated that courts-martial  have  exclusive 
jurisdiction of purely military off  ens  es .  By  purely military 
offenses are meant  those offenses which  are not  generally 
denounced  by a  civil system of  justice.  They are such offenses 
as absence without leave,  desertion,  disrespect towards  officers, 
willful disobedience of  officers,  and  similar offenses of  a 
military character.  An  off  ens e is not  ftpurely  militaryft  merely 
because it happens  to  be denounced  in one of the punitive article 
!Kth  respect to offenses of  a  civil nature,  courts-martial  and 
civil tribunals, both State and  Federal,  have  concurrent  jurisdic 
tion.  .As a matter of  comity the jurisdiction which  first attache 
in  any case is, generally,  entitled to proceed. 
3 
The  third subparagraph is identical to the comparable discus 
in paragraph 11,  NICM  1949.  It is based upon  the rule of  Inter- 
national Lam stated by  Chief  Justice Marshall in Schooner  Exchang 
v.  McFadden,  7  Cranch 116 and  Chung  Shi Chiung  v.  The  Xing  /I9397 
A.  C.  160/.  It is to be noted that although a visiting s&zreign 
has the Fight to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over his troops 
who  are by  consent in  a foreign country,  the visiting sovereign m 
waive this right either expressly or by  failing to assert it. 
In the fourth subparagraph there is restated the provisions 
Article 21 which  save the concurrent  jurisdiction of  the war cour 
military commissions  and provost  courts--with  courts-martial. 
Articles 104,  Ithiding the Enemy,"  and  106,  ItSpiesyn  are the only 
articles in  which the express provkion for concurrent jurisdicti 
is made.  Nevertheless,  it does  not  follow that military comnissi 
cannot try  persons  subject to  military law for other offenses 
denounced by the code if  such offenses  are also violations of  the 
law of war  or in  the case of  civilians subject to the code,  for 
violations of the criiinal law of  occupied territory.  In Clh  3370 
-4Y~ins,  Seevers,  5  BR-JC  311,  the Amy  Judicial Council indicated 
-soldiers  may  be  tried by military commissions  under the law 
war  for violations of  the laws  of  war.  In connection with the co 
current jurisdiction of  military com~ssions,  the testimony of 
General Fnoch  Crc~der,  Judge Advocate  General of  the Army,  with 
respect to Article of  !Tar:  15 (which is identical to Article 21 of 
the code) is significant.  In 1915 he  said: 
"Article 15 is new.  'lie  have  included in  Article 2 
as subject to military law a number  of persons who  are 
also subject to trial  by military commissions  hersons 
accompanying  the Armies in  the field7.  A  mili%ary com- 
mission is our common  law war  court:  It has  no  statutory 
existmce,  though it is recognized by statute law.  As 
long as the articles embodied  them  in  the designation 'persons  subject to  military lawt and provided that they 
might  be  tried by courts-martial,  I was  afraid that,  having 
made  a  special provision  for tneir trial by  court-martial 
(Arts.  12, 13,  lk) ,  it might  be held that the provision 
operated to exclude trials by military commission and other 
war courts;  so  the new  article was  introduced v  36  *.  It 
just  saves the war  courts the jurisdiction they now  have 
and makes  concurrent a  .jurisdiction with court-martial,  so 
that the military commander  in  the field in time  of  war 
will be at  liberty to employ  either form of  court that 
happens  to be  convenient  -:6  #. *"  (~ouse  Report 130,  64th 
Congress,  1st Session,  page  LO) 
It is to be  noted that a military corrrmission  does not have 
jurisdiction of  a purely militav offinse  (CM  318380,  Yabusaki, 
67  BR  265)- 
Reciprocal  ---  jurisdiction.--Under  Article 17,  and  sub  j ect to a 
regulation of  the Pre&dPlnt,  each armed  service has jurisdiction 
o6r  arpersons subject to the code.  The  President's regulations 
are  found  in paragraph 13.  The  general policy is that reciprocal 
jurisdiction  should be exercised only when  the accused cannot be 
turned over to his own  armed  force without manifest  injury to the 
service.  Subject to this general policy,  reciprocal  jurisdiction 
may  be exercised as follows: 
(1)  By  a commander  of  a joint command  or  joint task force 
who  has been  expressly autltlorized by  the President or 
by the Secretary of  Defense  to try members  of  other 
services. 
(2)  Such a commander  of  a  joint command  may in turn author- 
ize commanders of  subordinate joint task forces to 
convene  special.  and summary c  ourts-martial  cases with 
respect to members  of  other armed forces under  their 
respective cormand under such regulations as the 
superior comander may  prescribe.  The  superior may 
limit  the kinds and types of  cases which  may  be tried 
under  subordinate reciprocal jurisdiction.  In view 
of  the superior commander 1s  familiarity with the 
status of  discipline and morale of his joint command, 
he  will  be  in the best position to  determine to what 
extent such reciprocal jurisdiction should be  exercised. 
Note  that any restriction on  the exercise of  jurisdiction by  one 
armed  force over  the personnel of  another armed force pertains only 
to military personnel.  Civilians subject to the code under  Article 
2  (lo),  (ll),  and  (12)  are not "members"  of  an  armed force and may 
be  tried by  any armed  force irrespective of  which  force they may  be 
accompanying or s  erving. Joint or canllon  trials involving members  of  different armed 
forces are discouraged.  In paragraph kg it is provided  that at 
least a majority of  the members  of the zourt should be members  of 
the accused's  own  service.  It would  be a difficult mathematical 
feat to  provide a majority of members  of  the armed  services of  each 
accused in  a joint  or common  trial  where the accused are members  of 
different services. 
kg  Composition  of courts-martial  for reciprocal jurisdiction. --In 
paragraph  4g are stated the rules for the composition of  courts- 
martial for-the  exercise of  recripocal jurisdiction. 
The  first rule of policy is that members  of  courts-martial 
should be members  of  the accused's  own  service.  %'hen reciprocal 
jurisdiction is exercised,  the convemng authority should exhaust 
all  reasonable means  for securing as members  of  the court personnel 
of  the accused's  om service.  This policy is applicable to  members 
of  courts-martial  only,  not to counsel or to the law officer. 
If,  for any sound  reason,  it is  impossible to convene  a court, 
all  of whose  members  are members  of the accused's  service,  at least 
a majority of the members  should be members  of the accusedls armed 
force unless exigent circumstances render it impracticable to  obtai~ 
such members  without manifest injury to the service. 
In order to implement  the policy of  4;(1),  commanders  of  joint 
commands  and  joint task forces who  may  exercise reciprocal juris- 
diction may  appoint as members  of courts-martial  any members  of 
their command  who  are members  of the accused's  armed  force.  This 
subparagraph also provides that when  reciprocal jurisdiction is 
exercised by a subordinate  commander the superior commander  should 
make  available to such subordinates members  of the accused's  armed 
force in  order that  the court may  be constituted in  accordance ~6th 
the policy stated in  bg(1).  - 
In extremely rare cases it may  be necessary to constitute mixec 
courts for cases other than those in  which the exercise of reciproc! 
jurisdiction is involved.  Such a situation might  arise from the 
absence of  eligible persons vrithin the command  in  which  the court i: 
convened.  For example there might  be an absence of  eligible enlist1 
men  within the command,  although enlisted men  of  ancther a6ed forc' 
may  be  reasonably available,  or it might  be  necessary to borrow a 
law officer or counsel  for the trial of  the case. 
In such cases,  the mutual  concurrence of  the Secretaries of thc 
Departments  concerned is required before manbers  of  other armed 
forces may  be borrowed  for court-mrtial  duty.  This does not requil 
specific avthority for each case.  A  general authority covering the particular local situation will  be sufficient . When  the Secretaries 
have agreed to  permit  such a borrowing  of personnel,  the appointment 
of personnel for the trial of  cases is to be made  from members  made 
available for this purpose by  their om commanding  officers. 
l4  Jurisdiction.of general courts-martial.--a.  Persons and 
offenses.--General  courts-martial  are the only twes of courts- 
martial which  have  jurisdiction as to  persons" ani-  offenses other 
than those specifically provided  by the Uniform  Code  of Military 
Justice.  As stated before they have  concurrent  jurisdiction with 
military tribunals to try any person who  by the law of war  is sub- 
ject to  trial  by  military tribunals.  Under  the law of war  they 
have  jurisdiction to  try  two  classes of  cases: 
(1)  Violations of the law of  war.  This included 
not  only war  crimes as that term has been 
defined and  ljnited to  crimes  committed  against 
citizens of  another state,  enemy  or neutral, 
while there are subsisting in  the field,  forces 
capable of  ejecting the occupant  or belligerent, 
but it also includes offenses against the 
civilian population of an area  under hostile 
occuwation after unconditional surrender.  See 
CM 57089,  Aikins,  Seevers. Under  this clause 
there is noquestionmenibers  of  our armed 
forces may  be tried for violations of the law 
of  war,  either by military tribunals or general 
courts-martial. 
(2)  The  other classes of cases are "crimes  and 
offenses against the law of territory occupied 
as an incident of  war  or belligerency whenever 
the local civilian authority is superseded in 
whole  or in  part by the military authority of 
the occupying power."  With respect to this 
type of  jurisdiction the 1949 Manual apparently 
contemplated  only occupied  enemy territory. 
This was,  perhaps,  too restrictive because 
under the law of war  a belligerent may  establish 
military government  in  neutral territory which 
becomes  a battleground as well as in  the terri- 
tory of  a friendly ally under  similar circun- 
stances.  The  United  States Manual  of  Civil 
-  Affairs,  Military Ckwernment,  FM 27-5,  OPNAV 
50E-3  recognizes that military governnent  and 
occupation is not limited to enemy  territory and  further that such occupation is governed by  the 
rules of international law and  the established cus- 
toms  of  war. 
The t  exb  provides  for concurrent  jurisdiction of  general 
courts-martial  with respect to offenses against the law of 
territory occupied as an incident of war  or belligerency.  The 
distinction between  war  and belligerency is made  to provide for 
application of the principles of this paragraph  to occupation 
incidental to undeclared war,  rebellion wherein the rebels are 
recognized as belligerents,  occupation after unconditio~al 
surrender (although not an incident of  belligerency,  hostile 
occupation remains an incident of  war),  and  formal military 
hostilities. 
The  scope of this paragraph  does not include occupation 
pursuant to a peacetime agreement  or other peaceful occupation 
since the law of war is not involved in such  cases. 
Punishments.--Article  18 provides that when  a  general  court- 
rnartial tries a person pursuant  to the law of  war,  it  may  adjudge 
any punishment  permitted by the law of  war.  Some  of the Limitations 
on punishments prescribcd by the Geneva  Convention of  27 July 1929 
are listed as notes under Article 18 in  appendix 2.  If the 12 August 
1949 Convention is ratified, it  will  replace the conventions  listed 
in  the notes.  It is contemplated that appropriate articles of the 
new  convention will  be included in the Cumulative  Pocket  Supplement, 
Jurisdiction of s~ecial  courts-martial.--a.  Persons  and  I  - - -  -  - -.  -  -  - - -  -  ~.  -  -  - 
offenses.--Special  courts-martial  have  jurisdiction over all  persons 
subject to military law for non-capital  offenses.  They  also have 
respect to jurisdiction over capital offenses,  the general rule is 
that an officer exercising general court-rartial  jurisdiction may 
cause a  capital offense except one  for which  a mandatory sentence 
beyond  the jurisdiction  of  a special court-martial  to  adjudge to b 
tried by a special court-martial.  The  Secretary of  a Department 
may  modify this rule.  It is not now  contemplated  that the Army  or 
the Air  Force will  relax it, but the Navy  and  the Coast  Guard  will 
probably authorize officers exercising special court-martial  juris 
diction to  refer capital offenses except those in  violation of 
Articles 106 and  118(1),  (41,  to a  special court-martial without 
obtaining the consent of  the officer exercising general court-mart 
jurisdiction.  This  rule may  be adopted by the Navy  and  the Coast 
Guard  because ships at sea might  not have any convenient method  of 
referring such matters to  the officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction. 
jurisdiction for capital offenses under certain circumstances.  With1 This paragraph enumerates  the offenses which are capital at 
all times,  and  those which are capital in time  of  war  only.  To 
constitute "time  of  warn it is  not necessary that there be  a formal 
declaration  War  may  be  formally declared or it may consist of 
subsisting hostilities between  two  or more  nations or subdivisions 
of  nations,  either general,  or limited as to area,  places,  and 
things.  See  The  Eliza,  Bas  v.  Tingey,  4 Dallas  37,  1  L.  Ed.  731; 
Prize cases,67~.  S.  6S5; Hamilton v.  McClaughery,  136 F.  445. 
The  mere  fact that an article of  the code makes  an  offense 
punishable by  death does  not necessarily mean  that it is  a  capital 
offense within the meaning  of  Article 19. 
(1)  It is  not capital if the maximum  punishment 
authorized by  the President is  less than death; 
or 
(2)  If, for the purpose  of  making  a  deposition 
admissible,  an  officer competent  to refer a 
capital case to trial declares it to be  non- 
capital pursuant  to Article 49;  or 
(3)  If, on  a  rehearing-  or new  trial, a sentence 
less than death had  been  adjudged at  the 
prior hearing  or trial. 
15b  -  Punishments.--One  of  the matters to be  noted with respect to 
the punitive power  of  a special court-martial  is that it may  not 
adjudge forfeitures in  excess  of  two-thirds  pay per month  for six 
months.  Therefore,  even if a bad  conduct  discharge is  adjudged 
by  a special courLmartial,  the maximum  forfeiture which may  be 
adjudged is  two-thirds  pay per month  for six months. 
16  Jurisdiction of  summary  courts-martial.--Persona,  and  " 
offenses.--971th  respect.to the jurisdiction of  summary  courts- 
martial as to persons and  offenses the code  provides one 
substantial change  insofar as the Army  and Air  Force are con- 
cerned.  Under Article 20  every person subject to trial by 
summary  courts-martial  may  object to such trial and  demand 
trial by  a higher court with one  exception.  This  exception 
is that persons  who  have  refused punishment  under Article 15 
may  be  tried by  summary court-martial  even if they object.  It 
is also to  be  noted that paragraph 16a extends the principles 
of  paragraph  15a(2) and  (3) with respect to what  is a  capital 
offense to the Turisdiction of  summary courts-martial. 
16b  -  Punishments.--The  power  to adjudge a  reduction to an inter- 
mediate  grade is  new  to the 4my.and Air  Force.  It ia to  be  noted that a  summary court-martial  roay not adjudge reduction in a case 
of  a noncommissioned officer or  petty officer above the 4th pay 
grade except to the next  inferior grade,  rnr  may it adjudge con- 
finement  or hard labor ~Lthout  confinement in  a  case of  such  a 
noncommissioned officer because  such a  sentence would automati- 
cally result in  a reduction to the lowest grade. Conference No,  2 
APPOIN-T,  PERSONNEL OF COURTS-BI[ARTKAL 
Conducted  by 
MAJOR ROaR M.  CURRIFB 
References:  Paragraphs  3,  ha  through f, 6,  7,  36-51 
and  Zppendix 4 
39  Classification of  courts-martial.--All  the services now  have 
4b  three types of  courts-martial  classified as general courts-martial,  -  consisting of  a law officer and  at least five members,  special 
courts-martial  consisting of  at  least three members,  and  sumnary 
courts-martial consisting of  one officer.  nBO  of these terms  are 
new  to the Navy  and  Coast  Guard-the  special court replacing the 
former  summary  court of  those services and  the sumnary court taking 
the place of  the deck  court. 
k  Composition,--This  paragraph  sets forth the provisions of 
~rticle  25 as to who  may  be appointed and  serve as members  of 
courts.  Generally this includes any person on  active duty with 
an armed  force as defined in  the paragraph.  As the word  %ithI1 
instead of  the word  "inn  was used  in  the article, personnel of 
the Coast and  Geodetic  Survey and  Fublic  Health Service may  be 
included as eligible for appointment to courts-martial when 
assigned to and  serving with an armed, force.  This is in  accord 
with Navy  practice  (NC  & B,  par.  347). 
Although  no  distinction is  made  among  various classes of 
armed  forces members,  the next  subparagraph points out  certain 
disqualifications of  such members.  Availability of other persons 
may  be  restricted by  departmental regulations.  For  example,  in 
the Am,  AR-60-5 restricts the appointment  of chaplains,  This 
is not the case in the Navy, 
In the case of  enlisted men,  wen if requested by an accused, 
they may  not serve if they are members  of  the same  unit as the 
accused.  Since a  definition of  the word  "unitH  involves jurisdic- 
tional matter,  departmental definitions were included in the text. kc  The  subparagraph on rank  of  members  follows generally Ma,  - 
1949,  as modified by Article 25.  Following  certain  Navy  practices, 
the paragraph  includes a direction that the senior member  of a 
general or special court should be  an officer with the rank  of 
lieutenant of the Navy  or Coast  Guard  or captain of  the Army,  Air 
Force,  or Marine  Corps.  This provision also avoids a possibility 
of  courts being composed  entirely of  warrant officers or enlisted 
persons.  Another  policy is announced-that  a smary  court should 
be an officer with the rank of  captain in the Armyy  Air  Force,  or 
Marine  Corps or lieutenant  in the Navy  or Coast  Guard.  Thus  the 
former Army policy of appointing field grade officers as summary 
courts is changed to conform to present Navy  policy,  The  other 
change from MCM,  1949,  as required by the code is a  provision for 
proceeding to  trial  without enlisted persons if they are not avail- 
able and  cannot  be made  available without injury to the service. 
An  example of this is where a  court appointed on  board  a Navy ship 
at sea  could  not possibly have  enlisted men  as members  because under 
the Navy  definition of  %nitN, all  enlisted persons aboard  the ship 
are members  of  the same  unit,  When  such a  case arises the convening 
authority must  attach a detailed written statement concerning the 
unavailability of  enlisted persons and  attach the statement to  the 
record  of  trial.  The  strong legislative intent underlying this 
requirement is contained in  the House  Hearings  in  which  Mr.  Larkin 
stated: 
aWm  we intend that that be part of  the legislative 
history as instructions to commanders  and  the people that 
write the manual that it would  only be  in the most  excep- 
tional type  of  case that they muld  proceed  and it would 
only be after the commander  writes a statement of the 
conditions he  has  faced whlch  made it impossible for him 
to  obtain enlisted men  and  the statement is to go with the 
record.  So it will not just be arbitrary or capricious 
convenience of  his which  he  could  adopt in order to avoid 
using enlisted men  in  the event he was  the type of  comnder 
who  wasn't  sympathetic with this provision." 
(~earings  on  HR  2498,  House  Armed  Services 
Committee,  pages  ll5O - 1151) 
The  next subparagraph  contains a  direction that convening 
authorities shall appoint mmbers who  are qualified for duty by 
reason of age,  experience,  length of  service,  and temperament.  It 
may be noted  that a requirement for certain years of  service has  { 
been  deleted from the code and  also the manual.  Experienced  persons 
will always be available in  peace time,  but in time of  war,  years of 
service requirements tend to dif  f idt  administration . Language  has 
been  added  suggesting that in  certain types of  special court cases 
a  convening authority should  give  serious consideration to appointi 
a qualified lawyer as a member  of  the court. The  statutory requirements for the qualifications of  law 
officers are recited in the first'subparagraph.  They are appointed 
for general courts only,  and must  be an officer on active duty,  a 
manber  of  the bar of  a Federal court,, or the Mghest court of  a 
State,  and  certified as qualified by the. appropfiate Judge Advocate 
General.  Relative to such certification,  the fact than an officer 
is certified as a  law member  under  the articles of  war,  does not 
qualify him  to act as a law officer within the purview  of Article 
26.  He  must be certified under  the uniform  code.  In  the Army, 
SR 605-175-10,  27 February 1951, sets forth the procedures to be 
followed to obtain such certification.  It should be noted  that 
new  qualification forms must be accomplished by all  qualified 
officers except  officers  of  the Judge Advocate  General's  Corps. 
Disqualifications are next stated.  The  person  cannot be the 
accuser,  a witness for the prosecution,  or the investigating 
officer or counsel in  the same case.  In this connection an officer 
who  has  served as a member  of a court should  not be  appointed  law 
officer of  another court  involving the same  case.  Certainly an 
officer who  has sat as a member  of  a courtjand therefore necessarily 
arrived at  some  conclusion on  the facts,  should not be appointed Lo 
act in the capacity of  a judge  in  another hearing of  the same  case. 
Having  served as law  officer in  the same  case  might  render an 
appointed law officer subject to a challenge for cause. 
. 
4L  'his deals with appointment  of law  officers and  members  of differ- 
ent units of  the  eame  anned  force.  Such appointment8  to membership of 
courts have  occurred  frequently in the Amy.  Any  convening authority 
may  appoint member9  of  other coaunanda  of  the  aame  armed farce  to courts- 
martial provided  a  concurrence  of  the other commander  involved is 
obtained.  This  concurrence  may  be  oral  and  need not be  shorn  in the 
appointing order.  The  appearance  of a member  or law  officer from 
another  command  at a  reseion of a court is evidence  of  the  concurrence 
of  the commander  concerned  in the appointment. 
6a  -  Let  us turn now  to  the appointment  of  counsel.  Paragraph  6a 
restates the general statutory provisions and  disqualifications For 
prior participation stated in  Art.  27a.  A  clarifying statement is 
added to cover the borderline situaticns of  prior participation of 
a member  of the prosecution or defense within the meaning of the 
statutory disqualification.  In at  least one recent  case the problem 
presented was  whether an officer who  was  the appointed defense 
counsel of  a court to which  a case had  been referred,  but who  stated 
in open  court that he had  taken no  actual part in  the preparation of 
the case for trial, was  qualified to  act as trial judge  advocate in 
the trial of  that case.  The  case was  held legally sufficient on the 
grounds  that the officer had  not acted for the defense.  This view 
is supported by  Harvey v.  2uppan,'Wed.  Supp.  574,  a habeas  corpus proceeding wherein it was  held that the accused  could not  complain 
because the trial judge  advocate upon  a  rehearing had  been nomin- 
ally  an assistant defense counsel at  the former trial, but where  he 
took no  part in the preparation or trial of the former case. 
Nevertheless one may  presume that an appointed  defense counsel 
will  have performed  his duty of  beginning the preparation of  the 
defense at  the earliest possible time,  or that at least he  has 
directed an assistant to do  this.  Consequently,  prima  facie he  - 
should be presumed  to have acted for the defense and  if he  didn't 
the record should show his non  action affirmatively.  In a recent 
application for a new  trial,  The  Judge Advocate  General of  the Army 
granted relief because the allied papers showed  that the trial j'udge 
advocate,  who  had  previously been the defense counsel,  had  in fact 
done something as defense counsel although the record was  silent on 
the subject (~emorandum  Opinion,  Application for New  Trial, 
260159,  ~evine). 
The first subparagraph restates the statutory requirements  for 
legal qualifications of  trial counsel and  defense  counsel before a 
general court-martial as stated in Article 27(b). 
The  second subparagraph defines the terms  njudge advocaten and 
specialistsn as used  in Article 27(b)(l),  The definition of  an 
army  judge  advocate is  taken from  BbC3.4  1949,  par,  0.  It is to be 
noted  that regular officers detailed in the Judge Advocate  General's 
Corps are not included.  Such detailed officers will  have  to be 
members  of  the bar of  an appropriate court in order to qualify. 
The  Air Force definition is taken from Public Law  775,  80th Congress 
and  the Air  Force preface to  X[=h9  1949,  The  definition of  'Ilaw 
specialisttt is taken from Article l(13) of  the code.  The  conclusion 
of  qualification by  virtue of  certification by  the Judge Advocate 
General is in accord Pdth the present Army practice for showing the 
qualifications of  Law Members.  (Appendix 2,  I&%  19493  It is to  be 
noted that the statute authorizes any person who  is qualified to 
act as counsel.  Under  certain circumstances, 'Warrant  Officers, 
enlisted persons  and  civilians could be appointed counsel,  The  Army, 
however,  in  SR 605-175-10,  dealing with certifications of law offi- 
cers and trial and  defense counsel,  has  indicated that only officers 
will  be certified by the Judge Advocate  General. 
As to qualifications of  counsel of  special courts-martial,  the 
word  tlofficerlt  instead of  tlpersontt  has  been  used  in the text, 
affirmatively limiting the class of  persons to be appointed as 
counsel of  inferior courts. 
Since requirements for legal qualifications of  counsel before 
special courts-martial exist only when  the trial counsel is fully 
qualified, it is stated that any officer not otherwise disqualified is competent to act as trial counsel or defense counsel of  a special 
The  remainder of  the first subparagraph states the 
statutory provisions for equalization of  representation for the 
defense (Article 2%).  - 
6d  This  paragraph provides  for equalhation of  representation for  -  the defense in the situation where the conduct of  the prosecution or 
defense devolves upon  an assistant. 
It is to  be noted  that Articles 38d  and  e permit  assistants who 
are not  qualified as required by '~rticlg  27 tz take an active part 
in a trial only under  the direction of the trial counsel or the 
defense counsel. 
In general court-martial cases,  therefore,  if the conduct  of 
either side devolves upon  an assistant (i.e.,  when  the counsel is 
absent) such assistant must  be legally qualified. 
In a  special court-martial,  if  the officer conducting the 
prosecution is not a  lawyer,  there is no need  that the officer con- 
ducting the defense be one.  In such a  case he.is qualified as 
required by  Article 27 and  may  act under  ~rticlF38(e). But  if  the 
officer conducting the prosecution is a lawyer whether  he be the 
trial counsel or an assistant,  then whoever  conducts the defense as 
a  regularly appointed member  of  the defense must  be similarly 
qualified.  This  is now  jurisdictional and is not subject to  waiver- 
although,  of  course,  the accused  can  excuse the personnel of  the 
defense. 
7  Appointment  of  reporters and  interpreters.--The  appointment  of 
these persons is vested in  the convening authority instead of  the 
president of the court.  This matter was  suggested  in the Congressional 
Committee Hearings on  the code because the convening authority would 
have more  authority to obtain qualified personnel.  Although  he  cannot 
delegate his appointing authority as to  other personnel of  the court 
he  may  delegate it in  the case of  reporters and  interpreters.  Of 
course reporters are necessary on  general courts-martial,  but their 
appointment for special and  sumnary courts mag  be restricted by 
departmental regulations.  In  the Army,  regulations  in the SR 22 series 
are now  in process which  will  restrict the use of reporters to cases 
in which under  the charges a bad  conduct  discharge may  be adjudged. 
36  Paragraph 36  sets forth the manner  of  effecting appointments. 
A  court-martial  is created by an appointing order issued by  a  con- 
vening  authority.  The appointing  order,  formerly called a precept 
in  the Navy,  designates the kind of court,  place and  time  of  original 
meeting,  and  enumerates the personnel of the court.  Personnel who 
are required to have  special qualifications must  have  these qualifi- 
cations stated in the appointing order.  Inasmuch  as the convening authority is now  the person who  appoints reporters and  interpreters 
an authorizing clause relative to such personnel  should not be con- 
tained in  the order. 
36c  -  A  new  provision detailing the action to be taken to  provide 
enlisted personnel for a  court is incorporated in subparagraph  (2). 
3  7  The  next paragraph  deals with changes  in  personnel of  courts 
after appointment.  This was  placed within the discretion of  the 
convening authority tc fill  in  the gap  left in  Article 29.  The  con- 
vening authority may  detail members in  lieu of  or in  addition to 
original members  or he may  change the law officer or counsel. 
37~  -  Effecting changes.--Here  is implemented the manner  in which 
changes may  be made  such as by message,  despatch,  or oral order 
confirmed  later by written orders.  The  text also contains words 
of  caution regarding the number  of amending  orders. 
Relative to  the relationship between  convening authority and 
members  of  courts this paragraph serves to clarify the position of 
the convening authority with respect to  Articles 37 and  98.  He  may 
not,  directly or indirectly,  give instruction to  or unlawfully 
influence any court as to future action.  He  may,  however,  give any 
court appointed by him general instructions as to the state of 
discipline in  the command,  duties of  personnel of  the court,  and 
other legal matters.  This should be done through his  staff judge  .. 
advocate or legal officer. 
40  We  now  turn to  parts of  Chapter IX  dealing with duties of  the 
appointed  personnel.  These paragraphs generally are amplifications 
of  their counterparts in the 1949 Manual.  Because  of  the new  pro- 
visions for law officers,  paragraph 40  is more  definitive of  the 
duties of  senior members  of  courts-martial.  The  senior member 
appointed to the court or the senior officer presiding over the cou 
during the conduct  of a case of  course is the president.  He  is 
charged with the usual historic duties of  setting the time and  plac 
of  trial, prescribing the uniform,  preserving order,  handling ad jou 
ments,  and  administering oaths to counsel.  He  presides over close 
sessions of  the court and  speaks for the court in  requesting instru 
tions of  the law officer and  announcing  findings and  sentences. 
Certain of  these duties necessarily are carried out in  conjunction 
with or after consultation with the law officer.  For  example,  a 
recess or an adjournment might  be  an interlocutorj question which 
-) 
must  be  decided by the law officer.  The  president of  a special cou 
martial has additional duties which  devolve upon  him because  of  the 
absence of  any law officer.  He  assumes the duties similar to  those ,! 
of  a  law officer of  a general court such as ruling upon  all  inter-  ' 
locutory questions which,  of  course,  are subject to objection by any { 
member  of the court and  instructing the court as to elements  of 
offenses,  presumption of innocence,  reasonable doubt,  and  burden of  1 
proof.  Finally the senior officer present at the trial of  any case  7 
authenticates the record  of that case as president.  4 41  Members  of  courts have duties similar in nature to  the duty 
of a juror  in a civil court.  Wh  member  has  an  equal voice and 
vote upon  deliberations and has a legal. and military duty to 
arrive at a decision on  findings or on  sentences and  generally 
to discharge any duty required under  his oath.  The subparagraphs 
dealing with absence  and  new  members  are restatements of  pmts 
0%  NCB33  and.  MCM, 1949. 
42  CounseJ..--Paragraph  42 provides generally for conduct  of 
counsel.  Appropriate portions of  the canons  of  ethice of  the 
American Bar Association,  some  of which are set out in Naval 
Courts and Boards,  are included.  The  paragraph  sets up  standards 
for a military bar. 
43  Sumension of  couns&.-Under  certain circumstances wrongful 
acts of  counsel may  constitute grounds  for suspension from 
practice before military courts.  Care has been  taken  to obviate 
suspensions which might  arise from personal  dislikes or mistaken 
zealousness of  convening or other authorities.  A suspension 
cannot be  effected except by  the Judge Advocate General of  the 
armed  force concerned.  Provision is made  for departmental regrzla- 
tions as to how  this may  be  effected.  It may  be  noted  that auch 
regulations are required  to  contain rules defining disqualifying 
misconduct  and  the procedures  relating to a  suspension which 
procedures must  include notice and opportunity to be  heard  as  to 
the affected person.  me  Army  regulation on  the subject is SR 22- 
130-5, 26  March 1951,  which is a new  regulation under  the military 
jus tice series.  It contains defini  tions of  misconduct,  grounds 
for suspension,  and  outlines action to be  taken.  This  includes a 
hearing by a board  composed  of  lawyer officers  who,  dfter giving 
notice and  opportunity to be heard  to  the counsel  in question, 
report  their findings and  recommendatione  to the convening  author- 
ity.  If  the convening  authority decides that suspension is 
warranted he  forwards  the proceedings of  the board with Ms action 
thereon  to  the Judge  Advocate General who  takes appropriate action. 
he  regulation does not prohibit relief from  courts-martial  as 
distinguished from  suepension in appropriate cases.  It should be 
noted that  suspeneion proceedings  are gpplicable only to persona 
qualified in the sense of  Article 27  and  individual camme1 
selected or provided by an accused.  !Cbas  in certain casea,  civil- 
iaa counsel  may be  abject to  suepension.  Suepandon is a bar to 
practice in military courte. 
44  Duties of  tr*  caunael.--The  paragraphs  dealing with such 
duties are taken from  WM, 1949,  and  expanded.  We  are all 
familiar with 8uc.h duties-preparation of  the case, checking the file,  detsrmining the eligibility of all persons 
concerned to serve,  assisting the defense in procuring wit- 
nesses,  serving the accused--in  other words,  conducting the 
trial as any lawyer properly should* 
45  The  sane is true,  of course,  as to the assistant trial 
coulrsel who  carries out all  orders of  the trial counsel and 
acts as such when  the duty devolves upon  him. 
4s  -----  Defense Counsel.--These  provisions also have  been taken 
from r'ormer  manualsand are fmiliar. 
48  This paragraph also is taken substantially from W3h 1949. 
Individual  counsel does  not have  to be qualified in the sense 
of Article 27  but if he  is a military person he must  be anil- 
able for such duty.  Rules  for the determination as to  avail- 
ability are set forth.  The  duties of  any  counsel for the 
defense parallel closely the duties of  any lawyer to his client 
and  the matters set out  in the manual  are similar to those b 
previous  service marzuals.  Certain things have been added, 
homevor,  such as drafting a clemency petition or an  appellate 
brief. 
In  addition,  there is a subparagraph dealing with the 
counsel forthe accused advising the aacused of  his appellate 
rights.  This  is quite important  as there is a time limitation 
of ten days from the judgment  of  the court in which  the accused 
nay requeskappellate counsel.  Defense  counsel therefore 
should,  after a  finding of  guilty,  advise the aocused in  appro- 
priate cases that he has  a right to cornsel before the board 
of review and also under  cer-bain conditions may  have  a right 
of  appeal to  the Court of Military Appeals.  A  proper request, 
conditioned upon,  of course,  whether  the oase is one  subject 
to  appellate review,  should be  obtained in~writing  and  for- 
warded to  the convening  authority for attachment  to the record 
of %rial. 
One  other point relative to counsel for the accused-- 
although he  may  exmine the record of  trial, it  is not necessary 
for him  to do  so  prior to authentication nor is it necessary 
for him  to sign the record. 
49 3  Reporters,  Interpreters,  Guards,  -.-  --  Clsrks and  ,---  Orderlies.-- 
50,  These  paragraphs-a~-~imilar to those contained in  ~@=9, 
51  with implementation relative to numbers  of  copies of  records 
to be prepared.  Joirt Army-Air  Force  regulations AR  35-3920, 
.UR 173-90,  11  January  1950,  contain provisions for the corn- 
pansation of  reporters and  interpreters.  The  army  special 
regulations mentioned  before relativo to limitation on appointment  of  reporters also contain  a provision for attend- 
ance  of  clerical personnel  to assist in the proceedings  of 
any court. 
APP  4  Appendix 4  sets forth the forms  to be  used in appointing 
orders,  and  appropriate notes for guidance  in preparation. 
These  forms will be used by each service subject to the various 
service regulations or  customs  pertaining to  written orders. 
For  exmple,  in the Navy  the precept-now  called "appointing 
order of the convening  authorityt1--was always  signed personally 
by  the oonvening authority &ereas,  in  Army  and  Air Force 
orders,  the appointing order usually was  authenticated by  a 
ohief  of  staff, adjutant general,  or adjutant,  for the cormnand- 
ing officer.  No  prohibition as to  how  the order is thus promal- 
gated is set forth.  It is desirable,  however,  that those 
portions of  the orders stating qualifications of  law officers, 
counsel,  and setting forth unit designations of  enlisted 
members,  be followed meticulously. Conference No.  3 
Conducted by 
NUOR  WILLIAI-4 H.  CONLEY 
References ; Chapter  V,  Paragraphs 17-23 
Brticles 7-14,  57,  96-98 
The  material of  Chapter 7,  "&prehension  and Re~traint,~~  is 
predicated prinarily upon  the provisions of  Articles 7  through 14 of 
the Uniform  Code  of Military Juatice. 
Both Chapter  VII, Naval  Justice,  an&  Chapter  V,  Manual for 
Courts-liartiel,  are captioned "Arrest and  Confinaent."  In this 
respect, Mr.  Larkin,  General Counsel  for the Secretary of Defense, 
in his testirtiony before  the House  Subcommittee,  stated with regard to 
bticle  7; 
"In our  study of  the hrticles of  War  and  the Articlea 
for the Government  of  ths Navy  we  found a certain duality 
of  meaning  in the worOs  arrest,  '  restraint,  confine- 
ment,'  * * *  ami we  adopted  this scheme  to clarify the 
definitions of  those words  *  * * 
"Section (c)  specifically is  borrowed  from  subdivision 
,  (c!  of  article of  war  68.  But it is just a general 
simplification. " 
Par~rii~h  17,  "Scope,"  emphasizes  that  the discussion of  appre- 
hension  and  restraint deals prinarily with the apprehension  and 
restraint of persons  subject to the code  in connection with trial by 
court-martial  sad deals only incidentally,  if at all, with the 
apprehension  and  restraint of  persons  for other purposes,  type6  of 
which  are  set out as  examples  in the latter portion of  the paragraph. 
Parcxgraph 18a contains the definitions, as prescribed by  the 
indica.ted articles of  tne code,  of  "appreken~ion,~  "arrect,I1 and 
confinement, 
i 
With reference to the definition of  cppreliension,  the cross-  i 
reference  "17d&t1 per  te.ins to  the defir~i  tion of  Ifcus  tody"  as contained 
in the discussion of  "Escape  fron custodytt in par~raph  1749, wherein 
it is  provided  that: "Custody is that  restraint of  free locomotion  which 
is inposed by  lawful apprehension.  The  restraint may 
be  corporeal  and  forcible or, once  there has been  a 
submission  to apprehension  or  a forcible taking into  - 
custody,  it  may  consist of  control exercised in the 
presence of  the prisoner by  official acts or orders." 
Article 7 must  be read  in conjunction wi  ti? Articles 8  through 
14 which codify  the generd provisions  co~cerning  apprehension  and 
restraint of  persons  subject to the code.  In this respect,  para- 
graph 181,  l'Basic considerations, " contains some  salient provisions 
of  the  code which place certain limitations on  the free use of 
discretion in the exercise of  apprehension and  restraint activities. 
Paragraph l8&(  1) psovides  that a person  subject  to  the code  and 
accused of  an offense  against  the code may  be ordered into arrest or 
confinenient as  circumstances may  require.  It is to be  noted that  in 
the first sentence of  this subparagraph the words  of  Article 10, 
"a person  charged with an  or"fense,I1 have bjen changed  in the manual 
to "a person accused of  an  ~ffense.~  Thfs change was  made  to elim- 
inate the possibility of  confusing  the  "accusation" with the llformal 
charges."  In this respect,  the Hearings before  the Houre Subcom- 
mittee, page  908,  read as follows: 
Wr. Brooks.  Then  your  interpretation  of  the  word  there 
in the first line of  that section 'charged'  is that it does 
not really niean  formel charges. 
I.  kin.  That  is  right. 
1%.  Smart.  That  is  what  I muld say." 
The  second  and  third eentences conform  to current  practices and 
tend  to explain  the provision that confinement  should not  always be 
resorted to in cases involving offenses ordinarily tried by  summary 
courts-mtial.  Concerning  the  sentence that,  ItNo  restraint need  be 
imposed  in cases involving minor  offenses,"  paragraph 1281,  Winor 
offenses, " provides: 
8 
Whether  an  offense may be considered  'minor'  depends 
upon  its nature,  the  time  and place of  its commission, 
and  the person  committing it.  Generally speaking the  term 
includes misconduct not  involving moral  turpitude or any 
greater degree of  criminality than is involved  in the 
average  offense tried by  summary  court-martial. It With  reference to the provisions of paragraph 18~(2),  which 
prohibits the placing of  members  of  the amed forces of  the United 
States in confinement  in immediate  association with enemy  prisoners 
or other foreign nationals not members  of  the armed  forces of  the 
United  States,  the comlentary to drticle 12 provides that: 
"AW  16 could be  interpreted to prohibit  the corifine- 
ment  of  members  of  the armed  forces in a brig or building 
which  contains prisoners of  war.  Such cocs  tructi  on  would 
prohibit putting naval personnel  in the brig of a  ship if 
:he  brig coxtained prisoners from  an  enemy  vessel.  Tkis 
article is inter-ded  to permit  confinwent in the same 
gusrd hoase  or brig, but would  require segregation." 
Further in this respect, Mr.  Larkin in his testimony 
stated: 
Ve  thought  we  kept the sense of  the present  law but 
made it a little  more  flexible by saying  'in immediate 
association'  which  in effect would mean you  could keep 
then  in the sane jail by at least segregating them  in 
different cells. 
"* *  * We  have deleted,  if you  will notice,  'outside 
the ccntinental limitst and  made  it apply  every place, 
but prohibit incaxceration in close association but not 
wi  th because  wi  th'  has  the conno tstion that you  could not 
keq them  in the same  prison and  there nay be only one. 
Wr.  Anderson.  Mr.  Chairman, is there any place in 
the code  that  expresses prohibition againat confining our 
men  in foreign jails? 
Hi, -  dr.  Larkin.  No;  but this one prevents then from being 
confined with eneny prisoners of war  or foreign nation,ds 
not mwlers in the same  cell.  " 
Article 13, which is based primarily on  Article of  War  16, pro- 
vides that,  nSubject to  the provisions  of  Article 57,  no  person, 
while being held for trial or the results of  trial,  shall be 
subjected  to punishment  or pcnalty other than currest  or confinement 
upon  the charges pending  agdnet him,  nor  shall the arrest or 
confinement  imposed  upon  him fje any more  rigorous than  the circuni- 
etances require to inswe his presence,  but he may  be  subjected  to 
punishment  during such period  for minor  infractions of  dis~ipline.~~ 
me reference therein to Article 57  is intended to clarify the 
relation of Article 1s to the effective date of  sentences.  In FF 
pragraph l8&(3) an  attempt was  made  to spell out,  for further 
clarity,  the provisions of  Articles 13 and  57  as they relate to the 
against punishment  or penalty,  what  restraint is author- 
ized,  and  the fact that  forfeitures become  effective on  and  after 
the date of  approval by  the convening authority of a sentence to 
confinement not suspended  and  forf  eitilres.  In this respect,  the 
commentary  to Article 13 provides; 
"AW  16 has been  interpreted to prohibit  the enforce- 
ment  of  any sentence until after final approval even 
though  the accused  is in confinement  after the sentence 
is adjudged.  It is felt that a person  who  has been 
sentenced by a court-ffiartial  ad  is  in confinement which 
counts against the sentence should not  draw  f'ull  pay  for 
the period between  the date of  sentence. and the date of 
final approval . 
'She  provision  in Article 13 as  to the rigor of  restraint, that 
is,  that the arrest or confinement  imposed  shall not be  any more, 
rigorous than  the circunstances require to  insure his presence,  is 
derived from  present practices of  all the Services. 
Article 13 specifically provides  that a person being  held  for 
trial or the resulte of trial may  be  pnfshed for certain offenses 
not warranting trial by  court-aartial.  Ihe provisions of  that 
article have  been paraphrased  in 18&(3) to emphasize tkt  punishment 
is  authrized for infractions of  the disciplinary rules of  the con- 
finement  facility concerned.  Such rules,  including the authorized 
punishments,  are to be  set out  in departmental regulations rather 
than  in this manual.  Such punishmmts may include reprimand  or 
warning,  extra duty,  deprivation oI" privileges,  reduction in conduct 
grade,  segregation on  regular or restricted diet, and loss of  good 
conduct  time. 
It will  be noted  that the provision of  the manual  pertaining to 
the facilities, accornmodatf ons,  treatment,  and  training to be 
accorded prisoners being held for trial or the results of  trial is 
to be  implemented  in pertinent regulations.  This provision was  pur- 
posely designed to afford the authorities charged with the aduinistra- 
tion of  confinement  facilities the opportunity to prescribe,  within 
their judgment,  the necessary rules subject,  of course,  to  the 
prohibition against  the imposition of  unauthorized punishment  or 
penalties.  In tgs  respect, Depar-tment of  the Army  Bulletin #I,  16 
January  1951,  contains the Unifbrm Policies and Procedures Affecting 
Military Prisoners,  approved by  the YersoAmel  Policy Board, 
Department  of  Defense,  which become  effective 31  Nay  1951. The  provision concerning  forfeiture of pay and  allowances  is 
baaed  on  paragraph 19&, Manual  for Courts-blartial,  1949, as modified 
by Article 57.  It  is  to be noted  that  this provision is a restate- 
ment  of  the basic provisions of  Article 13.  Consideration was  given 
to the effect on Article 13 of  Article 57b_  which provides  that any 
period  of  confinement  included  in a sentence shall begin  to run  from 
the date adjudged.  It was  determined that  Article 57b_ did not 
abolish the guarantees of Article 13 once a sentence of  confinement 
was  adjudged  and  further that to  impose,  prior to the order of  execu 
tion,  upon  an accused any punishment  other  than confinement,  plus 
forfeitures after approval,  would  violate Article 13.  It was 
determined  that Article 57h merely enunciates  the practice now  pre- 
scribed by regulations,  that is,  the relating back  to  the date of 
sentence as the  time  when  credit for confineruent  starts.  By  such an 
interpretation both Articles 13 and  5TD_  may be given full force and 
effect.  To  interpret kticie 57b_  as modifying  the treatment  to be 
accorded  to pri  soaers sentenced  to confinement,  after adjudgment 
thereof,  would  not give Brticle 13 its full force and  effect.  Thus 
the pay a prisoner awaiting trial or  the results of  trial accrues 
and  may  be paid,  prior to the  approval of  the sentence,  as he may 
direct.  However,  although pay which  has accrued may  not be for- 
feited,  there is  no  requirement  that an  accused be permitted to have 
such  finds in his personal possession during such periods of 
confinement . 
In prescribing  the authority to apprehend,  Article 7b  provides; 
"Any person authorized under  regulations governing 
the armed  forces to apprehend persons  su5ject to  this 
code  or to trial thereunder may  do  so  upon  reasonable 
belief  that an offense has been  committed  and  that the 
person apprehended  committed it  .I' 
Paragraph 19,  ItApprehension, It  spells out  the presidential regula- 
tions,  authorized by  Article ?q,  concerning persons  empowered  to 
apprehend.  The authority of noncommissioned officers of  the Army  and 
the Air Force  to apprehend  offenders has been  brortdenea  to correspond 
to that  of petty officers of  the Navy.  Further,  the authority of 
personnel  in the execution of  air or  military police or shore patrol 
duties,  and  such other persons who  are properly designated to perfom 
guard  or police duties,  is spelled out within the spirit of Article 71, 
the commentary  to which provides  in part: 
NSubdivisions  (a)  and (b) are new  and  relate in 
particular to military police. " 
The  second  subparagraph prescribes the conditions under  which 
enlisted persons performing  police duties should apprehend  commissioned or warrant  officer offenders.  In case of  such an  apprehension, 
notice thereof  must  be given immodiatelg by  the apprehender  to an 
officer to whom  he  is responsible or to an  officer of  the air 
police,  military police,  or shore patrol. 
Paragraph 191 is, in essence,  a quotation of  Ar%icle  7s.  Thls 
provision of  the code  is derived from  Article of  War 58  5ut differs 
from  that  article in that it eliminates the power  of  the apprehend- 
ing person  to place  the offender  in 'farrest," as currently provided 
in Article of war  68.  Article 7s  ~uthorizes  the  ''appr~hension~  but 
not  the placing in arrest of  the offenders subject to  the code  who 
take part in quarrels,  frars, or disorders. 
Paragraph 192,  "Procedural  steps to apprehend,  provides that 
an  apprehension  is effected by  clearly notifying the person to be 
apprehended  that he  is thereby taker* into custody.  It lms been 
inserted as an  informative directive and also to conform  to compara- 
ble instructions in  paragraph 20&(1)  and  (2)  concerning the 
procecdral steps to arrest and  to confine.  ?he  procedure conforms 
to the current practice of  the Services. 
'Phe  commentary  to Article 9  provides  that,  "SuSdivision  (A)  is 
included  to provide for custody of persons apprehended until proper 
authority is notified.If  Tae  first sentence  of 199, "Securing custody 
of  alleged offehder,"  is  designed  to emphasize  the variance in the 
authority to  apprehend  as contrasted with the authority to arrest or 
to confine.  The  second  sentence of  this paragraph paraphrases  the 
provision of  Article 92  that nothing in the article shall be  con- 
strued to limit the authority of  persons authorized to apprehend 
offenders  to secure the custody of  an alleged offender until proper 
authority ma,v  be notified.  Although no  more  force than is  necessary 
under  the cirzumstmces  should be used  to secure the custody of the 
offender,  Brticle 55  specifically authorizes the use of  irons "for 
the purpose  of  safe cu~tody.~'  Paragraph 21g, as indicated in the 
cross reference,  prescribes  the  specific categories of  persons who 
possess authority to arrest or to confine. 
Paragraph 203, "Status of  person  in arrest," reasserts that 
arrest is  moral  restTaint iaposed by  competent  authority.  The  third 
sentence permits the various Services to prescribe regulations 
incident  to the status of  "arrest" end thereby to provide for sit- 
tions peculiar  to the respective Services.  Tie  fourth sentence has 
expanGed  a  somewhat  comp~rable  provision of  the 1949 Manual so as to 
emphasize  that  the act of unauthorized persons placing an accused on 
duty inconsistent with the status of  arrest does not terminate  the 
arrest. Paragraph a&,  ffRestriction  in lieu of  arrest,  It  is derived from 
the 1949 Manual, paragraph 19h.  ?hen that,latter paragraph was pre- 
pared,  the sugporting memorandum  therefor indicated that  the paragrap 
was  inserted to distinguish between  arrest and customary administra- 
tive restriction,  and, further,  to obviate any moot  questions which 
might  arise in connection with the two  types of  restriction as a 
result of  the limitation involved  in arrest,  that is, that a person 
in arrest hiill not  be  required to perform  full military duty;  also, 
that paragraph was  inserted as  informational matter for officers in 
lbwer echelons  to point out  the advisability of  this form  of  restric- 
tion in proper  cases.  When  paragraph 20h was  being drafted it was 
determined  that,  in crder to eliminate the possibility of confusing 
restriction of  the type here under  consideration with the "administra 
tiveff  restriction properly imposed  for training,  sanitary, or securit 
reasons,  the term  ffrestriction  in lieu of  amestn should be utilized. 
It is to be especially noted  that a person properly placed in 
restriction in lieu of  arrest may  be  required  to participate  in all 
military duties =d  activities 03 his orgvlization while under  such 
restriction. 
Air Force  and Army  personnel  will note  that,  in cocsonance with 
an  Air Force opinion  (ACM-S  145)  dated 5 October 1945,  the power  to 
restrict in lieu of  arrest has  been lodged in Ifany officer authorized 
to arrestff  rather  than in ffcommanding  officersft as provided  in the 
1949 Manual. 
The provisions of 202, ffConfinement  prior to triaJ.,If  consist af 
a restatement  of  the provisions  of  Article 9&,  P,  and g.  The  final 
sentence,  which amplifies that portion of  Article 10 which provides 
that  any person  subject to  the code  char'ged  with an  offense under  the 
code  shall be ordered into arrest or confinement  as circumstances mag 
require,  is consistent with current provisions of  the 1949 Manual., 
paragraph 19p,  and  N C  80  B, section 343,  concerning confinement 
deemed  necessary in the interest of  good  order 2nd  discipline in   vie^ 
of  the nature of  the offense or the cAharacter  or condition of  the 
accused. 
Paragraph 20&(  1)  , "Procedure  for arresting or confining ,  If 
incorporates the present practice of  the Services that  no  person  shd 
be  ordered  into arrest or confinement  except  for proba.ble  czuse. 
Paragra2hs 20&(2)  2nd  (3)  prescribe the procedure  for effecting 
arrest and  confinement.  The  $revisions of Article 1b  and JJ  concern- 
ing the required written stateiaent of the name,  grade,  and  organizati 
of  the prisoner,  the alleged offense,  and  the report of  comrnitment 
have been  spelled out  in some  detail in paragraphs 20&(3)  and  20&(5). 
According  to the testinony given  at the Hearings,  the purpose of  suck 
notice is to  insure that the comman6ing officer is "notified as to wk is being confined  so  that  he  can  start the necessary processing of 
the whole  case. 
With  reference  to th6 provision of  Article 10 that when  any 
person  subject to the code  is  placed  in arrest or confinwent prior 
to trial irmediate steps shall 'oe  taken  to inform him  of  the  specific 
wrorg  of  which he  is  accused and  to try him  or to dismiss the charges 
and  release him, the commentary  thereto  contains the statement,  "The 
provision as  to notification of  the accused  is  new.I1 
Concerning  the term  "immediate  steps,  the testimony provides  in 
part: 
Wr.  Larkin.  *** That  is a direction to  the author- 
ities in charge  to go  forward.  It says  limmediate 
steps.'  *** 
"The  idea was  to provide  that there be a speedy trial 
but not one  that is so  speedy that the man  cannot prepare 
his own  defense. 
"Mr.  DeGraffenried.  *** knd where  we  use the word 
immediate'  here,  that is  like using  forthwith,'  wMch 
means  to go  ahead.  I believe that  is just about as close 
'as we  can  get to it." 
Paragraph 32f(l)  of  the new  manual  spells out  the procedure  for 
informing  the accused of  the charges ageinst him. 
Paragraph 20g,  Wnlawful  dekntion,  " is a paraphrase of  Article 
97 which is new. 
As provided  in paragraph  21&,  "Arrest and  confinement - Who  may 
arrest or confine," and  in Article 92 and &,  only a cornanding officer 
to whose  authority the individual is subject may order  into arrest or 
confinement  an  officer, warrat  officer,  or  civilian su5ject  to  the 
code,  but  any  officer rnw  order  an  enlisted person  into arrest or 
confinement.  In  the case of  an  officer, warrant  officer,  or civilian, 
the authority may  not be delegated,  but in the case of  an  enlisted 
person  the conmanding officer of  any  cammand  or detachment  may 
delegate such authority to the warrant  officers, petty officers,  or 
noncommissioned  officers of  his command.  The  delegation may be general 
in nature,  such as by written cornpany  orders, but  the ordinary pro- 
cedure  is to  delegate the autl-iori  ty to  the  first sergeant,  the platoon 
sergeants,  or  the charge-of-quarters. 
It is  to be noted  that with reference to the arroat  or confine- 
ment  of  an  officer, warrant  officer,  or  civilian,  the term  ucomrnanding officern refers to a cornanding  officer of  one of  the  specified cate- 
gories,  while with  reference  to  the arreet or confinement  of  enlisted 
persons it refers to the commanding  officer of  any  command  or detach- 
men t . 
The  provisions  of paragraphs 2l& and & concerning  the authority 
the trial counsel  and court to restrain an  accused  are implemented 
pnxagraph  60,  "Attendance  and  Security of  A~cused,~~  which provides 
part: 
"The  convening  authority,  the ship or station com- 
mander,  or other proper officer in whose  custody or 
command  the accused  is at the time  of  trial is respon- 
sible for the attendance of  the accused before  the 
court.  *** Neither  the court nor  the  trid counsel  as 
such is responsible  for, or has any authority in 
connection with,  the security of  a prisoner being 
tried,  and neither the court nor  the trial counsel  as 
such has  any  control over  the imposition  or nature of 
the arrest or other status of  restraint of  an  accused. 
However,  the court or the  trial ccunsel may  make 
recommendations  to the proper authority as to  these 
matters.  The  court does have  control over  the 
accused  insofar as his personal  freedom  in its  pres- 
ence is concerned." 
Paragraph 21&,  "Responsibility for restraint after trial,  " pro- 
vides tbat  after trial,  the trial counsel must  promptly notify 
(44&(2))  the commaodirig  officer to vhose  comand  the place of  confine- 
ment  is subject,  who,  together  wi  tin  any other commander  officially 
concerned  with the restrdnt of  the accused,  is responsible for his 
immediate release or the imposition of  further restraint, depending 
upon  the circumstances. 
Paragraph 22,  "Duration  and  termination,  implements  the basic 
provisions of  Naval  Justice, page  58,  and  the 1949 Manuel, paragraph 
21,  by  spelling out Just who  is  the  nproper authorityf' to  release an 
accused  from  arrest or confinement.  The  proper  authority to release 
the accused  from  arrest is  normally  the officer who  iqosed the 
arrest.  The  proper authority to release from  confinement  in a mili- 
tary confinement  facility is the  commanding  officer to whose  comand 
such facility is subject .  Once  a prisoner is placed in confinement 
he passes  beyond the control and power  of  release of  the officer who 
initially ordered him  coifined,  unless such  officer is the  cornmand- 
ing officer deecribed above.  me  provisions  of  Articles 96  and 98 
concerning the unauthorized release of  a prisoner and unnecessary 
delay in the disposition of  any  case have been  inserted in this 
paragraph as matter relevant  to  the general subject. Concerning  the apprahension  of  deserters by civilians,  as 
presented in paragraph 23,  Article 8 is comparable  to Article of 
War  106 and  to 34  U.S.C.  1011 which provide,  respectively,  for 
arrests by  civil authorities in the case of  military and  naval per- 
sonnel. 
Article 14, "Delivery of  offaders to civil authorities,  is 
included  in Part 11, "Apprehension and  restraint," of  the code,  and 
has been  referred  to in 23s  aa matter pertinent  to the general scope 
of  the chapter. Conference Be.  4 
PBfilP~IO~  AND  DISPOSITION Ob  CIUUWES 
References:  Chqpters  VI and  VII;  e;ppendicea 5.  6,  end 7 
Chapfer VI  ie implemented by  appendix 6 which contains 176 
form  egecifications and a number  of  atlditional rules as to the ca 
tent and form of  specificatione. 
Befinitions.  The  definitions adopted in paragraph  are 
consirtent with the use of  the terms  "chargesR and Hepecificatio~ 
in the code.  The  Amy-Air  rule that the charge refers only to  th 
article of  the code  the accaeed is alleged to ham  violated was 
adopted becare it is rimilar to Rule  7e.  Federal Rulee of  Criain 
Procedure,  and also became it ie leee complicated  them  the Navy 
rule that the charge aets forth a descriptive title for the offen 
alleged in the rspecification. 
Additional. Although paragraph 24&  proviaes that 
additional chargee may be preferred for nmxy committed offensea 
for newly discovered old offenoer,  there ia no  prohibition againa 
preferring charges for an offernee that  waa known at the  time  the 
original charges were preferred.  A failure to prefer charges 
promptly for a knowzi  offenee may  be a violation of  Article 98,  bu 
unlees  the etatute of  limitatione has run, trial of  the offense 
will not be barred by  the delay. 
%id  of -.  Xo  limitation ha@ been placed 
the time when  additional chargee may  be  referred for trial to the 
court before which the original charges are pending.  Aa a practi 
matter,  additional chergoe  ehould not be referred for trial by  tb 
raase  court if the proeecution hae  rested its caae ar tb the origi 
chargee.  It would  be  futile to try additional chargee with the 
original charges if the  eenteme hae  been  annoancod ar to the 
original obarges sa the court cannot  reconaidor that sentence wit 
view  to increasing ita severity (76s) . 
-ainn  out of  one tr-.  The  I  rule against m 
ing one  traneaction tbe baais for an unreasonable multiplication 
ohargee  ard the  rule against Joining eerioue  aad minor  offenses a more  liberal in some  respects than Rule 8a of  the Federal Bules  of 
Criminal  Procedure.  The  Federal joinder  rule requires that  the 
offenses cbarged be  of  the  same  or similar character,  or be based  on 
the  ome act or transaction,  or two  or more  acts or transactl~ns 
constdtutbg part of  a common  echeme  or plan.  What  is  deoired  in 
court-martial  practice ie the application of  a resoonable  rule.  l'or 
example,  the accused  ehould not be  charged with both a principal 
offense and a lesser included. offense.  However,  a s*le  transmetion 
may be  the basis of  several offensee if necessary to meet  the con- 
tingencies of  proof.  Thus,  an accused may  be  charged with rape and 
with od  knowledge  in violation of  Artiole 120 if the victim ia 
under  the age of  eixteen and the expected  testbony as  to the use of 
force is  not otrong.  Although an accused may be  found  guilty of  any 
number of  epecificationa,  even  though they allege offenses arlaing 
out of  a ~lingle  act or omission  and do not  allege eeparate offensee 
(?&(4)),  he  mey be punished only for meparate  offenaes (76&(8)  ) . 
a  hint off-.  & court-martial practice,  accused may  be 
charged jointly with the comiesion of  an offense if the proof  show8 
they were  acting together in pursuance  of  a common  intent.  However, 
joint participants may be  charged  separately or jointly.  4pendix 
6&(8)  ahows  eeveral exaurples of  how Joint participants may  be charged. 
It is sometimes better to charge Joint participants separately- 
eepecially if there is a probability of  a severmce.  Whether  uharged 
jointly or  eeparately,  the charges ma. be  investigated jointly and, 
unless a eeverance ie  granted,  tried jointly. 
27  The  rule8 as to the  effect of  an improper designation of  the 
punitive article in the charge is substantially the  same  as Rule 7c 
of  the Federal Rules  of  Criminal Procedure.  It follows the opinlon 
in  Johnson v.  Biddle  (19261,  12 3'.  2d 366,  which  involved charging a 
soldier with  murder  under  an  improper Article of  War. 
With  respect  to the rule that specific offeneee ordinarily should 
be charged under  a specific article rather than. ar  a violation of 
Article 134,  note  that many violatione of  orders or regulations under 
Article 92 would  also be unbecoming conduct under Article 138 or 
preJudicial or discrediting conduct under drticle 134.  'Phe  general 
rule is that,  if appendix 6  sbows the  offenee  to be chargeable under 
Article 134, the offense may  be  laid under  that article even  though it 
is also a violation of  an order or regtilatian,  Otherwiree,  i  t ordi- 
narily ebould be alleged ae a violation of  drticle 92.  blthough the 
article under which  etlch an  offense ia laid ordinarily ir immaterial, 
note that  a footnote has been  included in tb  Table of  Harimtun 
hiahmmts (127~)  providing  that the puaiehent prescribed for s 
specific offanee will -ply  even  though  the offense may  be  a violation 
of  an order or a reaation and nay  have been  alleged as a violation of  Article 92.  Thus,  wearing art  unaathorized uniform  ia puniehable 
by  one month' a  confinsaaent and forfeiture of  two-thirds  of  one 
month' a pay,  whether it is leid under Article 92 or under Article 1% 
%a  Draf tine of  anecif icau. This  paragraph ie Implmented by 
appendix 6a.  The  followiw mattera are noteworthy: 
The  service number  ia not  included  in the specifiaae 
tion. 
The  armed  force of  the accused ia set forth in the 
specification.  This  requirement has  been added 
because  of  the Jurisdictional complications which 
lnag arise in the trial of  persona  of different anaed 
forces,  and also to  insure review by  the appropriate 
agencies.  See  Article 17. 
'Phe  fonaa  for specifications in appendix 6a are to 
be  ueed when appropriate to the offense being  charged. 
Rote  the provieions of  the recond rentence of para- 
gr-h  1  of  appendix 6a: 
n!Che  suggested  forms do  not  as a matter of  law 
exclude other methods  of  alleging the erne offenses, 
but  the appropriate fom lieted with a punitive 
article setting forth a specific offaee is pre- 
scribed for uae,  when  properly completed,  as a d- 
ficient allegation of  that offenee. 
Paragraph 28a(3) lws down  some broad, general rules 
as  to  the manner  of  alleging offenses.  Be  noted  above, 
the  specification forms in appendix 6 do  not need  to 
be  tested by them rulee.  Rule  7c of  the Federal  Rules 
of  Criminal  Procedure  and the decisions of  the Bederal 
courts thereon are the  sources of  much of  tihis material. 
If  it is  concladed  that.the  mere addition of  words  in- 
~orting  crhinality to a specification alleging -en  act 
or miasion that is  not per se an  offense will  not make 
tm  offense of  that act or omieeion,  malee evolve that 
demand  all the technical niceties of  eomnon  lav plead- 
ins. 
To  avoid  euch  technicalities, words  importing criminal- 
ity,  such se nwro~~lp,  ~~~ly,  %&. ,  have 
been given a definite meaning.  B'or  example, with 
respect to offensea laid under Article 133 or Article 
134, the general mlee laid down  in pwsgraph ~8~(8) 
eboprld  lead to this reeultS  If, in the  light of the general  eituation exicrting at the  time and place alleged, 
the act described can reasonably be  conaidered as being 
tmbecming an officer and a genthemm,  a0  pre3udicial to 
good  order  and diacipliae, .or ae bringing discredit -on 
the armed forces,  then  the addition of  an qpropriato 
word  importing criminality or wrongeilnesa is eufficient 
to @prim the accueed that the act  charged  is dlegeb 
to have been committed Pnaer up1becoming,  di  soredit  fag, 
or disorderly cirmmrtances.  ￿˜twh  circuanetancee asy  be 
inferred if applicable law,  reg\lfation,  or cuetom  or 
practice having the effect of law, makes  such act tmlarw- 
ful.  See  CM W'1897,  60 BE 199,  223. 
Utho-rrgh paragraph 28  is to be  considered  in detesmbiw 
the legal  sufficiency of  rrpecificstiona  which are not 
alleged in the forms prescribed  in appendix 6&,  consider- 
ation met also be given to paragraph 87&(2)  which lt~a 
down  the rules for determining the legal aafffaiency of 
a epecificatlan qon  rwiev of  a record. 
28s  wruten ine-.  The  rule as to  the pleading of 
written instruments ie  bared on recent Federd cases,  particularly 
U.  S.  v.  Sterks (1946)~ 6  F.R.D.  43.  5t  oaee involved  the denial 
of  a motion  of  a defendant  for a dismissal of  an  ~clic~gnt  charging 
forgery of  an  indorsement  of  a U.  S.  Treasury cbckbecanse it 
failed to set  forth the alleged forged instrument  Wc.  rerh. 
'Phe  court said,  in pertinent mrt: 
ndrssuming that at common  law an  indictment  for forgery 
had  to  set out _an  the docummt charged  to have 
been forged (citing U.  S.  v.  Heinze (1908),  161 3. 4251, 
it is the view  of this mart that  We  requirement  no 
longer prevalle uder the new  Federal Rules  of  Criminal 
Procedure.  * * *  Xt is no  longer neceasaryto comply with 
any technical requirmenta with which  the common  law wae 
rqlete in respect to the contents of  an  indictment.  * * * 
These t  echaicalities he  long been otltnoded.  5ey are no 
longer the law in  the Federal co~rta.~ 
am.  Note  that  when an act vhich fa violative of 
a atatute ie alleged under  Article 183 tae   becoming conduct,  or 
under 1%  aa preJPdicia1 or eervice discrediting conduct,  there is 
no  requireslaent  that  the  specification refer to the atatate from  whioh 
the offense atems.  Howw~~,  an  obscure  otatute properly s~ay  be 
referred to in the specification to aid the convening authority,  the 
court,  and  the appellate agencies in idemtffying; the source of  the 
offenee.  In auch a caee,  the specification should,  neverthelea@, aet forth the act or omission of  the accused which conmtitutea the 
offense.  The  statute is included in the specification only for pu 
poses of  identification. 
If  the act is alleged as  a violation of  the third clanee of 
Article 134 as a crime or offense not capital, it quite properly m 
be  allege4 as  "unlawfblly  and  in violation of  the particular stat 
(CM 2W,  -tta,  21 BB 97).  However,  an offense may  Be  alleg 
and  found as a violation of  the third claaee of  Article 134 if it 
alleged aibstantially in  the mrde of  the statute and  it appears t 
the statute was  applicable at the time  and place alleged (CM  28188 
Me-,  S4  BB 241;  CM 51252%  Moore,  62 BR 215). 
CH  s.  Chtrpter  VII contains a discussion of  the varioaa 
VII  administrative and  procedural matters involved in the adminirtrati 
of  military Juetice f'rom  the the  of  the commioslon of  an offense 
until the final disposition of  the offenee-either  by  hposition o 
non-judicial  punishment under  Article 15,  dismissal of  the charge, 
reference of  the charge  to trial by  court-sartial. 
Although anyone  subject to the code may prefer charges,  the 
manual  eatablishea a regular  procdure to insure the prompt  and 
orderly disposition of  offenses commiCted  by pereons  subject to th 
code.  In eatabliehing a uniform procedure,  some  pmblema  were  con 
fronted.  In the Xavy,  the convening authority preferred charges. 
bs  the code provides that  the acmaer may not act as convenin 
authority of  general and  special oourteaartial (Arts.  22,  23  f ,  th 
Navy rule could not be  adopted without divesting convening axrtbari 
ties of  their normal power  to appoint general and apecial courts- 
mart id. 
Coneideration waa  then given to the adoption of  the present A 
Air  procedure  of  having the Immediate  commander  of  the accuse8 pre 
chargee.  However,  in the Navy, the Immediate commander  of  the 
accused ordinaxily ia almo  the convening authority of  epecial and 
6unmary  courts-martial.  If  the Amy-Air  procedure were  adopted wi 
out modification,  the Navy convening anthority usually would  lose 
power  to qrpoint special courtslaastial. 
The  hearings before the Subcommittee of' the Huuae  Gomaittee ont 
hed  Servicee indicated that a commander, 
terest in a cm,  could direct a aubordi 
ae the stibordinate vaa  willing to eubrtmtiate by the required oa 
See paragraph 58(4)  in tbia copnectian. 
For  the foregoing reaama,  the procedure  for the mbmiaeion  of 
and action on charges wae baaed  on  the preeent Axmy-Air practice, that practice wae  modified  to permit  the convening authority in 
the Navy  to avoid becoming;  an accuser when  he  hae  only an official 
intereet in the caee. 
Prefw  of -.  Stated briefly,  the procedure  eat&- 
liebed by thlr  chspt  sr for the preference of  chargee ir ae followe: 
a.  Ordinarily the commander  sxercieing implediate jurisdiction 
over  the accuaed under Article 10 will  prefer chargee. 
b.  If  the immediate  cosunanber  court -  aarw 
an official intereat in  cw,  he will 
transmit whatever  Informatian he har  about  the caee  to a sub- 
ordinate vith the followiPg instmetion: 
"or  preliminary  inquiry and report,  including,  if 
appropriate in the interest of  juetice and  dis- 
cipline,  the preferring of  arrch  chargee as  appear 
to you  to be  auatained by  the expected  e~idarroe.~ 
c.  If  eomeone  other than  the immediate commander  under Article 
15 prefere chargea,  the chargea ordinarily will  be transmitted to 
the immediate commander  for hie action.  Bowever,  a auperior coa- 
mander,  ae he  ha8  the power  to reearre the agpoinbent of  courts to 
himeelf  (Arte.  22,  23, &,  ma~r  reatrict the action of  the imaediata 
commander.  For example,  he may  ltmit  the Immediate commander1 0 
action to making a necessary  inquiry,  attaching approprf ate pe- 
eonnel records,  and  returning the chargee with a recommendation for 
disposition. 
Action on m.  Subject to juriedictionel llmitationa, 
charges againet an accused,  if tried at all, shouldbe tried at a 
single trial by the loweet  court that has the power  to ad3-e  sn 
eqrpropriats and  adequate punishment  (as&).  Baaed  on  this rule and 
on  the rule a8  to the preference of  cheu-gee,  chapter VII eetabliehes 
the following normal.stepby-etep  procedure  for the dieposition of 
an offense  committed by a pereon  eabJeat  to the code: 
,  a  a.  First at*:  Prelimina~y  inquiry and  conaideration of  the 
offenae  or charge by  the  commander  exercising Immediate juriedietion 
over  the accased under Article 15 (by pr  eubordinate officer of  uuch 
commander  if tb  latter also exercieea court-martial  juristdiction 
and has  only an official interest in the case).  Dnlere  oaerwise 
directed by competeat  superior authority,  the iiumebiarte  commander 
may prefer or fail to prefer chargee,  dignisa charge8 that  have been 
preferred,  punieh the aectrsad under Article 15, or forward  the 
cbarges to an officer exsrcieing appropriate court-startial  juriedic- 
tion with a recommendation  for trial. b.  Second  step:  Consideration of  the charge by  the commander 
erercising immediate  mammary  coar~tial  Jurisdiction over the 
accused.  This commander  be  essentially the  sasle powera  as  the  $1 
immedi ate coxunander . In addition,  he  ueually has broader powerre  " 
under  Article 15 and he  alrro has  the  right to refer the chargee  to 
a court appointed by  him,  or  to return fihm  to the  Immediate  can- 
laandsr  for disposition.  If triel by a court appoint&  by him ie 
C 
not appropriate,  he  may forward  the charges  to a superior-comm~ber  ' 
with a recommendation  for trial  by an appropriate court-martial, 
but he  will not  forward  the charges with a recommendation  for trial 
by  general court-martial  unless the charges have been  investigated 
under  Article 32. 
c.  'Phfrd  step:  Consideration  of  the  charge by  the  comander 
exercising general cour~tiR3  Jurisdiction over  the accused. 
'Phis  commander has essentiallg tb  s-e  powers as  his subordinates. 
In addition,  he has broader powers Pvrder  Article 15 and  he  also has 
the right  to refer the charges  to a court-martial appointed by  hint 
or to return them  to a subordinate coder  for disposition. 
2Q  -and.  Article 30  require8 charges 
to be  eigped and  aworn  to before  an OEFIC=  OR'  TEE  ARMED  lDRCES  3 
(e.g.,  a commissioned  officer or a coanniesioned warrant  officer) 
who  is authorized  to administer oaths.  The  reason for this unusual 
limitation on  the power  to administer  the oath to chargee  ia not 
known.  Failure to comply with this requirement  is  not a jariedic- 
tiobal error bPt  the accused may not be tried on  unswor~  chargee 
over his objection.  See paragraph 6a. 
aoa  P-iw  -at  abaanf-.  !be provisions 
of  the second  subparegraph of a  point up  the desirability of 
preferring charges against ao. accused who  is absent withoat  author- 
ity (1)  If  testbony of witnesses is to be preserved by depositions,  , 
or (2)  if the running of  the statute of  lbitatione ie to be  stopped  ~ 
by filiag morn charges with aa officer eaerciaing BuMlary  court- 
martial jurisdiction  wer the  command which  includes the accused. 
Departmental  regulations may prescribe that charges will be pre- 
ferred agdnst every accuacd who  has beaa dWOL for a certdn length 
of  time. 
31s  &rx&iw  C-  in -.  Paragraph 31s 
I 
provides  that in exceptional  cases  In  which  the  accused is not, 
strictly speaking,  under  the command  of  my  military a~ltbority 
inferior to a Department,  the charges may be  forwardea  to the Secre- 
Cary  or to an appropriate area commander.  'Phis  provision is 
qpplicable to those cases vhich may  arise under  the code with reaped 
to perecmel who  mcry be  subject to  the code,  yet who,  because of their civilian status at the time,  are not under  any particular 
commander.  For  example,  auch action would be appropriate when 
jurisdiction undar Article 3a is erercised. 
3zJ2  Pre  rn  into -.  The  preliminary inquiry man- 
tioned i=  pmzh  (also in paragraph 334  is not  the foa 
investigation contemplated by paragraph 34 and  Article 32.  It is 
intended  that the formal  investigation required by Article 82 be 
dirsctd  by an  officer who  exercises sumnary  cour~tial  jUrie- 
diction;  firther,  the formal  investigation under Brticls 32 may be 
conducted ooly after charges have been preferred.  However,  if an 
immediate commander  who  doee not  exercise court-martial  jurisdiction 
directs a formal  investigation of  charges under  drticle 32,  no 
firther Investigation may be required  if such ins.tstigation  ie 
adequate in dl1 respects. 
'Phe  prelianinasy  inquiry mentioned may  involve nothing more  than 
considering the fils in the case.  The  interviewing of  witneeses or 
the collection of  docttmantary evidence will not  be necersary  in 
every case. 
32s  PreferrirrP1_.  !be  immediate commander my, after con- 
ducting hie preliminarg hqui~,  prefer okges  or prefer chargee 
eddltional to,  or different from, those already preferred.  IPhis 
provision ie intended  to  insure that charges  will  be  corrected and 
made to conform with the  expected  evidence at the earliest moment. 
!Fhe  effect of  alterations is  discussed in paregraph 33&  If  new  or 
different charges are preferred,  it is a general rule that  all 
chargee be  consolidated into one  set of  charges.  There  are some 
exceptions  to this rule.  For  example,  the origiral charges  ahould 
be  retained if they were  preferred and  dapoeitions taken with 
respect  to them,  or if the statute of  limitations would  have nm 
with respect to the  offenae if the  original charges had not been 
preferred. 
3%  Wissal of  ca.  Bs  the immediate commander  mey prefer 
or fail to prefer charges,  It follows tbat if someone  else ha8 pre- 
ferred charges,  the immediate commander  should have  the authority 
to diamiss than.  Although this rule always existed in the Amy  emd 
Air Force,  it was  not  gecificalljr stated in  the 1949 Manaal.  do 
the dismissal of  charges prior to trial does not bar trial (Art.  44), 
a superior commander  may prefer,  or have preferred,  charges alleging 
the  same  or different offeneea  than  those dismiesed by the immediate 
commaoder.  Likewise, a atperfor commander  may linit the authority 
of  the immediate commander  with reepect to diemiasal of  the chargee. Non-Audi-M  D-.  If the accueed has  committed both 
326  minor  and serious offeneee,  the immediate  commander  may impose 
punisbment under  Article 15 for the minor  offenses.  Theredter, 
the eerious offenses may be processed for trial by  court-martial. 
Bovever,  the puniehPsent  of  the accused for a minor offense-while 
other offenses are being processed--should  be rather a rare occur- 
rence.  It is usually better practice to dispose of  all of  the 
charge8  in a single proceedings. 
'Phe  immediate coder  usually will not  impoee non-Judicial 
purriebnent upon  officers or warrant officers.  The basie for thle 
rule lies in the fact that many mall unit commanders have  almoat 
the sale rank  as their junior officere.  In view of  the Wury the 
may result from  the unwarrar;ted irqoaition of  etlch puniehment,  it 
wae  deemed  desirable to pemit the officer exercising summary  corn 
martial  Jurisdic  tlon to act on  ach caaes. 
TnfoIsliw ac~yaed  of w.  The  immediate commander  of  ths 
accused  will  meet  the requirement  of  llrticle 10 that ths accueed I 
informed of  "he  epecific wrong  of  which he is acctleedY  and the 
requirement  of  Article  that he be Hiinformed of  the charges 
against him  as soon  as practicable-y  reading the charges to the 
accueed,  giving; him  a copy,  or advising him generally of  tbs  charg 
'11218  feet that  the accueed  haa been so  infoxmod.  will  be noted on  pa 
8 of  the charge sheet.  It ia not neeeseary to inform  the accuood 
what  dieposition ia to be made  of  the charger. 
In the &my and Air Force  the refnsel of  the accued to accq 
puaiehment under  Article 16 will be noted on  page  four of  the chtu 
sheet as thie fact will  be  important  if the accueed ir tried by 
aruamary coart.  The  Navy and Coast hard are not concerned with ti 
provieion as Havy  and Coast Guard personnel may not demand trial 
11-  of  punishment  under drticle 15 (132). 
a& a  -  -  m.  Paragraph  is applicable when  chasgee have not been 
preferred.  It permits  the Navy  to proceee  charges without making 
the convening authority the accueer.  Appropriate  language direct3 
a subordinate to make  an  inqyiry and  to prefer charges ie set for! 
in quotes.  Use  of  thia language  in ell casee will prevent  any 
qaestions being raired ae  to whether the convening athority beta 
the accuser by airtae of referral of  the matter  to a  subordinate. 
Mast  actiqp.  No  att6mpt wae  mede  in this chapter to incoxpol 
the Navy's  preaent procedure  of  investigation of  an offense at me1 
The  language  of  the chqter does not prohibit the use  of  the mast 
action,  but  there is a.  strong probability that , if a commander  h03 F- 
a mast  for each a purpose,  he  may become  the accuser and  divest him- 
self of  whatever powers  he  may  have  had  to convene a epecial or 
general court-martial  for the  trial of  the case. 
3a  Date of  recmt of  c-  by officer  exeroie_inP  con& - 
m-bdic-.  Paragrarph 3ap  ertablishes the procedure by 
which proof  may  be made of the interruption of  the running of the 
statute of  limitations.  Obviously the entry on  page  3  of  the charge 
sheet of  the date of receipt of  the chargee  will not be  Important 
in maay  caees.  However,  entry of  sach information  ie already 
routine in most  comande. 
D  . Paregraph 33a establiahee 
a rul%h?:~~?w&%~invee  tigation under  Article 
32  is to be  conducted.  If  the offenses charged appear  to be  so 
eerious that it woad be  appropriate  to recommend  trial by  general 
court-martial,  the officer exercising  summary  cour~tial  jurie- 
diction will direct an invostigstion of  the charges under Article 
32.  &cept  in rare instances,  chargee ehould not be  forwarded to 
the officer exercising general court-martial  jurisdiction with a 
recommendation for trial by general court-mcrtial  unlese  an krticle 
32  investigation has  been medar.  Thoee  rare instances might  invol~e 
situations in which  an nimpertialw  investigation could not be made. 
For  example, if the officer exsrclaing summary  court-nertid  jaris- 
diction is the accuser or  the only officer present with the command, 
there might  be some doubt  as to whether  he  could conduct  an  "ar- 
tiala investigation. 
The  officer exercising summary  court-lrartial  3uriediction wae 
made  responsible for the conducting of  the Article 32  investigation 
because he  usually is nearer  the accueed and  the witnesses. 
=a( 1)  If an  l.nvestigation  of  the  aubject matter has been mnducted 
prior to  the time  charges were preferred,  Article 32  does not  require 
a further formal  investigation unless it is demanded  by the accused 
after he  is infomed of  the change.  It must  appear  that at such 
prior investigation the accused was  af'forded  the opportunities for 
representation,  croes-examination,  and presentation prescribed in 
Article 3a. When  such a preliminary investigation of  the  subject 
matter is relied  upon  to meet  the requirements  of  Article 32,  the 
allied papers  should contain a statement  that the accueed was  afford& 
an opportunity  to demand a fbrther  investigation an8  his desires in 
the matter. 
w  dlteratio  of  c  .  Article  provides  that mfomnal  correc- 
ad20 tions,  and  suc~  chang%  the chargee  and  sp.cificatlons  as are 
needed  to make them  conform  to  the evidence may  be  bay person 
authorized  to act on  the charges may  make  much  changes.  It is ~bvloara 
that  sach changes  should be made.  It mag not be ao  obvi  aas whether 
the changed  charges  should be reeworn  and whether it is necessary to 
have a new Article 32 investigation. At page lOlOff  of  the hearings  of  the Subcommittee of  the Hotlee 
Committee on  Armed Services (H.  R. Report No.  37,  81st Cow.,  1st 
Sess  .) , the following colloquoy appears: 
WE.  L4RKIN. * * * If  it appears from  the pre- 
inveetigatian that the original charge and 
specification is not  sustained or that the 
investigation has spelled out a different crbe, 
then it will  be necesesry that  the chrgea and 
speciiicatione be redrawn  and there be a new 
inveetlgation on  the different charge. 
tsMB.  E&SfK)M.  In other words,  if a man  is chargod 
with being A.W.O.L.,  they could not change  that 
to desertion? 
#MR. SWil'.  That  is a greater offense  md,a 
different offanse,  and I would  say 'no.' 
flMR.  LARKI#,  I think that is right. 
nMR.  ELS!LDN.  On  a charge of man~laughter,  yoa 
could not make  it  murder in the first degree. 
rrMIi.  SEPBRIC.  You  could not  r.hnnP.8 it to a more 
aevere crime,  but I  think you could  make correc- 
tions to a leeser and included offense only. 
W. LARKIN.  May  I point oat that we  tried to 
spell out  the  idea in the commentary  which  ees: 
'Changes  in the chargee may  be made  in 
order  to make  them  confow to the  ev2- 
dence brought out in the  investigation 
without requiring that new  charges be 
drawn  and sworn  to.  * * *' 
The  purpose here is, became your  charges and 
specifica.tions are drawn  after the receipt of  the 
original complaint,  when  there is only a moderate 
amount  of  evidence,  the next step io this pretrial 
investigation,  which is a very much  mom  extensive 
investigation and it may be that,  aa a result of that greater and  more  extensive investigation, 
some  technic&  changes  for the purposes of 
accuracy are necessary.  However,  if the infor- 
mation  adduced in the pretrial investigation is 
such that it warrants a different charge,  then 
the new charge and  specification must be dram 
at that point and  a new pre-investigation  must 
be  held,  so  that  the accuaed can meet,  if he 
desires,  the new  charge which he  was not aware 
during  the  first pre-inveetigation. 
sap  Effect  of  wr&ona  unon  oath to w.  Anyone  mthor- 
imd to take actfon upon  charges mar  alter and reviae the charges 
over the signature of  the accuser,  However,,mch alterations ma;r 
not include  nany  persoo,  offense,  or matter not fairly included 
in the chargee as preferredn unless  the altered chargee are  signed 
and  sworn  to by  an  accuaer. 
In reviewing  a record  of  trial involving chargee which have 
been altered after they have been  sworn to,  there my  be  some 
question as to whether  the  altered charges  should have been  signed 
and sworn  to by  an  accuser.  Such queetione usually are eliminated 
by the failure of  the  accused to object at the  time of  trial to 
being  tried on tansworn  chargee.  See  296 and  67h. 
33&(2)  Effect of  alter  one won hti  32  iav  . Para- 
graph a(2)  provide-zime  aft-cle  32 
investigation has  been conducted,  the cmrgeo are changed  to  allege 
a more  serious or essentially differant offense,  a new  inveatiga- 
tion should be  directed so that  the  accased may,  if  he  desires, 
exerciae his rights under Article 32  with respect  to the new  matter. 
In other words, if (based on  the evidence contained in the formal 
investigation) a charge of  BWOL is changed  to  desertion with intent 
to renaln away  permanently,  the charges must  be  sworn  to  and, 
thereafter,  the accused  should be afforded an opportunity to present 
evidenee as to such intent. 
wosition  of  W~ea  involy&g  seamits  laatt_era.  Axticle 43~ 
provides that the Secretar~  of  a Departanent  may extend  the normal 
period of  the statute of  linitations by cartifying to the President 
that the trial of  an offenee in time  of  war is detrimental  to  the 
proeecution  of  the war or inimical  to the national security.  Thio 
article haa  been  implemented,  in  part, by  parsrgragh 33g which pro- 
vides,  in effect,that  if trial of  an ofYense is warranted bat might 
be detrimental to the war  effort or inimical  to  the national eecurity, 
the officer exercising summary  court-lcartial  juriediction will forwasd  the case  to  the  officer exercidng general court-martial  T 
Jurisdiction.  &V  officer exewin~  emu  court-marw j~Zh  - 
diction may  make  a final determination  in such a case  as to 
whether  the charges  sbould be dismissed,  referred for trial,  or 
fomar;led  to the Secretary of  the Department. 
Fo-  charges.  If the officer exercising summary  court- 
martial Jurisdiction forwarde  charges with a recommendation for 
trial by  general court-aartial,  he  will came a copy of  the 
-the  tes~"  taken  on  both sides at the inveetigation 
to  be  fbrniahed to the accuaed.  It is not intended that  the 
accwed be  furnished with a verbatim  report of  the feathony given 
before  the investigating officer.  There is  no  legal requirement 
that duplicate copies of  documentary evidence be raade  and furniehed 
to  the accused.  The  matters mentioned  in  aregraphs 4s  and 5a  of 
the investigating officer1  a  report (app.  7  7  should be  furnished 
to the accused.  Local  commandera  may  preecribe that a copy of  the 
investigating officer's report and all of  the exhibits therein will 
be  f'urnished to the accused.  'Phe  practice in the Army  and Air Borce 
has been  to furnish much  material to  the accusd after the case has 
been referred for trial.  If  the material  ie finished before  the 
reference,  it ie a good  practice to obtain the accused' a  receipt 
therefore to preclude his requesting the oame  material after the case 
ia referred for trial. 
The  officer exercising suPunary  court-aartid.  3uri  adiction ie 
required  to note the availability of  material vitnesses.  This  re- 
quirement  should alert the commander  exercising atammy wurt-;Psrtial 
jurisdiction  to retain material military witnesses pending  the trial, 
=a  The  provision nermitting  the trial of  two  or more  accueed at a 
common  triel  ia  based  on  rules 8b and 13 of  the Federal  Bules  of 
Criminal Procedure. 
It is to be  aphasieed that the  exerciae of  diecretion by  the 
convening anthority as to whether  he  shall order a common  trial ia 
limited to proper  csrsee.  He cannot ordsr a common  trial unless it 
involves offenses which were  committed at the same  time  aad place aad 
are generally provable by the oame  evidence.  If he  directs a common 
trial of  eeveral accused,  again6 t  some  of  whom  there are chargea which 
are separate and distinct from those againat others,  it would be pro- 
judicial  error to deny a motion for severance.  However,  he  may 
strike out  BUC~  separate offenses in order to permit trial of  common3f 
offenses at a common  trial.  breafter, if the case warrants  such 
action,  he  may revive the chargee which were  etricken and refer the 
to a court for a separate trial. &&&J&-  32 .inveetitrstion.  l!he  Axticle 32  investigation ie 
principally a fact finding investigation.  It is conducted by an  im- 
partial officer who  ie udly  appointed by  au officer exercising 
summary  court-aartial  jt~riediction. Although such an investigation 
is required  in any cam which is  referred to a general courhmrtisl 
1  for trial, it  may  be  conducted in any case.  Ilhue,  as a matter of 
policy,  some  commands  require  that such a formal  invee tigation of 
ohasgee be  conducted in any case in which it appears that a bad  con- 
dact dimcharge  ia warranted.  !be  investigating officer may hear 
teetimony which would  not be  admissible in a trial by court-martial. 
If  his recommendation  ia based  on  evidence which would  not be 
admissible at a trial,  the report of  investigation should  ahow  to 
vhat extent  and for wbat  reasons the inadmissible  evidence war 
considered. 
%a  of  the -.  Axticle 3aprovides that the 
failure to have a pretrial  investigation shall not constitute a 
jurisdictional  error.  This  enactment  la  based  on  the opinion of  the 
Su  reme  Court  in Eumphrey v.  Smith (1949).  336  US  695 (8 Bull.  Jda 
67  7 ,  in which the court,  after holding that  the reqnirement  of  such 
a  pretrial  investigation was  not jurisdictional,  said: 
#. .  .We  cannot assume  that judicial  coercion is 
essential to compl the hy  to obey  this Article of 
9 
War.  It was  the Army  itaelf that  initiated the pre- 
trial investigat$on procedure and recommanded  con- 
greasionaJ.  enactment of  Article 70. 
n*  * * A  reasonable aeauxuption is that  the dnny 
will require compliance, with the Article 70 investige 
tory procedure  to the end  that Amy work  ahall not be 
unneceesarily  iarpeded and  that Bnny peraonael shall 
not be wronged  as the result of wfounded  and frivolous 
court-martial charges  and trials,  %is court-martial 
conviction retaulting from  a trial fairly conduct& 
cannot be  invalidated by  a judicial  finding that the 
pre-trial  inveetigation was  not  carried on  in the man- 
ner premribed by  the 70th Article of  War.n 
A.W.  70  was  superred& by A.W.  46b which  con- 
tained requirements similar to thoee of  Article 32, 
OW.  For  an excellent discussion of  the A.W.  70 
investigation and the attacks made  on  it in the Federal 
aoarts,  see 18 George Washington Law Review  67. 
Paregraph a46 provides  that a failure to have  a pretrial 
investigation my  result in prejudicing the  accused's  substantial 
rights at the trial aad thus be the'  basie for getting aside finding0 of  guilty.  For  example,  if  the investigating officer failed 
to  take action to have the deposition of  a  defense witness 
taken or to examine  an available witness  requested by  the 
accused,  the accused might be placed in a position where  he 
could not defend hinself at the trial.  In such a  case,  the 
question of  prejudicial error probably would  involve an 
inquiry into the manner  in vchich  the pretrial investigation 
was conducted.  In the Humphrey  case,  supra,  the Supreme 
Court  indicated that Federal couPts should not  inquire into 
such matters as the pretrial investigation for the purpose 
of  determining due process.  However,  the doctrine subsequent- 
ly announced in  Thelchel v.  ldc~onald  (1950).  340 US 122, 
indicates that the Federal courts might  inquire into whether 
the denial of due  process at  the trial resulted from an improper 
pretrial investigation.  Consequently,  all staff judge  advocatee 
and  legal officers are required by paragraph 350  to find that 
all charges referred to  a  general court-martial-have  been 
properly investigated under  paragraph  34 and Article 32.  They 
may  not rely upon  Article 32d to cure all errors arising out 
of  an improperly  conducted izves  ti  gat  ion. 
34c  -  Pretrial counsel.  The  right of  the accused to  pretrial 
oounsel must  be  construed reasonably.  He  must be given a fair 
opportunity to obtain counsel of  his choice, but i?  he  fails 
to produce  that counsel within a  reasonable time,  the investi- 
gation may- proceed with the pretrial counsel appointed by 
the officer exercising general court-martial  jurisdiction. 
Except  by  cross-reference  to  paragraphs  42b  and  48, 
which  pertain to the duties of  defense counsel zt  the trial, 
the duties of  the pretrial counsel  are not  outlined.  The pre- 
trial c,ounsel has  no  right to object to the testimony of 
witnesses or to demand-a verbatim  report of fhe testiinony 
taken.  In performing  his duties, the pretrial counsel 
generally is  limited to cross-examining  the available witnesses, 
presenting requests for defense witnesses,  presenting defense 
evidence,  and advising the accused as to his rights at  the 
investigation. 
34d  -  Availability of witnesses.  A  difficult problem  arising 
in the pretrial investigatitan is  that of  determining whether 
a  witness is "availablen.  The  testimony before the Sub- 
committee of the House  Committee  on Armed  Services with respect 
to the meaning  of "availability"  is not helpful.  It indicates  i 
a  failure to  understand that the primary and practical restrio- 
tion on  the availability of witnesses arises from these facts: 
Witnesses may  not be paid for attending the investigation; 
civilians may  not be  compelled to attend.  Thus,  the availabiliw 
of  a  civilian viitness  is determined by whether  he will attend 
the investigation voluntarily.  In cmplicated cases involving serious offenses, it may  be  necessary for the investigating 
officer to travel a considerable distance to interview a 
witness.  In such a case,  the witness is  considered as 
"available"  and the pretrial comeel and the accused,  if  he 
desires,  should be  given an opportunity to accompany the 
investigating officer. 
The last sub-paragraph  of  paragraph  34d  was  inserted to 
give the investigating officer the right to-withhold  froh the 
accused and  pretrial counsel matters of  a  confidential or 
'  security nature which  are in the file  but which  are not 
material to the inquiry. 
Reports.  Two  types  of reports are authorized.  The  formal 
repor-xample  of  which  appears in appendix 7,  should be 
made  in any case in  which  the investigating officer recommends 
trial by  general court-martial.  The  informal  type of report 
will permit the investigating officer to expedite the dis- 
position of a case in which he has recommended  dismissal of 
the charges,  disposition under  Article 15,  or reference to an 
inferior court for trial.  As  the recommendations  of  the 
investigating officer are advisory only,  the officer directing 
the investigation may  require tho, preparation of a  formal 
report in every case. 
35a  -  Action by  officer exercising general  court-martial  juris- 
diction.  All charges  should be  investigated before they reach 
the offiber exercising general  court-martial  jurisdiction.  Other- 
wise,  that officer nay be forced to consider &my.cases  that 
should have  been dismissed,  disposed of under Article 15,  or- 
referred to an  inferior court for trial.  Further,  if general 
court-martial  charges must be investigated after they reach 
the officer exercising general court-martial  jurisdiction, 
needless  delays will result. 
If the officer exercising general court-mrtial  juris- 
diction determines  that trial of  the charges by  general court- 
martial is not warranted,  but that trial by  inferior court 
is warranted,  he may  appoint the inferior court himself.  How- 
ever,  if  he  transmits charges  in such a  case t'o a  subordinate 
commander  for disposition,  he  should not direct such officer 
to dispose of  the charges  in a certain my.  His  advice tc the 
subordinate commander night read substantially as follows: 
"Trial by  general court-martial  is  not deemed  appro- 
priate beoause  . You  are authorized to refer 
the charges to a court-martial  convened by  you,  or to make 
other appropriate disposition." Conference No.  5a_ 
TRIAL  PROCEDURE 
Conducted  by 
LT-  COL-  JEAN F.  RYDSTROIJ 
References:  Chapt,er X 
Chapter XI 
Chapter  XVI,  Paragraph 82 
Appendices 8,  9,  10 
A  guide to-  trial procedure may  be  found  in appendh 8g.  It is 
intended that this appendix be used as  a  guide to practice and pro- 
cedure before both general and special courts-martial, whether  or 
not the particular case requires that a  verbatim record be  prepared. 
The  guide would  have  linited applicability to a  summary court-martial 
of  course,  although it is to  be used  insofar as it might be  approp- 
riate,  e.g.,  in  regard to  an explanation of  accused's right as  a 
witness,  calling and questioning witnesses,  and the like.  See para- 
graph 79~.  Appendices 9s  and 10g are guides to the preparation of 
all  records of  trial  by general and  special courts-martial,  and one 
or the other is used-depending,  not upon  whether  a general or  , 
special court-martial  is involved,  but,respectively,  upon  whether a 
verbatim or summarized record is required to be  prepared. 
6  1  Preliminary or~anizatiouf  the court.-A  general or special 
court-martial assembles at  its first session in accordance with the 
orders appointing it (paragraph  59).  Such orders,  after stating the 
date and hour  of  original convening,  should state "or  as soon  there- 
after as practicablen (app.  &).  It is not necessary that a  court 
meet  initially at  the date and hour  stated,  and as a  practical matter,- 
courts ordinarily meet at  the call of  the president sometime  thereafter 
Prior to the court's being called to order at  the first session 
of  any case,  the law officer or president of  a  special court-martial 
should determine that trial  will  be able to proceed when  court opens, 
i.e.,  that the accused and a quorum  of  the court are present,  and 
that the appointed counsel are apparently properly qualified (para- 
graph 6l.a).  Also,  he  should  consider whether  enlisted court members 
and individual counsel are likely to be requested,  and if so,  are 
available.  Apparent  irregularities in these matters should be dis-  i 
cussed with counsel and brought  to the attention of  the  convening 
authority if necessary.  Such an initial determination will  greatly 
facilitate the opening  session of  the court and will avoid the nec- 
essity of  formal continuances during the early stages of  trial* w 
Appendix 8s  suggests appropriate seating arrangements for 
general and special courts-mrtial  and,  insofar as practicable,  the 
arrangement of  courts-martial  should conf om  substantially therewith. 
Even  if the suggested arrangement cannot be followed in a  general 
court-martial,  the law officer is to  be seated apart from the members 
(pragraph bib). 
Due  to the confusion and the  serious errors which  can result, 
a  succession of  orders amending an appointing order should not be 
published.  If  amendments are necessary,  they should be kept to a min- 
imum,  perhaps two  or three,  and when  more  changes must be made,  a  new 
court should be appointed.  See note 6,  appendix &.  The  members and 
counsel who  are still  available may,  of  course,  be appointed to the 
new  court. 
When  the court is called to order,  the trial counsel announces 
by wbt  order the court is convened and a  copy of  the order is given 
to the reporter for insertion in the record.  The  trial counsel then 
states for the record the names  of  the persons present and absent, 
'  omitting mention  of servicenumbers unless necessary to distinguish 
between  two  individuals named  in the order (appendix 93).  The  reason 
for the absence of  any persons named  in the appointing orders need 
not be  stated by trial counsel,  but absence at  this time  is to be 
distinguished from the absence of  a member  of  the court after arraign- 
ment;  in that case the reason for the absence must be made  a nm tter 
of  record.  See paragraph  41&(4). 
\ 
Swearing Reporter and Interpreter.--The  reporter is then sworn 
and an interpreter may be sworn  at  this time  or just before he  acts. 
See  paragraph  61&.  When  a  reporter is used as such in a  special 
court-martial whose  proceedings need  not be recorded verbatim-for 
example,  when  the maximum  punishment which could be  imposed for the 
offenses does not extend to bad conduct discharge--the  reporter 
should also be  sworn  even  though  the record is eventually to be  pre- 
pred in summarized  form following appendix 102. 
53L  The  swearing of  E&  interpreter for an accused who  does not under- 
stand the English langi~ge  and desires the services of  an  interpreter 
is particularly appropr5ate at  this time.  See paragraph  53L.  It is 
not incumbent  upon  the bourt or trial counsel to ascertain the neces- 
sity or desirability of:a separate interpreter for the accused,  but 
upon  a  showing  by the defense that accused does no+, understand 
English,  it is within the sound discretion of  the court as  to whether 
a  request for an interpreter will be  granted.  See 140ALR 766.  In 
Gonzales  v.  Virgin Islands (194l; CCA  3d)  109 F  (2d) 215,  the court 
stated that,  although an accused who  was  unfamiliar with the language 
would be entitled under a  constitutional provision that  "in  all  crim- 
inal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against hinlu  (see paragraph 139~  as to right of confrontation  in courts-martial)  to have  the testimony of  the Peoplet s  ; 
witnesses interpreted to him  in order that he  might  fully exercise 
his right of  cross-examination,  it was  not .mndatory that the court 
furnish such an interpreter where  there was  evidence of  record  show- 
ing that the accused,  who  were  Spanish speaking natives of  Puerto 
Rico,  were  familiar er?ough with the English language to enable them 
to  understand the proceedings. 
A  note in appendix  8a_  points out that as soon as  the reporter 
is sworn,  he  records verbatim all  proceedings had  in the case-subject 
to certain exceptions,  and a  note in appendix 9=  indicates that as 
soon as a  reporter is morn "the  remainder  of  the record of  trial 
follows the actual proceedings had  in court."  In short,  the prelimi- 
nary organization of  the court and accounting for the accused and 
persons present and absent is a routine matter.  The  reporter need 
not be under  oath during that procedure  for any notes he  might make- 
such as  the hour  the court convened,  or the members  present and absent-- 
are brief preliminary matters which are inserted in the record,  pro 
form, and authentication of  the record establishes that these matters 
which transpired before the reporter was  sworn were,  in fact, as stated. 
No  single article requires that a  verbatim record of  trial  be 
prepared  in a  court-martial,  but the comment  of  the Morgan  Committee 
to  Article 54 was,  "It is intended that records of  courts-martial 
shall contain a  verbatim transcript of  the proceedings. 
Other tban the exceptional procedures  involved in in-  and out-of- 
court conferences,  during which  the reporter makes  a  verbatim record 
only as  directed by the law officer,  the reporter records verbatim 
(see paragraph 49b(l)) everything except (1) the preliminary organi- 
zation of  the court which  occurs prior to maring of  the  reporter 
but concerning which he may  make  notes for the assistance of  the trial 
counsel in preparing the record;  and (2) the actual words  of  the 
oaths administered,  whether  to  witnesses,  members  of  the court,  or 
otherwise.  Appendix 9 requires only that he  record the fact that the 
individual was  sworn.  For example,  the procedural guide sets forth 
the entire procedure of  swearing the court and counsel,  showing a 
statement,  "Proceed  to convene  the court;I@  trialcounselts statement, 
"The  court will be  sworn;"  and then the entire oath.  The  record, 
compiled in accordance with appendix 9=,  however,  need  show only that 
the law officer or president stated,  Vroceed to convene  the court, 
and then a  statement inserted in the record by  the reporter,  "The 
members  of  the court,  the law officer,  and the personnel of  the pro- 
secution and defense were  sworn.I1 
The appointed reporter has the further responsibility of  recording 
the time and date of  the opening and closing of  each session of  the court whether for adjourment,  recess,  voting,  or otherwise,  and de- 
scribing for the record events which  transpare,  such as that a  chal- 
lenged member  withdrew from  the court.  There  are no  off-the-record 
discussions  in open  court (paragraph 49&(1)).  Furthermore,  when  testi- 
mony  is ordered stricken, it must  nevertheless be reported and tran- 
scribedverbatim into-the completed record;  an inexperienced reporter 
should be advised that "strikell is  a  legal "term  of  arttt  meaning 
Hdisregardil  rather than "expunge.  " 
Publicity of  tria  1s .--The  prohibition in paragraph 53s on  the 
taking of  photographs during sessions of  court or broadcasting the 
proceedings is similar to rule 53  of  the Federal Rules of  Criminal 
Procedure.  Sessions of  courts-martial,  however,  will be open  to the 
public unless security requirements,  presentation of obscene  matter, 
or other good reason exists,  in which case the convening authority or 
the court may direct that the public be excluded. 
612  Introduction of  counsel.--Prior  participation of  counsel in the 
case must be carefully observed,  particularly,  prior participation 
as  a member  of  the prosecution.  See paragraph 61g and f.  If  it 
should appear to the court that one  of  the individuals appointed to 
the prosecution,  whether  present in court or not,  is disqualified by 
reason of  prior participation,  e.g.,  as investigating officer,  law 
officer,  court member,  or membep  of  the defense in the same  case,  or 
has acted as counsel for ths accused at  a  pretrial investigation or 
other proceedings  involving the same  general matter,  the court should 
Mediately initiate an inquiry into two mattars-(1)  whether  he  is 
disqualified,  an3  (2) whether  he  has  acted for the prosecution. 
(In connection with prior partici9tion as investigating officer, 
pragraph 64 expressly excepts a  person who  had  investigated a  case 
in performnce of  duties as counsel.)  Article 27g provides that no 
person who  'has  previously participated in the case shall act subse- 
quently as. trial counsel or assistant trial counsel;  pzragraph 6g 
provides  that a person appointed as trial counsel is deemed  to have 
acted as a member  of  the prosecution unless the contrary affirmatively 
appears of  record.  Suppose,  for example,  it appears to the court 
that the appointed assistant trial counsel and the officer conducting 
the pretrial investigation under Article 32 are one and the same  person. 
As investigating officer,  he  is disq~alif  ied,  and unless there is af- 
iirma  tive evidence that he has not acted' for the prosecution in any 
way,  despite his designation as  assistant trial counsel,  the court will 
adjourn and report the facts to the convening  authority (See Paragraph 
41%).  An  "affimative11 showing that counsel has not acted might be a 
statement by the individual himself  for the record,  or a  statement by 
other members  of  counsel in this regard.  Of  course,  evidence may be 
presented  on  the issue. Action for the prosecution is also of  great importance in regard 
to  defense  counsel for,  by Article 27g,  the person who  has  acted for 
the prosecution is statutorily ineligible to act for the defense,  and 
the sane presumptions apply.  See paragraph 6g.  Unless there is af-  a 
firmative evidence to  the contrary,  a menber  of  the defense who  a~~earg 
to have acted for the prosecution must be excused forthwith,  and 
Article 27s does not permit the accused to request such counsel.  When; 
a menber  of  the prosecution has acted for the defense,  the court must 
adjourn and report the matter to the convening authority;  when  a  member 
of  the defense has  acted for the prosecution,  it is sufficient that 
he be excused forthwith.  The  difference in disposition of  the two 
situations,  both of  which  are equally violations of  Article 27a,  is 
based upon  consideration of  prejudice to the rights of  accused:  If  a 
member  of  the prosecution  has previously acted for accused,  the incom- 
patability of  the positions and the possibility of  prejudice  to ac- 
cused in  his defense makes  imperative all  the corrective action pos- 
sible.  If  defense counsel has acted for the prosecution,  the possi- 
bility of  prejudice to the prosecution is not so compelling,  but 
such counsel must be excused by the court for it cannot be a  party 
to a  continued violation of  Article 27%. 
DisqualLfication of  defense counsel on  the basis of  prior partici- 
pation is similar to  that of  trial counsel,  with the additional ground 
of  prior participation as the accuser (see paragraphs 62,  6lf(4)), 
and the proviso that accused may  expressly request the services of 
such defense counsel otherwise disqualified,  except for counsel who 
has acted for the prosecution.  In the absence of  an express request 
for a  defense counsel who  has  prtjcipated previously in the case, 
the law officer or president of  a  special court-martial excuses  that 
counsel. 
61g  Enlisted court me;nbers.--Article  25g(l)  provides that enlisted 
persons are eligible to serve on  general and special courts-mrtial 
for the trial of  any enlisted person  if,  prior to  the convening of 
the court,  "the  accused personally has requested in writing that en- 
listed persons serve on it."  Appendix 8g shows  that the law officer 
or president of  a  special cour~rtial  directs,  "Proceed  to convene 
the court,  whereupon  the court,  law officer,  and counsel are sworn. 
The  convening  of  the court is then cmplete (see paragraph 61&), 
and it is provided  that if a written request is not made  prior to or 
at  the time  of  ltconveningll the court,  the accused may  not thereafter 
assert his right to  have  enlisted members  on  that court. 
One- time  swearing of  court. --Paragraph  53b,  requires that the 
proceedings and  the record in each case must be complete  without re- 
ference to  any other case.  This requirenent is particularly to be  1 
noted  in connection with the swearing of  the court and personnel thereof,  including counsel and reporter,  at  one  time  in the presence 
of  a  number  of  accused who  are to  be tried separately but by the 
saae court.  The  procedures  to be  followed in such a  case are set 
forth in appendix 85,  and are not to  be confused with joint and 
common  trials and the procedures  therein.  This one-the  swearing 
of  the court for several trials is not specifically required by any 
of  the articles, but the Morgan  Committee  commented  in regard to 
Article 42,  Oaths: 
"The  article does not require the court to be  resworn  in 
every case.  The  language muld allow a  court to be  sworn 
once  a  day where  there is to be more  than one  trial, if  the 
accused in each trial is present at  the time the court is 
initially sworn.M 
When  a  court is sworn  in the presence of  a  number  of  accused 
who  are to  be tried separately,  those accused who  are not then to 
be  tried are excused after the  court,  law officer,  and members  of 
counsel are sworn,  but before challenges.  Appendix €I&.  The  record 
of  trial in the case of  each accused would  repeat the same  procedure 
up to that point,  and  the record in the case of  an accused who  was 
excused at  that point would  show merely that he  was  excused,  pur- 
suant to  the statement of  trial counsel,  and  the hour and date. 
The  record of  his case would  reopen with the usual statement of 
trial counsel,  "The  prosecutio~  is now  ready to pxoceed  in the case 
of  the United States against Lthe excused accusedwho was  present 
during the administration of  oaths to the personnel of  the court. 
All  parties to his trial who  were  present when  be  was  excused are 
again present in court."  See also 1122. 
The  use of  this procedure is not encouraged except when  the 
saae court and counsel bave  several relatively simple and short 
cases to  dispose of.  Its use will tend to considerable  confusion, 
both in the minds of  the court and in the preparation of  the record, 
in those cases where  there are different counsel appearing for each 
accused and some  want  enlisted court meinbers and same  don't. 
62  -  Challenges.-Provisions  for challenge under  the new  code are 
very sirnilar to those with which the Army  and Air  Force were  familiar 
under  the Articles of  War,  but these provisions present some  changes 
for the Navy,  particularly as to perenptory challenge.  The  chief 
thing that Amy  and Air  Force judge  advocates must  observe is that 
in joint and common  trials, each of  the accused must be accorded 
every right and privilege which  he  would  have  if tried separately, 
including the right to  make  individual challenges for cause and  in- 
dividual peremptory challenges.  See paragraph  53b.  Further,  while 
the articles do not provide any exact counterpart to the civilian F 
"challenge to  the array,"  paragraph 62b provides a  somewhat  analo- 
' 
gous procedure by authorizing a  general questioning of  the court 
as  a  whole concerning the existence or non-existence  of  facts which 
may  disclose proper ground of  challenge for cause.  Of  course,  the 
court disposes of  specific challenges to members  individually,  and 
does not receive more  than one at  a time.  See paragraph 6%.  For 
sin;plification of  discussion,  the excusing of  members might be di- 
vided  into three categories,  resulting from: 
(I)  Disclosed grounds for challenge, 
(2)  challenges for cause,  and 
(3)  peremptory challenges. 
Grounds  for challenge are initially disclosed aft& the court 
has convened,  when  the trial counsel states the general nature 
of  the charges,  by whom  they were  preferred,  fomrded, and 
investigated,  and whether the records of  the case disclose 
any ground for challenge of  a member.  See paragraph 62b.  For 
examale,  he  inquires whether  any enlisted member  of  the court 
belongs to the same  unit as  the accused.  If  the records in 
the case,  or any member,  discloses a  ground for challenge 
which  is within the first eight listed in paragraph 622, that 
member  is Wediately excused by the president or Law officer. 
The  first  eight grounds of  challenge are those which may  go 
directly to the jurisdiction of  the court.  Lf  grounds within 
this group exist,  there is no  question as to  the necessity of 
excusing the member,  hence,  the ruling need  not be made  subject 
to objection.  See pragraph 62s.  No  problems  ordinarily arise 
upon  disclosure by a member  or law officer of  such a  ground 
of  challenge--unless  the facts are disputed,  in which  case 
the matter should be handled as a  challenge for cause, 
Challenges for cause may be disposed of  simply when  the member 
is cballenged for any of  these first  eight grounds enumerated 
in 62f,  and admits the facts;  he may  be  excused by the law 
officer or president of  a  special courtrmartial forthwith,  un- 
less a  question is raised.  If  it is manifest that any other 
challenge for cause would be unanimously sustained if brought 
to  a  vote,  as,  for example,  that a member  of  the court is an 
avowed  enemy  of  the accused,  such member  may  be excused by 
the law officer or president of  a  special court subject to 
objection by any member.  Wen these challenges for cause are 
disputed,  they,  like other challenges for cause,  must be con- 
sidered by  the court and each sid.e  pemitted to present evi- 
dence and argument  thereon.  Unless the challenge is withdrawn, 
the court must finally close and vote whether  to sustain or  not 
sustain the challenge.  The  cballenged member,  of  course,  with- 
draws from the court when  it votes,  as does the  law officer. While  he  ru-les upon  interlocutory questions arising during 
presentation of  evidence on  the challenge,  the law officer 
does not rule finally upon  a disputed challenge but permits 
the court to  retire into closed session when  satisf  Fed  that 
it has  sufficient evidence  to make  a  determination. 
Paragraph 62h(2)  provides  that the law officer or presi- 
dent of  a  special court-martial  shall continue to rule upon 
interlocutory questions which arise during the hearing of  the 
challenge,  even  though the chsllenge be  to himself  and  he 
testifying as to his own  competency  at  the time. 
(3)  The  peremptory challenge requires no  reason or ground  there- 
for to be  stated or even  to exist,  and  each accuseC and the 
prosecution are each entitled to a peremptory  challenge of 
one  member  of  the court.  See  628.  The  law officer may  not 
be  challenged peremptorily (~rticle  Wb),  and a challenge for 
cause to the law officer that he  is  not eligible to act  as 
such is closely circumscribed by tbe provisions of  paragraph 
62g. 
A  member  challenged peremptorily is excused  immediately 
by the law officer or president  of  a  special covrbmartial. 
Ordinarily the challenges for cause of  all  accused are dis- 
posed  of  before any is asked whether  he  wishes to exercise 
his right to  a peremptory challenge. 
In the JAG  Journal of  February 1951 published by the Office of 
The  Judge Advocate  General of  the Navy,  there is a very fine article 
on  challenges under the Uniform  Code.  A  statement in that article 
requires comment,  however;  that is,  that  challenges occur relatively 
infrequently in trials by  court-partial  and "the incidence  of  per- 
emptory  challenges is actually rare."  This statement will  perhaps 
engender  in the casual reader a misconception as to the relative 
importance of  the challenge,  a misconception which,  happily,  the 
author did not  share.  A  frequent use of  the peremptory challenge 
is that by defense counsel who  finds nine members  sitting on  the 
court.  Since conviction requires as many  votes of  "guiltyN  of  an 
eight member  court as it does of  a nine member  court,  i.e.,  six 
votes,  he  determines that the prosecution1  s duty of  establishing 
the accusedls guilt beyond  a reasonable doubt  in two-thirds  of  the 
members1 minds is  mathematically more  difficult if only eight members 
are present. 
56  Withdrawal  of  specifications.--Article  44c  provides  that a pro- 
ceeding which is terminated by  the convening authority or on  motion 
of  the prosecution for failure of  available evidence or witnesses without fault on  the  part of  the accused,  subsequent  to the intro- 
duction of  evidence,  is a trial.  Withdrawal  of  a  specification is 
not  in itself equivalent to an acquittal (paragraph  562) and  in a 
subsequent trial,  the action taken  at  the first trial  must be raised 
by way  of  a  plea of  former  jeopardy.  The  power  to withdraw a  speci- 
fication after evidence has  been  taken on  the issue of  guilt or in- 
nocence  is restricted by  paragraph  56b to urgent circumstances and 
only for very plain and  obv'ious  causes.  See Wade  v.  Hunter,  336  U.  t 
684.  The  reasons for withdrawal  should be clearly stated in the 
record for reference  in the event of  future proceedings.  As to the 
authority of  a  judge  to discharge a  jury without the defendant's 
consent,  the Federal rule is that such action may be taken only when. 
taking all 3!le  circ~stances  into eonsideration,  there is  a -mnifest 
necessity for the act and  the ends of  public  justice would  other- 
wise be defeated.  US. v.  Perez,  22  US  579;  Himmel  v.  U.S.,  175 F 
2d  924,  cert.  den.,  338  US  860. 
These  limitations,  of  course,  do  not apply to withdrawal  of 
specifications, for any reas'm,  prior to trial  or prior to arraign- 
sent  thereon.  In such a  case,  the withdrawn  specification should 
not,  in fairness to the accused,  be  brought  to the attention of  the 
court.  See  paragraph  564.  If  it is ;vithdrawn  prior to convening  of 
the court,  such a  specification should be  lined out and  the charges 
and  specifications renumbered  as necessary;  if with&sm  after the 
convening  of  the court and before arraignment,  it should be  mentionec 
only by number,  and this for the inf omation of  the court which may 
otherwise wonder  if the charge  sheet is in error. 
54  Intrc6ustion of  evidence.--The  court may  require the p-oduc- 
tion of  additional evidence.  It  should not  ordinarily have  to take 
action with a view  to obtaining available additional evidence but 
it my properly do  so when the evidence before it appears to be  in- 
sufficient for a  proper  determination of  the matter before it, or 
when  it is not  satisfied that it has received all  available ad- 
missible evidence  on  an issue.  See pzragraph  5&.  The  trial coun- 
sel,  unless otherwise directed,  handles the interrogation of  a wit- 
ness called by the court.  In a  general court-martial  the law off ice1 
rules finally as to whether  additional evidence or witnesses will 
be  produced  (see pragraph 5%),  except  that as to a witness ex- 
?acted  to testify as to the  sanity of  the accused,  he  rules subject 
to objection of  any member.  The  president  of  a  special court-martial 
rules that the witness be called or not called "subject  to objection 
of  any member."  13'  there is objection,  the court closes and  deter- 
mines  the matter by majority vote. F' 
/  The  statement of  this rule of  3najority voten does not resolve 
all  cases,  however.  Suppose  that the court desired to call a wit- 
ness,  the president ruled,  "Subject  to object  ion by any member, 
X  will  be called as  a witness," a member  objected,  and  the vote to 
sustain or not sustain the ruling resulted in a tie.  Would  that 
vote fail  to overturn the president's  ruling so that it would  stand 
and the witness be  called?  Or would  that vote fail to express a 
mjority wish that the witness be  called,  so that,  a fortiori,  he 
would  not be  called?  Article 53c  furnishes a rule of  thumb  for 
such a difficult situation-a  tie vote "shall be  a determination 
in favor of  the accusedM  on  such a question.  Article 53  also pro- 
vides rules on  tie votes on  challenges,  sanity,  and motions for a 
finding of  not  guilty, which are,  however,  different and must  be 
carefully observed  in each instance.  The  situation suggested above 
in regard to an interlocutory question is perhaps  the most  difficult 
which  could arise to require application of  the rule,  for,  ordinarily, 
the request or motion  will  plainly i~dicate  whom  the detamination 
will  favor;  either trial counsel or, defense  counsel  will  make  the 
request,  and it will appear  that a  determination  in accordance with 
defense counsel's  position will  be  a determination in favor of  the 
accused--this  because  regularity in the presentation of  the defense 
may be  assumed until the contrary affirmatively appears.  See para- 
graph 53h.  But a similar assumption may  be  used  to resolve in 
accordance with the rule,  the hypothetical situation mentioned above. 
If  defense counsel  had wanted  the witness,  for the defense of  ac- 
cused,  it may  be  assumed  he  would  have  made  an effort to call him. 
Since he  did not want  him,  a Hdetermination in favor of  accusedn 
on  a tie-vote  in such case would  require that the witness not be 
called. 
APP  8&  Items of  real evidence  should be accurately described,  and a 
description thereof  substituted in the record of  trial in lieu of 
the evidence  itself.  Appendix 8g  goes  into considerable detail in 
connection with maki~g  2 matter of  record incidents which ~llould 
not otherwise appear  in recorded testimony.  It requires that a 
witnesst  s gestures and motions be  described accurately for the  re- 
cord by the reporter,  with the members,  counsel,  and  the  law of- 
ficer or  president of  a special courhartial  assisting if neces- 
sary.  It further provides that unless the  testimony of  a witness 
has developed a full and accurate description of  an  object to be 
withdrawn  later,  counsel or the  law officer (president of  a special 
court-martial) should give a  verbal description of  such an  object. 
31 this way  all  parties to the trial have  an  opportunity to advise 
in regard to the description if they are not satisfied therewith, 
and appellate agencies ail1 have  a clear word-picture  of  the  item 
as the  court  saw it.  Appendix 8a  also provides an  orderly procedure 
for the  disposition of  exhibits.  The  reporter will  keep a list 
of  the numbers  or letters of  exhibits offered for identification by each side,  and when  an exhibit is finally admitted into evidence, 
the words  "for  identificationl1 are merely stricken frm  the exhibit.  , 
";  In this way,  it will be  clear throughout the trial,  and  in the re-  r 
cord for the benefit of  a  reviewer,  exactly what  exhibit was  being 
considered by the court at  any .point  during the trial  without the  , 
necessity of  setting up a  parallel reference table. 
"Parties to  the trial1' is a  new  term  coined to simplify the 
record of  proceedings when  a  court opens after  an adjournment, 
closed session,  or otherwise.  It permits trial counsel to show 
briefly for the record that no  one  is absent who  should be there. 
In the ordinary case,  there will  be no  exceptions,  particularly as 
to members  of  the court whose  absence must be  shown  to have been  the 
result of  challenge,  physical disability,  or order of  the convening 
authority (see paragraph 41cl(4)),  but it does not prevent absence of 
an individual who  is not required to  be  there at  all  times,  for ex- 
ample,  an assistant counsel who  is interrogating a witness.  However, 
the reason for absence after arraignment is to be  set forth in the 
record. 
Hef  erence to convening authori  ty.--All  problems which are re- 
ferred to the convening authority are referred by him  to his staff 
judge  advoczte or legal officer and this includes not only questions 
arising during trial but those which may  arise before or after trial. 
See pragraph 52.  A  common  example  of  such a  problem  is that which 
arises when  a  court finds substantial evidence offered it tending 
to prove  the accused guilty of  an offense other than tkt charged. 
Of  course,  the court may  proceed with the trial and in the example 
given  in paragraph  55=,  acquit the accused of  stealing the watch, 
thereafter reporting the matter to the convening authority;  or it 
might suspend  trial  and refer the matter to  the convening  authority, 
" 
whose  staff judge  advocate should recommend  withdrawal of  the charge 
from  the court and preparation of  new  cherges,  reinvestigation of 
new  specifications,  and referral to another court.  See  paragraph 5521 
Records of  trial.--Appendices  9  and 10 set forth a  guide for 
the preparation of  records of  trial  which differ,  not because  they 
involve a  general or special court,  but only because  they represent 
a  verbatim or summarized record.  As  a  practical matter,  a  verbatim 
record is made  in all  cases of  the type which must be fomrrded to 
The  Judge Advocate  General and any such record should appear in 
. the form set forth in appendix 9g, b,  and 2, arranged with the allied 
papers  in accordance with appendix 9gy and additional copies made 
in accordance with 92.  A  special court-martial in which the sen- 
tence adjudged does not affect a  general or fkg  officer or involve  4 
a  bad  conduct discharge need not be  forwarded to The  Judge Advocate 
General nor  need  the testimony be  set forth verbatim;  when  directed 
by the convening authority pursuant to  paxagraph 7,  a  reporter need F 
not be used and such a  record may  be summarized and arranged as 
.  set forth in appendix 10.  Whatever  form the final record may  take, 
however,  the procedure during trial  will be that set  forth in 
appendix 8g. 
Whether  the authentication required is that for a  genera.1 
courtrmartial--i.e.,  by the law officer and president,  or of  a 
special court-martial--president  and trial counsel,  the record is 
prepared by the trial counsel,  and it  may  be kept or written by 
him  or by a  rc  porter acting under  his direction.  He  will insure 
that all  required accompanying papers are securely bound wi.th the 
record of  trial and. tba t  the necessary forms--such  as  the chronology 
and data  sheets--are  initiated,  exhibits attached,  and so on,  in 
accorda.nce with appendices 9g and lob.  Each  accused is entitled to 
an authenticsted copy of  the record and in general and  special court- 
martial cases in which  the sentence ad.judged affects a  general or 
flag officer or extends  to death,  dismissal,  dishonorable or bad 
con.duct  discharge,  or conf inenient for a  year or more,  the reporter 
will  prepare an original and two  copies of  each record and of  all 
docurrlentary  exhibits received in evidence besides those made  for 
each accused.  In addition to  this a  convening authority ,nay direct 
additional copies at  his discretion.  See  49b(2). 
P3rzgraphs 82d and 82g(l) set forth provisions concerning re- 
cords of  trial  which must,  for security reasons,  be  classified. 
Records  should never be c1assiTie.d for such reasons as  obscenity 
and  the like,  even though the court may  have  excluded  the public 
from tne trial,  but should be  classified only for reasons of  se- 
curity required by departmental regulations.  If the accused1  s 
copy of  the record contains matter recyiring security protection, 
it is forwarded to the convening authority who  withdraws  therefrom 
matter requiring security protection and then returns the expurgated 
copy of  the accused to him  with a  certificate that certain matter 
has been deleted and,  in the case of  a  general courtrmartial,  that 
the  conplete record may  be inspected in the files of  The  Judge 
Advocz te General. 
AppenZix 8s  covers proceedings  in revisj-on and 9& shows  a  certi- 
ficate of  correction.  Revision procedure is that which takes place 
after final  adjounment in  a  case when  the court reconvenes and 
reconsiders any action it has taken.  A  certificate of  correction 
of  the record is  merely a formal way  of  making  a  change  in the re- 
cord to  make  it conform  to a  fact which actually occurred during 
the trial.  However,  errors of  transcription and the like are ordi- 
narily corrected by trial counsel prior to authentication of  the 
record and,  frequently, as a  result of  suggestions from defense counsel who,  when  pmcticable,  should be permitted  to examine  the 
record.  See  paragraph $22.  Errors may  also be  c,orrected at  the 
time of,  and by those who  perfon,  authentication of  the record. Conference 5b  - 
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DUTIES  OF  LATi  OFFISER 
3  9  Status of  law officer.  In determining the status of  the law 
officer,  the following testimony,  which  was  presented by  a member 
of  the drafting committee  to the Senate Subcommittee  which  con- 
sidered the Uniform  Code  of Xilitary Justice,  is  helpful: 
"Article  26  and Article 27  deserve special mention. 
The  former,  which provides  for a law officer on general 
courts-martial,  changes  the practice of the Navy whi ch 
has  heretofore had no  judge  on  its courts.  It also 
changes  the practice of  the Army,  which has  had a  law 
member,  in that t5is official toill now  act solely as  a 
iudm and not as a member  of  the court, which becomes  "  "  - 
much  like a civilian jury.  * *  * Another  example  of 
uniformity is found  in Article 51,  which  covers the 
question of  voting and rulings.  As  set out by the pro- 
vision of  the Articles,  the law officer now  becomes 
more  nearly an impartial judge  in the manner  of  civilian 
courts.  * * *"  (Underscoring supplied.) 
Similar testimony was  presented to the Subcodttee of  the House 
Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Because  the legislative intent is  so 
clear on  this point,  the law officer has been charged generally 
with the responsibility for the fair and  orderly conduct of  the 
proceedings . 
The  president of  a general court-martial,  with few listed 
exceptions  in  paragraph 40b(l),  is assigned a position similar to 
that of  the foreman of  a jGy.  However,  it is  provided that he  is 
to be  consulted as to the time  of  trial as he  should be  familiar 
with the military situation and the availability of  personnel. 
There  was  some  objection to  relegating the president of a general 
court to this comparatively insignificant position.  It was  con- 
tended that he  could not maintain his dignity or the dignity of 
the proceedings  unless he were  assigned the usual prerogatives 
of  a presiding officer of  the court.  On  the other hand,  it 
appeared that the average line officer does  not wish to  perform legal or quasi-legal  duties.  %rther,  it appeared desirable to 
eliminate the embarassing possibility that a ruling of  the presi- 
dent,  purportedly as presiding  officer, would be ovsrruled by 
the.law officer by  virtue of  his power  to rule finally on  almost 
all interlocutory questions. 
40b,  Continuances.  As the law officer rules finally on the 
585,  question of  continuances  during tri  a1 ,  thes  a  paragraphs  pr  odds 
59-  that he is to be  consulted by the president of  6~  general court- 
martial  as to the time  of  trial.  It is contemplated that the 
law officer may,  in  an  appropriate case,  conduct an out-of-court 
hearing prior to  the commencement  of  the trial as to a  request 
for postponement,  the taking of  a deposition,  or any similar 
matter.  Hia  decision at such a hearing will  not be final and 
the aggrieved party may  raise the question again in  open  court 
in order that the question and ruling may  be made  a matter of 
record. 
62f,  Challenges.  Although not a member  of  the court,  the law 
g,T;  officer maybe challenged for cause under Article 41.  However, 
T2T  the general legal qualifications of  the law officer are not a 
proper subject of  inquiry under  a challenge for cause.  If his 
eligibility is  made  a subject of  challenge the only grounds are 
his prior participation in  the same  case and  the four enumerated 
in  paragi-aph 62g.  Fishing expeditions are not permitted.  To 
insure the prot&tion'of  the law officer in  this respect, it is 
provided that the law officer will oontinue to  rule on  intsr- 
locutory questions which may  arise during an inquiry into his 
own  eligibility (6Zh(2) ) . These  rather stringent rules were 
inserted beoause  of-the  past experience of  the Army  and the Air 
Force in cases in which  the law member  has been  embarrassed by 
an  unneoessary and unwarranted  inquiry into 'his general legal 
education.  Some  such inquiries,  usually limited only by the 
rulings  of  r  president who  mas  no  match  for clever counsel,  have 
gone .soh  as to require the law member  to answer myriad hypo- 
thetical questions of  law for hours--sometimes  days.  In some 
cases,  this harassment' was  renewed each time the law member 
ruled adversely to  the defense.  Such chicanery has  now  been 
laid to rest. 
57  Interlocutory questions.  The  procedure  for ruling on 
interlocutory questions is  completely new  to the Navy.  The 
procedure  set forth in the manual  is-new in part to  the Army 
and Air Force.  In a  general court-martial,  the law officer 
has been given about the same  pmrs  with respect to  inter- 
locutory questions as the judge  of  a civilian court.  One 
restriction on his powers  is the fact that his ruling is not 
final if it involves the question of  insanity or a motion for 
a  finding of  not guilty.  bother restriction-an  empty  one-- is  the provision that he may  not  rule upon  challenges.  As  to 
the matter of challenges,  appendix 8a  permits the law offioer 
(president of  a special court-martiar)  to rule initially  when 
it is  manifest that a challenge for cause muld be sustained. 
Without  this provision,  a void would be  oreated in the pro- 
ceedings whenever  a challenge for cause was  made. 
The  law officer may  in a proper  case oonduct hearings 
outside the presence  or view  of  the members  of  the court; 
examine  proffered documents  outside the view of  the members 
of  the  court;  recess the court to hear argument,  conduct 
research,  or oonsider written briefs,  motions,  requests, 
etc.,  submitted by  counsel. 
The  Federal  rule in this respect is  that the trial judge 
is tci determine the admissibility of  evidence,  but there is 
no  hard and fast rule that the jury must  be  withdrawn when  the 
question of  admissibility is  being  explored.  For  example,  if 
the preliminary evidenoe  has  no bearing on  the guilt or inno- 
cence  of the accused,  the jury need not be  excused.  It is 
considered better practice,  however,  for the jury to retire 
when  the preliminary testimony may  influence the jury  on  an 
issue which is to be  determined by it  (~ierman  v.  U.S.  (1930), 
46  F.  2d  46;  BBcNabb  v.  U.S.  (1943),  318 U.S.332,  338x1,  346). 
The  manual gives the law officer more  discretion than is 
permitted the  judge  of  a Federal court by  including the rule 
that,  except for hearing arguments  on  proposed  additional 
instructions: 
"*  *  *  there is  no  requirement  in courts-martial 
that the law officer conduct any hearings out  af  the 
presence  of  the menbers  of  the court." 
Thus,  it is completely within the discretion of  the law officer 
whether  he  shall hold out-of-court  hearings.  However,  if 
the offered evidence is admitted,  the law officer must  giw 
both sides an opportunity to present in  open court any compe- 
tent evidenoe  affedting the might to  be  given to the admitted 
evidenoe  (e.g.,  see 140a,  Conf'essione  and  admissions.)  If the 
offered evidenoe  is  denied admission  counsel  may not present 
the preliminary  evihnce in open court as the question of 
whether the law officer's ruling denying  admisoion is correot 
can be  determined by  the reviewing  authorities *om  an examin- 
ation of  the appellate exhibits.  Counsel  and the law offioer 
will $ake  appropriate action to insure that the record contain8 
the appellate exhibits and that the appellate exhibits contain 
the offer and the ruling thereon.  The  term "appellate exhibit" 
has been  given to an exhibit which has been attached to  the 
record for the consideration of  the reviewing authorities. Rules as to when  and how  out-of-court  conferences are to be 
recorded are set forth in paragraph 57g( 2)  Examples  of  the 
manner  of  conducting such hearings arFin  appendix 8a.  - 
57~  0)  If the members  of  the court are to vote on  an inter- 
locutory question,  the law officer may  give the court such 
instructions as will better enable the members  to understand 
the question they are to determine.  Mote  also the provision 
of  this same  paragraph that the law officer will rule finally 
as to whether a member  can properly object to his ruling. 
Thia  provision was  inserted to  prevent  unnecessary and un- 
seemly wrangling betmen the court and the law officer as to 
whether  the court has  a right to object to,  or  vote on,  a 
particular  ruling of  the law officer, 
Meaning  of  term "court.n  It  was  oonsidered unduly burden- 
some  to repeat in every instance involving an interlocutory 
question that the  law officer of  a  general  court-martial  or 
the president of  a  special court-martial would  rule.  Accordingly, 
the manual  states in many  instances that a particular question 
is to  be decided by the "oourt."  Notwithstanding  such statements, 
if the question is an  interlocutory one,  the law officer or 
president will  rule as indicated in paragraph 57. 
Instructi  ng  the court--general . The  law officer (  presi- 
dent of a special court-martial)  is required by Article 510 
to charge the oourt as to the presumption  of  innocence,  thz rule 
of  reasonable doubt,  and the burden  of  proof.  This  charge is 
to  be given in  the words  of  the article (bpp.  8a).  In addition 
the law officer (president) is to "instruct the-court  as to the 
elements  of the offense."  These  instructions and  charges must 
be given in every case--even  those in  which the aocused has 
pleaded  guilty. 
Instructing the court--elements  of the offense.  Tha meaning 
of  the phrase,  "instruct the cou*  as to the elements  of  the 
offense'  is  nut  clearly indicated in  the legislative history. 
The  draf'ting  oommittee  referred to  A.W.  31 and to proposed AGB, 
Artiole 24,  and stated:  "This  article is  derived from AW 31." 
A.W.  31 did not  contain the phrase in  question.  Proposed AGN, 
Article 24,  me  similar to Rule 30,  Federal Rulee  of  Criminal 
Procedure,  in that it required the judge advocate (Navy name  for 
law offioer) "in open  court,  to instruct the court upon  the law 
of  the casein  It must be concluded,  therefore,  that Congress  did 
not intend to  adopt the Federal rule that "instruotion on  the 
law" of the case will be  given,  but rather that it intended to 
adopt a much  less burdensome  rule.  The  above  conolusion is further 
bolstered by the fact that, as Article 51c makes  no  distinction 
between the powers  and  duties of  the presTdent  of a special court- 
martial and the law officer, it is olear that Congress  intended the president and  the law officer to  give the same  Instructions 
as to the elements  of the offense.  As  the president is not 
=equired to be a lawyer  or to  have  legal training or  experience, 
it is  also clear that the instruction as to the elements  of the 
offense must be limited to mterial that is within the knowledge 
of  the average  line officer.  Accordingly,  the manual  provides 
that the requirements  of  Article 51c,  with respect to instruct- 
ing the court as to the  elements  of-the  offense,  will be met 
if the instruction includes nothing more  than a  reading of  the 
pertinent  subparagraph entitled  r roof" which  appears  in the 
discussion of  each of  the punitive articles (~pp.  8a).  Thus, 
to instruct the  court as to the elements  of the offznse of 
bribery (Art.  134),  the law officer  (president of  a  special 
court)  properly could advise the court that it may  find the 
accused guilty if it finds: 
"(a)  xhat the  accused  did or failed to do  the acts,  as 
alleged;  and  (b) the circums  tames as specified." 
The  president of  a special court-martial should always  follow 
this procedure  in instructing as to the elements  of  proof. 
Admittedly,  such instruction as to the elements  of  an of- 
fense serves only one  purpose:  It calls the attention of  the 
court to the dimxssion of  the punitive article concerned.  In 
fact, it is a  good  practice for the law officer (president of  a 
special court-martial)  specifically to invite the  court  1 s attention 
to the pertinent paragraph.  However,  the law officer is not pre- 
cluded from amplifying his instruction as to  the elements  of  the 
offense.  He  may  feel that such amplification is neoessary, 
especially with respect to offenses  laid under Article 133 or 
134,  as only a few offenses under  Article 134 contain a detailed 
statement  of  the  elements  of  proof.  If he  believes  amplified 
instructions to be  necessary,  he may usually derive the essential 
elements  of  proof--actually  the essentiel facts to be proven-- 
from  the specification itself.  Thus,  to instruct the court as 
to the elements  of  proof  of  the offense of  careless discharge 
of  a firearm (a rifle) under  Article 134,  the law officer might 
advise the court that it may  find the accused guilty if it findsr 
"(a)  That,  at  the time and place alleged in the speci- 
fication,  the 5ccused  discharged a rifle,  (b) that suoh 
dis  charge resulted from the carelessness of  the accused, 
and  (0) that,  under  the circumstances,  the conduct  of 
the accused was  to the prejudice of  good  order and  dis- 
oipline in the armed  forces or  was  of  a nature to  bring 
discredit upon the amied  forces  .* 
Note  that, if the la;w officer instructs in the  language  of  the 
specification,  he  should include in his instruction as to  the 1 
4 
elements  an offense laid under  the first two  clauses of  Article  1 
134 the natter indicated in (c) above.  Similarly,  with respect 
' 
to offenses laid under  Article 133,  the instruction in the 
language  of  the speoification should conclude with: 
"That,  under the circumstances,  the accusedfs act or 
omission was  unbecoming  an officer and  a gentleman." 
The  manual  does  not contain the usual subparagraph =Proofn as 
' 
to  crimes  and offenses not  capital laid under  the third olause 
of Article 134.  These  offenses will be rare and the instructions 
as to the elements thereof  should be  prepared with care.  Ordi- 
narily,  counsel should be  asked to submit  proposed  instructions 
as to the elements.  The  trial counsel should be  able to furnish 
the correct elements as the staff judge  advocate  or legal of'ficer, 
at the time  he  referred such a charge to trial, ehould have 
advised the trial counsel  of  the  elements  of  the offense. 
730  -  Instructing the court--additi onal  instructi  ons . The  report 
of  the Senate Committee  on  Armed Services (Sen.  Rap.  No.  486, 
81st Cong.  1st ~ess.) contains the folkwing comment with 
respect to Article 510:  - 
"~ubdivision  (a) prescribes that the  law officer of  a 
general court-martial  and  the president of  a special 
court-martial  shall instruct the court as to the ale- 
ments  of  the offense and  charge the court on presumption 
of  innocence,  reasonable  doubt  as to guilt,  reasonabh 
doubt  as to degree  of  guilt,  and burden  of  proof.  This 
subdivision sets out  the minimum  requirements as to the 
scope  of  the instructions.  It will  not prevent him 
from charging on  additional  rules of  law hich  are ger- 
mane  to the case." 
The  following remarks  with respect to  the position of  the 
law officer appear  at page  1387 ff of  the Congressional Record 
of  2  February 1950 (~ol.  96,  No.  23)  t 
"MR.  KEFAUVER.  * * * It ahould be  pointed out 
that under  article 51 the court will  have  the benefit 
of the law officerfs instructions on  the elements of 
the offense,  the presumption  of  innocence,  and the 
burden of  proof,  and that the same  article does  not 
prevent him  from giving further instructionls on  other 
appropriate matters.  * * * 
"The  Wavy  has  never  had a  law member  or' a law 
officer.  Under  the Army system,  +he  law member  would 
retire with the court and would advise the court and 
vote with it.  So  this is  a oompromise  between the Navy 
procedure  and  the Amy  procedure. * * * "Answering  more  directly the question of  the dis- 
tinguished Senator from Missouri,  it seems  to me  that 
following the jury conoept in  the matter is a pretty 
safe thing to do.  The  law officer is distinguished 
from a member  of the oourt,  and he must be  a lawyer. 
He instructs the court on the reoord.  * * * 
"Thir  is  merely getting a little closer to  the 
civilian approach in court-martial  proceeding.  . It 
approaches  the judge  idea,  I think in its  general 
tendency and general aim the pending bill, while not 
going  overboard in attempting to adopt  civilian tech- 
nique,  is an attempt to bring the system a  little 
further into harmony with civilian methods.  This 
method  of  having  the law officer instruct,  and  what 
he  says appear on  the record,  and not retire and not 
vote with the court,  is  exactly what  is  done  in ci- 
vilian trials before juries  today.  * * * 
"We  believe the one  particular advantage our 
proposal  has  over  the procedure whereby the lm  offioer 
retires with the members  of  the court into executive 
session,  is that whatever  the law officer may  say will 
be  on  the record,  so that the reviewing authorities 
may  see what  his attitude about the matter was  and 
what  he  had  to say about it." 
Fram the foregoing, it is clear that Congress  intended to 
permit the law officer and the pres%dent of  a special court- 
martial to give instructions additional to  those required by 
Article  51c.  Likewise.  it is clear that neither the law  -  -  .-  -  - 
officer nor the president of  a special oourt-martial  is required 
to give  rauch  additional instructions.  If  it is  necessanr for 
Y 
the president of a  special oourt-martial  to  give additiokl 
instructions (e.g.,  as to a lesser included offense),  he may 
do  so in  closed session,  off the record. 
Paragraph 73c  permits the law offioer to give additional 
instructions "when  he  deems it necBssary or  desirable."  In 
giving additional instructions on  the whole  case or on  a  par- 
ticular point,  the law officer should not violate the rules 
pertaining to proper  comment  by a Federal  trial judge.  These 
rules are outlined in  broad general tern in  73c(1).  Although 
the Federal rules permit  comment  on the guilt OF innocence  of 
the accused in "extraordinary cases,'  the law officer should not 
make  such comment  in  any case.  In this oonnection,  note in 
appendix 8a the concluding instruction that is to be  given by 
the law ofTicer.  This  concluding  instruction eliminates the 
need  for the law officer to  waste the time  of  the court in 
giving it the usual  stock instructions as to  reasonable  doubt, 
circumstantial evidence,  etc.  It also emphasizes  the fact that 
the court is  the  sole agenoy for the determination of the f aota 
in the case. Although not so provided in the Manual,  the law officer 
should advise counsel m11 in advance  of  the conclusion of  the 
case if he  intends to call upon  them  for proposed instructions. 
Similarly,  upon  request  of  counsel,  he  should advise them 
prior to the time  of  their closing arguments  what,  if any, 
instructions he  intends to givs the court. 
The following  rules might  well  be adopted by  the law officer 
in giving additional instructions : 
a.  Recognize  the fact that the members  of  the court usually 
are more  experienced in legal matters than ie the 
average civilian jury,  and that it may  consult the 
manual  in closed session. 
b.  Don't  gim any additional instructions unless they 
are "necessary  or desirablen to  aid the court in 
making  its  findings. 
c.  In lieu of  giving instructions on  a oertain point, 
the law officer properly may  invite the court' s at- 
tention to  appropriate portions  of  the manual  and 
note in the record that a copy  of  the manual  is 
available for the court's  examination. 
d.  If  additional instructions are given,  they should be 
-  given in the language of  the manual  whenever  possible. 
e.  In lieu of  giving additional instructions before the 
court closes to  make  its  findings,  advise the court 
that under paragraph  74e it may  open  and request 
additional instructionsdif  it is  in  doubt as to  the 
applicability of  the law or the effect of  certain evi- 
dence. 
f.  Most  important,  in  determining whether  to give additional 
instructions,  and in giving them, keep  in  mind the 
injunction of paragraph  39a:  4 * *  he  (the law officer) 
should not be tempted to txe unneces'sary  display of 
learning or a premature  judgment." 
FINDINGS  AND  SENTENCE 
74x'  -  Form  of  finding.  The  provision of  Article 39  that the law 
officer and the reporter may  be  called before the court for the 
purpose  of  putting the findings in  proper form is  new.  Any 
discussion between  the court and the law officer at  thia tim 
is to be recorded verbatim.  The  law officer should put the 
findings in proper  form in any case in  which  findings by exceptions and  substitutions are made.  If, after conferring 
with the president,  the law officer is in doubt as  to  what 
offense the court intended to  find,  he  should give it proper 
instructions,  and  advise the court to close and reconsider  its 
findings, and to make  a new  finding that is not ambiguous, 
Howver,  if  there is  a clear indication that the court has 
found the accused not guilty of a particular offense, it can- 
not thereafter,  under  the guise of  clarifying an  ambiguous 
finding,  find tne accused guilty of  that offense. 
Previous  convictions.  The  rule for determining admissible 
previous  convictions--a  compromise  solution--is  new  to all the 
armed  forces.  It will apply to any case involving an  accused 
who  is convicted of  an  offense  committed  on  and  after 31 May 
1951.  Certain ex post facto matters affecting the Army  and 
Air Force are treatedinthe conference on  the executive order, 
Only those convictions of offenses committed within three 
years  of  the commission  of  an  offense  of  which  convicted may be 
considered.  As  a neneral rule,  the previous convictions must  - 
relate to offenses  committed  during  current enlistment, 
voluntary extension of  enlistment,  etc.  The  term nvoluntary 
extension of  enlistment" pertains to present Navy  enlistment 
procedures  (~rts.  C-1406  and  C-10304,  BUPERS  ~anual). Such 
a "voluntary  exteneion of  enlistment"  creates a new  enlistment 
for the purpose  of  determining whether  previous  convictions 
are admissible.  Note  the following exceptions to the general 
rule : 
a.  To  prevent  oonsideration of  previous convictions for 
offenses  committed  in  a  prior period of  service,  the prior 
period of  service must  have  terminated honorably.  Thus,  if 
the accused received an  administrative discharge which was 
other than  "honorable,"  any convictions for offenses  committed 
during the period so terminated  could be  considered if they 
are within the three-year  limitation, 
b.  If  a current enlistment or period of  service is 
extended by  act of  law,  such as the Service Extension Act  of 
1941 or the Extension of  Enlistments Act  of  1950,  a new 
enlistment or period of  service is not created.  ~hurin  the 
case of a man  whose  enlistment normally would  have  expired on 
31 August  1950 but who  was  retained in the service by  virtue 
of  the Xxtension of  Enlistments Act  of  1950,  a conviction of 
an offense committed in  June, 1950 could be  considered at a 
trial at  which  he was  convicted of  an offense committed  in 
June  1951. 
743  4)  Maximum  punishment.  The  accused may  be  found guilty of 
all offenses arising out of  the same  transaction,  regardless of  wfiether  such offenses are separate.  It  follows that the 
convening authority need not  disapprove  a finding of guilty 
of one  specification merely because it alleges the sane  offense 
alleged in  a  companion  specification.  Under  this rule,  an 
accused could be found  of  both a principal offense and 
an  offense lesser included therein. 
76a(8)  -  Although  he maybe found  guilty of  all offenses arising 
out  of  one  transaction,  the accused may be punished only for 
separate offenses.  These  two  rules are taken,  generally,  from 
the decisions  of  the Federal courts.  The  mle that offenses 
are separate if  each offense requires proof  of  an element not 
required to prove  the other is commonly  referred to  as the 
"~lockburgsr  rule,  having been  taken from  the opinion of  the 
Supreme  Court in  Blockburger  v.  United States (1932),  284 U.S. 
299. 
Both  of the foregoing  rules are new  to  all the armed 
forces.  The  Army and Air Force  previously have  followed the 
rule that,  although the accused could be  found guilty of  any 
number  of  specificatioiis alleging offenses arising out  of  one 
transaction,  he  could be  punished only with "reference to the 
act or omission in its  most  important aspect."  See KCX, 1949, 
par.  80a.  The  "most  important  aspectn rule is  stated in Naval 
Courts Znd  Boards  (~ec.  451),  but it is considered advisory 
only.  The  Navy  has  recently commenced  to follow the Block- 
burger rule,  but,  instead of  applying it to the sentence as 
it is applied by  the Federal courts,  has  applied the rule to 
the findings.  Thus,  if an accused were  convicted of  a single 
larceny charged in  multiple specifications (200a(7)),  the 
present Navy rule would  require the disapproval-of  findings  of 
guilty of  all but one  specification.  Applying  the rule an- 
nounced  in  paragraph 76a(8) to such a case,  an  accused legally 
could be  found  guilty 07 each of  the multiple specifications 
alleging the single larceny,  but the sentence would  be  limited 
to that authorized for one  specification (the one  authorizing 
the most  severe sentence).  One  of the principal reasons for 
adopting the Blockburger rule is  that we  may  now  look to the 
Federal courts for preoedent.  It  will also eliminate the need 
for unnecessary corrective a.ction by  reviewing  authorities in 
that,  if  the sentence is supported by  a  good  specification, it 
will be  unnecessary to deternine whether  the offenses are 
separate. 
Rt3  SI  ON  PROCEDURE 
80  There  is  nothing new  in the procedure as to revision of  a 
record of  trial except for the requirement that all personnel-- including counsel for both sides,  the law officer,  and  the 
accused--must  be pressnt.  This requirement resulted from the 
wording  of  Article 39,  With  respect to  membership  of  the 
court,  the procedure is the same  as that now  in existence in 
all  the armed  forces.  That  is, new  members  may not be added 
to  the court for revision proceedings.  However,  new  counsel 
and new  law officers may  be appointed for the purpose of  the 
revision proceedings.  If they are so appointed,  it is  not 
necessary that the record of  trial be  read to them.  It is 
sufficient if they familiarize themselves with those portions 
of  the record which will enable them  to carry out their duties, 
if any. 
8  1  The  hy4ir  rehearing procedure  was  adopted.  Rehearings, 
5y that name,  are new  to the Navy  but the actual proceedings 
are similar to the Navy's  present  new  trial provisions  (Sec. 
477,  NC  &  B).  It is provided that the law officer (president 
of  a  special cart-martial) may  examine the record of the 
original hearing if necessary to  enable him  to rule properly 
upon  the questions arising at the rehearing.  This provision 
permits the law officer (president of  a  special court-martial) 
to  examine the review of the staff judge  advocate or legal 
officer or the decision of  the board  of  review or  Court  of 
Military Appeals  if  they are atiached to the record.  Note 
also that a part of  the record,  including the review of  the 
staff judge  advocate  or 1  egal officer or the decision of  the 
board  of  review or Court  of  Military Appeals,  may  be  read to 
the court when  necessary for it to pass  on a  ruling made  sub- 
ject to objection under Artioh 51b.  - 
Oneproarisionthatisnewtoall the forces ie 
permits the trial counsel to advise the 
adjudged at the original trial.  This  advice is 
the court may  not adjudge a sentence in 
than that adjudged at the original hearings (krt.  63).  i Conference 52 
ARRAIGWNT-PLEAS  AND  MOTIONS 
Conducted by 
LT.  COL.  WALD-  A.  SOU 
References : Chapter XI,  Paragraph 65 
Chapter  XII,  Paragraphs  66-71 
Appendix 2,  Articles 43,  44,  45,  62,  63,  6%  675 
Appendix  8%  Arraignment 
65  Arraignment,.-Paragraph  65 was  taken without too much  change 
from paragraph 62,  MCX  1949.  Arraignment  is the procedure which 
begins the trial proper.  It consists of  reading or otherwise 
bringing to the attention of  the  court and  the accused the charges 
upon  which  he  is to be  tried and calling upon  him  to  plead. 
This is consistent with Rule 10,  Federal Wes  of  Criminal 
Procedure.  Procedural cbeviations  from this procedure  do  not 
necessarily affect the validity of  the arraignment.  See  CM  335328, 
Scott,  2  BR-JC  ll5, Garland v.  Washin&on,  232  U.S.  6-42. 
In most  courh~a.rtial  jurisdictions it has been customary 
to prepare,  in advance,  copies of  the charges and  specifications 
and  to distribute them  to the members  of  the court,  the accused, 
and counsel.  In most  cases this was  done  before  maignment-- 
Lidiately  when  the court assembled  for the trial of  the case. 
This custom permitted the members  to examine the charges prior 
to challenges.  This enabled them  to recognize more  readily 
whether grounds for chdlenge existed than would be  possible 
from the trial counsel~s  oral statement of  the general nature 
of  the charges.  Hmver,  when  specifications which  had been 
witlidram  or which mre about to be  no1 prossed come  to  the 
attention of  the cmrt this practice resulted in  possible un- 
fairness to the  accused.  Consequently,  the new manual  prov5-des 
that the copies of  charges and  specifications will  be  distributed 
to the court at the tim of  arraignment.  No  charges or specific* 
tions which  have  been  ordered withdrawn  should be  shown  the 
court,  nor should the accused be  arraigned on  them.  If,  at the 
time  of  arraignment,  a member  discovers a cause for challenge 
against him which  he  had  not disclosed,  he  should of  course 
disclose it at this time. 
* 
',? 
If you  look at Appendix 85 you will note that inmediately 
after the trial counsel asks the accused ham  he  pleads,  he 
will  say: Wefore receiving your pleas,  I advise you that any 
motions  to dismiss any charge  or to grant other &lief 
should be  made  at this time," 
This  of  course  stems from the rules me  am  about to consider-- 
namely,  that motions  are generally made  prior to pleas. 
CHAPTER  XII-PLEAS  AND MOTIONS 
The  Xorgan  Cormnitbe which  drafted the Unifom Code  in- 
dicated that the chapter in the 194.9 manual dealing vdth the 
procedure  for raising special defenses and  objections by 
motions vias  approved by  the Camittee as a  sound basis for a 
similar provision to appear in the regulations implementing 
the code,  The  1949 manual abolished special pleas-pleas  in 
abetement  and pleas in  bar,  In lieu'  thereof  the procedure 
prescribed by Rules 11  and 12,  Federal Rules  of  Criminal 
Procedure,  were adopted insofar as practicable  for court-martidl 
practice,  Briefly stated the reasans advanced for the change 
in  the  supporting mmorandm  for Chapter XIII of  the 1949 
manual  were : 
1.  Article of  Har 38  LvJhich  is similar to Article 3g 
in  giving the President the authority to prescribe procedural 
rules,  announced the general legislative policy that those 
rules should,  so far as practicable,  follow the rules of 
Federal District courts for the trial of  criminal cases. 
2.  Special pleas,  as  such,  are rarely used in modern 
civilian jurisdictions,  and it was  believed that most 
military lawyers  with a civilian background  would be more 
familiar with rules similar to those used  in  Federal courts, 
3,  Colonel Winthmp  had  stated many years ago  that 
comnon  law special pleas had no  place in  military 
jurisprudence,  and that,  although labeled special pleas, 
these matters had really been treated as motions. 
66  In parwaph 66,  the  general paragraph,  it is stated that 
pleas in  courts-nartial procedure  are  pleas of  guilty,  not guilty, 
and pleas corresponding to permissiblp findings of  lesser in- 
cluded offenses or findings by  exceptions and substitutions. 
The  matter of  entering a plea of  guilty to a lesser included 
offense is new to the Navy  but it is clearly consistent with the 
legislative jntent as expressed in the commentary to  Article 45. Consideration was  given to authorizing the plea of -  nolo 
cmtende*  which is used  in  Federal procedure  and which is also 
authorized in present naval pnactico  (%c.  412,  NC  &  B).  The 
purpose  of  this plea is to  avoid any adnission of  guilt which 
might  be  used as an  admission in a civil proceedings.  It was 
not adopted,  however. 
1,  During the House  Hearings  the representative of 
the Department  of  Defense  told the House  committee that 
it-  would not be  used  (p.  1054)~ 
2.  There is considerable  authority in the adjudicated 
cases that a sentence adjudged under  such a plea does not 
amount  to a conviction.  Thus  in Olzewski v.  Goldberg,  223 
Mass.  27,  it was  held that such a sentence could not be 
used as a basis for impeaching  the credibility of  a witness 
on the grounds  of  a cmviction of  a felony.  It was  also 
feared that such cases could not be  used as a ltprevious 
 conviction^^  in  -the consideration of  a sentence adjudged 
at a later trial. 
If the accused wishes  to protect himself  against the admission 
merent in a plea of  ,guilty  with respect to liability in a 
civil suit,  he  might  accomplish that  result by  entering a plea 
of  not guilty or by standing mute.  If lie  does not wish  to contest 
the prosecutionts case he  need not  introduce any evidence. 
67  Paragraph 67  follows Rule  12b.  It provides that any defense 
or objection which is capable of  determination without trial of 
the general issue may  be  raised either before trial,  by reference 
to the convening authority,  or by motion to  the court before a 
plea is entered. 
At the conference  on  the 1949 Uanual  a question was  raised 
as to  whether reference  to the convening authority before trial 
precludes renewal of  the motion to  the court.  The  new  manual 
makes it clear that reference to the  convening  authority is 
without prejudice to renewal  of  the assertion by motion  to the 
court. 
67a  -  Defenses  and objections which may  be  raised.-  Rule  12g 
divides  these pretrial motions  into 2 categories--+hose  which  . 
be raised before a plea,  and those which must  be  raised before 
a plea.  The manual  uses the same  headings. 
The motions which  may  be  raised before plea are those 
previously treated as pleas in bar,  such as statute of  lhitation~t' 2, 
former  jeopardy,  pardon,  constructive condonation of  desertion, 
promised  immunity,  lack of  jurisdiction,  or failure of  the 
chazges  to allege any offense.  Such matters may  be  raised at 
any time  during  the trial,  although it is better practice to raise 
them  before ples.  However,  with certain exceptions,  if they  are not 
raised during the hearing they are deemed waived.  Of  course, 
lack of  jurisdiction  or failure of  the charges to allege an 
offense render the whole  proceedings  wid and  such  objection 
cannot be  waived at any time. 
67b,  Defenses and  ob.iections which must  be raised.-'his 
paragraph  follows Rule 12&(2) and deals with matters which must 
be  raised before pleas or be  considered waived.  Generally these 
are the matters which were  considered proper  as pleas in 
abatement.  lhey are formal defects which,  for any reason, 
.interfere mith the proper preparation for trial  by  the accused. 
These matters include defects in  the preferring of  charges, 
reference for trial,  form  of  the charges and  specifications, 
and  defects in any pretrial proceeding.  Failure to assert any 
such  objection before  a plea is entered coristitutes a mver, 
but in accordance with Rule  12,  the  court may  for good  cause 
shorn grant relief from the waiver. 
672  Form  and content of  motion.-This  is substantially similar 
to paza~aph  64%  bICM  1949,  In  accordance with the expressed 
legislative intent, it is  made mandatory that an accused not 
represented by  counsel be  advised of  any apparently available 
defense  or objection 
The  substance  of  the motion,  not the form,  is controlling. 
Time  of motion. -This  paragraph  dXf  erent  iate  s between  the 
motions  discussed above  and  those predicated upon  the evidence, 
such as a motion for a finding of  not guilty,  or a motion  to 
dismiss on  grounds of rs  judicata.  These  lattex motions  are 
made  either at  the close of  the prosecution's case or at the 
close of  all  the evidence. 
672  Hearring  on  the motion.--0rdinarlly  the court will  hear and 
determine  the merits of  a motion when  it is made,  affording to 
each side an  opportunity to  be  heard.  Rith the exception 
stated in  the manual,  the burden is on  the defense  to support 
his motion by a preponderance  of  the  evidence. 
There  are,  hovrever,  occasions when the hearing on  a motion 
may  be  deferred.  For example,  an accused may  wish  to make  a 
motion  in order to  avoid waiver,  but may  need  some  time  to 
prepare for  the hearing on  the motion.  The  court may  then 
proceed to trial reserving to the accused the right to produce 
evidence  in  support of  his motion  at  a later time.  A  more usual situation is one  where  the motion  raises matters  which 
should man?  properly  considered by the court in  connection 
with its deterraination of  the issue of  guUt at- innocence. 
For  example,  if the accused moves  to  dismiss on  grounds  of  the 
statute of  limitaticms asserting that the offense was  comitted 
at an earlier time than that alleged,  the proper ruling muld 
be  to  leave the matter  for the  court to dstermine  on  the basis 
of  the evidence.  Of  course,  if  the prosecution puts in no 
evidence at all  tendingto shmv  that the offense was  committed 
~Lthin  the period of  limitations,  the  law officer might  sustain 
the motion after the prosecution has  rested. 
The  queseon of mental responsibility might also be  so 
closely cantested that the  lam officer might  appropriately 
leave the matter to the judgment  of  the court in its findings 
on  the general issue, 
67g  Ufect of  ruling on motion.-This  paragraph is about the 
same  as 6L&  MCM 1949.  Briefly it provides that the court maq 
continue .mil&  ths trial if, a.fter  disposing of  all  motions, 
there remains before the court any  specification which was  not 
stricken or dismissed.  If the court cannot proceed further 
because  of  its ruling on a motion it will submit its record 
so far as had to  the convening  authority,  The  convening authority 
may,  if he  disagrees with the court,  return it for reconsideration 
of  any ruling except one  which  amounts to a finding of  not guilty. 
This provision was in  IdEd  1949 and it now  has statutory 
recognition in Article 62~. If  the matter as to  which  the 
court and the convening authority are in disagreement is a 
question of  law-euch  as if  a charge  alleges an offense-the 
court will  accede to the views of  the  convening authority;  if 
the matter is one  of  fact,  the court will exercise its sound 
discretion.  If the convening  authority can cure the defect 
which was  the basis of  the ruling,  he  may  return the record 
after effecting a cure,  with instructions to proceed with the 
trial.  If he  does not wish to return the record he  should 
generally terminate the proceedings by the publication of  appro- 
priate orders. 
68  Motions  to dismiss,--The  motion  to dismiss is one  raising 
a defense or objection in  bar  of  trial.  We  mill now  proceed to 
consider some  s&ific  motions to  dismiss: 
682  Statute of  limitations.--!be  statute of  limitations effects 
some  substantial changes for all the services.  Article '43  ---. 
provides fhat the period of  limitations will  end when  sworn charges are  received by an officer exercising summary cour.Gzr.a;rtrial 
jurisdiction.  Under  the Articles of  War  the period of  limita- 
tions ended at arraignment.  Under  the Articles for the Govern- 
~ent  of  the Navy the period of  limitations ended upon  "the  issuing 
of  the order for such trial" (AGN 61 and 62).  In Naval practice 
the  convening authority signed the charges and referred them  for 
trial on the same  document after an investigation had been held. 
Thus any similarity between  Article 43  and AGN  61 and  62  is 
only superficial,  In actual practice the period of  limitations 
FsiU  end at  an earlier period than it would  have  ended  hereto- 
fore under either the Articles of  War or the Articles for the 
Guvernment  of  the Navy. 
In effect this may  mean that there will  be  virtuaUy no 
statute of  limitations as to  AWOL  and desertion cases if 
departmental regulations w5L1  authorize the forwarding of  charges 
to the various departments when the absentee is dropped frm  the 
unit as a deserter.  Ilken they are received by  the Secretary of 
the Deparbnent  (who exercises summary court-r;ixtiaJ.  jurisdiction 
over the command  which  includes the accused) or his representative, 
the running of  the statute is stopped.  See 3@. 
In the first subparagraph reference is  made  to Article 43, 
You  will  note that in time  of mr  or national emergency the 
Secretary may,  under Article 430,  certify to the President that 
the trial of  certain charges is detrimental to the national 
security and thus extend the statute of  limitations to six 
months  after the termination of  hostilities.  In  time  of  mar, 
under  Azticle 435 there is an  automatic  suspension of  the 
running of  the statute of  lknitations until three years after 
the termination of  hostilities in certain fraud cases.  This 
means  that the statute of  limitations as to fraud against the 
government committed  in  time  of  war does not begin to run until 
3 gears after the termination of  hostilities.  In other words 
a prosecution may  be  begun  within  5 or 6 years after the 
cessation of  hostilities depending upon whether the statute 
of  limitations is 3 or 2 yeas.  See .pp.  1045-1046  of  +.he House 
Hearings. 
The  secmd subparagraph makes it clear that if  the old 
statute of  limitations has run by 31 May  1951,  Article 43  will 
not revive liability.  However, if the old statute has not run 
before  31 May,  then the provision of  Article 43  mill  supersede 
the  old statute.  See  U.  S.  v,  Fraidin,  63 F.  Supp.  27.  In 
this connection,  prior to 1  February 1949 the statute of 
limitations as to absence without leave--time  or peace- 
time-+as  two  years.  On  that date the amended Article  of  War 39 removed any limitation on  wastime  AWL.  The  same  is 'me of 
Article 43  of  the code.  World War  I1 was  terminated mith respect 
to AW  58 (and its lesser included offense,  AIR  61)  by  P.L.  239, 
25 July 1947.  Assume  that Private A  went ATDL on 1  July 1947. 
At that time  the statute of  limitations was  two  years.  Less 
than two  pars latbr, on 1  February 1949, the statute of  limitatims 
on  wartime  AVaL was  abolished.  A is picked up  on  31 May  1951 
and charmd with AW9L.  Can he assert the statute or"  limitations? 
(See  ACM  1659 SCHAUF,  CMR  325,  328  cited in the note under Art, 
432 in  APP.  2.  ) 
The  third subparagraph discusses in detail how  the statute 
of  limitations is stopped.  Note  that,  in  order to stop the 
running of  the statute,  sworn charges must be  received by  any 
officer exercising summary  court-martia3 jurisdiction over the 
command  which  includes the accused.  The  stopping of  the ,period 
of  limitation may  be  shown by  the signed receipt of  that officer 
or his representative as prescribed in  33b, 
With respect to a conthuing offense,  such as wrongful 
cohabikation or maintaining a nuisance,  the accused cannot  avail 
himelf of  the statute of  limitations for those portions of  the 
offense which  are not within the bar of  the statute of 
limitations,  Note,  however,  that AWOL,  desertion,  and 
fraudulent enlistment are not continuing offenses.  As to 
these offenses the statute begins. to run on  the date the accused 
absents himself,  deserts,  or receives pay  under  the fraudulent 
enlistment.  Consequently a court cannot,  by  exceptions and 
substitutions,  find that the accused went  AWOL  or deserted at 
a later time  than that alleged when  it appears that the chazges 
are barred by  the statute of  limitations.  However,  if the 
statute of  limitations is  not involved the court may,  by 
exceptions and  substitutions change  tbe date of  the initial 
absence,  but in such  a case it may  not awaril a greater punish- 
ment  than that authorized by the chages on  which  the accused 
was  a;rraigned,  For example,  if  an accused ia  Korea were 
charged with AWL  from 1  August  1950  (when  the limitation 
on punishment mas still in effect)  until 31 &y  1951,  and m 
his trial the only competent  evidence was  that he  was  in an 
AWL  status on 15 August  1950,  the court might find that the 
absence began  on 15 August  1950,  but it would be  limited to 
the imposition of  dishonmable discharge,  confinement for 6 
months  and total forfeiture. 
In the fifth subparagraph it is provided  that whenever it 
appears  that the statute of  limitations has run against an offense charged or a portion of  a continuing offense,  the court 
must  advise the accused  of  his rights in the premises unless 
it appears of  record affirmatively that he  is aware  of  his 
rights.  Similarly,  if he  pleads guilty to a lesser included 
offense against which the statuute  has run,  such an explanation 
must  be  made.  If  the court has found  the accused guilty of 
a lesser included offense against which  the statute has run, 
such an explanation must  also be  made  and if the accused success- 
fully asserts the statute it operates in  bar of  punishnent. 
The  court,  in  such a  case. should revoke  its findings of  guilty. 
In the sixth subparagraph it is stated that the burden is 
on  the prosecution to show  any inteirmp-tion of  the period of 
limitation.  Under  naval practice the burden  rests on  the accused 
not only to shorn  that he  comes within the provisiofis  of  the 
statute of  limitations but also that he  is not within their 
exception.  The  Army  rule,  on  the other hand,  provided  that 
the burden is upon  the prosecution to show  any manifest bpedi- 
nent which interrupted the running of  the statute of  limitations, 
The Army  view mas  supported by  Federal authorities.  See  Capone 
v.  Aderhold,  65 F.  2d 130;  Brouse v.  United  States,  68 F.  2d 294* 
In the last subparagraph there is a discussion of  waiver  of 
the statute of  limitations..  If an accused pleads guilty to an 
offense or a  lesser included  offense after explanation of  the 
right to  assert the  statute of  limitations,  his plea is a waiver, 
but only so long as the plea stands.  HoQvever,  as long as the 
plea stands the accused cannot,  after a finding of  guilty,  . 
assert the statute of  limitations as a bar  to punishment. 
It is  alsc made  clear that the statute of  limitations need 
not be  raised by motion  but may  be  taken advantage of  under  a 
plea of  not guilty by introducing evidence  to the effect that 
the  offense took place at a time when it was  barred by the 
statute of  limitations.  This was  derived from Navd Courts 
and Boads.  Note,  however,  that the accused must  inform the 
court that he  is  relying on the statute of  limitations.  Other- 
ovise  his failure to do  so during the hearing constitutes a 
waiver. 
68g  Former  .jeopardy.  As Article 442  provides for attachment 
of  jeopmdy before  findings are final,  the title of  the 
paragraph has  been  changed  to Former  jeopardy  instead of  Fomer  - 
trial as it appeared in  MCM 1949.  - 
Under  AW 40 no proceeding  in  which there was  a finding of 
guilty was  a trial in  the sense  of  that article until the 
findings became  final,  In other words  a  rehearing might 
properly have  been ordered in  any case in which  there mas  a 
firding of  guilty,  This is  no  longer tirue  under the code. 
Under  Articles 63%  66dd  and 672 rehearings are forbidden if 
the sentence is disapproved "for lack of  sufficient evidence 
in  the record to support the f5ndings.t'  Major  Hodson  will 
say more  about this in Conference  72, Another  significant change is that contained in  Article 
,!&  which  provides : 
"A  proceeding which,  subsequent to the introduction 
of  evidence but prior to a finding,  is dismissed or tednated 
by ths convening  authority or on motion  of  the prosecution 
for failure of  available evidence  or witnesses without  any 
fault of  the accused shall be  z trial in the sense of  this 
aticle  .It 
It appears that Congress  intended jeopardy  to attach in 
every case where  the proceedings  a.re  terminated,  without fault 
of  the accused,  by  the convening  authority or the prosecution 
because  of  ltfailure of  available witnesses or evidence* after 
evidence  on  the  general issue had been received.  Hwrever,  if 
the proceedings are.  terminated by  the convening authority for 
any  other reason Itbecause of  manifest necessity in  the interest 
of  justice"  jeopardy  does not attach.  'lhus,  if  the trial is 
terminated because  of  enemy  action,  or the death or illness of 
the  members  of  the court,  or if a mistrial is declared because 
of  matters prejudicial to the accvsed or the Gomrment,  jeopardy 
does not attach.  See  56b, Wade v.  Hunter,  336  U.S,  684;  Perez 
v,  U.  S.,  9 Wheat  579. 
In the fifth subparagraph it is stated in  part: 
"In general,  once  a.  person is tried for an  offense 
in  the  sense of  Article 44 he  cannot without his consent 
be  tried for an  offense necessarily included therein.1t 
It is,  of  course,  readily apparent that when  an accused is 
tried for an  offense he  is also tried for every offense  included 
therein.  The  paragraph then goes on  to say: 
When  once  tried for a  lesser offense,  an  accused 
cannot be  tried for a major  offense which  differs from 
a lesser offense in degree  onlyeff . 
Suppose that A drives his car past B's  house at 8:05 a.m., 
after having carefully asoertained that B customarily leaves his 
house  at  precisely 8:05 in the rnarning  and makes a dash for a 
bus stop across the street.  On  the morning in question B  makes 
his customary dash and A  drives the car into him,  B  is seriously 
injured and  dies.  A  is  .tried for involuntary manslaughter by 
court+ila.rtial.  His  defense mas that he  was  using due  care,  but 
he  was  nevertheless found ,guilty.  After the trial A  has  om 
or two  drinks too many  and boasts that his act was  a carefully 
premeditated plan to kill  B.  Thereupon  A  is tried for  murder. F 
Question:  Can  he  successfully assert former jeopardy?  (Answer: 
Yes.  ) 
Suppose that at the time of  trial R  had not died and  A 
mas  tried for assault and battery.  A  was  found  guilty.  After 
B  died can  A  successfully assert former jeoparm  (Answer: 
No.  ) 
What  if A  had been  acquitbd of  assault and battery,  could 
he  assert former jeopardy?  (Answer:  No.) 
What  might he,  hawever,  successfully assert?  (Answer:  .Res 
judicata. ) 
71b  Res  judicata is the doctrine that any issue of  fact or law 
put in  issue and  finally determined by  any court of  competent 
jurisdiction cannot be  disputed between  the  same  pasties in 
a  subsequent tria3.  even  if the second trial is for another  offense. 
It was first recognized in military law in  CY 306858 Lawton,  28 
BR  (ETO) 293. 
In that case hton  and  others m~re  tried jointly for a 
murder  perpetrated during a riot in  Zngland.  Lawton's  defense 
was  an  alibi and he  was  acquitted.  He  was  later brought to trial 
for a felonious assault committed  during the  same  riot.  At the 
trial he  pleaded' f omr  jeopardy b'ut  the board of  review 
recognized that his plea really amounted as  a motion to dismiss 
on  grounds  of  res judicata.  After considerable research the 
board found  that res judicata was a defense in  Federal criminal 
cases and  Lawton's  conviction was  reversed. 
Res  judicata differs from fomer jeopardy  in these important 
respects: 
a.  Jeopardy applies only to the  same  offense,  its lesser  - 
includad offenses,  and  same  (but not all) offenses in 
which  the offense  charged is included. 
Res  judicata,  on  the  other hand,  is a defense to any 
issue or element  of  an  offense previously adjudicated 
betmen the sm  partie. 
b*  Jeopardy might  attach before  a sentence is final- 
but res judicata requires a final determination. 
c.  Jeopardy applies to either a conviction or an  - 
acquittal-but  re_s_ .judicata in  inmilitary lam is 
. -1. 
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"p applicable only to  an  acquittal,  Logically res judicata 
might be a two  edged sword.  But it muld be  extremely 
undesirable if the  prosecution were  to assert it in a 
criminal case in  order to preclude  an  accused from 
defending as to some  issue which  another court had 
resolved against him,  Consequently the text makes it clear 
that ms judicata is a defense.  The  prosecution is 
precluded frm  asserting it except,  that if  jurisdiction 
is  based on  a conviction of  fraudulent sepaation in 
violation of  Article 83(2) the defense will be  precluded 
from attacking the jurisdiction of  the second court on 
the ground  that the accused's  separation from  the service 
was  not fraudulent. 
A motion to  dismiss on the grounds  of  res judicata should be 
made  at -the.  conclusion of  the prosecutionts case  or at the close 
of  all  the evidence for the court cannot  otherwise determine 
whether the issues of  fact in  the case on trial are the same 
as those in  the foriner trial. 
682  Pardon.-It  is to be  noted that constructive pardon  has been 
deleted on the basis of  an opinion by  the Attorney General in 
31 Atty.  Gen.  4.19  which  held that there is no  such thing as  a 
constructive pardon. 
68g  Former  punishmcxA--This  is new  to the Navy  and the Coast 
Suard.  Under  the provisions of  Article 152 disciplinary 
punishment is a defense in  bar of  trial for minor  offenses, 
Note  this is only for rainor  offenses and if punishment  has been 
errcmeously imposed for a mzjor  offanse under  Article 15,  the 
defense of  former punishment  is not available,  It would,  how- 
ever,  be  a matter of  mitigation. 
69  Motion to mant appropriate relief,-In  this paragraph 
there are  discussed the matters formerly regarded as pleas in 
abatement.  'l'hey  cover matters which  in  sane way  hinder the 
accused in the preparation of  his defense.  These  are waived 
unless asserted before a plea is  entered,  but the court may 
grant relief from the waiver. 
69k  The first ground  discussed in detail is a defect in  the 
charges and specifications.  If  ths charges do  not  state any 
offense,  the court lacks jurisdiction of  the  subject matter 
and a motion  to dismiss is indicated.  However,  if the charges 
do allege an  offense but are defective in  some  manner  of  form 
or do  not properly apprise the  accused  of  sufficient facts 
or details to  enable him to properly prepare his defense,  he 
may  raise the objection of  a motion for appropriate relief, A  variety of  courses are available to the  court,  which  should 
use its cornmen  sense in determining which  one  to  take.  If the 
court is convinced that the defect did not mislead the accused, 
it may  direct an  appropriate amendment  and proceed  immediately 
with the trial.  One  example  when  this course is obviously 
appropr5ate is when  it appeus that a good  specification is 
erroneously laid under  the wrong  charge. 
If  the court believes the defect to be  such as to mislead 
the accused it may  do  one  of  three things: 
a.  Direct that the defective  specification be 
stricken,  or 
b.  Amend  the defective  specification and continue  the 
case for a reasonable  time %o enable Lhe  accused 
to  prepwe for trial,  or 
c.  Continue  the case to enable the trial counsel to 
refer the matter  to the convening authority. 
For the sake  of  clarity and to provide  guidance  to the court 
in detemining which course  to follow there is a rather detailed 
discussion of  some  instances when  it might be  appropriate  to 
follow these vazious courses. 
69s  Defects arisiw out  of  the pretrial investigation.  --Article 
322 arid  tkae  Supreme  Court's  decision in  Humphrey v.  Smith 
336  U.S.  695  (1949)  settled the long standing question as to 
whether  ccanpliance with the requirements for a pretrial in- 
vestigation is jurisdictional.  It is not.  But both the statute 
and the  Supreme  Court indicate that it is the duty of  all those 
concerned with the administration of  military justice to comply 
with the  terms of  the statute. 
If a substantial failure to comply with the  provisions of 
Article 32  and tb provisions of  paragraph 34  actually affects 
injuriously- the accusedls substantial rights at  the trial he 
may  assert the matter by motion.  Lf  the motion is sustained, 
the convening authority may return the record to the court with 
instructions to proceed with  the trial after taking necessary 
action to cure the  defect.  Occasion for this relief dl  be  rare. 
69g  Motion  to sever.-Major  Hodson  has discussed some  of  the 
more  cmon  grounds  for the motion  in Conference  4.  One  of  the 
occasions for a mandatory  severance  is when  om of  two enlisted 
co-accused  requests that enlisted persons sit on  the court and 
+.he &.her  dne doesntt.  In such a case a severance must  be 
granted  -  whether  or not a motion is made. 702  '5  Pleas.-The  first subparagraph restates the provisions of  , 
Article 453  Jf  an accused refuses to plead,  vitiates a plea 
of  guilty,  or makes  any irregular pleading,  a plea of  not guilty 
shall be  entered in  the record and the court shall proceed as 
though the accused had pleaded not guilty.  It is made  clear 
that a plea of  guilty to a lesser included offense is not an 
"irregular plea. 
The  secmd subparagraph restates the provision of  Article 
4%  to  the effect that a plea of  guilty may  not be  received as 
to any offense for which  the death penalty may  be  adjudged- 
but it is made  clear that a plea of  guilty may  be  accepted as 
to  a non-capital offense,  which  is necessarily included in the 
capital offense charged. 
The discussion as to the waiver inherent in a plea has 
been  discussed earlier during the conference.  Note,  however, 
that by  standing mute  the accused does not waive  anything.  If 
an  accused  stands mute,  he  does  not even waive  any objection 
as  to identity,  and the prosecution must be  very careful to 
prove  idenity.  Note  also that any admission or waiver inherent 
in  a plea of  guilty haq  effective existence only so long as the 
plea stands. 
In  the fifth subparagraph it is stated that a plea of 
guilty does not exclude the taking of  evidence  and  in the 
event that there be  aggravating or extenuating circumstances 
not clearly shown by the  specification and plea,  any  available 
and admissible evidence as to such  circumstances may_ be 
introduced.  This is derived from paragraph 71,  MCM  1949, 
In.the Army,  the practice has  been  for the prosecution to 
introduce evidence  of  a prima facie case not only to insure 
that the accused will not be  convicted on  an  imprwident plea 
but also to show  the court the circumstances  of  the offense so 
that the  court nay  more  intelligently assess a proper  punishment. 
In the Navy  conviction generally follows immediately af tar  a 
plea of  guilty.  Matters in aggravation and extenuation-not 
only with respect to the background,  'character,  and record of 
the accused but also mith respect to  the offense itself-mre 
presented after findings.  In  order that both the Army and  the 
Navy might  continue  their present practices the word  llshouldn 
in  the 11th line of  page  108 has been  changed to %ay.  11  The 
Army's  policy has not been  changed  in  this respect. 
Since pleas of  guilty to  lesser included offenses are new 
' 
to the Havy  it is  provided that if  an  accused enters such a 
plea the  prosecution Mill proceed  to prove  the  offense charged. 
It was  felt  by  the Navy  representatives that in the absence of  such a provision the civilian practice of  It copping a plea"  by 
agreement batmen the prosecution and the accused might  become 
prevalent, 
70k  Procedure.--This  paragraph  states the procedure  to  be 
follmd  and explanations to  be  made whenever  a plea of  guilty 
is entered.  There is also a discussion as to the procedure  to 
be  followed whenever it appears that the accused  has entered his 
plea improvidently  or without  understanding of  its meaning  and 
effect.  If  the accused vitiates his plea the prosecution will 
be  given an opportunity to reopen  its case and  introduce any 
evidence it may  have withheld  because  of  the plea. 
71  Motions  predicated upon  the evidence.-Wrlier  in  the 
discussion of  pleas aid motions  reference was made  to certain 
motions  which may  appropriately be  made  only after some  evidence 
had been  introduced.  The  taro  most  cammon  ones  are : 
1.  Motions  for a finding of  not  guilty which is 
based upon  failure of  the prosecution to make  a prima 
facie case of  any  offense charged or included,  and 
2.  Notions to dismiss on  the ground  of  res judicata 
which was  discussed in  connection with fonuer Seopardy. 
715  Motion for a finding of  not Rl;cilty.-The  discussion of  the 
motion  for a finding of  not guilty is generally derived from 
paragrapn 72%  EM  1949.  Hmver,  it has been  redrafted in 
accordance  with Rule  29,  Federal Rules  of  Criminal Procedure. 
The  text makes it clear that  this motion properly may  be  made 
either at the end  of  the prosecutionts case or at  the end of  all 
the evidence.  It is also made  clear that after the deniai of 
such  a motion at  the end  of  a prosecutionts case,  the accused 
may  offer evidence  in lus own  behaf,  but only at the risk of 
curing any  defect in the prosecutionts case.  In  other words, 
under  the harmless error rule,  it' a conviction is sustainable 
by  the whole  record,  the accused  cannot,  after curing the 
defect,  complain if  the court erroneously denied his motion 
when  made.  This is in accord aith the practices follmd  by 
Federal courts.  xi1  Leyer v.  United Sta-  183 F.  102 at page 
104 the court said: 
"If  ths whole'  record indicates that a verdict of 
guilty was  justified it is immaterial that evidence 
essential to conviction was  voluntarily introduced by 
the defendant himself.  There  is no  force in the 
contention that the  denial of  the motion to direct acquittal at the close of  the case  'would  in effect 
shift the burden  of  proof,  . and the 'defendant would be 
compelled to go fo.rwa3.d  2nd prove  his innocence before 
the prosecution had  succeeded in proving his guilt, 
Defendant.was not compelled to  go  forward.  If the 
prosecution failed to make  o~t.  its case,  he  could 
quite safely rest upon  his exception,  knowing  that, 
even if the  jury should find a verdict against him 
on  such imcomplete  proof,  it would be  promptly  set 
aside. fl 
The  last sentence of  paragraph 71s makes it clear that the 
ruling itself amounts to a finding of  not guilty unless there 
is  an objecticn to the Wing.  In other words,  the  court need 
not  go  through the formality of  voting on  findings. Conference 
OATHS AND  INCIDENTAL  MATTERS 
Conducted by 
MAJOR  VEUllbrI H.  CONLEY 
References:  Chapter XXII,  Paragraphs 112-114 
,  Chapter MDII ,  Paragraphs 115-119 
Articles 42,  46,  L9,  Slb,  52,  135,  136 
&pendices  8a,  - b,  - 9,  10;  13, 17-19 
In addition .to  the provisions of  Article 42,  nOaths,n  and 
Article 136,  *Authority to administer oaths and to act  as a 
notary,'  chapter XXII is compiled,  in great part,  from the 
material contained in Naval  Courts ar.d  Boards,  appendix E,  and 
chapter =I,  Manual for Courts-MaA-ti&,  1949. 
112a  The  practices of  all  Services currently provile for the  - 
administration of  an affirmation in lieu of  an oath,  in  appro- 
priate cases.  The provisions in paragraph 112a concerning the 
omission  of  the w  rds,   SO  help you  God,n  in  tEe  case of  an 
affirmation is derived from Article of  War  19 and  is inserted 
as a general instruction for all  personnel. 
When the decision was made  that chapter XXII was  to consist 
only of  matters pertaining to oaths in military justice procedure 
and that matters concerning the administration of oaths in  other 
military activities such as courts of  inquiry and boards  of 
officers were  to be presented in different publications,  for 
instance,  departmmtal regulations,  manuals,  or pamphlets,  it 
was also d etennined that chapter XXII should contain a cross- 
reference to Article 135e  -  which provides: 
"The  members,  counsel,  the reporter,  and  interpreters 
of  courts of  inquiry shall take an oath or affirmation to 
faithfully  perf  om  their duties.t' 
ll2b  -  With reference to the persons required to be  sworn,  the first 
two sentences of  paragraph 112b are virtual quotations  of Articles 
42a  and b,  except that in the First sentence it is provided that, 
in-addityon  to the personnel required by Article 42a  to  be  sworn , 
individual counsel  also shall be morn.  This provigion was 
inserted in view of  the requirements  of  Article 42a that the 
defense counsel and the assistant defense counsel Gust be  sworn. The  references to the administration of  oaths to  persons 
giving depositions and to the escort on  views and  inspections 
I$ 
by the court have been consolidated in  paragraph  ll2b.  - 
112c  -  Article 42a  requires that the specified officials and 
clerical assistiints of  the court shall,  "in the presence of  the 
accused,lf  take an  oath or affirmation  to perform their duties 
f aithfdy. 
In the commentary to Article 42,  the Bdorgan  Committee stated: 
"The  article does not require the court to be  resworn 
in every case.  The  language would allow a court to be  .  sworn  once a day where  there is to be  more  than  one trial, 
if the accused in each trial is present at the time that 
the court is initially sworn." 
In conformity with the expressed intent of  the draftors that 
the repeated administration of  oaths to the specified personnel 
of  the court should be  dispensed with,  provided  that such person- 
nel of  the court did not change,  paragraph ll2c contains an abrupt 
deviation from the current rule that the prescFibed  oaths must  be 
administered in and for each case.  Paragraph Il2c,"Qaths to  be 
taken in  the presence of accused,"  provides,  altekatively, either 
(1) for the administration of  the required oaths in each case,  or 
(2) for the administration of  the required oaths at  the first 
session af  the court when  the court sits for more  than one trial 
and the accused in  each  trial is  present in the court at the time 
the officials and clerical assistants thereof  are initially sworn, 
such  oaths to be  effective for the trials  of all  accused then 
before the court.  See also in  this respect,  paragraph 61h,  - nAdmin- 
istration of  0aths.a  1 
112d  -  The  procedure  for administering oaths conforms  to the present 
practices of  all Services.  Paragraph 112d consists, principally, 
of  material from Naval  Courts and  ~oards,-a~~endix  E-3. 
The  second  subparagraph,  which requires personnel to stand 
during the administration of  oaths,  conforms to the above quoted 
provisions of  paragraph  61h  -  and presents little, if  any,  change 
from current practices. 
113  The  Morgan  Cormnittee  s commentary to  Article 136,  "Authority  , 
to administer oaths and to act as notary,"  provides: 
fiThis article is a combination  and  modification  of 
A.  V. 14  and A.G.N.,  Article 69.  Only certain persons 
specified are given notarial powers,  as it is believed 
inappropriate that persons  having temporary  powers to 
administer oaths should notarize legal instruments which may  have  tragic legal consequences if inc  o  rrsctly drawn . 
The  persons specified in subdivision  (a)  are believed to 
have  legal.  experience  or experience in  personnel matters. 
Conmanding officers of  the Navy  and  Coast Guard  are 
included in subdivision  (a) as Navy  and Coast Guard 
cornads do not have  adjutants and personnel ad  jutants  .n 
In view  of  the quoted provisions concerning personnel possess- 
ing notarial powers,  it was determined,  in  preparing paragraph 113, 
'IAuthority to Administer Oaths,"  to refer to Article 136a by  cross- 
reference and to set out verbatim only the provisions of-kticle 
136b  - 
Concernigg  the cross-reference  to Article 49c,  that article  - 
provides that: 
nDepositions may betaken before and  authenticated by 
any  military or civil officer authorized by the laws of 
the United States or by the laws of  we place where  the 
deposition is  taken to administer  oaths." 
The  footnotes to Article 136 in  appendix 2  contain examples 
of  persons aut'norized  to adninister oaths pursuant to departmntal 
regulations or to statute as referred to  in Article 136a and b. 
Those footnotes also contain the provision that under  Gticle-3%  - 
only officers,  includirrg commissioned warrant  officers,  are 
authorized to administer an oath to charges.  In  this respect, 
see  paragraph 296,  - 'Signing  and  swearing to charges.w 
14  Concerning  the forms of  the various oaths,  as presented in 
paragraph 14, the comwntary to Article 42  provides: 
nThe  oaths are not  specified in the code as it is 
felt that the language of  the oaths is suitable matter 
for regulations  .n 
Actually,  the prescribed oaths vary but little from those now 
utilized by each of  the Services. 
The  phrase,  *Subject to the provisions of  ll2~,~  which appears 
in 114,  refers to the provision in  paragraph ll2c %at  the person- 
nel of  the court who  are required to act under  oath during the 
trial must  be  morn  in the presence of  the accused either (1) at 
the beginning of the trial of  each accused'  or (2) at the first 
session of  the court.when the court sits for more  than one trial 
and the accusad in  each trial is present in the court at  the 
time  the officials and clerical assistants thereof  are initially 
worn . The provision that a person who  testifies Itshall be examined 
on  oath or affiprnation * * * in  the following fohn * 9  # is sub- 
ject to the exception expressed in 112 that persons who  recomize 
peculiar forms  or rites as obligatory may be  sworn  in their cnsn 
manner which they declare to be  blnding.  When  read in  conjunction 
with each  other,  each  of  those provisions may be givm full force 
and  effect. 
Although Article 53 requires the findings and  sentence to be 
announced as soon  as determined,  the oath of  counsel contains a 
provision designed to prevent the  overzealous  counsel from pre- 
maturely divulging the findings or sentence discovered through 
improper  or inadvertent means. 
The  form of  the oath of the escort  on  views and 
inspections permits the inclusion of  the appropriate terminology 
concerning the view  or inspection of  the premises,  place, 
article, or object concerned. 
The  oath administered by the investigating officer to  wit- 
nesses in an investigation under  Article 32 is mitten in the 
alternative,  that is,  fl (statement given by you  is)  (evidence you 
are abaut to give shall be)  ,n  in view  of  the provisions of  ad,  - 
'ISubmis sion and action upon  charges--Witnesses .  * 
The oath of a person whose 'testimony is  taken by deposition 
has been  included in the marginal notes of  appendix 18,  Hinter- 
rogatories and Depositions,It  for ready reference by  any authority, 
military or civilian,  who  may  be  designated to take the deposition. 
INCIDENTAL 
The  topics presented in  chapter WII include  (1) the attend- 
ance of  witnesses,  (2) the employment of  expert witnesses,  (3) the 
procedure for the taking of  depositions,  (4) contempts,  anit  (5) 
expenses of  courts-martial. 
U%  Article 46,  "Opportunity  to obtain witnesses and other 
evidence,n  is set out verbatim in  the first subparagraph of  llsa,  - 
"Attendance  of  Witnesses.fi 
The  second subpamgraph contains a definition of the term 
l'subpoenav  and provides that a subpoena  cannot be used to  compel 
a witness to appear  at  a pretrial investigation.  In this 
respect,  see paragraph  3kd,  Witnesses  .n  - 
As to  witnesses before courts of  inquiry,  a subject which 
will  be  included in a  separate publication,  Article 135f  provides:  - &? 
f&  IlGVitnesses may  be  summoned  to appear and testify 
and be  examined before courts of  inquiry as  provided 
for courts-martia1.H 
With  reference  to the power  of  the summary  court to compel 
the attendance of witnesses,  the term !Itrial counsel"  includes 
the term "sumnary  cow&-martial.n  Paragraph 79b,  -  *Summary  courts- 
mrtial--Power  to obt.ain  evidence, If  provides : 
IiA  sum~aary  court has the same  power  as the trial 
counsel of  a  general or special court-martial  to compel 
the attendance of  civilian witnesses by  subpoena * * * 
and to  take depositions in proper  cases  +e  w.n 
The  fourth subparagraph implements  the initial provisions  of 
Article 46  that %he  trial counsel,  defense counsel,  and  the courts- 
martial  shall have  equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and  other 
evidence.  The  trial  counsel is  required to provide for the attend- 
ance of  witnesses,  whether  prosecution  or defense witnesses,  who  have 
personal knowledge  of  the material facts at  issue and whose  personal 
attendance is necessary.  The  cross-reference  to Article 49d,  which 
article prescribes the conditions under which  a  deposition,-to  be 
admissible,  may  be  taken,  is intended for consideration when  deter- 
mining whether  the personal appearance of  the desired witness is 
necessary* 
The  fourth sentence, which  provides that the trial counsel 
will take the same timely and  appropriate action to  provide  for 
the appearance of  defense witnesses whose  testimony before  the 
court is  material and necessary,  is  based on  the sentence in the 
commentary to Article 46  that the article  was  intended to  insure 
equality between  the parties in securing witnesses.  However, 
experience has  shown  that some  defense counsel present arbitrary 
and unreasonable requests for witnesses merely for the purpose 
of  creating confusion,  diversion,  or delay.  In order to curb 
such practices,  it is  provided  that the trial counsel,  who,  as is 
stated in  paragraph  &g(l),  is  prohibited from performing any act 
inconsistent with a gezuine desire to  have  the whole  truth re- 
vealed,  will screen defense counsel1s request for witnesses.  In 
case the trial counsel and the defense counsel disagree whether 
it is  necessary that the requestedwitness be subpoenaed,  the 
matter will  be referred to the convening authority or to the 
court,  depending  upon whether  the court is in  session.  It is 
believed that the provisions of  this paragraph  maybe relied 
upon  as a rule of  thumb  concerning the authority for denying the 
personal attendance of  awitness who,  because of  distance or 
position,  that is, status or duty assignment,  should not 3e 
required to attend personally.  In the case of  such a disagree- 
ment  between  the trial counsel and the defense counsel,  the defense counsel will  be required to show,  in the manner  indicated 
in  this paragraph,  that the personal attendance of  the  witness is 
necessary. 
IlSb_  Paragraph llsb,  "Military PPitnesses,H  provides that as to 
the attendance of Stnesses  who  are, in  the military service and 
stationed at or so near the place of the meeting of  the court 
that travel at government expense would not be  involved may 
be obtained by  notification,  oral or otherwise,  by the trial 
counsel.  Provision has been  made  for formal rmtice through  - 
channels,  provided any Service determines to use  such  fonnal 
procedure. 
The  provision as to a military witness,  whose  attendance 
would  require travel at government expense,  proceeding to the 
situs of  the court in accordance with orders issued by  the 
appropriate superior conforms  to current practices of  the 
Services. 
Military personnel who  are retired or otherwise in  an 
inactive duty status are subpoenaed in the same  lllanner  as 
civilian witnesses,  no  travel orders being issued in such 
cases 
llsc  As provided in I&,  the production of  documents which are  -  in the control of  milicry authorities is effected through mili-  - 
tar7 channels,  no  legal process being required. 
llsi(l)  In paragraph 115cl(l),  "Civilian witnesses--I  ssue,  service, 
and return of  subpoena,*  the content of  Article 46  is presented 
in a paraphrased version to ehphasize that ordinarily the trial 
counsel is the agent for issuing a  subpoena,  at government  expense, 
for a civilian whose  testimony is material.  By virtue of  his 
capacity as trial counsel of  the court-martial,  he  can compel,  in 
appropriate cases,  the attendance of a  civilian witness who  has 
been properly subpoenaed and who  is found in any part of  the 
United States, its Territories,  and possessions,  regardless of 
where  the court-martial  is convened. 
Articles 46  and 47  of  the code  eliminate the restrictions 
imposed by Article 42 (c) ,  Articles for the Government of the NaV, 
on the power  of  a naval court to punish a witness who  is found 
beyond the State, Territorys or District where  such naval court 
is  ordered to sit, and who  willfully  neglects to obey the subpoena* 
The  preparation of  the  subpoena  in duplicate conforms  to 
present practices of  all Services.  The  form of  the  subpoena, 
which  is set out in appendix 17,  has  been approved as. a Depart- 
ment  of  Defense  form and will be avajlable to all Services for use in  conjunction with the new  manual.  For  purposes  of  illustra- 
tion,  the' form in  appendix 17 has been  filled out using sample 
entriespertaining to a member  of  the Navy.  The  form was  designed 
so that it could be used whether the subpoena was  required for a 
civilian witness,  as a subpoena  duces tecum,  or  for a civilian 
witness whose  deposition is to be taken.  Also,  by  striking out 
inapplicable words  and inserting applicable words,  the subpoena 
form my  be used to smon  a witness to appear and testify before 
courts of  inquiry as provided in Article 13Sf.  - 
In military procedure,  formal service often is neither 
advisable nor  necessary,  To  expedite the most  economical  method 
of  service,  the trial counsel may  mail the properly prepared 
subpoena,  in duplicate,  to the witness,  with  the request  that 
the witness sign the acceptance of  service and return one  copy, 
the original.  merience has shown  that frequent delays can be 
elimhated by the trial counsel~s  use  of  a penalty return envelope 
addressed to the trial counsel in that capacity rather than to him 
by 
Similarly,  the procedure for effecting ford  service is 
comparable  to that currently prescribed by all Services, 
Service of  the subpoena will  ordinarily be made  by persons 
subject to military law but legally my  be  made  by  others.  Rlth- 
out exception,  it is the rule that formal  service must  be made  by 
personal delivery to the witness,  Service having been  executed, 
the original copy of  the subpoena,  with the proof  of  service made 
thereon as indicated in the form,  will  be  promptly returned, 
addressed to the trial counsel of  the co-urt as trial counsel 
thereof,  rather than  to that officer by name. 
The  power  of  the appropriate commander  of  occupied enew 
territory to compel  the attendance of  a civilian witness in 
res~ponse  to a  sub?oena  issued by a trial counsel is established 
in the ~anual  for Courts-Xartial,  1949, in paragraph  105b.  - 
U5d  -  (2 )  Paragraph USd(2),  "Neglect  or refusal to appear,11 asserts 
the existhg requiFement  that prior to maintaining a prosecution 
under  Article 47  the witness must  be paid or tendered fees and 
mileage  as required by  the current practices of all  Services and 
as prescribed in Rule  17(d),  Rules of  (Criminal Procedure. 
Before issuing a marrant of attachment,  as provided in llSd(3),  - 
Warrant of  Attaclment,'f  to compel  the attendance of  a witness 
who  aillfulLy neglects or refuses -b attend and  testify before 
a court-martial,  the trial counsel must  first  consult the convening 
authority or the court depending on  whether the court has Seen convened.  This conforms to the present Navy ride but is more 
stringent than  the Army  and Air  Force rule which  currently pro- 
vides that the trial counsel bayn consult the court in such a 
case. 
The  warrant,  in an  appropriate case,  will be issued and 
dispatched by  the trial counsel rather than by  the president of 
the court.  TKe  warrant  will  be accompanied by  the listed 
documents. 
116  Concerning paragraph 116,  Wnployment  of  Experts,"  it  was 
determined that both time  and noney  could be saved by permitting 
the convening authority,  rather than the Secretary of  a Depart- 
ment,  to authorize the employment  and  to fix the fee of  the 
requested expert.  In this respect,  the Comptroller  General has 
stated (MS. Conp.  Gen.,  B-49109,  25 June 1945)  that *retroactive 
authorization by the appointing authority of  the employment  of, 
an exgert,  in a  situatim where  only the trial judge  advocate 
' 
had agreed to an expert's  fee prior to the testimony,  was  insuf- 
ficient to permit pawent  of  anything more  than ordinary witness 
fees.* 
ll-7:  Article 49a  -  provides in part: 
'tat  any time after charges have been  signed as 
provided in article 30,  any party may take oral or 
written depositions unless an authority comptent to 
convene a court-martial  for the trial of  such charges 
forbids it for good cause." 
Neither the code nor  the Xorgan  Conmitteels comentary 
contains any  def initior~  of  the terns tldeposition  ,'I  Written 
interrogatories  ,(I  Itwrit t  en deposition, n  or  oral deposition. 
The  first subparagraph of  117a,  -  "Depositions,"  consists of 
definitions of  those terms. 
Paragrash 117 is intended to set forth ody  matters pertain- 
ing to  the procedure  for taking depositions.  A  cross-reference 
has been inserted directing attention to those paragraphs which 
pertain to the introduction and  use of  depositions in  evidence. 
For instructional purposes,  an approved Department  of  Defense 
f om  for depositions has been  partially illustrated in  *pendlx 
18.  The  form of  the oath to be administered to the deponent is  [$ 
included in  the marginal notes on that  form. 
In  providing for competent personnel to represent both the 
prosecution  and the defense in  taking a deposition,  the provision 5 
of  the 1949 Manual,  106,  that the trial counsel and  the defense 
counsel,  or assistants,  of  an existing court will  be utilized 
has been  retained.  Similarly,  in  order fully to protect the 
rights of  the accused,  it is  provided that the officer detailed 
to represent the defense in  taking a deposition must  possess at 
least equivalent legal qualificatims as *ose  possessed by  the 
officer representing the 3 rosecution. 
In order to obviate questions that would arise in  case om 
of  the parties is unavailable for personal  service:, it has been 
provided  that the required Itreasonable notice"  of  the taking of 
a deposition for the prosecution may be  given to  the accused, 
his counsel (civilian or military),  or  the officer designated  to 
sepresent the accused  in the taking of  the deposition.  SimFlarlyo 
notice of  the taking of  a deposition for the defense may  be  given 
to the trial counsel,  an assistant trial counsel,  or the convening 
authority.  This provision for service of  notice on counsel con- 
forms  to the cases cited in  the footnotes to  Rules 2&31,  Federal 
IhiLes  of  Civil Procedure,  which  are referred to in  Rule  15, 
IlDepositions,fl  Federal Rules of  Criminal Procedure. 
It is re-emphasized  that with relation to the taking of 
depositions,  the tern "trial counselfl includes a summary court- 
martial. 
117b_  The  procedure  for taking depositions on writ  ten interroga- 
tories (ll7b) varies little  from the current practices of  the 
various ~er%.ces.  It wfil be noted,  however,  that the pare 
desiring the deposition will  s-&mit his list of  written inter- 
rogatories to  opposing counsel rather than to %he  opposite 
partp or to Itthe court.n  Likewise,  in  addition to submitting 
cross-interrogatories,  opposing counsel rill note any objections 
on  the papers prior to submission thereof  to the convening 
authority or to the law o  f f icer,  depending upon whether  the 
court is in session.  As  the ruling on the objections is an 
interlocutory nstter which will be determined finally by the 
law officer, it was  determined that there was no  reason to 
require the papers to be  submitted to the court for consider- 
ation*  Also,  initial submission of  the papers to the law 
officer rather than  to the convening authority  will  relieve the 
comtmnder  of  the additional administrative burden of  processing 
such papers.  However.,  it is the convening  authoritywho must 
forbid the taking of  the depositions if  he deems  good cause 
exists therefor,  It is  foreseen that a situation may arise 
where  the court is  not  in session and the exigencies of  the 
service render it impossible to refer the papers to the conven- 
ing authority.  In such a case,  it is provided that the papers 
may  be  referred by expeditious means  to Itcompetent authority" who,  pursuant to Article k9a,  is an authority competent  to convene 
a court-martial for the tria of the charges. 
The  statement that,  When  the defense  in a capital case sub- 
mits  interrogatories,  cross-interrogatories  may  be submitted to 
the same effect as in a case not capita3,n  is predicated upon 
Article 498  -  which provides that: 
Wubject to the requirements of  subdivision (d) 
of  this article, testimony by deposition may be adduced 
by the defense in  capital cases.tl 
11 7c  -  The procedure prescribed in 117c for the sending out of 
interrogatories conforms to  the presznt practices of  the Services, 
provision being made  for the transmitting of  the papers to quali- 
fied civilian or military personnel for the actual taking. 
With  reference to the statement that the voucher will  be 
accompanied by Itthe required number11  of  copies of  the orders 
appointing the court,  departmental regulations prescribe what 
the required number  shall be. 
U7:  Paragraph 117d prescribes no  change  in existing procedure 
concerning the actron by  the person receiving the deposition 
for taking, except that Air  Force and Army  personnel will notice 
the additional item that it may  be  left to the person designated 
to take the deposition to indicate the time an3 place of  taking 
and  that a civilian who  performs travel to give his deposition 
is entitled to the sam  fees as if  he  had attended personally 
before the court at  the place the deposition was  taken.  Navy 
personnel will  notice the adnonition that in  all cases  the taking 
of  a deposition will be expedited and that in  the event that a 
deposition cannot be  taken promptly the person receiving the 
interrogatories will  immediately advise the officer who  sent 
them  out of  the delay and  the approximate date the  deposition 
will be  taken. 
n72  The procedure for obtaining the appearance of  a  civilian as 
well as a military witness whose  deposition is desired is set out 
in 1172,  ffSuggestions  for person  talchg deposition.tt  The  instruc- 
tion that the interrogatories be  read and  explained to the witness 
is intended as an aid for the non-legal  officer.  Included are 
instructions for the administration of  the required oaths,  for 
the procedure  to  be followed in case objections are noted at the 
time  of  the examination,  for the examination by  the witness of 
the transcribed testimony,  and for the explanation by  the officer 
taking the deposition in  case the witmss refuses to sign or 
fails to sign because of  illness or inability to be  located. "r a 
1175  Upon receipt of  the deposition (117f),  the trial counsel 
becomes  the legal custodian thereof  and zs  charged with noti- 
fying and permitting the defense to examine it before trial. 
1175  Article 49a provides for the taking of *oral depositionsn 
but does not d&e  the term noral depositionson  As  a  conse- 
quence,  the terrhology of  Rule 26,  Federal Rules of  Civil 
Procedure,  that any party may take testimony by  deposition upon 
Nora1 examination"  has been incorporated in llQ,  Wepositions 
on  oral  examination.^^ 
It is realized that the circumstances of a particular case 
might  require that a  deposition be taken before charges are 
referred fmtrial  and,  thus,  before the accused has become  a 
"partyn  to  whom  notice is required to  be given.  In this respect 
attention is  again invited to the provisions of 308 concerning 
the action to be  taken  when an accuser,  investigatiln'g officer, 
or commander  to whom  sworn charges have  been refer~ed  believes 
that a witness whose testinrony my  be perpetuated by the taking 
of  a deposition will not be available at  a  su5sequent stage of 
the proceedings.  Provision is  made  herein for the perpetuation 
of  testimony by  depositicm  on  oral examination before charges 
are referred  for trial,  In such a case an authority competent 
to convene  a court for the trial of  the charges may  direct 
officers,  preferably experienced counsel of  an existing court, 
to t  ake the required depositions. 
The  procedure  for taking depositions on  oral examination 
after charges have been referred for the trial is  quite similar 
to that prescribed for the taking of  depositions on  written 
interrogatories.  The  party desiring the depositim must submit 
to opposing counsel a written outline of  the points desired to 
be  covered.  Opposing counsel may  note objections ad  submit the  . 
points he desires to  be covered on cross-8xanination.  Although 
the law officer,  if  the court is in session,  will  examine  the 
papers  so submitted,  only an authority competent  to convene a 
court for the trial of  the charges may  forbid the taking of  such 
depcsitions . 
The  person to  whom  the papers are sent for the actual taking 
of  the deposition will follow,  generally,  the same procedure  as 
that prescribed for the taking of  a deposition on mitten inter- 
rogatories in that he  should,  if practicable,  detail officers 
(preferably experiemed counsel) to represent both sides in pro- 
pounding  the oral questions which upon  being propounded will  be 
reduced  to writing as rill the answers.  The accused is entitled 
to be represented by  individual counsel in  such  cases. 
A  general discussion of  Wonteqts"  is  presented in 118a.  - Article 48 provides,  in part,  nA  court-martial * * + may 
punish for contempt any person who  uses any menacing words, 
signs,  or gestures in its presence,  or who  disturbs its pro- 
ceedings by any riot or disorder,ll  and  the maximum authorized 
punishment  therefor shall not exceed confinement  for 30 days, 
or a fine of  $100,  or both. 
The Bdorgan  Committee1 s commentary to Article 48  provides  t 
Vhis article is derived from  A*%.  32.  The  pro- 
posed  4.G.N.  article 35  woilld require contempts by 
persons not subject to this code  to be tried in civil 
courts.  It is felt  essential to the proper-functioning 
of  a court,  however,  that it have  direct control over 
the conduct of  persons appearing before it.'t 
Article of  War  32 has been  construed  (MCM,  109) as vesting in 
general,  special,  and  summary  courts-martial  the power  to punish 
for contempt.  This construction has been applied to the term 'la 
court-martials  as it  appears in Article 48, 
-Vith reference  to the words  '1any  personft as used  in Article 
48,  tihe  House  Subcommittee Hearings  (page 1060) provide: 
Wr.  Chairman,  I  think that there are  two things 
that should be clarified for the record here.  One  is 
that this section contemplates the right to punish for 
contempt civilians who  may be testifying or appearing as 
counsel in a court-martial  case.  Secondly,  while the 
article does not say so,  it anticipates that the military 
court may  punish  summarily. 
"MR.  RIVERS.  Civilians?  ~~.  SURT.  That is correct. 
*MR.  FUPE2S.  .Not subject to it? 
WR.  SMART.  When  civilians came  before a court 
martial .they  must be  bound  by the same  rules of  decorum 
as  the other people before  it.n 
In  view of  the foregoing,  the term  *any personm  in  U8a has 
been  construed in the same  sense that  the term was construe3 when 
it was a part of  Article of  War 32.  There the term included all 
persons whether  or not otherwise subject to military law,  except 
the members  of  the court which  included the law maber.  Under 
this construction,  the mmbers  and  the law officer are excepted. These persons  remain  punishable as provided in bib.  Counsel, 
whether  regularly appointed or special,  are inchzed in  the 
term Itany pers0n.n 
The interpretation of  conduct which constitutes ltdirect 
contemptsf' and %direct  or cmstructive contemptsn  is similar 
to the interpretation of  those terms as used under  Article of 
rNar  32  (MCM,  109).  The  procedure  for punishing a person  not 
subject to military law for an indirect or constructive contempt 
or for neglect or refusal to appear or testify is as prescribed 
in  Article 47,  that is, by  trial in a United  States district 
court or other  specified court of  original criminal jurisdiction. 
Kith reference to persons  subject to military law,  appendix 6c,  - 
ltFoms for charges and  specifications,tt  contains a for111 of  a 
specification  (form 164) for wrongful refusal to qualify or to 
testify as witness.  Similarly,  the Table  of  Bmcimum  Punishments 
(Art.  134) authorizes a  sentence of  dishonorable  discharge,  total 
forfeitures,  and confinement  at  hard  labor for five years upon 
conviction thereof. 
Pursuant to a request  of  a member  or any party to the trial, 
the law officer of  a  general court-martial,  the president of  a 
special court-martial,  or a  summary court-martial  may warn a 
person that his conduct is  such that his persistence therein 
will likely result in his being held in  contempt  of  court. 
u8b  -  Paragraph  118b contains a detailed procedure for contempt 
proceedings.  In c&e  of  conduct  constituting a contempt within 
the meaning  of  Article  48,  the regular proceedings  of  the court 
should be  suspended and the prson directed to show  cause why 
he  should not be held  in  contempt.  He  will be given the oppor- 
tunity to explain his conduct;  however,  his mere  insistence that 
his language  or behavior was proper  does not necessarily purge 
him of c  ontempt.  In considering the authorized summary procedure 
for contempt  proceedings,  it was determined that the preliminary 
question as  to  whether a person shuld or should not be held in 
contempt would be  disposed of  in the same  manner  as a motion  for 
a finding of  not guilty,  the ruling of  the law officer thereon 
being made  subject to objection by any member  of  the court as 
provided in  Article Slb.  In case there is no  objection to  the 
law officer1  s preliuLnsy ruling that the person be  held in 
contempt,  no  further action is required on  the part of the court 
which will resume  its regular proceedings;  however,  a verbatim 
report will be mde of  this portion of  the contempt  proceedings, 
as indicated in  appendix 8b,  "Contempt  Procedure."  - 
If there is objection by  any mber of the court to  the 
preliminary ruling of  the law officer,  the court will close 
and vote upon  this interlocutory question in  the manner  pre- 
scribed in  57f,  - to  wit, orally,  beginning with the junior in.  rank, the question to be decided by  a majority vote. 
If, as a result of either the vote of  the court or the ruling 
of  the law officer that is not objected to,  them has been  a 
preliminary determination that the Person be  held in  contempt 
the court will  again close to determine by  secret written ballot 
whether he  shall be  held in contempt  and  in the event of  convic- 
tion an appropriate punishment.  Concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  the 
members  present at  the time  the vote is taken is required both 
to hold the person in  ccntempt and  to punish  him  for contempt. 
This provision concerning  the required vote is based upon  the 
intent to protect the rights of  the person  charged with contempt 
just as fully as the rights of  any accused before the court are 
protected.  It is  to be  noted that Section B,  127c (~ermissible 
additional punishments)  provides that a  fine may  &ays  be  imposed 
upon  any member  of  the armed  services as punishment  for contempt. 
The  president announces  in open  court the courtfs  determina- 
tion whether  the person has been  held in contempt  and the 
puni shent ,  if any,  adjudged. 
With  reference to the summary nature of the contempt proce- 
dure,  the House  Subcommittee Hearings  (page 1060) further provide: 
WFt.  BROOKS.  Is there any appeal from this? 
flldR,  SMART.  There is  none.  There is a limited 
punishing power  and  there is  no  appeal.  It is  a 
summary citation for contempt. 
WR.  BROOKS.  This is 30  days  for each  successive 
or each offense,  plus the fine of  $loo? 
YdR,  LARKIN.  I should  say s0.a 
In conformity with the requirement of  general military proce- 
dure,  the automatic review by  the convening authority is  required 
in contempt  cases.  In the event of a proceeding in  contempt,  the 
court,  prior to resuming  the original proceedings,  will  cause a 
record to  be made  in and as a part of  the regular record of the 
case by  the court showing  the facts concerning  the contempt and 
the proceedings held with reference to it.  An  example  of  such 
proceedings is set out in  appendix 8b.  That  example contains 
detailed instructions concerning the-harmer  in which  the person 
is  warned of  his conduct and advised of  his opportunityto show 
cause why  he should mt  be held in contempt,  the preliminary 
ruling of  the law  officer,  the procedure  involved whether or not 
an objection is made  by  a member  of the court to the preliminary 
ruling by the law officer,  the proceedings of the court in closed 
session to determine whether  the person  should be held in contempt and the assessment of  proper punishment,  if aw, the announcement 
by  the president in  open court of  the courtls decision and  any 
punismt  imposed,  and  the direction to resume  the regular 
proceedings. 
As a further protection of  the rights of  the person held in 
oonbmpt,  it is required that any punishment  assessed by  the 
court must  be  approved by -the  convening authority who  may,  pend- 
ing his formal review of the contempt proceedings,  require the 
person  to undergo any confinement  imposed*  The  requirement  that 
written notification of  the approve2 holding and punishment  in 
the contempt proceeding be  furnished to the persons concerned 
with the execution of  the punishment  is  designed to expedite 
the administrative phases  of  the execution of  the punishment. 
The  provision for causing the removal  of  the offender and 
referring the case for prosecution before a  civil or military 
court is a continuance of the procedure currently mthorized. 
U6c  -  The convening authority is in a better position than  the 
commanding  officer to carry out the administrative details 
involved in executing punis-t  adjudged for contempt and, 
as such,  shall &signate  the place of  confinement as provided 
in  ll8c.  - 
119  Regulations pertaining to the expenses of  courts-martial 
will be prescribed in appropriete departnaental regulations. Conference  HO.  6 
ITSERIOR  COURTS 
Conducted  by 
PGLJOR EOGEH  1Vi.  CURRIER 
1-52  Jurisdiction of  Special Courts-Nartia1.--Persons  and 
offenses.--2~s  first subparagraph restates the first sentence 
of Article 19.  It  is to be  noted that special courts-nartial  - 
are given the power  to try capi%al cases under  such regula- 
tiom as the President  mtiy prescribe instead of  when  the 
officer exercising general courl-martial  jurisdiction over 
the comd  authorizes. it.  According to  the commentary,  the 
change was  made  beceuse : 
"The  Mavy  proposes  this procedure  so that 
prior blanket authority nmy  be  obtained for oapf- 
tal offenses to be tried by  special cpurts aboard 
ships where  circullrstances make  It desirable,  s kc6 
it is not  practicable to  refer such a  case to  the 
officer with generrl co~rt-me.~tirl  jurisdiction. " 
Accordingly  the text coatinues the practice now:  used  in 
the Army  and Air  Force  fbr requirixg the consent of  the officer 
exercising generd  court-nartizl  jurisdiction before a capital 
case may be  referrod to a special court-martial,  but al~o 
authorizes the Secretarj of  a  Deparkment  to  authorize,  by 
regulations,  trial of  capital offenses  without  reference to 
an officer exercising general  court-martial  jurisdiction.  Cf 
course,  violations of  Pxticles 106 (spies) and  188(1) and  (4) 
(premeditated and felony murder) can never be tried by a 
special court-martial  since the mandatory punishment  is be- 
yond  the jurisdiction 02 special courts-martial. 
It  is contemplated  that the Secretary of the Bavy  will 
pemit t r '.d  by  special court-martial  without  reference to 
higher authority in oases involvirg some  capital  offenses. 
In this connection,  the Code  ~&es  capital the following 
off  ens  es : 
Ca~ital  at all times 
Art.  34 - blutiny  or sedition 
Art.  llOa - Willfully hazarding a vessel  - mtal  in time  of  YY~~E. 
Art.  85 - Desertion 
kt. 90 - Assaulting or willFully disobeying 
a superior officer 
Art. 99 - Mi~behavior  before the enemy 
Art.  100 - Subordinate compelling surrender 
Art.  101 - Improper  use  of  countersign 
kt. 102 - Forcing a saf eguard 
Art.  104 - Biding the enemy 
Brt.  106 - Spies 
Art.  113 - Misbehavior  of  sentinel 
The  second and  third paragraphs  etrtte  that a capital offense 
is one  for which a GCM  may adjudge the death penalty.  The 
explanation makes  it clear that  although capital by  statute, never- 
theless,  if the table of  maximum  punishments,  or  the  seatence in 
a previous hearing,  or the direction of  the convening  authority 
with respect  to depoaitions prevents the imposition of  the death 
penalty,  the case ia no  longer cecpital. 
La  wmtg.  --This  paragraph followa  subs  tantially the scope 
of NW,  1949,  paragraph 15 as modified by Article 19. 
16~  Jurisdiction of  courts  -  .--Sersoe offenam. 
This paragraph restates the provisions of  Article 20.  The  prin- 
ciples of  prragraph 15~  with respect  to what  is a capital offense 
are made  applicable to  anmmary courts-martial.  Of course,  as 
statd  in Article 20, no  authority has power  to refer a case for 
which  the death penalty may be  adjudged to a summary  court. 
It may be  noted that  relative to obJection to trial if en 
accused has not been permitted  to refuse punishment  under Article 
15,  the langwge of  the  statute is:  n*  * * trial  be 
ordered by a special or general court-martial  * * * .  fl  Uthough 
this apparently would  make  such trial mandatory,  it mast be can- 
stmed in mnnection with powers and  duties of  commanding  officere 
and convening  anthoritiea as  to proper dieposition of  charges. 
Since,  for minor  offenses,  charges may be  dismissed  or pislnnent 
imposed under Article 15, it is felt that either reference to a 
higher court or other disposition of charges ie appropriate in 
such cases. 16b  -  Punishments.--The  first subparagraph restates the last 
sentence of  Article 20  and  points up  the problem  created by 
the insertion in Articles 16,  19,  20 the term  "any punishment 
not  forbidden by  the codeOt1 The  reasons  for the change  are 
stated as follows in the cammmtary to Article 18: 
"The  punishments which may  be  adjudged  are 
changed fronthose 'authorized  by  1e.w  or the cus- 
tons of  the service* to those  *~ot  forbidden by 
this Code'  because  the  law  and  custcm of  each of 
the services differ." 
In this connection Articles for the Gov-ernmsnt  of  the 
Wavy  30,  35,  and &b  authorize reduction to the next  inferior 
grade  es an mthorized punishent.  lhdeed reduction to any 
lmrer grade is not authorized unless accompanied by  a punitive 
discharge or confinement  in excess of'  three months.  On  the 
other hand the Army  and fir Force  rule in the past has been  , 
that  stated in ~~,  1949,  par.  116d:  - 
"Authorized  punishment  for snlisted personnel 
include reduotion to the lawest  enlisted grade from 
any higher grade.  Reduction  to an  intermediate 
grade by s entence of  court-martial is not authorized. " 
The  reason for the Amy-Air  Force  rule appears to be that; 
a court-martial  has  no  paver  to fill an appointive office. 
Fet-ertheless,  ii  view of the c  ommentary,  it  does  not  appear 
likely that the draftsman of the Code  intended to place  any 
limitation on  the present Navy  practice of  reducing enlisted 
men  to the next  laver grade.  It is to be noted,  however,  that 
by  increasing the jurisdiction of  a summary  court to incl~de 
all noncoromissioned  officers,  adherenee to the present Army 
rule would  enable  a summary  court to reduce a master  sergeant 
to the lowest enlisted grade.  Thus  a limitation on  reduction 
has been  included as to "first throe graders." 
The  second subparagraph restates the rule with respect 
to the apportionment of  different punishments  of  the sams 
general type  in one  sentence which  is now  stated in  MCX,  1949, 
par.  17.  It is to  b o  noted that vhereas Article  of War  I& 
authorized restriction to limits for 3 months,  Article 20  vrill 
reduce  this to 2 months.  It would,  therefore,  appear that 
Congress  now  intends 2 months  restriction to be the equiva- 
lent or 1  monthrs  confinement.  Accordingly,  a court in  adjudg- 
ing 1/2  of  the authorized confinement  (15 days) will no  longer 
be  able to  adjudge 45  days  restriction since that would be 
3b  of  the authorized restriction. 78  Paragraph 78 dealing with procedure  of  spec ial court  a- 
mmtial is taken from paragraph 82, MM,  1949,  wlth additional 
provisions  as to duties of  the preeident.  Since there ie  no  law 
officer on  the special court the president rules on  all inter- 
locutory questions other than challenges,  strb  ject to objection 
by  other menbere,  and givea inetmctiona to the court before 
findings as to element8 of  offausee,  p~esumption  of  innocence, 
reasonable doubt,  end burden of proof. 
79  Paragraphs  on  summary courts-martial  also are taken  from 
the comparable provlslons of  MCM, 1949,  with certain implaslemta- 
tione.  'he  eornnary  court,  of  course,  has  the rame power  as  trial 
couneel of  a special or general court to issue subpoenae and  take 
depositloas.  A provision be  been  added.  that  in obtaining wit- 
nesser, & will take action slmilar to that taken by  trial 
counsel.  New matters included in procedure  are provisions for 
advising an  accused as  to his right to object to trial if he  hae 
not been permitted  to rehse punishment  under drticle 15 for the 
offense charged.  In the Navy,  since the accused has no  right to 
elect to refuse punishment  under Article 15,  the only question 
which would  be determined is whether  the accused  objected to 
trial by  sumnary court without  the neceeaity of  reasone.  Of 
coarse,  if the accused objects the file  must  be returned to the 
convening athority for appropriate action.  In the Army  and  Air 
Force  if the accused objects and it appears that he  ha8 been per- 
mitted aad has  elected to refuse punisbent under Article 15 for 
all the offenses alleged,  the sarPinary  court will proceed with the 
trial, but if he  has not been  permitted  to Plake an  election under 
Article 15,  the  stuamar~  court mutat  return the file to the conven- 
ing authority. 
Incorporated  also are directions that  elements of  proof  and 
reasonable doubt  should be coneidered by  the court in arrivi~lg  at 
findings and the accused  should be  allowed to produce matters in 
mitigation and  extenuation before sentence.  The  findings and 
'sentence will be  announced by  the court ae eoon  as determined. 
Names  of  witnesses which appear on  the charge sheet but wh  were 
not called to teetify should be deleted by the etrpnnary  court and 
names  and addresses of-witnesses who  did not appear  on  the cwgs 
sheet but did teati-  should be added.  If  a  aummary of  evidence 
ie reqaired by  the convening authority,  this ehoald be  attached to 
the record.  It is  probable that the navy  will require thia mm- 
mary ata  fomerly,  in deck  court cases,  if the accused  filed an 
appeal,  the mmaary  was  fo~~arded  with the record. 
A form  for the record of trial by  summary  court ir  conteined 
in appendix U. and is a part of  the Departxat of Defense  Perm  for 
Charge Sheets. Incidentally,  the Department  of  Defense numbers for the 
forms  appearing in the various appendices  have just been made 
available and are as follows:  Appendix  5 contains the form 
for the Charge  Sheet  and is Department  of  Defense Form  458; 
Appendix  7,  The Investigating Officer' s Report,  is DD  Forn 457; 
Appendix 16, Report  of  Proceedings  to Vacate  Suspension,  DD 
Form  455;  Appendix 17,  Subpoena for Civilian Witness,  DI)  Form 
453;  Appendix 18,  Interrogatories and Deposition,  DD  Porn 456; 
and  Appendix 19, Warrant  of  Attachment,  DD  Form  454.  All these 
forms  will  bear the date 1  March  1951. 
83  Records of  trial - Inferior CO-  -  .--The  very brief 
paragrwh 86,  MCM,  1949,  was  enlarged in an attempt to  spell out, 
as to recorde of  trial by  special courts-aartial: 
(1)  those recoirds  which must be recorded verbatim, 
(2)  those records which  be  recorded verbatim,  and 
(3)  those records which  will not be  recorded verbatim. 
Incorgorated is material taken  from  the headnotes of  the present 
appendix 7,  MCM. 
I  am advised that the Air Force and  the Navy  contearplate 
using a reporter  in all cases when  the maximum authorized punish- 
ment  involves a  BCD,  but that theiy  contemplate prescribing 
regulations that such records need  not be reported verbatim  if a 
BCD  is not actually adjudged.  The  paragraph was drafted with the 
view  of  permitting almost any  regulation  to be promulgated  and, 
at the  same  time,  prescribing a  satisfactory proc6du.m  which  c0ad 
be followed  in the abeence  of  regulation.  It has been  the Brmy'e 
experiance that  a  number  of  the records of  trial by  special court- 
martial involving a BCD were  improperly prepared because  of a 
failure to understand  that they are to be prepared in the same 
manner  as a  record  of  trial by  general court-martial.  Amy  regu- 
lations in the SR 22  series are now  in process limiting the 
appointment  of  reporters to  those cases in which a punitive dig- 
charge my  be  adjudged. 
8a2  In view  of  the scarcity of  reporters,  it eeemed  appropriate 
(2)  to permit  a  summary  of the record in a case in which a BCD  wae not 
adjudged  wen though a reporter was  present at the trial.  Bny 
case demed important  enough to warrant a verbatim record  may be 
so  recorded  if the convening authority desires.  The proviaion  fa* 
destruction of  the notes of  the proceedings is believed appropriat6 
as appellate review and  the record  itself is ordinarily not 
complicated. F' 
8~  The  rule as  to preparation of  the record permite the use 
(a)  of  a clerk to record  the proceedings.  Thia  is a common  practice 
in reporting special courts-martial  cases in the Army,  espe- 
cially in  those conrman.de  having a volume  of work. 
8a  The  rule as  to  preparation of copies is stated here.  It 
(4)  was  deemed  desirable to state the rule siac e the requirement 
that the accused be  Mished a copy of  the record  in all casea 
tried by  special (summary in  ~avy)  courts-martial  ia new.  The 
last sentence of  the paragraph was  added to take  care of  a 
particular class of  caees.  The  appellate review  of  cases involv- 
ing general or flag officers incladea automatic consideration of 
the case not only by a board of review,  but also by  the Court of 
Military Appeals,  Thia  circumstance lrequires  the preparation of 
two  additional copies of  the record.  Some  day there may  be a 
special court-martial  case involving a general or flag officer. 
If  one  of you  is responsible for the administration of  the case, 
do  not forget to forward  two  extra copies of  the record. 
83s  The  conplete rule as to authentication of  special court- 
martial records is stated here in view of  the  inapplicability of 
certain provisions for authentication of  general courts-martial. 
It appears appropriate to have  trial counsel as one  nf anthenti- 
cators as this canfirme a practice of  all forces at present. 
91h  This  paragraph is a modification of  paragraph 87,  MCM,  1949, 
but material with respect to promulgation  of  orders and  appellate 
review is now  covered elaewhere. 
It is prov'ided  that  four copies of  the order,  if any,  be for- 
warded  to the staff judge advocate or legal officer.  It is 
propoeed  that regulations will  be  issued covering %he distribution 
of  such orders and  that such regulations will  provide that,  after 
corrective action is taken,  one copy of  the order,  with the action 
of  the  staff judge  advocate or legal officer thereon,  will be 
transmitted  to the convening  authority and  another to the chief 
cartodian of  the personnel  records of  the armed  force concerned. 
Such regulatione are now  in  process in the Amy. 
91s  'Phis  is an impleaentation of  the third eubparegraph of  para- 
,  graph 87~,  MCM, 1949.  It is provided that  two  copies of the 
record will  be  forwarded  to  the staff judge  advocate or legal 
officer in  order that one of  these copiea,  after corrective action, 
if any, has been  taken,  may  be  forwarded  to the chief  custodian of 
personnel records of  the armed  force concerned under appropriate 
departmental regulations.  Such regulations inemring that a copy of 
the record,  as correct&  on  appellate review,  will be  filed In the 
office of  the Adjutant General,  will  be promulgated  shortly in the 
SB 22  series. Genera.--This  paragraph reaffirms the proposition  stated 
in paragraph 91,  MCM,  1949,  aad  MCM,  1928,  to  the effect that 
the officer exercising gmeral court-martial jurisdiction over 
a command  has  supervisory powers  over  inferior courte therein. 
Althmgh historically the proposition has been  subject to mch 
debate  and controrersy (see Winthrop' s Military Law  and Prece- 
date, 26 W., p.  489;  .  JAG 202.26,  &.  30, 1932,  Dig % 
JAG,  1912-40,  Sec.  403(5  7 overruled by  SPJGJ,  1943/19599,  18 
Jan  1945; it is now  well settled in the  and  the Air 
Force  that such supervisory power  is law%  and  that it includes 
the power  to vacate illegal sentences and  sentences not e~p- 
ported by  the evidence.  Article 65 does not rertrict such super- 
visory power  and  the commentary  to Article 65s  contemplateia  that 
it be left to departmental  regulations subject onlx to the 
provision that  cases not  subject to appellate review be exa~iined 
by a 3ud.ge  advocate,  law specialist or lawyer of  the Coast  Guard. 
According to the conrmsntarg,  Art. 6!&  was  framd  in such a 
way  as to provide  elasticity to meet  the needs  of  the varioue 
services : 
\ 
nSubdivision (c) permits  the review of  other 
special and summary  courts-martial to be prescribed 
by regulations,  subject  to the requirement  that all 
such records shall be  reviewed by a specialist or 
judge  advocate  (or lawyer  in a Coast Guard  case) . 
The  reason for thie provision is that the volume  of 
cases,  the availability of  law  specialists and judge 
advocates,  and the feasibility of  reviewing records 
in the field may differ in the various armed  forces.  fl 
Accordingly,  the gemeral paragraph has been  so  framed  that 
the Secretary of  a Department,  ~leq,  by regulation or otherwise, 
deeignate any  other a~thorit~,  in addition to the officer immed- 
iately exercising general  court-martial Jurisdiction to exercise 
supervisory powers  over  inferior courts.  %us  the Navy or  the 
Coaat  Guard may, if they desire,  designate  !L'he  Judge  Advocate 
General  or the General  Ca~aserl  of  the.'k.eamry,  to canme  a review 
to be  made of  inferior court recordr,  or designate the comander 
of  a service force or base  co&d  to supervise inferior court8 
when  it  would not be  qsditlaus to rand  such records  to the 
officer exercieing general court-r~artial  jurisdiction. 
Re  oft  to to-  65c,-This 
is baaed generally on  the procedure preecribed  in paragraph 91, 
MCM,  1949,  as modified,  to proade for the exercise of  euperviaory 
powers by  any axzthority designated by  the Secretmy of  a Department C 
as well as by the officers exercising general court-martial 
jurisdiction over the command.  However,  objections were pre- 
sented to  a provision whereby the eupervisory authority might 
the convening authorits to take corrective action, 
although under  the code  there is no  obJection to advising the 
convening  authority when  fat& error is found  and  a rehearing 
appears advisable.  !The  Navy  view  is that  once  the convening 
authority has  taken his action he  is  officio and  any 
proper  corrective action should be  taken by  superior authority. 
This  view  is based on  the Articles for the Government  of  the 
Xap=t  which eqresaly required review'by the next  superior in 
command.  The  Articles of  War,  on  the other hand,  did not 
expressly require review by  higher authority,  but  the Manual  for 
Courts-Martia.1 did require such review.  In MCM,  1949,  paragr-h 
91,  it was  mede  clear that corrective action could be  effected 
either by  the convening  authority or by the superior.  In view 
of  the Navy  rule the text provide8 that  corrective action be 
taken by  the superior himself  ineted of  directing the subordi- 
nate to take the action,  except when a rehearing,  proceedings 
in revision,  or a corrected action is required. 
Article 61 provides in part that if a trid by  general court- 
martiel results  in an  acquittal the review by  the staff Judge 
advocate shall be limited to jurisdictional matters.  Blthoagh 
there is no  comparable  statutory provision with respeot to infer- 
ior courts,  it is believed  that the same  general principle ought 
to be applied with  respect to such inferior courts. 
The  power  of  the supervisory authority to set aside findings 
of  guilty d  sentences as  the result of  the review by  his legal 
officer or judge advocate as provided  in paragraph 91,  MCM, 1949, 
is retained.  Statutoq authority for the procedure may  be found 
in Articles 74(a)  and  ?5(a) . Although Axticlo ?4(d provides that 
the Secretary of a Department  pley designate an UPder  Secretm, 
Assiertant  Secretary,  Judge Advocate  General or commanding officer 
to renit or suapefid  the unexecuted portion of  a.  sentence,  it ia 
belioved  that the President may, by regulations,  effect what  the 
atetute authorizes the Secretary to do.  Moreover,  the Judge Advo- 
cate General of  the Army  has  taken the position that  superior 
authority,  including the Department  of  the by,  ma,, vacate infer- 
ior court sentences and restore rights.  Thns in  JAGJ  1946/440, 
MEIWK,  the War  Departsent vacated a sentecce by a special court- 
martial to reduction in grade and forfeiture becevse  investigation, 
after the  sentence has been  fully executed, di  sclcsed prejudicial 
error. 
It is d.so provided  that  the convenir~g  authority may, as 
authorized by  the supervisory authority,  wltMraw his former action, disapprove  the sentence and order a -rehearing.  This was  not per- 
mitted under  the Articles of  War.  In .the Navy  "new  trids" were 
granted only upon  the request of  the accused  ( Sec 477,  NC  & B)  . 
The  power  to  order a rehearing must  be  considered in connection 
with the prohibition against former  jeopardy.  Article 44  pro- 
vides in pertinent part : 
"No  proceeding  in which an accused  hae been  foud 
guilty by a court-martial  won rtny  charge or specifica- 
tion shall be  held  to be  a trial in the sense of  this 
article =ti1  the findinp: of eu-B  become  fbna;l 
Since under  the provision of  Article 65&,  the records of 
inferior courts: 
nshall be reviewed  by a judge  advocate of  the Army 
or Air Force,  a law  specialist of  the Xavy, or a,  law 
specialist of  the Coast  Guard or Treasury Department***" 
it follows that the review of  the case has  not been  fully com- 
pleted when  the conveliing aathority of  the inferior court has  taken 
the action thereon.  Bccordingly,  it is not a violation of  Article 
44  to direct e rehearing before the case has  become  final upon  a 
completion  of  the review. 
%ere  remains  for consideration,  however,  the question as to 
whether the supervisory authority has power  to order  w rehearing. 
The  authorities expressly authorized to direct rehearings before 
the sentence has become  final are the convening authority (Art.  63&), 
the Board  of  Review  (kt. 66&,  and the Court  of  Military Appeals 
(kt.  67E).  Other  authorities who  nmst  act on  certain records are 
not given this power  (President,  Art.  7u; Secretary of  a Department, 
Art. ng) .  It would,  therefore,  seem  that  insofar as rehearings 
may be  directed in this type  of  case,  it must  be  directed by  an 
authority expressly given tht power  by  the statute.  Accordingly, 
the text provides  that the supervisory authority may authorize the 
conveniqg authority to  take the action but he  may not  himself  order 
a rehearing. 
Another  problem  is  preoented. by the fact that a rehearing ma$ 
operate to the subatential detriment .of  the accueed  in that unless 
he  is given credit for executed portions of  the original sentence, 
he may  actually be punished more  eeverely tban  if the original 
sentence has been  allowed  to  latand. 
As pointed  out by  the Supreme  Court in  .Par.ta w,  85 U.S.  175: 
1%  : lll?he petitioner,  then,  having paid into the  court 
the fine imposed  upon him  of  two  hundred  dollars,  and 
that money  having passed  into the Treasury of  the 
United  States, and beyond  the legal control of  the 
court * * * -0  having-- 
one mart  P  -om&,  all under a valid judgment, 
can  the court vacate that  Judgment  entirely,  and  with- 
out reference  to what  has been  done under  it, impose 
another ptmiabment  on the prisoner on  the aame  verdict? 
To  do  so  is to punish him. &&Q  for the same  offense. 
He  is not only put  in Jeopardy twice,  but put to actual 
punishment  twice for the sane thing. 
HThe force of  this proposition cannot be  better 
illustrated than by what  occurs  in the preeent case if 
the  second judgment  is carried into effect.  The  law 
authorizes imprisonment  not exceeding one year py a 
fine not  exceedkng two  hundred dollars.  The  court, 
through inadvertence,  imposed both punishments,  when  it 
could rightfully impose but one.  After * * * the 
prisoner had  suffered five days of  his one year's h- 
prisonment,  the court changed, its Judgment  by sentenc- 
ing him  to one  yeas's  imprisonment  from  that time.  If 
this latter sentence is enforced it follows that the 
prisoner in the end pays his two  bared  dollars fine 
and is imprisoned  one year  and five days,  being all 
that the first Judgment  Imposed  on  him  and  five days1 
imprisonment  in addition.  And  this is  done because the 
first Ju-ent  was  confessedly in excess  of the author- 
ity of  the court.n 
The  ob3ection ~olated  out in  the LIJ  case is avoided  in the 
text by providing expressly that  the accuse6 will be  credited with 
any  executed portion of  the original sentence by  the pereon having 
the administrative duty of  executing the sentence after a rehear- 
ing ordered pursuant  to  this paragraph. 
With respect to proceedings in revision,  it is believed to be 
improper for the supervisory authority to  refer such matters 
directly to  the court although there does not appear  to be any 
objection to returning the record to the convening  authority with 
instruction to reconvene  the court for proceedings in revision.  It 
is noted  that Article 628 provides  that only the convening authority 
may return a record  to the court for such proceedings.  (compare 
Article of  War 40  which provides  that  %o  dull return 
a record of  trial  to  any court-zartial  for reconsideration of I. 
Lzertain specified findings or  !&ere  is no  other 
provision  in the code whereby  an appellate agency or any authority other than  the convening authority may direct proceedi  s in re- 
vision.  We  is in accord with present Naval practice  NC & B, 
Sec 684,  Note  88).  "g 
94a 
clude an approved  sentence to bad  conduct discharge,  Article 65P 
provides the following alternative methods  for review  after action 
by  the convening authority; 
(1)  Review  and  action by the officer exarcirw general 
court-martial  jurisdiction  over  the command  as now 
provided  in Articles of  War  13,  36,  and 47A. 
(2)  Direct transmittal to !L'he  Judge Advocate General  for 
review by a board  of  review. 
The alternative method  of  direct transmittal to  The  Judge 
Advocate General  was propoeed  by  the Xavy because  ships with 
special court-aartial  jurisdiction frequently are so  far removed 
from  the commander  who  exercises general court-martial  jurisdiction 
that it would  be more  expeditious to send  the recod directly to 
'Phe  Judge  Advocate  General.  The  text provides that such direct 
transmittal is authorized only when permitted by  the officer exer- 
cisiag general court-martial  jurisdiction.  He  ought  to be permit  ted 
to exercise his supervisory powers  if he  desires.  He  will have  the 
infornation at his diqosal to  determine which  course is moat 
expeditious.  Moreover,  he,  and  not  the subordinate,  will  know 
whether  a judge  advocate or legal officer is  present for duty. 
!be  text also provides that direct transmittal may  be  restricted 
or limited by  the Secretary of  a Department.  Army regtilatione  will 
be promulgated  shortly limiting the direct forwarding of  such records. 
The  next  to  the last sentence is a  restatement  of  the last 
sentence of Article 65B.  The  parenthetical  remark  is intended to 
show  that if  the court is convened by  an officer exercising general 
court-aartial  jurisdiction,  he need  not  send  the record  to a superior 
who  ia also competent  to appoint a general court-martial. 
wl  Fil*.  This  is based on  the provisions of  Article 65s.  The 
problem of disposition of  records of  inferior courts not subject to 
appellate review differs in the various  services.  Accordingly,  it 
has been left to Departmental  regulations  subject to  the provisions 
of  44 U.S.C.,  Section 366-380.  !be  basic act dealing with the dis- 
position of  official recorda has been  cited to provide ready refer- 
ence  for any one who  might  have  to refer to it in the course of  his 
duties.  But  the various anendments  have been  omitted  for the reason 
that there have  already been  3 amendments  since 1948.  Army  regula- 
tions on  the subject are now  in process as discuseed  in connection 
with paragrqph 91. C onf er'ence 7a  - 
IHITIAL FEVIEN  OF  AND ACTION  OM  RECORDS  OF  TRIAL 
Conducted by 
MAJOR  KENNETH  J.  HODSON 
References:  Chapter XVII 
Appendioes  14,  15 
General.  Chapter  XVII was  organized to  permit the various 
powermuties  of  the convening authority to be  diecussed 
in sequence  of  events so far as that was possible.  It contains 
more  detailed provisions with respect to  the pomrs and  duJies 
of the convening authority than are found either in the Manual 
for Courts-Martial,  1949,  or Naval  Courts  and Boards.  The 
detailed rules were  incorporated to insure that convening  aut  h- 
oritis6 of  inferior courts-martial  would  be  able to perform 
their review functions without  the assistance of  a judge  advo- 
cate or legal specialist as well as to  secure uniformity of 
action in all  armed forces.  In great part,  the detailed rules 
are but a codification of rules of  custom now  existing in the 
armed forces. 
84a  -  Definition of  terms.  The  term "convening  authority,"  as 
applied to the officer taking initial action on  a record of 
trial, is  new to the Army  and Air  Force which had referred to 
such officer as the "reviewing authority."  The  use of  the 
term "convening  authorityn is required because  of  the language 
of  Articles 60 through 67.  Also the tern "reviewing  authority," 
as used in  Article 59b and other articles,  now  includes a con- 
vening authority,  a bFard  of  review,  the Court  of Military Appeals, 
the President,  and the Secretary of a Department.  These  desig- 
nations are  similar to those now  in  use in the Navy  (Sec.  471, 
NC  &  B). 
84b  -  Normal  convening authority.  The  normal  convening authority 
is the offioer who  convened the court,  an officer comnanding 
for the time being,  or a successor in command.  Such  commander 
should,  if practicable,  review and  take action on a record of 
trial by a court-martial  convened by him or his predecessor 
in  command.  The  term "officer commanding for the time being" 
was recognized in this paragraph because the term was  used in 
Article 60.  However,  it is included in  the term wsuccessor in 
commandw as  <he  latter term includes the commander  who  succeeds 
temporarily,  as well as the commander  who  succeeds permanently, 
to command. Ordinarily it is  not necessary or appropriate for the con- 
vening  authority to indicate in his action whether he  is acting 
as the officer who  convened  the court,  as an officer commanding 
for the time being,  or as a  successor in comnand.  However,  if  one 
command  is absorbed by another command,  the commander  of  which 
does  not exercise general court-martial  jurisdiction,  the suc- 
cessor commander,  in  acting on  a  record of  trial by  a  court- 
martial convened by  his predecessor,  should indicate in  his 
action, not only that he  is "C~mmanding" the suocessor ccmmnand, 
but also that he  is  the "~ucoessor  in cormnand  to (name  of  absorbed 
command) ." If the successor commander  exercises general court- 
martial jurisdiction,  it is  not necessary to indicate that he 
is taking his action as a  "sucoessor  in command." 
84c  -  Officer exercising general  court-martial  jurisdiction,  This 
.paragraph does  not create any jurisdictional limitations on 
the power  under Article 60  of  an officer exercising general 
court-martial  jurisdicti  on to  take initial action as convening 
authority on any record of  trial-whether  it be  by  general, 
special,  or summary  court-martial.  This  paragraph,  together 
with paragraph 84b,  merely establishes a policy that the "normaln 
convening  authoriyy should act in a case if practicable.  If  it 
is  not practicable for the "normaln convening authority to act, 
he is to forward the case--through  the chain of  command--to 
an officer exeroieing general  court-martial  jarisdiction,  giving 
the reason for his failure to act.  This  procedure is intended 
to  keep an Army  case in  Amy channels,  an Air Force case in  Air 
Force  channels,  and a Navy  case in  Navy  channels.  It should also 
prevent a staff judge  advocate or legal officer from  shifting 
his work  to  another command  without a good  reason. 
84 d  -  Action when  bad  conduct  discharge is  adjudged by  special 
court-martial.  Thic  paragraph,  together with 94a( 31,  implements 
Article 65b  with  respect to the disposition of  sGcial oourt- 
martial reoords  involving a bad conduct discharge which has 
been appro\-d  by an  officer  exercising special, but not general, 
court-martial  jurisdiction.  Such a record is  to  be forwarded 
to  the officer exercising general court-martial  juris  diction 
never  the commandn  or,  if  authorized by  such an  officer,  the 
record may  be forwarded  directly to The  Judge  Advocate  ~eneral. 
Such  direct transmittal should be  authorized only in exceptional 
cases and  for good  reasons;  direct transmittal may  be  limited 
by Departmental  regulatias , 
86a,b  -  -  Miscellaneous  powers  and duties of  convening authority. 
The  outline of  the general powers  and  duties of  the convening 
authority should help officers who  exercise inferior court- 
martial jurisdiction. Article 64 provides  that unless the convening authority 
indicates otherwise %pproval  of  the sdntenca, shall oonstitute 
approwl of the findings and  sentence."  Paragraph 86a interprets 
that provision to mean  "approval  of  the findings of  gFiltyn  since 
Article 61 provides  that the review of an acquittal should be 
limited to questions  of  jurisdiction.  It is provided  in  para- 
graph 86b(2)  that findings of  not guilty or rulings amounting 
to findiks of  not guilty should neither be approved nor dis- 
approved. 
To  simplify the action of  the convening  authorits itia pro- 
vided that the disapproval  of a sentence, without more,  shall 
oonstitute disapproval  of  all findings of  guilty.  This  rule 
satisfies the requirements  of  Article 63a that both the findings 
and sentence be  disapproved when  a  reheaFing  is  ordered.  See 
Form  24,  appendix 14. 
86cad  --  Certificate of ccrrection;  revision.  The  certificate of 
correction,  long a part of  Army-Air  procedure,  has  been inoluded 
because it simplifies the correction of  clerical errors in a 
record of  trial.  Although a revision pro~eeding  may  be  used 
for the correction of  clerical errors, it is  a far more  compli- 
cated procedure  than the procedure  involved in obtaining a 
certificate of  correction.  A  certificate of  correction may 
be made  by  any ti  persons vfno  oould have  authenticated the 
record,  whereas  revision proceedings  require at  least a quorum 
of the members  who  were  present at  the time  the findings and 
sentence were  entered. 
Procedure  in  revision is  useful chiefly to correct inoon- 
aistenoies in  the findings  or  sentence.  Several examples  of 
the proper use  of  revision proceedings  are  given in  this para- 
graph.  Article 62b  lists several matters which  are not properly 
the subject of  revTsion proceedings. 
87a(2)  -  Legal sufficiency of  specification.  The  test to  be applied 
in  determining  the legal suffi~~ency  of a specification was 
derived from the language of  the ~ederal  courts.  See,  for 
example, 
Foolley v.  U.  S.  (1938),  97  F.  2d  258, 
Nye  v.  U.  S.  (1943),  137 F.'  2d  73, 
U.  S.  v.  Josephsp (1947),  165 F.  2d  82, 
Todorow et  a1 v.  U.  S.  (1949),  173 F.  2d  439, 
Ross  v,  U.  S.  (1950),  180 F.  2d  160. 
In determining the legal sufficiency of  specifications,  note 
the language  of  the first paragraph of  appendix 6a  which provides 
.in effect that the form specifications,  when  propzrly completed, 
are sufficient allegations of  the offenses to  which they relate. Consequently,  the rule laid down  in  this paragraph is not import- 
ant in  determining the legal sufficiency of an  offense that is 
? 
alleged in  the language  prescribed in the forms  in appendix 6. 
87a(3)  -  Sufficiency of  the evidence.  Article 64  directs the con- 
vening authority to approve 
"only such findings of  guilty * * * as he  finds 
correct in law and fact and  as he  in his discretion 
dehmnhes should be a~~r0-d.'  (underscoring supplied. 1 
To  implement  thie provision,  the convening authority hae been 
given the same  authority as a board of  review with respect to 
weighing the evidence,  judging  the credibility of  witnesses,  and 
determining controverted questions  of  fact.  Before he  can ap- 
prove  a finding of  guilty he must  determine that guilt was  estab- 
lished beyond  a  reaeonable  doubt,  applying the same  rules that 
are to be applied by the court in determining this question. 
See 74a.  - 
87a(4)  -  Modification of  findings.  Although this paragraph speaks 
only of  the authority of  the convening authority to find the 
aocused guilty of  a lesser included offense,  he  may  a180 ap- 
prove  findings by exceptions  or exceptions and substitutions, 
ao as to find the accused guilty of an  offense,  differing frm 
the offense charged only with respect to immaterial variances 
in  dates or places,  or with respect to  matters of  aggravation. 
See Land  v.  U.  S.  (1949),  177 F.  2d  346.  Note,  however,  that 
he  will not use  the same  terms the court would  have used in 
finding the accused guilty by  exceptions and  substitutions. 
Instead,  he  will approve aonly so much"  of  the offense as in- 
volves  a  finding of  guilty of  amodified specification.  Ap- 
proval  of  a  lesser included offense is  accomplished  in  the sam~ 
manne re 
8  7b  -  This paragraph implements Article 62b(Z)  by laying down 
several ground rules as to the action tha,  is  to  be  taken when 
findings as to a  charge are inconsistent with the findings as 
to a  specification under the charge. 
87c  -  Effect of  error on the findings.  The  language  of  the 
harmless  error rule announced in this paragraph  (particularly 
in  the third and fourth subparagraphs)  is  new to the Manual 
for Courts-Martial  and  Naval Courts and Boards.  It is  based 
on  the language  of  kr.  Justice Rutledge in  the majority opinion 
in  Kotteakos  v.  U.  S.  (1946),  328  U.S.  750.  That  opinion was 
based  on the Federal  harmlese  error rulo which  is  similar to the 
harmless error rule in Article 59a.  The  effect of  an error on 
the sentence is  not mentioned.  ~zst  errors which  affect the eentonce only,  and not the findings, may  be  eliminated by 
revision proceedings  or,  in a  proper  case,  by approval  of  a 
less a ever  e sentence. 
880  -  Power  of  commutation.  These  paragraphs  deal with the 
approval  of  all  or a part of  the sentence and  thus implement 
the provisions of  Article 64.  The  convening authority,  unless 
he  is  the Seoretary or the President (Art.  71),  has no  power 
to commute  a sentenco. 
Approval  of  a part of  the  sentence.  The  general  rule as 
to approval  of  a part of  a divisible sentence is  that the part 
approved must (1) be  included in the sentence adjudged by the 
court and (2) must be a  sentence that the court legally could 
have  adjudged.  However,  the convening  authority may  approve a 
part of  a divieible mandatory  sentenoe  (i.e.,  oonfinement  for. 
life adjudged under  Article 118(1) or (4).  If the sentence 
adjudged by  the court is not divisible (e.g.,  death,  dismissal), 
but the convening authority determines that the sentence,  al- 
though  legal,  is  too severe,  he may  return the record to the 
court for revision proceedings  or he  may  recommend  in  his action 
that the sentence be  commuted by the proper  authority.  See 
Form  37,  Appendix 14a.  However,  if the convening  authority 
determines  that the regally sustained findings of  guilty will 
not support a non-divisible  sentence,  but would  support a less 
severe sentence,  he  should return the record to  the court with 
directions to reconsider the sentence in  the light of  the legally 
sustainable findings.  Thus,  if the court adjudged the death 
penalty and the convening  authority determined that the findings 
of  guilty upon which the sentence was  based  cannot  be  eustainod, 
but  that a  finding of  guilty of  a leseer included offonse can 
be  sustained,  he  should return the record of  trial to the court 
arith the direction that it reconsider the sentence and  adjudge 
an appropriate sentence based  on  the legally sustained findings 
of  guilty.  If revision proceedings were  impracticable in such 
a  case,  a rehearing of  the lesser included offense could be 
ordered,  or the record  could be forwarded  without action to the 
Judge Advocate  General as it appears that the President,  actine 
as an officer exercising general court-martial  jurisdiction,  could 
commute  the sentence under  the authority of  Article 71a.  - 
88d  -  Execution of  sentences.  The  convening authority,  unless he 
is the Secretary of  a Department,  has  not been authorized to 
execute a  sentence adjudged at a new  trial.  Except  in the case 
of  a newtrial,  the convening  authority may,  at  the time  of 
approval of  any sentence,  order its execution if, as approved by 
him,  it does not involve a  general or flag officer,  a  sentence 
of  death or dismissal,  or an unsuspended  sentence of  dishonorable 
or bad oonduct  discharge,  or confinement for one  year or more. Note  in  this respect that the convening authority should no% sus- 
pend  that portion of a  single sentence to confinement  that is 
in  excess  of  11  months  and  29 days  and order the remainder  of 
the sentence to confinemept into execution. 
88e  -  Suspension of  execution.  Both  the Army-Air  and the Navy 
typels  of  suspensions are authorized.  The  advantage of  the 
~-rn~-Air  type of  suspension (i.e.,  suspension of  a  BCD  or DD 
pending  release of  accused from  confinement)  is that it may 
permit  the convening authority to order the remainder  of  the 
sentence into execction.  Such action may  be desirable, 
especially when  the sentence involves a  short (less than one 
year) period  of  confinement which may  be  served prior to  the 
campletion  of  the appellate review;  otherwise  the accused 
might  get credit for his entire sentence to confinement  even 
.  though in  the status of an "unsentenced  prisoner."  Another 
advantage of  this type of  suspension is  that it puts the 
onus  upon  the accused to  prove  that he  is  entitled to  be 
restored to duty,  rather than on  the military authorities to 
prove tht he  is  not entitled to be  restored.  Note  the pro- 
vision (~orm  39,  appendix 140) which  is  to be  included in 
the action of  the convening Xuthority in such a  case to the 
effect that appellate review must  be  completed before a 
BCD  or DD may  be executed.  This provision should serve as a 
warning  to prison and brig of ficers that they must  be ad- 
vised of  the completion of appellate review before  a punitive 
discharge may  be  is  sued.  The  advantage of  the Navy  type  of 
euspension  (i.e.,  suspension for a definite period at the end 
of  which the unexecuted  part of  the sentence is remitted)  is 
that it simplifies administration and also gives the accused 
a goal toward which to  work.  It encourages him  to behave-- 
during  the period  of  suspension at  least. 
Departmental  regulations may  limit the use of  the various 
types  of  suapensione. 
88e  Suspending  or deferring forfeitures . When  a  sentence 
(2T( c) involves confinement not  suspended and forfeitures,  the for- 
feiture will apply to pay accruing on and after the date of 
the approval of  the sentence (126h(5)).  However,  the con- 
vening authority is  empowered  by ?irticle  71d to suspend any 
sentence except death.  Cons equently,  he my  always  suspend 
the execution of  the forfeitures in such a  case.  If  he  does 
not desire to suspend the execution of  the forfeitures in a 
particular case but does wish  to continue the accused in  a 
pay  status pending  completion  of  appellate review,  he may 
defer the,applicability of  the forfeitures  (~ote  to  Form  27, 
appendix 14b)  - To  aid disbursing officers in determining the date of  appli- 
cation of  forfeitures, the convening  authority--unless  he  orders 
forfeitures executed,  deferred,  or suspended--is  required to 
state in his action,  on  a case involving an  approved  sentence 
to forfeitures and  confinement not suspended,  that the for- 
feitures will apply'to pay accruing on  and'after the date of 
the action (~ote  to  Form  27,  appendix 14b).  - 
89  Forms  of  action and related matters.  This  paragraph ' 
contains the basic rules from which  the forms  of  action in 
appendix 14 have  been  derived.  In the case of  a joint  or 
common  trial, the convening authority should take a  separate 
action for each accused.  This  procedure will simplify the 
promulgation of  a separate court-martial  as to each accused. 
See appendix  15a.  - 
APP  Appendix  14a and b  sets forth in considerable detail 
14  examples  of  almox evefi  form of action which the convening 
authority of  a summary  or special court-martial  may take. 
Appddix 14b also includes  several forms  of  action to be  taken 
under ~rticTe  65b  by  the officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiczion upon  a record of  trial by  special court- 
martial.  Appendix  14c,  although it contains a num  >er of  forms 
of  action which  are p%tinent  to a record  of  trial by general 
court-martial,  incorporates,  by reference,  some  of  the forms 
of  action that are prescribed for a record of  trial by  special 
court-martial.  Thus,  according to the first instructional note 
of  appendix 14c,  - 
"Forms  of  action 11-26  above  are generally applicable 
to general  court-martial  cases  in which the sentence 
as approved  does  not affect a  general  or flag officer, 
extend to death,  dismissal,  dishonorable  or bad  conduct 
discharge,  or,  confinement  for one  year or more ." 
The  important words  in  the note are "as  approved.''  If  a general 
court-martial  adjudges  confinement  and partial forfeitures for 
six monti~s,  but does  not  adjudge a punitive  discharge,  it is 
clear that forms  11-26  are appropriate.  These  forma  are also 
appropriate,  for example,  if a sentence involving death,  dis- 
missal,  dishonorable  or bad conduct  discharge,  or  confinement 
for one  year  or more,  although adjudged by  the court,  is  not 
approved by  the convening authority. 
89a,b  - -  Signature of  convening authority.  The  action of  the con- 
venin.hority, or any  supplementary or corrective action 
taken by him,  is  to be  signed personally by the convening 
authority. 895  Modification of  adion.--To  give some  degree of  stability 
to the action of  the convening authority and  to insure that 
he will not modify his action-pending  appellate review unless 
he  obtains prior approval of a  superior revievrring  authority, 
it is provided that he may,  on  his own  motion,  recall or 
modify his own  action only if it has  not been published  or 
the accused  notified officially.  Any  supplementary or cor- 
rective action taken by him thereafter is to  be directed by 
a superior reviewing or supervisory authority. 
The  provision permitting the modification of an action 
that is "incomplete,  ambiguous,  void,  or inaccurate1I refers 
to  the same matters as the provision found  in  paragraph  95 
authorizing cor.rective action when  the convening authority1  s 
action is "incomplete,  ambimous ,  or contains clerical errors. It 
895(  2 )  ings of  guilty.--The  reasons 
ilty  must  be stated if a 
rehearing is ordered.  'Ihe  reasons for disapproval of  findings 
of  guilty may  be stated in  other cases.  However,  there is no 
intention of  adopting the Navy  rule that reasons for a  dis- 
approval will  be  stated in  every case  (NC  &  B,  Sec.  642,  note 
66).  The  rule to be followed is that reasons for the disap- 
proval of a  finding should be stated only when  they will  be 
of assistance to persons  charged with duties in connection 
with the administrative disposition of the accused thereafter. 
895(  7  Crediting accused when  acting on  rehearings  .--The  con- 
vening authority may  approve an appropriate punishment  ad judged 
at  a  rehearing without regard to whether any part of the prior 
sentence has been served or executed.  However,  Article 75a 
has been  construed as requiring that any portion of  a sentznce 
adjudged upon  a rehearing or a new  trial that has been  executed 
or served is to  be credited to the accused in  computing the 
term or amount  of punishment  actually to be served or executed 
under the new  sentence.  In the case of a new  trial, the 
Secretary will credit the accused.  In the case of  a rehearing, 
the convening authority,  if  he approves any part of  the sentence 
adjudged at  the rehearing,  will  direct in  his action that the 
accused be credited with the arnount  of  the former sentence 
served or executed between  the date it was  ad judged  and the 
date it  was  disapproved dr set aside.  Note that under Article 
\ 
57b_  a sentence to confinement begins to  run from  the date it 
was  ad judged.  Forms  18 and  38,  appendix a,  indicate the  \  \ 
language that is to be used  in  directi~g  the crediting of  the 
accused. If  any executed or served  portion of  the original sentence 
is not included in  the approved  rehearing sentence,  the con- 
vening authority will  include a statenent in  his action 
restoring to the accuied all  ights,  privileges,  and  property 
affected by that portion of t  'r,  e original executed  or served 
sentence that is not included  n the approved  rehearing  3  sentence.  Forms  9 and  23,  appeydix lh,  indicate the language 
that is to be used  in crediting the accused. 
90  Orders and  related matters  .-A  court-martial  order gener- 
ally  will  be issued by the convening authority who  takes initial 
action on a record of trial by  special or general court-martial; 
generally,  this order will be issued at  the time the initial 
action is taken.  However,  in  the case of a bad  conduct  dis- 
charge adjudged by a  special court a2pointed by  a  comraander  who 
does  not exercise general  court-raartial  jurisdiction,  the 
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction vill issue 
the court-martial  order when  he  takes his action on the case. 
It follms that,  if the record in  such a  case is forwarded 
directly to the Judge Advocate  General under the provisions 
of  paragraph 9b(3),  the court-martial order will  be issued 
by the special court-martial  convening authority at the time 
he takes his action.  These  rules with respect to  the issuance 
of  court-nartial orders were adopted  so that in  every case 
forwarded to the Judge Advocate  General there would  be a 
proraulgating  order.  If a rehearing is ordered by the convening 
authority,  he  will  promulgate  an order;  when  he  takes action on 
the rehearing,  he will  promulgate  another order. 
Date of  court-martial  order.-The  court,-martial  order 
will always  bear the date upon  which  the convemng authority 
took action on  the case except when  a special court-martial 
order promulgating an approved  sentence of  a  bad  conduct 
discharge is issued by  an officer exerdsing general court- 
martial jurisdiction.  In the latter case the order will 
bear the date upon which  the officer exercising general 
court-martial  jurisdiction took  his action.  Of  course,  if the 
canvening  authority takes no  action (e.g.,  an acquittal) the 
court-martial order will  bear the date it is published. 
Separate order as to each accused.--In  the case of  a  joint 
or common  trial, separate orders are to be issued for each 
accused.  Joint specifications will  be  copied verbatin,  but 
only the pleas,  findings,  sentence,  and  action pertaining to the accused as to whom  the order  is  issued need be  shown. 
See appendix  15r.  - 
90e  -  Summary court;  orders;  numbering.  As the armed fbrces 
do  not have  uniform types of  orders,  an order issued subsequent 
to the initial action-in a summary  court-martial  case is  to be 
prolnulgated  in such orders as may  be  prescribed by  depar.benta1 
regulations. 
The  convening authori-@ of  a  summary  court-martial  is  to 
number  each record at the time it is  submitted to  him for his 
action.  The  manner  of  numbering  is  left to the discretion of 
the convening or higher authority.  Unless  otherwise prescribed, 
a  command  should number  its summary  court-martial  cases in 
sequence during a  calendar year. 
9 1  Disposition of  the record.  This paragraph contains the 
rules as to the disposition of  the three kinds of  record of 
trial,  as well  as certain genoral  rules as  to the contents 
and  arrangement  of  the records.  Additional  provisions in 
this regard are to  be  found in appendices  9  and 10. 
91a  -  GBneral  courts-martial.  To  assist in  the expeditious 
appellate review of  records  of  trial which  are forwarded to 
the Judge Advocate  General,  it is  provided that,  in any case 
which is to be submitted to a board of  review under Article 
66,  the record will be forwarded in  triplicate. 
Note  that a  general court-martial  record ordinarily is 
not transmitted to the Judge  Advocate  General by a  letter of 
transmittal.  However?  if  the convening authority has taken an 
action contrary to  that recornended by his staff judge  advo- 
cate or legal officer,  the record should be  transmitted by a 
letter containing an explanation of  the convening authority's 
action.  There  is  no  requirement  that such a  letter be  signed 
personally by the convening authority. 
91b, c  Forwarding  inferior court-martial  records . Note  that, 
94x0  under  the authority of Article 65c  and paragraph 94a(l) the  - 
Secretary of  a Department may  preycribe  that recora of  trial 
by  summary  court-martial  and  those by  special court-martial 
not involving approved  sentences to  bad conduct discharge 
be  forwarded by the convening  authority to a  supervisory 
authority other than the officer exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction over the command. 
91b  -  Special courts-martial.  Four  copies of  the court- 
martial order  promulgating  the result of  a trial by special 
court-martial  are to  be attached to the recard when  it is f orrrdsd to the supervi  sory authority.  1t' ix  c  onternplated 
that departmental  regulations will provide for\the  disposition 
of  these copies.  It has been proposed in the Army  that,  after 
action of  the staff judge  advocate upon the record of  trial, 
one  copy of  the court-martial  order with a  notation of  the 
action of the staff judge  advocate thereon will  be  returned 
to the convening authority.  Another  copy  similarly annotated 
will be  forwarded to the chief custodian of  the personnel 
records of  the Army. 
9 1c  -  ~k:ary  courts-martial.  Unless  otherwise prescribed by 
departmental. regulations,  two  copies  of each reoord of  trial 
by summary court-martial  will  be  forwarded,  Departmental regu- 
lations will  provide for the disposition of  these copies. 
It has  been proposed in the Amy  that one  copy  of  such a 
record,  with a  notation of  the action of  the staff judge  advo- 
cate thereon,  will be  forwarded to the chief custodian of  the 
personnel  records  of  the Army. Conference No.  7b  - 
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References :  Paragraphs 89c(S) and  (6), 
92,  93,  96,  97;  appendices  1.4  and 15 
92  The  rehearing provisions of the code are new  to  all  the 
armed  forces.  A  rehearing may  be ordered by the convening 
authority to  whom  the record is forwarded for initial action 
(including the officer exercising general court-martial  juris- 
diction with respect to a  special court-martial  case involving 
a bad  conduct discharge),  a board  of  review,  or the Court of 
Military Appeals.  The  rehearing may  be ordered if the findings 
of  guilty and  the sentence are disapproved unless  Itthere is 
lack of  sufficient evidence in  the record to support the find- 
ings."  The  commentary of the drafting conunittee construed the 
phrase "evidence in the recordn as follows: 
"The phrase  'evidence in  the record  is in- 
tended to authorize rehearings where the prosecution 
has made its case on  evidence which is improperly 
admitted at  the trial, evidence for which there may 
well be an admissible substitute." 
The provisions of  92  are consistent with the intent of  the 
drafting committee.  The  evidence,  although improper,  must  have 
been admitted to be  "in the record."  Paragraph 821.  provides,  in 
effect,  that the requiranent that there be l1evtden;e  in  the 
record"  does not preclude a  rehearing in  a  case in  which the 
record of  trial cannot be prepared  properly because of  the loss 
of  the record or the reporter's notes.  However,  a rehearing may 
not be ordered in  such a  case unless the offenses as to  which  a 
rehearing is ordered  are supported by  the summary of. evidence 
which is included in  the substitute record.  Unless  the accused pleads guilty,  a rehearing may  not be ordered with respeot 
to a trial  by  summary  court-martial  unless a record was  made 
of the evidence considered by  the court.  Articles 66  and 67 
provide that a board  of  review and  the Court  of Military 
Appeals are empowered to order a rehearing.  In  such a oase 
the order of  the bomd or the court is usually trangmitted to 
the convening  authority do  took the initial aotion on  the 
record.  He  is empowered,  after considering the matter,  to 
proceed with a rehearing or to dismiss the charges.  In  other 
words,  the nordern of  the board of  revim or the Court  of 
Uilitq  Appeals amounts  to nothing more  than an authorization 
for a rehearing. 
Reasons  for disapproval of the findings and sentence must 
be  included in the conmning authority's  action if a rehearing 
is ordered.  It is contemplated that the reasons for disapproval 
of  the findings of  guilty be  specific.  For  example,  it muld be 
improper  to state "The  findings and  sentenoe are disapproved 
because of  errors in  the record."  If  the findings and  sentenoe 
are disapproved  and a rehearing is not ordered,  the action will 
note dismissal of  the charges. 
Distinction is made  between  a rehearing and  other trials 
whichnay have  been ordered beoause  the first court-martial 
lacked jurisdiction of  the person  or the offense*  The  cammen- 
tary of the drafting oommittee points out that the statutory 
restrictions of  Article 63  are not applicable in such cases. 
The  text incorporates the provisions of  the commentary  of  the 
drafting committee  but provides  that ohargea  in such cases 
should be referred to a court none  of whose members  participated 
in the first trial.  This  provision is implemented  in 62f(7) 
which  establishes this as a jurisdictional  ground  of  cha-lenge. 
,  PLACE  OF  CONFIXENENT  OR  CUSTODY 
When  confinement is involved,  the authority ordering its 
execution will designate a place of  confinement as prescribed 
in  departmental regulations.  Thus,  if the sentence involves 
oonfinement,  a place of oonfinement would  be  designated by  the 
convening  authority of  a summary  court-martial  and by  the con- 
vening authority of  a  special cour-1;-martial  unless the sentence 
also involves an  unsuspended  BCD.  There  is  no  statutory restric- 
tion with respeot to designating a federal institution (peni- 
tentiary,  reformatory,  eta.) as a place of  confinement  in any 
case involving an  offense committed on  and after 31 May 1951. 
Note,  however,  that the limitations of  Article of War  42 are applicable to  Army  and Air Foroe  cases involving offenses 
codtted  before 31 May  1951.  It appears that  the designa- 
tion of a penitentiary as the plaoe of  confinement  for a 
%on-penitentiary"  offense committed  prior to 31 May  1951 
might be  construed as increasing the punisbent therefor and 
thus be a violation of  the prohibition against expost facto 
laws.  As  the navy was  not restrioted by  a  statute simi~o 
Article of  War 4.2 it will experience no  transitional problems 
with respeot to designation of  the proper place  of  confinement. 
8gc  It is important that the accused's  whereabouts  be known 
(6)-  at all times during the period of  appellate review  (e.g.,  so 
that a  copy  of  the board of  review deoision may  be  served upon 
him).  Aocordingly,  a place of  temporary  custody  (89c(6))  or a 
placm  of  confinement  (89c (5)  ) will  be  designated in &e  aotion 
of  the oonvening authorizy in all cases whioh are forwarded  to 
the Judge Advocate General if an approved  sentence is involved. 
Although it is desirable that the  accused be  retained in 
the command  of  the oonvening authority exeroising general oourt- 
martial jurisdiction it is obvioug  that this may be  impracticable 
in many oases.  For  example,  a  combat  unit should not be  required 
to be responsible for prisoners during the long period that will 
be  required to complete appellate review.  The  advantage  in  re- 
taining the aocused  in  the oustody-of his local camand is that 
it simplifies a revision  proceeding  or a rehearing,  and it 
insures more  expeditious service upon  the  accused of  such matters 
as the decision of  the board of  review. 
96  If,  in any case in  whioh the approved sentence is subjeot 
to initial revim by  a board of review under Artiole 66, the 
place of confinement  or austody is ohanged  prior to  the time 
when  the accused has  been notified of  the deoision of  the board 
of  review,  the officer ordering such change will notify the 
appropriate Judge Advocate  General.  Note  that 89c (6) provides 
that in all cases forwarded  to th8 Judge ~dvocate-~eneral  which 
involve approved sentences the aonvening authority will desig- 
nate a plaoe of  temporary custody or a  place of  confinanent. 
Emever,  unless the approvdd  sentence is  subject to initial 
review by  a board of  review under  Article 66, the convening 
authority is  not required by  96  to report any change  in  the 
plaoe of  custody. 
RENISSION AND SUSPENSION 
Ekcept  for the third subparagraph of  g'j'a,  ojhich contains 
general  rules as to suspensions  and  the variTue  factors affecting them,  the provisions of 97a  are not applicable to the oon- 
vening authority at  the tGe  he  takes initial action on a 
record of trial.  They  are generally applicable to subsequent 
aotion on  a sentence which has been approved and  executed or 
suspended. 
The  power  to remit  or suspend the unexecuted  portion of 
a sentenoe-except  one which  has been approved by  the President- 
has been  left entirely to departmental  regulations with the 
follming exception:  The  unexecuted  portion of  santenoes of 
summasy  courts-martial and those of  special courts-martial  not 
including a bad  conduct  disoharge may  be remitted or suspended 
(1) by the offioer exeroising supervisory power  over  inferior 
courts,  or (2) by  a oommanding  offioer of  the aocused who  can 
I 
convene a oourt of  the kind that adjudged the sentenoe. 
Three  types  of  suspension are recognized.  They  are the 
same  as those discussed in  880.  A  suspension,  although it may 
extend beyond  a period of  confinement-imposed,  may  not  extend 
beyond  a period of  enlis-hnent or servioe.  Likewise death or 
non-fraudulent  disoharge serves to remit  any unexeouted  portion 
of  a suspended  sentence. -  Departmental  regulations may plaoe 
additional limitations on the period of  suspension. 
VACATION  OF  SUSPENS  ION 
This paragraph is a restatement of  Article 72 and  is new 
to all armed  forces.  The  important feature of  the procedure 
established by  Article 72 is that a  suspended  sentence involv5ng 
a bad  conduct discharge adjudged by  special court-martial and 
any sentence adjudged by general  court-martiel  mq-  not be va- 
cated without a hearing conduoted  personally by the offioer 
exeroising special court-martial  jurisdiction over the 
"probationer".  Artide 72a makes  no  provision for the dele- 
gation of  the pomr and  duxy  to hold the hearing on the alleged 
violation of  probation.  It is obvious,  hornever,  that many 
conrmrulders  exercising special court-martial  jurisdiotion will 
not have  sufficient time  to oonduct such hearings  in  their 
entirety.  Thus,  appendix 16,  which  contains a form of  a report 
of  such a hearing* indicates clearly that -he initial stages 
of  the hearing can be  conducted by  an officer appointed by  the 
officer exercising speoial court-martial  jurisdiction.  This 
prelimjnnry hearing will be  conduoted  in the presenoe  of  the 
accused  and the aocused will be  atitled to have  counsel  repre- 
sent him,  either counsel  of  his uwn choice if reasonably avail- 
able or counsel f'urnished by  the offioer exeroising special 
oourt-martial  jurisdiotion. After the preliminary hearing has been conducted,  if 
the offioer exeroising speoial court-martial  jurisdiction 
deems  that vacation of  the suspended  sentenoe is  warrasted, 
he  will conduct a formal hearing  in  the presence  of  the 
accused and,  if he  desires,  oounsel.  This formal hearing may 
be brief.  The  amused will be  given an opportunity to  con- 
sider the report of  the preliminary hearing,  object thereto, 
and submit  new  matter.  If  the officer exeroising special court- 
martial jurisdiction,  after holding  such a hearing,  deems  va- 
cation of the-suspended sentence to  be warranted,  he will for- 
ward the report of  the hearing, with a recommendation to  th& 
effeot,  to  the offioer exercising general oourt-martial  juris- 
diction over  ttze  oonrmand.  The  latter offioer may  vacate the 
suspension of  any sentenoe except one whioh  includes a dis- 
missal;  a  suspension of  a diamissd must  be  approved by the 
Seoretarg of  the Department. 
No  order of  vaoation shall be effeotive with respeot to 
any sentenoe until after the oompletion  of  the appellate review 
required by  Artioles 66  and 67. 
Although Article 72 and paragraph 97b  provide that the 
officer exercising special court+nartial j%risdiction  will for- 
ward  the report of  the hearing and his recommendations thereon 
to  the offioer exereiaing general court-martial  jurisdiotion, 
there is no requirement that he  forward  such report unless he 
deems  vacation of  the suspension to be warranted  under  the 
circumstances.  However,  as the findings and recommendations 
of  the  offioer exercising special court-martial jurisdiction 
are advisory only,  ompetent superior mthoritg may  prescribe 
that the report and rec~~rrmmdations  will be  forwarded in  any 
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Definition.  The  term  "legal offioer" is defined in 
Articb l(l.4)  as "ahy officer in the Navy  or Coast  Guard 
designated to  perform  legal duties for a command."  The  oode 
does  not define the term  "staff  judge  ad~ooate.~  The  ma.nual 
oontemplates that the staff judge  advocate or legal officer 
will  be the senior judge  advocate or senior legal speoialist, 
respectively,  performing military justioe duties on the staff 
of  an officer exeroising general  court-mrtial  jurisdiotion. 
In other words,  tbse  officers have  the same  status and  almost 
tne same  duties as the staff judge  advocate under  the Articles 
of War.*  a  this comection,  note that neither the oode nor 
the manual requires an officer exeroising general oourt-martial 
jurisdiotion to have  a  staff judge  advocate or legal.  offioer. 
Paragraphs 85a and 94a(3) recognize the possibility that he 
may not have yuch a lzgal adviser. 
Qualifications.   he  code  does  not prescribe any  legal 
qiralifications~the  staff judge  advocate or legal officer. 
In fact, Article 136  indicates that a staff judge-advocate 
need  not be  a judge  advooate;  that  a legal offioer need  not be 
a legal specialist.  Article 6a, however,  provides that all 
judge  advooatos  of the Army  anz ALr Foroe and  law specialists 
of  the Navy  and  Coast  Guard  are to be assigned upon the recommen- 
dation of the Judge Advocate  General.  It may  be  assuned,  there- 
fore,  that the staff judge  aclvooate  or legal officer ordinarily 
will have  the basio qualifioati'ons  of a  judge  advocde or lm 
specialist. 
-,-  --.-  -- --  -  - 
*For a more  oomprehensivs acoount  of  the status and  duties 
of the staff judge  advocate,  see nThe Convening Authority and 
His Staff Judge  Advocate"  in the December  1950 Military 
Review,  a publication of  the Comnand  and General  Staff College, 
Fort Leavenworth,  Kansas. With respect to  disqualifioations,  Article 6c provides 
generally that any person who  has acted as the &estigating 
offioer or as law offioer or as  a member  of the court,  prose- 
oution,  or defense in any  oase may  not subsequently act as 
staff judge  admcato or  legal  offioer to any  reviewing  authori- 
ty upon the sane case.  This  provision,  as  the drafting om- 
inittae pointed out,  is for the purpose  of  securing impartial 
review.  Consequently,  although not mentioned  in Artiole 60, 
it follows that any  person who  has acted in a  partisan cap&ity 
(e.g.,  accuser,  pretrial counsel  for the accused)  should not 
act subsequently  as the staff judge  advooate  or legal offioer 
in the same  case. 
Is  a  person x&o  has acted as  staff judge  advocate or legal 
officer disqualified for  the perfommce of  other military 
justice duties?  The  code  does  not contain aaj. disqualiem 
provisions of this nature,  but paragraphs  62f(11)  and  (12) pro- 
vide that the f act that any person has  acted-or  will act as the 
legal  okfioer or staff judge  admcate is available as a ground 
for challenge against a msmber  or law officer of  the court. 
There  is no  provision in  the code  or manual  whioh would  die- 
qua1 if'y a  staff judge  advocate or  legal offioer from~ting  as 
*counsel for the prosecution  or the defense.  If heAld act as 
oounsel,  he  would,  of  course,  be  precluded from acting as staff 
judge  advocate or legal officer on the same  case. 
Assipent ad  status.  The  effect of  Article 6a is to  --". 
put  judge  advocates and law speoidists under the costrol of 
the &die Advocate  General  of-tb aalmed  force of which  they 
are members,  Their assignment  for duty is to  be made  upon the 
reconanendation  of  the Judge Advocate  General.  The  hearings 
before Congress  indicated that orders assigning judge  advooat es 
and  lam specialists do not  have  to be  issued by  the Judge 
Advocate General  but may  be  issued by the Ad  jut  ant  General or 
Bureau  of  Naval  Personnel  based  upon  the recomndations of 
the  Judge Advooat e General. 
Artiole 6b not only authorizes direct c~ll~nunication  within 
military justize  chnels  but also enhanoes the position of 
judge  advooates and  legal  offioers by requiring direot comuni- 
oation on military justice matters between suoh officers and 
their conmanding  officers.  Although Ar-bicle 6b  provides that 
the staff judge advocate ,or legal  offioer is aTthorized to 
communicate with the staff judge  advocate or legal offioer of 
a  superior or subordinate comaand,  this provision does not 
prevent comunication between  staf'f  judge  advocates  or  legal 
officers of  commands  which are not  in the same  chain of  conrmpold. Thus,  it is a common  praotioe in the Army  for the staff judge 
advooate of  one  command  to contact the staff judge  advocate 
of  an  adjoining command  for the purpose of  expediting the dis- 
position of  cases.  For  exmple,  inquiries with  respeot to the 
availability of  witnesses,  depositions,  or  individual counsel, 
or with respect to transfer of  cases from one  jurisdiotian to 
another' are often made  by  direot contact between  judge  advocates 
of  adjoining or equivalent commands. 
Relations with the convezling  autinoritye  There is a clear 
indioation in Article 6b  that a staff judge  advocate or legd 
offioer is responsible To  his oommander  for tho proper  disponi- 
tion of  all "matters  relathg  to  the administration of  military 
justicon arising in the co&d,  As he  is a staff officer,  thi 
staff judge  advooate or legal  dfioer  may  act only in the mum 
of  his conveniq authority.  Completed  staff aotion requires 
that many funotions of  his commander  can and  should be  performed 
by the staff judge  advocate or  legal officer  ,without in each 
instance conferring with the commander.  The  extent to which 
the oo~mander  pernits his  staff judge  advocate or legal  officer 
to perf om  such functions will largely depend upon the oonfi- 
dence which he places  in the ability of  his staff judge  advo- 
cate or legal offioer.  Af'ter  he  hows the policy of  the oon- 
vening authority with respeot to  a partioular kind of  oaae, 
it should not be necessary  for the staff judge  advocate or 
legal offioer to  get the convening  authorityts approval  before 
disposing  of  a  similar case.  A  standing operating procedure 
usually will  be established with respeot to those military 
justice matters which the convening  athority  wishes brought 
to his personal  attention.  Ln general,  to insure the expedi- 
tious d isposal of  court-martial  matters as  well as to  free 
himself from the mass  of  administrative detail connected with 
the exeroise of  court-martial  jurisdiotion,  the oonvening 
authority-depending  upon  the confidence he has  in his  legal 
adviser-may  authorize his staff judge  advocate or legal 
offioer to take final aotion in every military justice matter 
except those requiring the personal signature of  the convening 
authority,  those involving a matter of  particular imporbmoe 
to him  (e.g.,  a case which  has received,  or may  receive,  atten- 
tion in  the public press  ) ,  or those involving a recommanded 
action that deviates from his policy. 
If,  under the standing operating pmoedure mentioned 
above,  a matter is to  be brought to the attention of  the con- 
vening authority, the staff judge  advocate or legal  officer 
normally wi  11  take the pertinent papers  (e.g.,  charges,  record 
of  trial,  e tc. )  personal ly to the convening  authority,  and 
give hlm  a oonoise report and  reoommendation;  thereafter,  he 
will carry the convening  authorityts deoision into effect.  In the event a convening  authority finds his military justioe 
duties too onerous  to pennit personal  oonsultation with his 
staff  judge  advocato or legal officer,  he  should cure the 
situation by  taking aationto have  other commandera  exeroise 
all or a part of  his  jurisdiotion.  He  should not try to evade 
the clear-out mandate  of  the statute pertaining to  direot 
oommunication with his staff judge  advooate  ar legal  offioer. 
In this connection,  General  Eisenhower,  vhile serving as the 
Supreme  Conrmender,  SHAEF, personally listened to the advioe of 
his theater judge  advooate on eaoh  of  the 764 death and  dis- 
?nissal  cases upon *iah  he  was  required to aot aa  confirming 
authority. 
The 
Duties before trial.  Article 34s provides:  --  - 
"Before  direoting the trial of  any  charge by  . 
general  court-martial,  tile convening  authority 
shall refer it to his s  taf'f  judge  advmate or 
legal officer for consideration and advice.  The 
convening  authority shall not refer a oharge to  a 
general court-martial  for trial unless he  has 
found that the oharge alleges an  offense under 
this oode  and  is warranted by  evidenoe indicated 
in the report of  investigation." 
effect of  Article 6b and  34a,  as  implemented by paragraph 
and  a,  is to place upon  thehestaff judge  advooate or legal 
.cer %e  responsibility for advising his commander  as to the 
proper  disposition of  oharges.  The  staff judge  advocate or 
legal of fioer should take appropriate aotion to the end that 
all necessary preliminary matters will have been  disposed of 
before a  oase is presented to the commander for aotion.  The 
following are some  examples  of  the preliminary aotions whioh 
might be taken by the staff judge  advooate or  legal  off  iaer: 
Having; the charges investigated or re-investigated  under 
Artiole 32;  redrafting  the oharges to allege a more  serious 
or essentidly different offense fbr the signature of  an ao- 
cuser,  and referenoe of the redrafted charges for a new  in- 
vestigation under Artiole 32;  redrafiing  the oharges  over the 
I  signature of  the aocuser to eliminate obvious  errors and to 
nake  them oonform to the evidenoe  aa provided  in Brbiole 34b;  - 
arranging for an examination of the accused's mental  condi- 
tion.  This  is not  intended to be  an  exhaustive list of 
exemples - the list covers,  however,  salient questions that 
may arise in the mind of a new  staff judge  advooate or lagal 
offioer. 
When  he  has oompleted the neoessary preliminary  action 
and the oharges  are ready for aotion by the convening P 
authority,  the staff judge  advooate or legal officer will pe- 
pare a written advice if it appears  td him  that  trial by 
general  court-martial  is  warranted,  Artiole 34~3, as imple- 
mented  by  paragraphs  35  b  and  o of  the manual,  covides 
generally that the advicg is t'i; be submitted in suoh manner 
and form as the convening authority may  direct except  that the 
staff judge  advocate or legal officer must  find: 
1.  Whether there was  substantial compliance 
with the provisions  of  Article 32; 
2.  wether each specifioation alleges an 
offense under  the code;  and 
3.  Whether the allegation of  each offense is 
warranted by  the evidence  indioated  in the 
report of  investigation. 
The  advlce will include a signed reoanrmendation of  the action 
to be taken by  the oonvening  authority.  The  findings and 
reoomme~ldations of  the staff judge  advocate  or  legal officer 
ars advisory only,  The  convening authority may  aooept them 
or rejeot them,  in *ole  or in part. 
Although not required by the code  or the manual,  the ad- 
vice of  ihe staff judge  advocate or legal  officer should list 
the elements of  any offense  that is to  be referred to  trial 
if a  detailed statement of  the elements  of  proof  of  that 
offense is not in  the manual.  Such a listing,  for exemplo, 
muld be appropriate as  to any  offense under  Article 133 and 
as to many  offenses under Article 134.  Similarly, if the 
trial  will involve a  question of  law the solution to  which is 
not to  5e found in the mmual  (e.g.,  entrapment),  the advice 
may well contain a brief statement of the law in point.  Such 
information will aid the  trial counsel in presentix correct 
proposed  instructions  if the law officer calls for such in- 
structions*  An alternate solution is to include such infoma- 
tion in  a separate memorandum  addressed to the trial counsel, 
4 
The  staff judge  advocate or logd officer may  determine 
as a  result of  his examination of  the  charges md  allied 
papers,  that  they should be  referred to  an  inferior court for 
trial,  disposed of under  Artiole 15,  dismissed,  or forwarded 
to another jurisdiction for action.  In suoh a  case,  unless 
he  is required by  his convening  authority to do  so,  he need 
not prepare a  formal written advice.  Instead he  should pre- 
pare the abtion that will effeot his recommendation.  For 
example,  if an Army  or Air  Force  staff judge  advocate recan- 
mends  punishment  under Artiole 15,  he  should prepare a  letter for the convening authority's  signature-if  such action is 
appropriate in the comaand--notifying  the accused  of  the in- 
tended imposition of  punisbent. 
85  Review of records of  trial.  Article 61,  as implemented 
by  paragraph 85,  provides thatuprior  to acting on a  record of 
trial by  nenerel  court-martial  or a  record of  trial by  special 
court-Griial which  involvos a bad conduct  discharge, the con- 
vening  authority will refer it to  his staff judge  advocate or 
leg3 officer for review and  advice.  If  he  has  no  staff 
judge  advocate or legal officer or if the one  he has is in- 
eligible, the convening  authority may request the assignment 
of  m eligible staff judge  admcate or legal  officer,  or he 
may  forward the record to the Judge Advocate General for ad- 
vice or to an  officer exorcising general  court-martial  juris- 
diction for action as presoribed by  Article 60 and  paragraph 
84c.  - 
The  riviaw of  the staff judge  advocate or legal officer 
is to  be in writing.  It is to contain at least the following: 
1.  A  summary  of  the evidenoe; 
2.  An  opinion of  the adequacy and  weight 
of  the evidenoe; 
3.  A  statement  of  the effect of  errors or 
irregularities ; and 
4.  A  specific recorrmsndation as to the action 
to be  taken by the convening  authority. 
Reasons  for the opinions and  recommendation will  be stated. 
If the record involves an acquittal, the review will  be  limi- 
ted to a determination of whether the court had  jurisdiction. 
Although not neoessary to a determination of  the question of 
jurisdiction,  the review may  include a brief sumnary  of  the 
evidence asd comment  as to  any procedural errors or irregu- 
larities.  Such comment  is  valua5le for the instruation of  the 
law officer and the trial counsel  if they have  committed  errors 
of  law during  the trial.  The  staff judge  advocate or  legal 
officer ordinarily will  attach to his review the aotion that  . 
has Seen prepared for the con~ening  authority  8s  s  ignaturs. 
Before  presenting the reoord,  his review,  and the pro- 
posed  aotion to  the convening  authority,  the staff judge 
advocate or legal officer will take neoessary prelFminary 
steps to insure that the reoord of  triel  is complete and 
correot and that the record is ready in ell respects for the initial action of the convening  authority.  When  neoessary 
or appropriate,  he  may,  for example,  obtain a certificate of 
correction,  direct action in revision,  or cause the accused 
to be  brought  before a board  of  medical  officers for the pur- 
pose  of  determining his sanity.  If  a rehearing is authorized, 
the staff judge  advocate or  legal officer-before  presenting 
the record to the convening authority for action--should  cause 
an  inquiry to be made  to determine whether  a rehearing ovi 11  be 
practioable, 
The  review of the staff judge  advocate or legal officer 
is in the nature of  a privileged  comunication between  a lawyer 
md his olient.  The  findings and  recormnenbtions are advisory 
only.  As the convening authority is responsible for the aotion 
taken by him,  he may  accept or reject the findings and reoamcnen- 
dations,  in whole  or in part.  As  a  general  rule,  hmever,  he 
should  follow the advice of  the staff judge  advocate  or legal 
offioer with respeot to suoh matters  as  (1) the effeot of 
errors or irregularities on the proceedings,  (2) the adequaoy 
of  the evidenoe,  and  (3) the legality of the sentence.  If  in 
disagreement with the staff judge  adwoate or legal off  ioer 
on  *ese  questions,  the convening  authority may  transmit the 
record of  trial with an  expression of his apgl vim  to  the 
Judge Advocate  General for advioe.  If  the action of  the eon- 
vening authority is different from that reoomended by  his 
staff judge  advocate or legal officer,  he  should state the 
reasons for his action in a letter transmitting the reoord 
to the Judge Advocate  General.  This  letter of  trmsnittal. 
nsed not be  signed personally by  the convening  authority. 
Tm  copies of  the review of  the staff judge  advooate  or 
legal officer are attached to my  record of  trial that is for- 
warded to the Judge Advocate  General,  In  the interest of 
instmotion in military justioe,  the law officer and  the trial 
counsel may  be  hrnished copies of reviews  in oaaes  in whioh 
they have  participated.  A  copy of  the review should also be 
furnished to the convening  authority of  a  subordinate co~lmtand 
trho  has  taken initid actioc md  fomwded a record of trial 
involving an  approved bad  conduct  discharge adjudged by  a 
special cour-t-martial. 
Miscellnneous  duties.  In  addition to preparing the pre-  '  trial advice,  reviewing  records of trial, ad  performing the 
duties that are conneoted th&ravith, the-  steff- judge  adkcate 
or legal offioer is generella- chargeable with the prompt  and 
fair administration of  militery justice  in his command,  Among 
his specific responsibilities -we  the following: 
1,  Before trial.--Selecting  personnel for 
appointment  as law officers,  members,  end  counsel of  court-martial  appointed by his convening authority; 
detailing pretrial counsel  for the accused;  taking 
action to insure the prampt  disposition of  offenses 
and  charges at  all levels of  comd. 
2.  .Curing triale--Taking  action to insure the  - 
availability of  sufficient reporters in the command; 
advising the convening authority whether a  capital 
oase should be treated as not capit&;  conferring with 
counsel  or the law officer with respeot to unusual  de- 
lays in the comencanent and  completion of  trials; 
assisting in the procurement  of  depositions  and wit- 
nesses;  taking action on  questions referred to the con- 
vening  authority by the court during trial;  advising 
the convening  authority whether  immunity  should be 
granted to one  aocused to permit use of  his testimony 
against an aocomplice;  disposing of  requests for indi- 
vidual counsel for the accused. 
3.  ATter trial.--Arranging  the record for trans- 
mittal to the  Judge Advocate  General;  taking action 
as directed by the Judge Advocate  General  to  expedite 
the completion of  appellate review,  (e.ge,  serving 
decisions of  the boards  of  review on,  and making 
appellate advisory counsel available to,  the accused 
if the latter is in his comnand;  notifying the Judge 
Advocate  General if an accused is transferred frum 
his command  beforo notif  icatioh of the decision of 
the board of review,  otc. )j determining,  in a oase in 
which  the place of confinement was  not designated at 
the time of  the initial aotion in a case,  whether, 
under  existbg regulations,  the aocused is to  be oon- 
fined in a Federal institution. 
4.  Cuties with respect to the review of  inf'erior 
aourt records.  If the officer exercising general 
aourt-martial  jurisdiction is the supervisory author- 
ity  with respeot to  reoords  of  trial by  summary  oourt- 
martial  and  those by  special court-martial  vhich do 
not involve a bad  conduct  discharge,  his staff judge 
advocate or legal officer will be  responsible for re- 
viewing such records  ii  accordance with the provisions 
of  paragraph 9b(2)  The  convening authority usually 
delegates to his staff judge  advocate or legal officer 
the full power  of  determining the legality of  suoh 
proceedings  and initiating the necessary corrective 
action in that regard.  If the staff judge  advocate 
or legal  officer determines that the sentence in a particular  oase  is more  severe  than  sentenoes  in 
similar cases in the colmnand,  or that  the  sentences 
approved  by a partioularr  subordinate oommender  are 
oonsistently more severe than  those  approved  in 
other similar cases  in the  oammand,  he  may recommend 
to the convening  authority that  suoh  sentences be 
mitigated or  suspended  and,  in an  appropriate case, 
that administrative  action be  taken  to insure that 
sentenoes in the  oammand  are  relatively uniform. Conference  No.  7d  - 
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APPELLATE  REVIEYII--EXECUTION  OF  SENTENCES 
Historioal Backaround 
Eistorically military law was  regarded as  summary in nature.  By 
the term  "summaryan I assume,  was  meant  not that trial procedure was 
unfair,  hasty,  or unsolicitous  of  the rights of  the accused,  but rather 
that the institution of  the proceedings  was  relatively more  swift than 
in civilian procedure  and  that punishment  swiftly followed a sentence. 
In 1776 a  Committee  of  the Continental Congress  composed  of 
Thomas Jefferson,  John Adams,  John  Rutledge,  James  Wilson,  and  R.  R. 
Livingston prepared a set of  Articles of War  patterned almost entirely 
upon  the British Artioles.  In his autobiographyl/  - John Adams  wrote: 
"This  report was  made  by me  and Idr.  Jefferson,  in 
consequence  of a  letter from General Washington,  sent by 
Colonel  Tudor,  Judge  Advocate  General,  representing  the 
insufficienoy of  the articles of  war,  and  requesting a 
revision of  them.  Mr.  John Adarns  and  Mr.  Jefferson were 
appointed a committee  to hear Tudor,  and revise the 
articles.  It was  a very  difficult and  unpopular  subject, 
and I observed to Jefferson,  that whakever alteration we 
should report with the  least energy  in it, or the least 
tendenoy  to a necessary disoipline of  the Amy,  would be 
opposed with  'as much  vehemenoe,  as if it were  the most 
perfeot;  we  might  as well,  therefore,  report a complete 
system at  onoe,  and  let it meet  its fate.  Something 
perhaps  might be  gained.  There  was  extant one  system of 
articles of war  which had  carried two empires  to the head 
lhiorks of  John Adams,  Vol.  111,  pp.  68-69.  .4utobiograjjhy,  Xonday  - 
~ugus  t 19,  1776. 
146 of mankind,  the Roman  and  the British;  for the British Articles 
of  War  were  only a literal translation of  the Roman.  It would 
be  in vain for us  to seek in our  own  inventions,  or the records 
of warlike nations,  for a more  coxplete system of military 
discipline.  It  was an  observation founded  in the undoubted 
facts,  that the prosperity of  nations had  been  in proportion 
to the discipline of  their forces by  sea and  land;  I was,  there- 
fore,  for reporting the British Articles of  War,  totidem verbis. 
Jefferson,  in  those days,  never  failed to agree with me,  in 
every thing of  a political nature,  and  he very courteously 
concurre6 in this.  The  British Articles of War  were,  accord- 
ingly,  reported,  and  defended  in Congress  by me  assisted by 
some  others,  and  finally carried.  That  laid the fo.undation of 
a  discipline which,  in  time, brought; our  troops to a  capacity 
of  contending with British veterans,  and a rivalry with the best 
troops of  France." 
These  articles with minor  modifications worked well,  sununary though 
they were,  until World War  I.  Early in that war  some  troops stationed 
near  Houston,  Texas,  engaged  in a  riot and  a mutiny.  Some  of  the 
offenders were  promptly brought  to trial by  court-martial  for mutiny. 
The  trial lasted several days  and was  carefully,  fairly,  and  scrupulously 
conducted.  Each  night the stenographic transcription of the day's 
proceedings was  brought  to the Department judge  advocate,  who  wrote his 
review as the trial progressed.  On  the last day  several of  the mutineers 
were  found  guilty and  some  were  sentenced to  death.  mat night the 
review was  completed.  The  sentences were  approved  and  confirmed by  the 
Departdnent  commander  pursuant to his authority under  Article 48  of  the 
1916  code  to confirm death sentences in the  of  war,  and  the next 
morning  the sentences were  carried into execution. 
This was  summary  justice-but  too sumnary for a citizen Army  of 
the twentieth century.  The  summary  disposition of  the Houston riot case 
created quite a reaction among  the public and  also in  the War  Depart- 
ment.  Very  promptly  thereafter the War  Department  promulgated  General 
Order  No.  7,  1918, which required review by  a board  of  review  in the 
Office of  the Judge Advocate  General or in a branch  office before any 
serious  sentence by  court-martial  could be carried into execution. 
General  Order No.  7  served as a pattern for appellate review in the 
Army.  Its essential provisions became  statutory in 1920 as Article of 
War  5@.  It was  modified by  Article of  War 50  in the 1948 revision of 
tho Articlesof War  which  empowered  the boards  of review to weigh 
evidence,  judge  the credibility of  witnesses,  and  determine controverted 
questions  of  fact.  A  judicial council  for the further review of  serious 
cases,  with power  to consider the propriety as well as the legality of 
Wmtences  was  also created. 
The  Navyrs  present appellate review system,  like that prescribed 
by General  Order  No.  7,  is not statutory. Prerequisites  To  Execution Of  Sentenoes 
This brings us  to the next development--the  Uniform  Code  of JJilitary 
Justice.  The  prerequisites  to the execution of  court-martial  sentences 
as approved by  the convening  authority are these: 
Sentences  extonding to death  or involving a  general  or flag 
officer may  not be  executed until they are: 
1.  Affinled by  a board  of  review  (&to 66b,  - -  c), 
2.  Affirmed by  the Court of Xilitary Appeals  (~rt.  67b(1)),  -  and 
3.  Approved  by  the President  (Art.  71a).  - 
Sentences extending to dismissal may  not be  executed until they 
are : 
1.  Affirmed  by  a board  of  review  (Art.  66b),  - 
2.  Affirmed  by  the Court of Military Appeals  if reviewed by 
it pursuant to Article 67b(2)  -  or (3), and 
3.  Approved by  the Secretary of  the Department  (Art.  7lb).  - 
Sentences  to dishonorable or bad  conduct  discharge,  or confine- 
aent for one  year  or more,  or any sentence whioh  includes  an 
unsuspended  pmitive discharge may  not be  executed until they are: 
1.  Affirmed  by  the board of  review (~rts.  71c,  - 722),  and 
2.  Affirmed by  the Court of Xilitary Appeals  if reviewed  by 
it pn-suant to Article 67b(2)  -  or (3)  (Art.  710).  - 
Review  In Other  Cases 
All other sentences by  court-martial,  unless  suspended,  may  be 
ordered  into execution by  the convening  authority &en  he  approves  a 
sentence  (krt. 71d).  These  latter sen.tences, however,  are reviewed  by 
higher authorities, as you  have,  seen in the conference on  inferior 
courts;  and  general court-iaartial~sentaces,  which  do  not involve 
general or flag officers,  extend to death,  disnissal,  discharge,  or 
confinement  for a year or more,  are reviewed  in  the Of'fioe  of the 
Judge Advocate  General subjeot to being  referred to a board  of  review 
which may  affirm the sentence in whole  or in part or set it aside 
like any  other sentenoe reviewed by  it under  Article 66. 
The  Appellate Syste~ 
The  most  convenient way  to become  oriented in the operation of 
the appellate system of  the code  is to follow the progress  of  the 
various  types  of  cases  on  the chart. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
GENERAL  COURT-  MARTIAL REVEW 
1.SENTENCES  OF  DEATH  OR  INVOLVING  GENERAL  OR  FLAG  OFFICER. 
*  I)  t 
I  REHEARING  OR  OTHER  APPROPRIATE  ACTION  1 
1I.SENTENCES  EXTENDING TO  DISMISSAL, DISCHARGE, OR  CONFINEMENT FOR  ONE  YEAR  OR  MORE. 
NO  PETITION  OR  PETITION  DENIED -  DISCHARGE OR  CHL I YEAR ORMORE 
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REHEARING  OR  OTHER  APPROPRIATE AGTION Review  Under  Article 69 
Let us  follow the progress  of  the simplest case--a  general  court- 
martial case in which  the sentence as approved by  the convening  authority 
does not require automatic  review by  a board  of  review.  Such a case 
might be  one  in which  the sentence extends to confinement  for six months 
and partial forfeitures or,  in  the case  of  an  officer,  a  reprimand 
azld  forfeitures. 
When  the convening  authority approves  such a  sentence he  will 
order its execution or suspension,  publish an  order of  execution as 
indicated in appendices  14 and  15, and  forward  the original  of  the 
record to the Cffice of  the  Judge Advocate  General  of  the ,accusedle 
armed  foroe for examination pursuant  to Article 69.  If the exminer 
finds the record correct in law  and  fact and  the  Judge  Advocate  General 
finds no  objection to the findings and sentence the matter is ended 
and  the  case goes  to file.  The  convening  authority will be  advised 
of  the finding.  Suppose,  however,  that the exaniner decides that 
the record is not correct to support the sentence.  In  such a case,  if 
the Judge  Advocate  General  agrees with the examiner,  the case is for- 
warded  to a board  of  review.  If  the  accused had  not conditionally 
requested  representation before the board under  paragraph 48 j (3) the 
Judge Advocate  General  will notify the accused of  the refere&  to the 
board  of  review  in order to enable him  to get representation,  provided, 
of course,  that he  acts promptly.  The  board  of  review will aot on 
the case in the sme manner  as it would  act in any  case coming  to it 
automatically under  Article 66.  The  appellate review ends with the 
action of  the board  of  review unless  the  Judge Advocate  General  orders 
the case forwarded  to the Court  of Xilitaqr Appeals.  The  accused  does 
not have  the right in such a case to petition the Court  of  Military 
Appeals  for a  grant of  a  review.  If  the case  is forvmrded  to the Court 
by  the  Judge Advocate  General  he must  advise the accused and  the appellate 
defense  counsel  of  his action. 
Review  Of Cases  Involving Punitive 
Discharae  Or Confinement  For 1 Year  Or  gore 
Next  let us follow the progress  of  cases  in mhich a bad  conduct 
discharge,  or a  dishonorable discharge,  and  confinement  is adjudged. 
Ve  will piclc  up  the case with the action of  the officer exercising 
general court-mrtial  jurisdiction  (or with a Navy  officer authorized 
to forward  special court-martial  cases directly to the Judge  Advocate 
General's  office).  In  this discussion we  are not concerned whether 
the record involves a general or special court-martial  case. If  the sentenoe involves confinement  for less than a year and 
the convening authority decides to suspend the discharge he will 
publish an  order of  execution with respect to the confinement  at 
hard labor and  forfeitures and  order the suspension of  the discharge. 
If  the sentence to confinement  is for a year or more  or if the 
convening authority deciaes not to suspend the discharge he  will 
publish a preliminary oourt-martial  order showing  the charges, 
findings,  the sentence,  and his action on  the record.  He  will  not 
order any part of  the sentence into execution.  See  fornls  in 
appendices  &c -  and  15a.  - 
The  convening authority must also make  up  his mind,  in  accordanoe 
with Deparbental  regulations,  as to what disposition to  make  of  the 
accused with respect to temporary  custody pending  completion of  the 
appellate review.  His  action must  show the temporary  custody,  for, 
as you  will see, it will became  crucial that the Judge  Advocate 
General know  where  he  can  get ahold of  the acoused after the board 
of  review has  acted.  If the accused is transferred from the command 
designated as having temporary  custody the Judge  Advocate  General 
must  be  notified promptly.  This  is covered in paragraph 96. 
Another  thing the staff judge  advocate or legal officer should 
do  before the record is  forwarded  is to determine whether or not the 
accused wants  appellate counsel.  Under  paragraph 48 j (3) the accused 
has  10 days  after sentence is adjudged to make  up  hi;  mind whether 
he  desires to be  represented by  the appellate defense counsel before 
the board of  review.  Ordinarily the request,  if any,  should accompany 
the record.  If  the amused does not make  such a  request the board of 
review need not delay the disposition of  the case,  and  if it has 
acted before a belated request reaches it the accused is deemed  to 
have  waived his rights to appellate oounsel. 
When  all these things have been  accomplished the record of  trial, 
in triplicate, with preliminary order,  request for counsel,  etc.,  is 
forwarded to the Judgs Advocate  General  of  the accused's  armed  force. 
When  the record reaches  that office the original will go  to the 
board of  review and  the oopies will go  to appellate government  and 
appellate defense counsel.  If the accused has  requested representation 
or if the Judge  Advocate  General  so directs,  appellate counsel--or 
civilian counsel provided by  the accused--will  be given sufficient 
time  to prepare their argument  and  file briefs.  After hearing any 
argument  and  considering any briefs,  the board  of  review will consider 
the correctness of  the record in law and  fact.  Like the present Amy 
and  Air Force boards  of  review it has  the power  to weigh  the evidence, 
judge  the credibility of  witnesses,  and  determine  controverted 
questions of  fact with due  regard to the fact that the court heard and  saw the witnesses.  It may  decide not only whether  the sentence 
is legal but also whether it is  appropriate. 
Affirmation by board of  review.--Let  us first assume  that the 
board of  review has  affimed the sentence in whole  or in part.  The 
record and  the decision of  the board of  review will  be  considered by 
the Judge  Advocate  General or one  of  his assistants to deternine 
whether  or not he  should forward the case to the Court of Kilitary 
Appeals.  If  the Judge  Advocats  General  decides to forward the case 
he  mill notif'y the accused and his appellate counsel of  his order and 
give them  an opportunj.t.j  to 5e represented before  the Court of Xilitary 
Appeals.  The  J~dge  Advocate  General may  also consider the propriety 
of  the sentence,  and  if he  deems  that any mitigating action under 
Article 74  is appropriate he  may  forward  the record to tne Secretary 
or,  if the Secretary has  authorized him  to exercise power  to remit or 
suspend,  he may  take such action as the Secretary may  have  authorized. 
If  the Judge Advocate  General  agrees with the decision of  the 
board of  review and  finds no  reason  for taking either mitisating 
action or forwarding  the case to the Court of  LElitary Appeals  he  will 
send two copies of  the board  of  review's  decision to the officer 
exercising general court-martial  jurisdiction ovsr the command  which 
incl-~des  the accused at  that time.  He  will instruct that officer to 
cause a  copy  of  the decision to be  served on  the accused.  This  copy 
will bear  an indorsement  advising the accused that he  has  3O days 
from the date of  notice to petition the Court of  Military Appeals, 
through the officer exercising general court-martial  jurisdiction, 
and  through the Judge  Advocata  General,  for a  grant of  review on 
queskions  of  law only.  If the accused has  been  transferred from the 
comnmd  of  the convening  authority a copy  of  the decision of  the 
board of  review will be  furnished the original convening authority 
for his infomakion.  eh~o  copies of  the accused's  receipt for the 
decision of  the board of  review will he  forwarded to the Judge  Advocate 
General's  office so that the Judge  Advocate  General and  tne Court of 
Nilitary Appeals  will  be  in a position to know  when  the appeal period 
starts and when  it will end. 
If  the accused does not forward his petition for a grant of 
review withi3 30  days,  the officer then exercising general court- 
martial jurisdiction  (or sach other authority as may  have  been 
designated by  the department) will publish a  supplsmentary court- 
nartial order which  will refer to the initial order and  order the 
sentence as affimed or modified into execution.  See  forms  in 
appendix  15b.  - 
If, without modifying  the action of  the convening authority,  the 
board  of  review af  f inns a  sentence to suspended  discharge and  coaf'ine- 
r~ut  for less than one  year,  no  supplementary  order of  execution is 
necessary. If the accused files a timely petition for a  review it must be 
promptly  forwarded to the Judge Advoaate  Generel.  The  latter  will 
extraot suffioient copies for appellate counsel and  then forward it 
to the Court of Nilitary Appeals. 
Under  Article 67c,  the Court of Military Appeals  has  30 days 
within which  to decid;  whether it will grant a  review.  Bear  in mind 
that the court c-ot  consider any  question except one  of  law.  If 
the petition attacks the weight of  the evidence or the propriety of 
a severe but legal sentenoe,  the Court  of Military Appeals  has  no 
appellate jurisdiction. 
If the Court  of Xilitary Appeals  grants a  review,  no  order of 
execution can be  promulgated until the court has  finally disposed of 
the case,  It acts only with respect to findings and  sentences as 
approved by  the convening  authority and as affirmed or set aside as 
incorreot in law by  the boards  of  review.  The  court need not consider 
any matters except those raised by  the accused's  petition or by  the 
Judge Advocate  General. 
The  action of  the court might be  in the form  of  a  setting aside 
of  the sentence with or without  a  rehearing--or  it might  involve a 
return of  the record to the board of  rsview for further proceedings. 
Setting aside by  the board  of  review.--Letts  go  back  to the board 
of  review.  Suppose the board sets aside  sentence.  It may  order a 
rehearing,  subjeot to the limitations covered  in Conference 7b,  or 
it may  dismiss the charges.  The  case goes  to the Judge  ~dvocxte 
General who  will decide whether  he  wants  to forward the case to the 
Court of Idilitary Appeals.  If he  decides to for~mrci  the case he 
will notify the accused and  appellate defense counsel.  If he  does 
not deem  review by  the court necessary he  sends  the decision to the 
convening authority for necessary action.  Ordinarily,  if the board 
has  dismissed the case,  the decision will go  to the officer exercising 
general court-martial  jurisdiction over the accused who  will publish 
the necessary orders based on  the foms in appendix  15b.  If  a 
rehearing  is ordered by  the board,  the decision will oydlnarily go 
to the original convening  authority who  will decide whether or not 
a  rehearing is practicable.  If he  decides that it is impracticable 
he  will dismiss the charges.  Even when  a  rehearing is ordered--and 
this is a change  for the Army  and. Air Force--a  supplementary  order 
will be  published  in order to  make  of  record the period of  confinement 
for which  the accused may  receive credit on  the execution of  any 
sentence adjudged  on  the rehearing.  See  the last form  of Appendix15b.  - 
If charges are dismissed,  all rights,  privileges,  and  property 
of which  the accused has been  deprived,  except on  executed dismissal or discharge,  will be  restored in the supplementary  order  (Art.  75). 
The  mentioned  exceptions occur in new  trial cases which will be 
discussed later in this conference. 
Review  Of  Disnlissal  Cases 
A  case  in which  the sentence involves  the dismissal of  an officer, 
cadet,  or midshipman  is processed  just like the cases we  have  just 
discussed up  to the point of  notice on  the accused of  the decision 
of  the board  of  review in cases  in which  the dismissal is affirmed. 
If  the accused does not file a timely petition for a review through 
the officer exercising general  court-martial  jurisdiction  over him, 
the latter must notie  the  Judge  Advocate  General  promptly.  This  is 
not in the Manual  but will probably  appear  in regulations.  Mien 
such notice has  been reoeived,  or if a timely petition is forwarded 
and  the Court  of  Xilitary Appeals  has  disposed of  the case,  the Judge 
Advocate  General  will forward the record to the Secretary of  the 
Department  for his action. 
The  Secretary has  the power  to approve,  disapprove,  remit,  or 
oommute  the sentence or any  part thereof.  In  time  of  war  or  national 
emergency  he may  commute  a sentence of  dismissal to reduction to any 
enlisted grade.  The  order promulgating the Secretary's  aotion in 
such a  case mill  be  published by  the Deparhent.  Of  course,  the 
preliminary order and  any  supplementary  order in cases wherein the 
sentence has  been  set aside are published in the field as in other 
cases. 
Review  Of  Presidential Cases  -.- 
Lastly,  we  will take a brief look at cases  involving a sentence 
to death or involving a general or flag officer.  If the board of 
review sets aside such a sentence it follows the course we  have 
indicated for other cases.  It either goes  back to the field for a 
rehearing or is dismissed unless the Judge  Advocate  General  forwards 
it to the Court  of  Xilitary Appeals. 
If the board  affirms the sentence it will go automatically to 
the Court  of  Milita,ry Appeals  with the Judge  Advocate  General's 
re~ornr~endations  in the premises.  If the Court  sets the sentence 
aside, it may  either order a rehearing,  subject to the usual limita- 
tions,  or dismiss the proceedings.  If it affirms the sentence,  the 
oase goes  to the Secretary of  the Department  for the aotion of  the 
President.  The  President takes the final action in the case.  He  has 
the power  to approve,  disapprove,  commute,  or to suspend sentences, 
but he may  not suspend a death sentence.  Orders  promulgating the 
President's  action are published by  the Departments. iF 
Court-Martial  Orders  - 
The  manner  of  promulgating  court-martial  sentences by  a 
preliminary order and by  a later ordor announcing the results 
of  affirming action will probably appear familiar to the Navy. 
However,  Army  and  Air Force  officers will wonder  why it was  neces- 
sary to depart frum  the old procedure  of publishing  only one  court- 
martial order promulgating  the entire proceedings  and  final results 
of  action on  a  record of  trial.  Let me  review this feature. 
In  paragraph 99 it is provided  that a  general or special court- 
martial order promulgating  findings,  sentence,  and  action of the 
convening  and higher authority will be  published in the field before 
the record of  trial is forwarded to the Judge Advocate  General. 
Thereafter,  when  the sentence becomes  final a supplementary order of 
execution is published. 
The  reasons  for adopting this procedure  were  to facilitate 
expeditious action upon  a sentence.  Boards  of  review will inevitably 
be  slower  in acting upon  records  in view of  the provision in  Article 
70 for free appellate counsel  than was  the case heretofore.  Writing 
briefs and preparing for arguments  in many  cases takes time.  Here- 
tofore,  after action by  the board  of  review the sentence was  ordinarily 
in such shape  that it could. be immediately  ordered into execution. 
Under  the new  procedure a 30 day appeal period plus time  for notice 
intervenes,  and  if a  timely petition for a review is filed,  the order 
of  execution cannot be promulgated until the Court of  Military Appeals 
has  acted.  This might  entail a very long time. 
In most  cases arising overseas  or on board  a  ship the accused, 
of  neoessity, will have been transferred out of  the con-and of the 
convming authority by  the time  the sentenae can be  carried into 
execution.  .Therefore, it would be more  expeditious to provide  that 
the final order of  execution may  be  issued by  the officer exercising 
general court-aartial  jurisdiction over the accused at  the time the 
case becomes  final rather than to engage  in a time  consuming  corre- 
spondence with the original convening authority.  If the aooused  is 
transferred from the co~nmand  in whioh  the trial was  held,  it is 
desirable that a court-inartial  order showing the status of  the case 
and his status acoompany him.  The  preliminarj order acooraplishes 
thisrequirement.  When  the board of review has  acted,  the Judge 
Advocate  General  oan  expeditiously transmit its decision to the 
offioer who  now  has  control over the prisoner,  thus  starting the 
appeals period to run at a much  earlier date than it would  if a copy 
of  the decision of  the board  of  review ms  sent to the original 
convening  authority who  would  have  to transmit it by  successive 
indorsement to the place where  the accused is to be  found.  When  the 
case Secomes  final,  a simple order of  execution referring to the original order and providing  explicitly &at  sentence has been 
affimed and  is ordered executed will be  sufficient. 
The  forns for such an order in  appendix  15b are intended to 
be used only with respect to orders of execution promulgated in the 
field.  If for any  reason the order of  promulgation is issued by 
the Deparhent concerned,  the Department  is free to use whatever 
form it desires.  Perhaps  the Navy  will oontinue to publish orders 
of  execution in the Department by means  of en bloc orders  -  as is 
the present practice. 
Need  For  Expeditious Action 
From  a considera-i;lon of  the entire apyellate procedure  and  its 
ramifications it can readily be  seen that expeditious aotion on the 
part of  all those concerned in the administration of  military justice 
is essential to prsvent a breakdown  of  the system.  If  a  substantial 
peroentage  of  say,  15,000  prisoners per year petition the Court of 
Military Appeals  for a  review,  the court,  which  consists of  only 
three judges,  nay well become  overburdened.  Frivolous appeals should 
be  discouraged.  It should be emphasized  by  all concerned that the 
Court of Xilitary Appeals  can entertain only matters  of  law,  and 
without discouraging meritorious appeals,  amused persons  should be 
advised by  their counsel  that if their reoords  of  trial do  not present 
any  substantial question of  law their petitions for apl?eal are a 
waste  of  time. 
Another  point drlich must  be  emphasized  to administrative person- 
nel concerning  the processing of  prisoners  is that it is  highly 
essential that the Judge  Advocate  General of  the armed  force concerned 
be  kept advised of  my  change  in tl~e  tennporary  custody of  the accused 
as required by  paragraph 96.  You  can rsadily pee  the delays which 
will ouour  if  the Judge  Advooatv  General,  relying upon  the statament 
in the action of  the convening  authority,  dispatches a decision of 
the board of  review to a place to which  the accused has  either not 
been  sent,  or from which  he  has  departed.  Such incidents will probably 
add  a month  or more  to the time neoessary for the final disposition 
of  the case.  All this time  the accused will remain an unsentenced 
prisoner,  but he  will continue to receive credit on  any confinement 
ad  judged. 
The  somdest way  to prevent a  breakdown  in the appellate systen 
and  to preserve military manpower  is to take very seriously the policy 
announced  in paragraph 30f:  - 
'%ubjeot to jurisdictional limitations,  charges against 
an  accused,  if tried at all, should be  tried at a shgle trial by  the lowest court that has  the power  to adjudge an  app-opriate 
and adequate punishment." 
The  policies announced  in paragraph  129 relating to disciplinary 
punishment,  if adhered to, will also serve to cut down  the court- 
martial rate. 
Chapter  XXI 
NEW  TRIAL AND FSL4TED  MATTERS 
Historical Background 
In  introducing the subject of new  trials it is well to consider 
some  recent history.  At the end of World War  I1 there was  the 
customary  post-war  reaction to the administration of military justice 
in the drmy.  Some  people  felt that during the war,  when  some  ten or 
twelve million men  and women  had become  persons  subject to military 
law,  miscarriages of  justice were  bound  to arise.  It was  also felt 
that the Amy's  appellate system,  operating in high gear and perhaps 
on  a mass  production basis,  must  have  overlooked some  miscarriages 
of  justice.  To  provide a  remedy  for these cases,  which  proved  to be 
rare,  Article of Xar  53 was  enacted as a part of  the 1948 revision 
of the .Articles of War. 
This  article provided  that under such regulations as the Presidmt 
might prescribe the Judge  Advocate  General  is  authorized,  npon  applica- 
tion of  an accused person,  and upon  good  cause shovm,  to grant a new 
trial or to vacate a sentence and  restore rights, privileges, and 
property lost as a  result of  an  executed sentence.  It further provided 
that in such cases the Judge  Advocate  General  is authorizad to 
substitute for an executsd dismissal,  dishonorable discharge,  or bad 
conduct discharge,  a  form of  discharge authorized for administrative 
issuance.  Application was  required to be made  within one  year after 
final disposition of  the case upon  initial appellate review except 
that in Torld Tar I1 cases,  application must be  submitted within one 
year after such appellate review,  or within one  year after the 
termination of  the war,  whichever is the later date.  An accused was 
pemitted only one  application.  The  provisions of  Article of War 
53 applied only to general court-clartial  cases and  to special court- 
martial cases in which there had been adjudged a bad conduct discharge. 
In spite of  the olmor concerning  the administration of military 
justice less than 1/3  of 1%  of  the persons  tried in the Army  and the 
Air Force  since 7  December  1941 have  felt so strongly that they were 
the victims  of an injustice that they took the trouble to apply for 
a new trial.  The  number  who presented meritorious  grounds  for such 
relief were infiniteshal. Article of  War  53 was  applicable only to the Army  and the Air 
Force.  In considering  the Uniform  Code  of  Xilitary Justice Congress 
felt that similar relief with respect to possible warthe  injustices 
arising in the Navy  and  the Coast, Guard  should be  accorded  to the 
personnel  of  those  services.  Consequently seotion 12, a  substantial 
reenactment  of  Article of  Yiar  53,  was adopted and made  applicable 
to all of  the services.  It became  effective on 5 May  1950 and  is 
applicable only to cases  involeng offenses committed  during World 
Tar 11.  It is provided  that with respect to section 12 and Article 
of  War  53,  Work Yu'ar  I1 is deemed  to end  as of  31 May  1951,  the date 
the Code  and the Kanual  become  effective. 
Article 73 And  Seotionl2 Compared 
In  order to come  under  the provisions of  section 12 an  offense 
must  have  been committed  on  or after 7 December  1941 and  before mid- 
night of  the night 30-31  May  1951.  It does not matter when  the trial 
is held;  the critical factor is when  the offense was  committed. 
Persons who  commit  offenses on  or after 31 Xay  1951 have  no  remedy 
under  section 12 and  conversely persons  who  conunit  offenses before 
31 ?day  1951 have  no  remedy  under  Article 73,  the permanent new 
trial provision  of  the code.  The  service man who  deserts on  30 May 
1951 and  is apprehended ten years  later will have  one  year after 
final disposition of the case on  appellate review  to petition the 
Judge  Advocate  General  for relief under  section 12.  If he  deserts 
the next day,  31 Iviay  1951,  he  will have  to proceed under  Article 73. 
The  general provisions of  paragraph 110 which  provides  the 
regulations  for new  trials under  section 12 stem  largely from  Chapter 
XXII,  MCM, 1949,  and  Ejrecutive  Order No.  10190,  8 December  1950, 
which  implements  section 12 with respeot to the Navy  and  the Coas-t; 
Guard.  Sinoe most  of  you  are familiar with these provisions,  it will 
be  well only to point out wherein  the relief under  section 12 differs 
from  the relief afforded by  ArCicle 73. 
Grounds  for relief  .--First  of  all the  relief under  section 12 
is "for good  cause  shown"  whereas  the ground for relief under Article 
73 is limited to "newly  discovered  evidence  or fraud on  the court." 
Good  cause under  section 12 is deemed  to exist only  if all the facts 
and circumstances  of  the case and  the matters presented with the 
petition convinces  the Judge  Advocate  General  that an injustice has 
resulted from  the findings and  sentence.  An  error constitutes  "good 
causen only  if it had  a  substantial contributing effect upon  the 
findings  of  guilty or the sentence.  Newly  discovered  evidence  and fraud on  the court are grounds  for relief under either seotion. 
paragraph lO9d  states what  constitutes newly discovered evidence 
or fraud on  tKe  court and  gives some  examples. 
The  Chief  of  the Army  New  Trial Division has  recently stated 
that upon  occasions  applicants for a new  trial under  Article of  3ar 
53  have  presented  rather novel views  as  to what  constitutes good 
cause.  Such reasons  for relief have  been  given as that it was 
expensive  to confine the prisoner,  that a case was  tried on  Friday 
the thirteenth,  following a tornado,  and  a week  after the death of 
President Roosevelt,  that an applicant should be  released to marry 
the mother  of  his child,  and that the perpetrator of  a  rape should 
be  freed because  he  had merely  violated a minor  Amy  Regulation 
(~rticle  of  War  92). 
Needless  to say  the Judge Advooate  General disagreed with the 
applicants  in these casss. 
Type  ofrelief.--The  relief which may  be  granted differs under 
the two provisions.  Under  section 12 tht;  Judge  Advocate  General  may 
not only grant a new  trial but he may  a;so,  without  ordering a new 
trial, vacate  findings and  sentences,  and  restore rights,  privileges, 
and property affected.  He  may  also substitute for an  txecuted 
discharge or dismissal,  a form of  administrative dischuge.  In actual 
practice,  experience has  shown  that when  an accused convinces  the 
Judge Advocate  General that meritorious  grounds  for relief exist, 
there is usually no  need  to go  through  the formality of  a new  trial. 
Yew  trials under  Article of  'Nar  53 have  been  very rare.  Under  Artiole 
73  relief is limited to the granting of  a new  trial.  It is, however, 
stated in paragraph 10gf  that if the Judge Advocate  General  is of 
the opinion that meritoTious grounds  for olanency  action under  Article 
74 have  been  established but that a new  trial is not indioated,  he 
may  transmit the petition and  related papers  to the Secretary of  a 
Deparbent with his recomaendations  in the premises  for remission, 
suspension,  or for the  substitution of  an  administrative form  of 
discharge for a  discharge or dismissal heretofore executed. 
Time  allowed for petition.--Another  difference between  these 
bm  sections is the  time permi-tted for a petition.  Qnder section 12 
a petition may  5e presented within one  year of  final action on  the 
record on  appellate review,  or at any  time before 31 Bay  1952, 
whichever  is tine  later date.  Under  Article 73  the petition must be 
filed within one  year after action by  the convaning  authority.  - 
Who  may  act on  a petit$on.--~till mother difference pertains 
to  vho may  aot on  the petition.  CJnder section 12 the Judge  Advocate 
General  aits on  the petition.  'Jnder  Article 73  the ~ud~e-~dvocate 
General acts, unless the case is before  the board  of  review or the Court of  Military Appeals.  If the case is thus under  review,  the 
board of  review or the Court  of  Eillitary Appeals  will act on  the 
petition.  One  problem  under section 12 which  is clsrified by  the 
Manual  is, which  Judge  Advocate General will act on  the petition 
with respect to offenses committed by  persons  who  were members  of 
the Army  Air Corps when  it vms  part of  the Amy  during lorld War 
11,  and who  will act on  Coast Guard  cases when  the Coast  Guard  is 
part of  the Navy.  In paragraph  llOc it is stated that the Judge 
Advocate  General  of  the Air Force wTll  act on  petitions of  persons 
who  were members  of  the Air Corps,  the Army  Air Forces,  or the 
United States Air  Force  at the time  of  trial.  Petitions submitted 
by  those members  of  the ~oast  Guard who  were  serving in the Coast 
Guard  at  the time  of  trial  will  be  acted upon  in the depar-bent in 
which  the Coast Guard  is serving at  the time  the petition is subraitted. 
Conduot of  new  trials.--I6ost  of what  I have  discussed up  to 
this point is of  direct interest to the New  Trials Division in the 
various  Judge  Advocate  Generals  off  ices.  The  actual conduct  of 
the trial and  action of  the convening  authority will be  of  more 
direct interest to staff judge  advocates and  legal officers. 
Please refer to paragraph  10S)g,  Conduct  of  the new  trial (under  - 
Brticle 73). 
First of  all, by  Presidential Regulation the rule as to the 
com~osition  of  courts for rehearings  stated in Article 63b  is extended 
to Mew  Trials.  Persons  who  were  members  of  the court whiTh  first 
tried the case  are not eligible to sit  as members  on  a new  trial. 
An  accused may  not be  tried. for any  offense  of  which  he  was  found 
guilty on  the first trial and --  because  this is an extraordinary 
remedy - it is also stated that no  new  offense may  be  added  for trial 
in the new  trial.  Finally the sentence adjudged may  not exceed  the 
sentence adjudged upon  the former  trial.  In this respect the military 
rule-is  more  lenient than  that; of  Federal courts in which  there have 
been  some  cases where  an accused  person was  sentenced to dea-bh upon 
a new  trial, although the sentence he  received on  the original trial 
was  to life imprisonment.  The  limitations on menrbership,  offenses 
which may  be  tried,  and sentences which may  be  imposed are equally 
applicable to new  trials under  Article 73 and  section 12. 
Now  we  come  to an  important  difference.  This  involves whether 
an  accused must be  credited with executed portions  of  the original 
sentence on  the execution of  the new  sentence.  As I have  indicated 
earlier, the general  rule in Federal  courts is that the granting of 
a new  trial vacates the original sentence and  the new  trial may  be 
held without  any  limitations based  on  the original  sentence.  The 
accused waives  double  jeopardy  and may  receive a more  severe sentenoe 
than that adjudged  originally.  The  entire sentence may  be  executed ,  anew.  This was  also the view of  the Judge  Advocate  General Office of 
the Army,  except that under Article of  War  53,  as construed by  him, 
the new  sentence might not exceed the original sentence adjudged. 
However,  the accused might be  required to serve the entire sentence 
adjudged on  a new  trial.  The  time  served under a previous  sentence 
was  considered for clemency  only.  This  rule is  carried over with 
respect to new  trials under  section 12. 
With  respect to new  trials as to offenses committed after the 
Uniform  Code  of Military Justice goes 'into effect, consideration of 
Article 75a was  required.  This  article provides:  - 
"Under  such  regulations  as the President may  prescribe, 
all rights,  privileges,  and property affected by  an executed 
portion of  the court-martial  sentence which  has  been  set 
aside or disapproved,  except an executed dismissal or dis- 
charge,  shall be  restored unless a new  trial or rehearing is 
ordered and  such executed portion is included  in a  sentence 
imposed  upon  the new  trial or rehearing." 
In  the report by  both the Senate and House  Corn-ittee relative 
to Article 75a  -  the following explanation is made: 
"If  a new  trial or rehearing  is ordered,  restoration 
is to be made  in regard to such part of the original 
sentence as is  not adjudged  upon  the new trial or rehearing." 
Congress  evidently contemplated that the executed portion of  a 
sentence nay be  included in a new  sentence.  Since restoration must 
be made  as to such part of  the original sentence as is not adjudged 
on  a new  trial, it follows,  by  necessary implication,  that Congress 
intended the accused to be  created with any  executed portion of 
the original sentence in detemining how  much  of a  sentence adjudged 
at  the new  trial is actually to be  executed. 
This brings us to the question of  who  should do  the crediting, - 
the court,  the convening  authority,  or the persons  charged with the 
administrative execution of  sentence? 
If  the court were  to do  the crediting in its sentenoe,  many 
absurd situations might  arise.  Suppose  that an accused has  served 
all of  his original sentence and,  in order to vindicate his honor, 
he  asks for,  and  receives,  a new  trial.  He  is again convicted.  If  the 
court were  to do  the crediting in  its sentence no  sentence could be 
adjudged,  and it mould  be  impossible to ascertain what  the court 
considers an appropriate sentence.  Consequently paragraph  109g(3) 
provides that the court will adjudge whatever it deems  to be 
appropriate sentence for the offense and  that it should not take 
into consideration any credit for the prior execution of  the sentence. Consideration was  given to requiring that the convening  authoritg 
should compute  the credit to which  the accused might  be  entitled. 
It was  felt that this would  involve consideration of  many  fairly 
complicated problems  which could be  solved only by  access to all of 
the accused's  personnel  records.  For  example,  the convening authori@ 
would  have  to ascertain whether  or not the accused had  been a5sent 
in escape  during the prior execution of  a sentenoe to confinement;  or 
whether  there was  any other inoperative  time.  Questions of  abatement 
for good  time would  enter into the computation.  He  would  have  to 
ascertain just how  much  of  a  forfeiture had  or had not been  collected. 
These  complioations  ruled out crediting by  the convening authority. 
This  left only the persons  charged with the duty of  executing the new 
sentenoe - who  usually have  ready access to all pertinent records. 
(see  par.  109~) 
Aotion of  convening authority and  secretary of a department.-- 
You  w5  a&tence,  reca  and  sentences 
adjudged on  rehearings,  that the officer who  takes final aotion on 
the record will restore all rights,  privileges,  and  property affected 
by  any  sentence which  has been disapproved  or set aside.  %hen  we 
come  to the matter of  new  trials we  find that the Secretary of  a 
Department  is the only authority competent  to give relief with respect 
to  an executed dishonorable  discharge or bad  conduct  discharge.  He, 
alone,  has  the power  under  Article 75  to substitute an administrative 
discharge for an executed  punitive  discharge.  He  has  similar powers 
with respect to an  executed dismissal,  and the President alone has 
power  to reappoint a dismissed officer under  Article 73.  Therefore, 
it appears  that a good  deal if not all of  the restoration must,  by 
law,  be  effected by  the  Secretary of  a  Department  or by  the President. 
Eestoration with respeot to other portions  of  a sentence may  present 
fairly complicated problems  which  require access  to depar-bental 
records.  Therefore,  the Manual  provides  in paragraphs  lQgh to k:  -  - 
a.  The  convening  authority will not order any  portion of 
a senten~e  adjudged upon  a new  .trial into execution although he 
will approve  or disapprove the sentence,  in  hole or in part, 
as in other cases, 
b.  Irrespective of  the sentence or the type of  court which 
imposed it the record of  trial of  a new  trial will be  sent to 
the  Judge  Advocate  General Is  Office , 
o.  Final action will be  taken by  the Secretary of the 
Department,  and 
d.  Orders  of  execution,  restoration,  etc.  will be effeoted 
ae  a result of  the aotion of  the Secretary or the President, 
and will be  promulgated  by  Deparbnental orders. Sentences  adjudged under  section 12.--Our  next problem  is, what 
is the crediting requirement  under  Section 12?  In paragraph llOh 
the principles  of  paragraphs  109g(l) and  (2) are made  applioable-to 
new  trials under  seotion 12 but not the principles  of  109g(3).  Thus 
the  rule applicable under Article of  War  53  is carried fosrard to 
section 12 under  the authority of section 4 of  the aot, which  provides 
that : 
"All  offenses committed  and all penalties,  forfeitures, 
fines, or liabilities incurred prior to the  effective date 
of  this Act  under  any law embraced in or modified,  changed, 
or repealed by  this Act  may  be  prosecuted,  puntshed,  and 
enforced,  and  action thereon may  be  completed,  in the same 
manner  and with the same  effect as if this Act  had  not been 
passed. It 
If you  will turn back  to paragraph  81b you  will  notice that 
since the accused  is  not entitled to mandaTory  credit,  the court upon 
a new  trial under section  12,  may consider the previous  execution of 
the sentence as a matter in mitigation. 
In paragraph  llOi it is stated that the convening  authority on 
a new  trial under  secxion 12 may  also consider the executed portion 
of  the original sentence as a matter in mitigation.  He  will not, 
however,  order any  such sentence into execution.  Here  again the 
Secretary of  the Department  will take the final action. 
Right  Of Dismissed  Officer To  Trial By  Court-Martial 
Paragraph 111  is concerned with a very rare situation.  In section 
10 of  the Act  there are reenacted  the provisions  of  Article of  Ear 
118 with respect to the President's  power,  in time  of  war,  to dismiss 
an  officer. 
Article 4  of  the Code  sterns  from the old RS 1230.  The  revised 
statute provided  that an  officer dismissed by  order of  the President 
in time  of  war  had  the right to demand  a court-martial.  If the court- 
martial did not adjudge dismissal or death,  or if  the President 
failed to convene  a court within six months,  the dismissal became  void. 
In  the few  instances when  RS 1230 was  invoked  the courts cast 
grave  doubt  as to its constitutionality.  Under  Article  11,  section 
12 of  the Constitution,  the President, with the advice and  the consent 
of  the Senate,  was  given the power  to appoint officers of  the United 
States.  RS 1230 purported  to give a court-martial  the power  to 
appoint an officer.  Xoreover  if' no  court martial was  convened,  an appointment would  purportedly have been  effected by operation of law. 
The  Supreme  Court consistently avoided the constitutional question 
whenever  the problem was  presented by  finding that a  dismissed officer, 
who  filed a  claim for pay,  was  not entitled to pay  since his position 
vacancy had been  filled by  a new  appointment before he could claim 
relief under  PS 1230.  Sometimes  the Supreme  Court went  so far as to 
say that the forner officer was  guilty of  laches in waiting as  long. 
as  three months  to apply for a court-martial.  See Wallace -v. united 
States, 55  Ct  Cl, 369;  affirmed 257  U.S.  5u. 
Article 4  of the Code  is consistent with the Constitution in 
that it does not purport to reappoint such a  dismissed officer to 
his commissioned  status either by  action of  the court-martial  or by 
operation of  law.  It merely provides that if the President fails 
to convene a court-martial,  or if a court-martial  acquits the accused, 
or adjudges a  sentence less than dismissal  or death,  the Seoretary 
shall substitute for the dismissal an  administrative fom  of discharge. 
If the dismissed offioer is to get back on the rolls at  all  the 
President alone may  reappoint him.  Notice  that upon any  such reap- 
pointment  the dismissed officer becomes  an  inferior officer of the 
United States because Congress did not require that his appointment 
be made  with the advice and consent of  the Senate.  But  the officer 
-mntt nind his inferior status very much  because he will get back 
such rank as the President thinks he  would have  attained had he not 
been  dismissed,  and he will be  entitled to all  back wy  and allowances. Conference No.  8 
INSANITY 
Conducted  by 
LT.  COL.  IVALDM A.  SOW 
References :  Chapter XXIV,  Paragraphs 120 through 124 
Chapter X, Paragraph 57 
Chapter XXVII,  .Paragraph 89c  -  (2) 
Matters dealing with insanity are becoming  increasingly more 
popular in criminal law and  court-martial practice.  I don't know 
whether  criminologists or psychiatrists are in  a better position to 
explain why there is such a rising incidence in  mental instability, 
but whatever  the reason may  be,  it was  thought  of  sufficient impor- 
tance in  the writing of  the 1949 Manual to  devote an entire chapter 
to  this subject. 
120a  -  Insanity as used  in  this chapter is defined as pertaining to 
two  conditions : 
1.  Lack  of  mental responsibility,  that is inability 
to distinguish right from wrong  or inability to adhere to 
the right.  This affects the question of  guilt or innocence. 
2.  Lack  of  men%al capacity,  that is inability to under- 
stand the nature of the proceedings and  intelligently to 
conduct  or cooperate in the defense of  the case.  This  affects 
the fairness of  the trial. 
120b  -  Lack  of mental responsibility.--This  paragraph was  based upon 
paragraph  110b,  Mad 1949.  The  standard for determining mental 
responsibility remains  unchanged  insofar as the Army,  Air  Force,  and 
Coast  Guard  are concerned,  but the irresistible impulse test is new 
to  the Navy.  However,  the discussion has been somewhat expanded  to 
clarify the following conditions inherent in the standard: 
1.  The  inability to distinguish right from wrong  or 
to adhere to  the right must  be the result of  mental  (as 
distinguished from moral)  defect,  disease, or derangement. 
2.  The  friability to distinguish right from wrong  or 
adhere to  the right must  be  complete and  not merely partial. The  first proposition was  thoroughly discussed in  the 1949 
Manual,  The weight  of  authority in  military as well as civil cases 
is that the defense of  insanity with respect to lack of  mental 
responsibility is available only where the mental  condition is the 
result of disease,  destruction,  or malfunction of  the mental func- 
tions as contrasted with the moral or character functions of the 
nervous  system.  This distinction becomes  important when one  considers 
the numerous  psychopathic cases in  which the defense of  irresistible 
impulse might be raised.  Many  psychiatrists do  not hesitate to 
testify that a sex psychopath or any person subject to  criminal ten- 
dencies cannot  resist--or  has tremendous  difficulty in  resisting--the 
impulse which  leads him  to commit  a sex or other type of  offense. 
The  explanatory provisions in  MCM 1949 have been of great help in 
keeping psychiatrists and  courts from  applying the irresistible impulse 
test to  criminals who  are merely antieocial, 
The  second proposition pertaining to the rule that mental irre- 
sponsibility must be complete requires further elaboration.  Tra di- 
tionally it has been  stated that to constitute irresponsibility,  a 
mental disorder must  completely deprive the accused of  ability to 
distinguish  right from wong or  to adhere to  the right.  Mental 
disease,  as such,  is not always sufficient to constitute lack of 
mental responsibility.  The  right or  mong test is derived  from 
Daniel MINaghtenls case (1843),  8 English Reprint  718,  in  which the 
House  of  Lords  held that the defense of  insanity was  available only 
when  the accused,  within the framework  of  his insanity,  believed that 
he was  doing a lawful act.  The  example  used  in  the text was 
derived from  the NIfNaghten case.  It shows  that insanity is a  defense 
when  the accused,  laboring under a  delusion,  kills in  what  he believes 
to  be self-defense,  but not when  his delusion causes him  to kill  in 
revenge  for some  imagined  injury to  his reputation.  Thus  a man  might 
be a  paranoid and still be  criminally responsible if  he knows  his 
acts are unlawful and if he can resist the impulse to commit  the unlaw- 
ful act. 
Heretofore the Navy  did not recognize the defense of irresistible 
impulse.  The  Army,  Air  Force,  and  Coast  Guard,  on the other hand, 
recognized that a truly irresistible impulse which is a result of 
mental disease is  a defense.  Colonel IVinthrop  recognized  this defense  - 
in  1898.  See pages  294 to 296,  Knthropfs  Miiitary Law  and  Precedents. 
The Federal courts have also recognized  the defense.  In Smith v. 
United  States,  36 F.  2d  548,  the Court of  Appeals  for the District 
of Columbia  reversed a murder  conviction in  which the trial court had 
failed to instruct the jury as to the irresistible impulse test: 
We think the charge erroneous in  point of  law in 
that it ignores the modern  well established doctrine of 
irresistible impulse.  The  English rule,  followed by the 
American  courts in  their early history and,  still adhered to  in  same States, was  that the degree of insanity which 
one must  possess at  the time of  the commission  of  crime 
in  order to exempt  him  from  punishment  must  be such as to 
distinctly deprive him  of  understanding and memory.  This 
harsh rule is no  longer followed by the Federal courts or 
by most  of  the State courts.  The  modern  doctrine is that 
the degree of  insanity which  will relieve the accused of 
the consequences  of  a criminal act must  be  such as to create 
in his mind  an uncontrollable impulse to commit  the offense 
charged.  This impulse must  be such as to override reason 
and  judgment  and  obliterate the sense of  right and wrong  to 
the extent that the accused is deprived of  the power  to 
choose between right and wrong.  The  mere  ability to dis- 
tinguish right from wrong is no  longer the correct test 
either in  civil or criminal cases where  the defense of 
insanity is interposed . 
The  irresistible impulse test was  assumed  by  the Supreme Court 
to  be part of the correct standard of mental responsibility in 
Fisher v.  United  States,  328  U.S.  463. 
You  will  find a very good  discussion of the whole  subject of 
insanity in the sense we  are using the term in  a  joint Army  and  Air 
Force publication,  TRI  8-240  and  AFM 160-142,  Psychiatry in Military 
Law.  This pamphlet  will  guide both military lawyers and military  - 
psychiatrists along the lines of  the approved doctrines.  In con- 
nection with the irresistible impulse test this pamphlet,  at page 5, 
states a very useful rule of thumb  which should,  however,  be applied 
with caution: 
"If the medical officer is  satisfied that the accused 
would  not  have  committed  the act had  there been a  civil or  - 
military policeman at his  elbow,  he will  not testify that 
the act occurred as a result of  an  'irresistible impulse. 
No  impulse that can be .resisted in  the presence of a high 
risk of  detection or apprehension is really very  'irresistible. ttt 
120c  -  Mental  -pa  city at  time of trial.--This  paragraph  discusses 
briefly mental  capacity.  Mental  capacity pertains only to the 
accused's  ability to understand the nature of  the proceedings and 
to  participate intelligently in his  defense.  It does not go  to the 
question of guilt or innocence,  but merely to the capacity to  stand 
trial.  Therefore,  an accused should not be acquitted solely because 
he lacks mental  capacity.  Instead,  the proceedings should be abated. 
121  Inquiry before trial,--If  it appears to anyone  connected with 
pending charges that there is reason to believe that the accused is or 
was  insane,  the matter should be investigated,  and  if  possible disposed of,  before trial.  A  report should be made  through appropriate 
channels to  the commander who  is in  a position to  direct or request 
an examination by  a psychiatrist or by a board  of medical officers. 
If a board is used  at  least one member  should be a psychiatrist. 
The board or the psychiatrist should be  furnished all necessary 
data pertaining to the offense and  should be  fully informed  of the 
reasons for doubting the accusedfs sanity.  The  report should  include 
answers to the three questions propounded  in paragraph 121 but it 
should not ordinarily be limited to the llYsslt or "Nott answers to 
those questions.  Insofar as Army and  Air Force psychiatric reports 
are concerned the report should follow the form  prescribed  in Section 
IVY  paragraph  18 of  'RvI  8-240,  AFM  160-42.  It is particularly impor- 
tant that' this report be  complete because the factual observations 
of  the psychiatrist contained in the report are admissible under the 
official records and  business entry exceptions  to the hearsay rules 
 herea as  the opinions  of psychiatrists including the answer to  the 
three questions stated in  paragraph  121 are not generally admissible. 
Of  course,  recitals of  previous  criminal acts of the accused  and 
statements of witnesses as to the circumstance of the offense charged 
do not come  within these exceptions to the hearsay rule so as to 
allow their reception in evidence as a part of  the report  (McM 1951, 
par.  1kLd).  - 
It is to  be noted also that an examination similar to  that 
discussed in  this paragraph may  be requested or ordered at any stage 
of  the proceedings before,  during,  or after trial. 
122a  -  Presumption of  sanity;  reasonable doubt,  burden  of proof.--In 
paragraph  122a there is a  discussion of  the presumption of sanity 
and the burds:  of  proof.  The  burden  of  proving the sanity of the 
accused is always on  the prosecution,  but the accused is presumed 
initially to be sane and  to hav2 been  sane at  the time of  the offense. 
In the absence of  any indication to  the contrary, it is not  necessary 
for the court to  inquire into the matter of sanity or for the prose- 
cution to introduce any evidence on this issue.  :.%en,  however, 
substantial evidence tending to show that the accused is insane or 
was  insane is introduced,  the issue of sanity becomes  an essential 
one  in the case.  Rut  unless such evidence is of  such nature that it 
cannot  reasonably be disbelieved, it does not necessarily rebut the 
presumption  of  sanity.  The  court may  always  consider the presumption 
of  sanity together with all  the evidence in  the case in  arriving at 
its determination  (~avis  v.  U.  S.,  160 U.S.  469,  487).  If, after 
considering the evidence and  the presumption  of  sanity,  a  reasonable 
doubt  as to  the mental responsibility of the accused remains  the 
court must  find the accused not guilty.  If a reasonable doubt as to 
the mental capacity of  the accused  remains the court will  adjourn 
and  transmit the record  so far as it has  proceeded  to the convening 
aat  hority . \ 
122b  -  Procedure.--This  paragraph  deals mith procedures  to be followed 
in  the determination of  the mental  issue.  The  issue of  responsi- 
bility  may  be raised either as an interlocutory matter or on the 
general issue.  As an interlocutory matter, it is frequently raised 
by asking the court to  make  an inquiry into the accused's  mental 
condition after presenting to the court sufficient evidence to  show 
that the sanity of the accused is an issue in  the case.  The  law 
officer or the president of  a special court-martial  rules,  subject 
to objection;  whether  an inquiry shall be made  by the court.  If 
his ruling is objected to,  the court votes on the matter (Art.  Slb). 
A  tie vote is a  determination against the accused  (Art.  52c).  If- 
after an inquiry is had  the law officer or president of a special 
court-martial  rules on the ultimate question of  sanity,  that ruling 
is also subject to  objection,  If the ruling is that the accused 
lacked mental responsibility and it is not objected to,  that ruling 
amounts to  a finding of  not guilty and the court need  not go through 
the formality of voting on  a finding.  If the question of  mental 
responsibility is raised as an interlocutory matter and the law 
officer feels that the evidence on both sides is substantial he may 
defer his  ruling and leave the decision of  the question to  the court 
in  connection with its finding of  guilt or innocence.  His procedure 
in such a case would  be not to sustain the motion to dismiss on 
grounds of  insanity.  This points up the proposition that when  the 
question of  sanity is resolved against the accused as an interlocu- 
tory matter,  the court should consider the question of  insanity in 
connection with its findings on  the general issue. 
Very  frequently evidence on the merits has  a direct bearing on 
the issue of sanity.  For  example,  in  a murder  case a psychiatrist 
may  testify that the accused  could not  distinguish right from wrong. 
The  court should weigh the opinion against the other evidence in  the 
case which might  show that the act of  the accused  in fleeing from 
the scene of the crime,  or his acts in  attempting to conceal the 
body,  or his intimidation of witnesses is strong evidence to  the 
effect that he  knew  his act to  be mong. 
Irrespective of  an adverse ruling on  an interlocutory question 
relating to  an inquiry by the court into the accused's  mental con- 
dition,  the parties are free to  introduce evidence on the issue of 
sanity on their own  motion.  Any  ruling of the law officer on  evi- 
dence introduced by the parties on the question of  insanity is not 
subject to objection.  It is just like any other ruling on  evidence. 
In this connection it might be well to consider what Mr.  Justice 
Douglas  had  to say about the accused's  absolute right to tender the 
issue of insanity in 9helchel v.  McDonald,  340 U.  S.  122: It*  * * we  think it plain from the law governing 
court-martial procedure that there must be afforded 
a defendant  at  some  point of  time an opportunity to 
tender the issue of insanity.  It is only a denial 
of  that opportunity which  goes to the question of 
jurisdiction. If 
If, as an interlocutory matter,  the court finds that the accused 
is mentally irresponsible the convening  authority is precluded from 
doing anything about it.  However,  if he disagrees with the court as 
to  a  ruling that the accused  lacked mental  capacity he may  return the 
record to the court with instructions to  reconsider the matter and 
if appropriate proceed with the trial.  Similarly, if he  finds that 
the accused's  lack of capacity was  temporary and  that he has  recovered 
his capacity,  he  may  likewise return the record to the court. 
122c  -  Evidence.--This  paragraph  deals mith  the evidentiary aspect of 
the inquiry into the accused  f s mental  condition.  The  1949 Manual 
provided a special rule permitting the introduction of  opinions as 
to the mental  conditions found  in  a report of  a board  of medical 
officers,  provided the officers making  the report were made  avail- 
able for questioning by the prosecution,  the defense,  or the court. 
This rule did not accomplish its purpose of  facilitating trials since 
the report was  not admissible unless the members  making it were avail- 
able for call as witnesses.  If either side objected to  the intro- 
duction of the report it was  necessary to grant a  continuance,  thus 
delaying the orderly disposition of trials.  For this reason the 1951 
Manual provides that opinions in  the report of  medical officers are 
not admissible in evidence as exceptions to the official record or 
business entry rules.  In this regard we  are following the rule in 
the Federal courts which  have  excluded  such documentary  opinion 
evidence coming both from Army  and  Navy  medical records,  whether 
offered as business entries (New  York  Ufe Insurance Company  v. 
Taylor,  a7  F.  2d  294)  or as official records  (England v.  U.  S., 
174  2d  466).  The  Navy,  heretofore,  has  also adhered to the 
stricter view-  recognizing-  that opinions as to mental conditions are 
not such precise determinations of  fact 'as woyld  permit reception 
of  a  diagnosis of  a more  simple physical ailment  (CMO  #6,1924,  p.  5; 
CMO #1, 1949,  p.  5).  It is to  be noted,  however,  that the complete 
report might  be introduced by  stipulation,  or,  in  a proper  case,  as 
a aemorandum of past recollection recorded. 
The text.  also provides  that,  on the preliminary issues of 
whether an inquiry into the accusedfs mental condition should be 
made  by the court,  the law officer or the president of  a  special 
court-martial  may  examine the entire report.  If the ruling on  this 
question is objected to,  the court may  examine the entire report 
for the same  limited purpose. 
7 123  Effect of  mental impairment  or deficiency upon  sentence.--In 
this paragraph it is provided that the court may  consider evidence 
properly introduced which  falls short of  raising a reasonable doubt 
as to the sanity of  the accused either as a matter in  mitigation or 
in  aggravation of  the sentence.  ,One  instance of aggravation might 
be found  in  the case of  a sex psychopath where the interest of 
societywould require that he be confined  for as long a period as 
possible.  Similarly,  a person with homicidal tendencies should not 
be given a short term of  confinement.  On  the other hand,  if  the 
accused is suffering from a temporary mental or neurological condi- 
tion which  diminishes his ability to adhere to the right the court 
might  consider this as a matter in extenuation.  Sometimes  a 
psychoneurosis  occasioned by combat  conditions which  falls short 
of amounting  to insanity would  warrant  a  court in  giving the accused 
a  much  lighter sentence than the circumstances  of  the conbat offense 
would  otherwise warrant. 
124  Action by convening or higher authority.--This  paragraph points 
out that two  types of  problems  may  confront the convening authority 
or higher authority: 
1.  The  evidence may  be  such  that he  entertains a 
reasonable doubt  as to the accusedls sanity.  In that 
event he should  disapprove the findings of  guilty and 
the sentence affected by such doubt. 
2.  Sometimes  the record,  or matters appearing 
outside the record,  may  suggest that a  further inquiry 
be made  into the accusedls sadty.  In such a  case the 
convening  or higher authority should take the action 
prescribed in  paragraph 121,  and  order a mental exami- 
nation. 
This paragraph makes it clear that the authority reviewing  the 
record is not necessarily affected by a reasonable doubt as to the 
accused's  sanity merely because he  directs a further examination  in 
the interest of  justice. Conference 9a  - 
Conducted by 
MAJOR KULIAM H.  COIJLEY 
References:  Chapter XIX, Paragraph 97c 
Chapter  ICKV,  Paragraphs 125,  126 
Articles 1(5), 12-a,  18-20,  49,  50,  52, 
55-58,  63, 71,  106, 118  - 
The  first  hour  of  this conference on  punishments  will be 
devoted to a general discussion of the limitations on  the various 
types of  punishments which  courts-martial  my  a djudge . Chapter 
XXV does not contain the provisions of  the manual pertaining to 
the basis for determining a  proper  sentence,  the advice of  the 
law officer to the court as to  the maximum  punishment  in  a par- 
ticular case,  the procedure  for voting and deliberating on  a 
particular case,  or the technical forms of  sentences,  which 
material is  contained,  primarily,  in  chapter XI11 ,  Watters 
Related to Findings and  Sentence,"  and appendix 13,  nForms  of 
Sentences." 
Wenera1 Limitations.~ In every case where  the court has 
found the accused guilty, it is the duty of  each member  of  the 
court to vote for a legal and adequate punishment without regard 
to his opinion or vote as to the guilt or innocence  of  the accused. 
Once  the question of  guilt has been  determined  by  the court,  each 
member  is  required to  accept that finding;  the only matter  left 
for his consideration is the determination of  an adequate and 
proper punishment.  A  court wuch automatically imposed the maxi- 
mum  sentence in every case is not performing its proper  and legal 
function.  In this respect,  76a  -  (4  ) ,  nSentence--Basis  for Deter- 
mining,#  provides: 
uCourts mill, however,  exercise their m  dis- 
cretion,  and will not adjudge sentences known  to be 
excessive in  reliance upon  the mitigating action of 
the convening or higher auth0rity.n 
In no  case may  the punishment  adjudged by  the court eucceed 
such limits as the President may prescribe pursuant to Article 56. 
The  prohibition expressed in Article 12 against the confine- 
ment  of  members  of  the United States armed  forces in  immediate 
association with enemy  prisoners or other foreign nationals not \ 
members of  the armed forces of  the United States applies both  to 
pretrial restraint and to post-trial  confinement. 
Article 12 does not prohibit confinement  of our personnel in 
confinement facilities containing enemy prisoners of  war or 
foreign nationals not members  of  the armed forces of  the United 
States but it does prohibit the ccnfinement  of  these categories 
of  personnel in  the  same  cell. 
Although  an accused,  while awaiting the results of  trial, may 
be  subject to loss of  pay by  forfeiture in  those cases of  a sen- 
tence to forfeiture ard confinement not suspended,  Article 13 
prohibits the imposition of  any punishment  or penalty,  other 
than  arrest or confinement,  prior to the order directing execution 
of  the sentence. 
Until a  sentence is ordered into execution,  an accused wiU 
not be required to observe duties devised as punitive measures, 
nor  to observe training schedules devised as punitive measures, 
nor  to perform punitive labor,  nor  to wear  other than the uniform 
prescribed by his Service for unsentenced prisoners. 
Regardless of  his status as a sentenced or an unsentenced 
prisoner,  an accused is always  subject to minor  punishments,  as 
prescribed in pertinent regulations,  for infractions of  disci- 
plinary regulations. 
Article 55  prohibits both the ad  judging  of  a  sentence and  the 
infliction upon a person  subject to the code of  cruel and unusual 
punishments. 
Because  many  strictly military duties may  properly be  required 
to be performed  by prisoners,  the new manual provides that Hformal 
military dutiesff and flduties requiring the exercise of  a high sense 
of  responsibility,ft as contrasted with ttmilitzy duties" as pro- 
vided in the Manual for Cour ts-BEartial,  1949,  will  not be  imposed 
as punishment by courts-martial.  E;xamples of  such  prohibited 
duties include assignment to a  guard  of  honor  or to guard or watch 
duties. 
With  respect to sentences including confinement on bread and 
water or diminished rations and  sentences to solitary confinement, 
attention is invited to the Morgan  Committee Commentary  to Article 
18,  n Jurisdic  tion of  general cow  ts-martial ,  ff  wherein it is stated: 
nThe punishments which  may be adjudged are changed 
from those   authorized by  law  or the customs of the 
service1 to those  'not  forbidden by this code'  because the law and customs of each of  the services differ. 
Cruel and unusual  punishments are forbidden  in the 
code;  other punishments which  may be  adjudged will 
be made  dorm  by the regulations prescribed by the 
President under  article 56 .a 
It is pertinent to note that all  Navy  courts-martial  are 
currently authorized to adjudge  both solitary confinement on. 
bread and water and solitary confinement  (AGN  30,  35,  64b).  - 
Concerning the cross-references  to chapter XXVI,  nNon-Judicial 
Punishment  ,It  paragraph  l3lb  (3  ) (e  )  contains the provision of  Article 
lsa(2)  (e) that authorizes ZonfGement  on bread ad  water or dimin- 
i&ed  rgtions for a period not exceeding  three consecutive days 
in  the case of an  Army  or Air  Force enlisted person  attached to 
or embarked  in a vessel.  A  sentence to confinement onbread and 
water or diminished  rations or to solitary confinement is pro- 
hibited in the case of  Air Force or Army  personnel but is author- 
ized for Navy  personnel. 
126  ~~~scellaneous  Limitations.  '1  Punishment a s adjudged by  the 
court must be in  conformity with the article prescribing the 
offense.  For example,  in time  of  war,  death or such other punish- 
ment as the court-riitial  may  direct is authorized upon  conviction 
of  the offenses denounced in  Articles 85  (~esertion)  ,  90(~ssaultihg 
or willfully disobeying superior officer  ) ,  and 113 (Misbehavior 
of  sentinel).  However,  upon  conviction of  any of  those offenses 
time of  peace,  the court is prohibited from adjudging death 
but may  adjudge any punishment  other than death with the exception, 
of  course,  of prohibited punishments. 
Although  the code my expressly authorize the death penalty 
in a  certain case,  death cannot be adjudged if the President, 
pursuant to Article 56,  has prescribed a lesser punishmnt. 
Similarly,  although the code may  authorize a much  more  severe 
punishment  upon  conviction of a certain offense,  the punishment 
so authorized cannot be  adjudged by  the court if  the applicable 
limit of  punishment prescribed by the President is less than  that 
prescribed by  the code.  For  instance,  upon  conviction of peace- 
time desertion,  Article 85 authorizes such punishment other than 
death as a court-martial  may  direct.  However,  the Table of 
Maximum  Punishments imposeslimitations on the punishment  author- 
ized by  the article in that the table provides a maximum  punish- 
ment  of  dishonorable discharge,  total forfeitures,  and confinement 
at  hard labor for three years in an ordinary case of peace-time 
desertion terminated by apprehension. 
Although the death penalty may  be  authorized but not made 
mandatory by the code,  Article 49f  prohibits the court from  - adjudging a death,  sentence if'  the convening authority has directed 
that the case be treated as not capital, 
Paragraph  92, NOrdering  Rehearing,#  contains that portion of 
Article 63b  -  mhich  provides,  +-I  part: 
-x * no  sentence in excess of  or more  severe than 
the original sentence shall be imposed unless the sentence 
is based upon  a finding of  guilty of  an  offense not con- 
'sidered upon  the merits in the original proceedings or 
unless the sentence prescribed for the offense is man- 
datory  (Art,  63b). 11  - 
Paragraph  109g(2),  "Conduct  of  new  tria1,n  provides that upon 
a new  trial r-o  senrenca in excess of. or more  severe than  the origi- 
nal sentence as approved or affirmd shall be adjudged. 
Tie prohibition against the imposition  of  a  sentence to death 
or dismissal in  those cases where  the sworn  testimony of  a court 
of  inquiry is read in evidence pursuant to Article 50 is similar 
to the present provisions of  Article of  War 27  and  Article '60, 
Articles for the Government of  the 1tav-y.  In this respect the 
commentary to Article 50 provides: 
MThe  effect of  the use of  the words  'not  capital 
and not extending to the dismissallof an  officer' is 
that if the prosecution uses a record of  a  court of 
inquiry to  prove  part of  the allegations in one  speci- 
f ication,  neither death nor  dismissal my  be  ad  judged 
as a result of  a conviction under  that specification. 
The  introduction of the record of a  court of  inquiry 
by the defense  shall not affect the punishment  which 
may be  ad  judged.tl 
Because  of  the frequent lack of  facilities whereby a death 
sentence nay be  executed,  the method  of  execution wiU  not be 
prescribed by  the court.  Whereas the Llama1  for Courts-Wtial, 
1949,  provides that the method of  execution shall be  prescribed 
by  the llconfFrmingtJ  authority,  the new  manual  provides that a 
"sentence to death which  has been  finally ordered executed will 
be  carried into execution in  the manner  authorized or prescribed 
in the service concerned." 
With  respect to prescribing the method  of  execution,  88d,  - 
V3xecution of  sentence,"  provides that: 
"The  authority ordering the execution of  a  sentence 
of  death  issues instructions concerning the tim  and 
place of  execution,  any desigmtions or instructions 
in this particular matter by the court or  the convening 
authority being disregarded. 11 As a result of  numerous  inquiries whether dishonorable 
discharge is included in a death sentence, it was determined 
to insert herein the provision that a dishonorable discharge 
is by implication included in  a death sentence.  This rule is 
predicated upon a  series of  opinions  (JAGA 1946/10582,  28  Feb 
1947;  SPJGA 1945/9511,  13 Sep 1945) including a  case  (CU 238136, 
Brevfster,  24 BR  173) wherein the Army  Board  of  Review, in  dis- 
cussing a  sentence wherein the accused upon  conviction of  murder 
was sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures,  and 
death by hanging,  stated: 
"Since  the death penalty operates per  se to dis-  -- 
honorably discharge the soldier * * * that portion of 
the sentence adjudging dishonorable discharge does not 
violate Article of War 50;  fihich  provided that upon  a 
rehearing no sentence 'in exFess  of or mre severe than 
the original sentence shall be  enforce47 ++  *  *I1  - 
Similarly,  it w&s determined that there should be  inserted 
~  this same paragraph  the rule that when  life imprisonment is 
adjudged  the cmrt should also adjudge dishonorable discharge 
and total forfeitures.  Concerning this latter rule, the opinion 
has been  expressed  (CM  320408,  LaFlore,  69 BR  3L3)  that upon 
conviction for murder  or rape in violstion of  Article of  War 92 
it is  within the power  of  the court to adjudge dishonorable d is- 
charge and total forfeitees with life imprisonment  (CM 244.4.45, 
Was,  2 BR  (ETO) 709).  - 
12611,  -  The  jurisdictional li~itations  on the ty-pes  and amounts of 
C  -  punishment  which the three classifications of courts-martial  my 
adjudge are again set out in  126b  -  and -  c  (see'lkb, 15b,  and 16b).  -  -  - 
Concerning  special courts-mrtial,  Article 18 expressly 
includes death in  those punishments  which  are beyond the juris- 
diction of the court to adjudge.  Another new  entry is the 
prohibition against hard labor without confinement in  excess 
of  three months. 
With reference to Summary courts-martial,  it is  noted that 
Article 20 includes in the specifically prohibited punishments 
hard  labor without confinement  in excess of  45  days and reduces 
the authorized period of restriction to limits to two  months. 
Many  suggestions were received that provision be made  to 
provide suitable limitations in the new  manual  to  ,govern punish- 
ment  of  nonconnnissioned  officers by  summary courts-wtial.  It 
was  agreed that the desired protection cmld be accomplished by 
providing  that in the case of  noncommissioned  or petty afficers T 
3: 
above the fourth enlisted pay grade summary  courts-martial may 
not  ad  judge  confinement,  hard labor without  confinement,  or 
reduction except to the next inferior grade. 
1265  Paragraph 1262, "Officers and warrant officers,"  consists, 
primarily,  of linitations prescribed by the President pursuant 
to  the authority of  Article 56. 
A  court-martial  may  not sentence either an officer or a 
warrant officer to  be reduced  in  rank or to  bad  conduct  dis- 
charge.  The  separation from the service of  an officer by sentence 
of  court-martial is effected by  dismissal;  that of  a warrant 
officer is effected by  dishonorable discharge.  No  officer or 
varrant officer shall be  sentenced Lo  confinement or to total 
forfeitures unless the sentence includes dismissal in  the case 
of  an  officer or dishonorable discharge in  the case of a warrant 
officer . 
In no  case shall a sentence to confinement  in  the case of 
an officer or warrant officer exceed the maximum prescribed  for 
enlisted persons  in the Table of Maximum  Punishments.  This  rule 
extends to officers and warrant  officers the provisions of  the 
table insofar as the limitations on  confinement  are concerned 
without specifically includ  ng  officers and  warrant officers as 
persons who  are subject to the table in general.  Under  the new 
code,  a  court-martial  is  no  longer authorized to sentence an 
officer to be reduced to  an enlisted grade.  In chapter XX, 
ItAppellate Review--Sxecution  of Sentence,"  100c(l)  (b) provides 
that an  officer who  in time of war  or national-emergency  is 
reduced to  any enlisted grade by  virtue of a  communtation  of  a 
sentence of  dismissal may  be required to serve for the duration 
of  the war or emergency and  six months  thereafter. 
126e  -  In vim  of the a  gre5ment  between  the Service representatives 
to  refrain from using the term  "general prisoneru in  the new 
manual,  that term,  as it  appears in  the 1949 Manual,  has been 
replaced by  a  reference to "prisoners sentenced to punitive 
discharge." 
Paragraph 126e contains a  modification of the Navy  procedure 
concerning the reduction to the lowest  enlisted grade by certain 
sentences.  In Amy  and  Air  Force procedure,  the rule is firmly 
established that in  the case of  an enlisted person of  other than 
the lowest  pay  grade a sentence,  which  as ordered executed or as 
finally approved and  suspended,  includes either punitive discharge, 
confinement,  or hard  labor without confinement,  immediately upon 
being ordered  executed or upon being finally approved  and  suspended 
reduces the enlisted person to the lowest enlisted pay  grade.  The 'basis for this rule is that the status of  a prisoner sentenced to 
punitive discharge,  confinement,  or hard  labor is incompatible mtth 
the honorable status of  a noncommissioned  officer and  that it is 
prejudicial to  discipline that an enlisted man  should be subjected 
to  a degrading punishment  while still holding the office of a 
noncomissioned officer,  To  use a Navy  example,  in  the case of  a 
petty officer 2d  class,  any court-martial sentence which,  as ordered 
executed or as finally approved  and suspended,  includes either 
(1)  dishonorable discharge,  (2)  dishonorable discharge suspended 
on a  period of pmbation,  (3) bad  conduct  discharge,  (4)  bad 
conduct discharge suspended  on  a period of probation,  (5)  conftne- 
ment,  (6)  confinement suspended  on  a  period of probation,  (7) 
hard  1abo.r without  confinement,  or (8)  hard  labor without  con- 
finement suspended  on  a period of probation,  automatically,  upon 
being ordered executed or finally approved and  suspended,  reduces 
the petty officer to  seaman recruit, ~5th  pay commensurate ~5th 
his  cumulative  ' s  ervi  ce , 
If a  court were to sentence an E-5  (sergeant) to be confined 
at  hard  labor for three months  and to be reduced  to  the grade of 
E&  (corporal),  the automatic reduction to the lowest pay grade 
rule  muld apply upon  the sentence being ordered  executed or 
finally approved and suspended.  In case of  such a  sentence an 
appropriate action on the part of the convening authority would 
be to return the record to  the court for revision. 
The  provision that in  case of such an automatic redudion 
"the rate of pay of  the person so reduced  shall be commensurate 
with his cumulative service" is predicated upon  peminent provi- 
sions of the Career Compensation Act  of  1949 (act 12 Oet  1949, 
63 Stat.  802) which,  in  providing the method  for computing the 
basic pay of  enlisted personnel of  the uniformed  services,  pre- 
scribes eight pay  grades,  E-1  through E-7,  the E-1  grade being 
subdivided into two  classifications :  (1)  uqder  four msnl;hs  @ 
service,  and  (2)  over four months  serarice,  Thus  the provision 
of  the manual  providing that an enlisted person with over four 
months'  service can be reduced  only to  the applicable classifi- 
cation of the lowest  pay grade,  that is, with pay for over four 
months 1  service,  conforms  to the requirements of the Career 
Compensation Act,  supra,  and  to the policy determination in  the 
matter. 
The  authority of a  court-martial  to sentence an enlisted 
person to  be reduced  to  an inferior or intermediate  grade is 
firmly established in Navy  procedure but is new  to  the Air Force 
and  the Army.  In a memorandum  opinion dated 2  May  1950, the Chief,  Military Affairs Division,  Off ice of  the Judge  Advocate 
General  (Army),  after tracing the historical development  of  the 
prohibition against reduction  to an  inferior or intermediate 
grade,  stated that previous opinions which raised objections to 
such  a reduction had  been  based upon  administrative prohibitions 
or,  in the case of  reduction by sentence of  a court-martial, 
upon  an express prohibition in  the manual  or an omission  of  such 
punishment from the category of  authorized punishments.  It was 
noted that the new  code authorizes courts-martial  to adjudge any 
punishment  not forbidden by  the code,  tMt reduction to  an inter- 
mediate  or inferior grade is not among  the punishments prohibited 
by  the code,  and that reduction to the next inferior grade is 
expressly authorized as a non-judicial  punishment  under.Article 
15'.  It  was  concluded that as  the purpose  of  the revised wording 
of  Articles 18,  19,  and 20 was  to obviate differences in  author- 
ized punishments,  which  differences were  based on  the varying 
laws and customs  of  the Services,  no  legal objection was  perceived 
to implementing  the articles of  the code by regulations prescribed 
by  the President establishing reduction to an intermediate or 
inferior grade as a  punishment  authorized by the Congress. 
The  provision concerning reduction to  an inferior or inter- 
mediate  grade does not prohibit reduction to the lowest grade  in 
an appropriate case. 
12  6f  -  Any court-martial  may  adjudge a  reprimand or an admonition 
(126f ) as punishment  upon  any person  subject to the code,  but 
the zourt will  not specify the wording  of  the reprimand  or 
admonition which,  as provided in  89c(8),  will  be  included in 
the action of the  conveniig authoriTy. 
12hg  -  Except that restriction to the limits  (126g)  will not be 
adjudged in  excess of  two  months  (as contrasted-with  the three 
month  limitation provided in  116f,  MCM,  1949),  there is no  limi- 
tation either as t:,  the court-maTtial  which may  adjudge this 
punishment  or as to the persons subject to the code upon whom 
it may  be  imposed.  An.accused is  never  exempt from performing 
his military duties because  of  a  sentence to restriction. 
126h  -  Forfeitures,  as such,  are specifically provided as author- 
ized punishment  in  Articles 15,  19,  and  20.  The  portions of 
this chapter concerning forfeitures,  fines,  and detention of 
pay  consist primarily of pertinent general principles and  a 
minimum of  regulatory material. 
126h(l)  -  No  punishment--whether  it be death,  dismissal,  dishonorable 
discharge,  bad  conduct  discharge,  or cmfinement--automatical* 
results h  the forfeiture or deprivation of  any pay or allowances. 
If  the court intends to adjudge a forfeiture,  fine,  or detention of  pay,  it must  be  adjudged in  express terms.  Loss  of  pay must 
be  statzd in dollars,  or dollars and cents, not in fractions of 
months'  or dayst pay.  A  sentence to forfeit ''10  dayst  pay"  or to 
forfeit "two-thirds  of  one  months'  pay"  wuld  be improper. 
The  jurisdiction of  courts-martial'  being entirely penal or 
disciplinary> -they have  no  power  to adjudge the payment  of  damages 
or the collection of  private debts.  A  court-martial  has no  power 
to assign or a?propriate the pay  of  an accused to reimburse the 
Government  or any agency or any person,  or to  r equire an accused 
to pay any debt or to satisfy any obligation. 
&FJ  military person convicted by any court-martial may  be 
sentenced to forfeiture of  pay  or9  when  appropriate,  to  pay  and 
allorrances .  Hoxever ,  allowances are forfeited only when  the 
sentence includes forfeiture of  all pay and allowances;  such a 
penalty will  be  adjudged only when  the accused is also sentenced 
to punitive discharge or dismissal.  An  approved  sentence to 
forfeiture operates to relieve the Government,  to the extent 
expressly provided in  the sentence,  of  its obligation to pay 
the amount  forfeited (J-~GA  1948/3826,  5 May  1948,  and  cases cited 
therein).  Unless total forfeitures are adjudged,  the amount  of 
the forfeiture must  not only be  expessly stated in  terms of 
dollars and cents per mnth or day,  but the number  of  months 
or days for which the forfeiture is  to  run must  also be  expressly 
stated in  the sentence.  See appendix 13,  "Forms  of Sentences," 
form 4.  A  lump  sum  forfeiture results in a forfeiture of  not 
more  than two-thirds  of  the accused1 s pay for one month.  For 
example,  in  the case of  anenlisted person  receiving $75 a month, 
a  sentence to  forfeit an  amount  equal to two-thirds  of  his pay 
for six months  expressed as a lmp  sum--i.e.,  "to forfeit $300t1 
rather than  "to forfeit $50  per month  for 6 monthsfl--result  s in 
a forfeiture of  only $50.  Similarly,  a  sentence to be confined 
at hard labor for six months  and  I1to forfeit $50 per month,"  is 
indefinite as to the amunt of forfeiture which should have been 
specifically expressed as  $50  per month  for 6 m0nths.n 
Subject to the-provisions  of  Article 57a, a forfeiture applies 
to pay and allowances which  accrue during thz enlistment or other 
engagement  or obligation of  service in which  the accused is serv- 
ing at the time  the sentence is adjudged. 
Army  and  Air  Force personnel will  note that the provision 
in U6g of  the 19h9 Uanual which  provides that in  the case of 
an  enllsted person a general court-martial  '%nay  not adjudge a 
forfeiture of  more  than two-thirds  pay per mnth for twelve M,  months  unless it dso  sentences the  accused to dishonorable or 
bad conduct dischargeR has been changed to reduce the "twelve 
~onths"  to Itsix months.fl 
Articles 19 an6  20 restrict special and  summary  courts- 
martial from adjudging forfeitures in excess of  two-thirds  pay 
per month  for a period exceeding  six months,  and  two-thirds  of 
one  month's  pay,  resp~,ctiaely. 
In computing  the maxinu amount o f  forfeiture in dollars and 
cents,  the basic pay of  the accused  (of  the reduced  grade if  the 
sentence carries a  reduction) plus sea or foreign duty pay  (if no 
confinement is adjudged) will be  taken as  the basis of  computation. 
The  ph~ass  ~~maxinu~o  amount of forfeitilreft as use6 jll  Lhis  rule 
applies to the total amount  of forfeiture resulting f rorr! the 
sentence  (JAGJ  1951/1652,  27 Feb  1951). 
Unless  dishonorable or bad conduct discharge is  adjudged, 
an  enlisted personls nonthly contribution  to family allowance 
or basic allowance for quarters  (Class Q  allotment) will be 
deducted prior to compvg  the net amount  of  monthly pay  subject 
to  forfeiture.  The  phrase  "net amount  of  pay subject to forfei- 
turetl refers to the rate per month at which  the forfeiture may 
be adjudged ard thereby differs from the phfase  nmaxin!~m  amount 
of  forfeiture11 which,  as has been  stated, refers to the total 
amount of forfeiture resulting from  the sentence. 
I  The  maximum amount  of  forfeiture per month  to be adjudged 
in the case of  a partial forfeiture will be computed  by  consider- 
ing the accusedls base pay at his reduced grade and  for his 
cumulative years of service,  less the amount  the accused,  at  his  -- 
reduced  grade,  is  re  uired by law to contribute to the Class Q 
a-nw~~  1950  ?  6513,  12 Dec  1950). 
Regarding  the proper method of computing  o~le  day1 s  pay  for  --- 
the purpose  of  forfeiting an  enlisted person's  pay,  the question 
was asked whether one  day's pay is to  be cor-sidered  one-thirtieth  --- 
of  his monthly pay  or one-thirtieth  of  his monthly pay  less any 
dedwtion for Class  &  allotment.  In the opinion  (JAGJ  19k6/795;5, 
26 Jan 19.51) it was pointed out that the Amy  policy of  not 
subjecting an enlisted pe rsonls family allowance contribution 
to forfeiture merely provides a  limitation on  the maximum  for- 
feiture per month,  that is, that a forfeiture in  any mnth may 
not exceed two-thirds  of  the enlisted personls pay less  his 
monthly  contribution to family allowance,  and  has no  applica- 
tion in  determining a day's  pay as that term  is used in  the  --- 
Table of  Uaximum Punishments.  Thus,  the f inal provision of  the directive that unless dishonorable  or bad  conduct discharge is 
adjudged the monthly contribution of  an enlisted person  to 
family allowance  or to  basic allowance for quarters will  be 
deducted  should be interpreted as meaning  that such  allowances 
shall be deducted prior to  computing  the net amount of monthly 
pay  subject to forfeiture.  However,  the total amount om 
feiture that can be  collected in any one  month  must  not exceed 
two-thirds  of  the dizcebetween  monthly pay and the Class 
& allotment  (JAGJ  1951/1652,  27  Feb  1951). 
Whereas a forfeiture deprives the accused of  the specified 
amount  of  his "pay,"  a fine (126h(3)) makes  him  pecuniarily 
liable in  general to  the United states for the amount  specified 
in the sentence,  regardless of whether  the accused receives any 
pay.  Apy  court-martial  has power  to  adjudge  a fine in lieu of 
a forfeiture in every case where  punishment is authorized as a 
court-martial  may  direct,  except  that as provided in  Section B, 
l27c,  in the case of  an enlisted person  a  fine will  not be 
adjzdged in  lieu of a  forfeiture unless a punitive discharge is 
also adjudged.  A  fine,  rather than a forfeiture,  ordinarily is 
the proper  monetary penalty to be adjudged against a civilian 
subject to the code.  As provided in Section B,  127c,  a fine 
should not ordinarily be  adjudged against a member  zf the armed 
forces unless the accused was unjustly enriched by  means of  an 
offense ofwhich he is convicted.  In such a  category,  of  course, 
would be  the finance officer who  absconds with government funds, 
-and  the black marketeer. CAs  provided in Article 48,  a fine may 
always be imposed  as punishment  for contempt.  Concerning the 
imposition of  additional confinement  in  the alternative upon 
failure to pay the fine ,  the totsl period of  confinement ad  judged 
(including the a]- ternative cod  inement added for failure to pay 
the fine) shall  ,not exceed the jurisdictional  limitation of  the 
court.  For example,  in the case of a  special court-martial  the 
combined periqds of the sentence to confinement and the alterna- 
tive confinement  upon  failure to pay the fine shall not exceed 
six months. 
\  3 
Detention of  pay  is not specifically authorized by the code 
as a type  of  punishment,  as it was  in  Article .of War  14. 
Paragraph  127b,  "General limitations,  limits any court, in 
a  single sentence,T rom  adjudging against an a ecused either (1: 
detention of pay  at  a rate greater than  two-thirds  of  his pay 
per month,  or (2) detention of pay in an  amount  greater than two- 
thirds of  his pay for three months. Paragraph  126h(5), which  pertains to the effective dates 
of  sentences to  foFfeiture, f he, or detention of  pay,  differs 
from Article 57a  in one particular in  that it  provides that in 
an approved  senTence of  forfeiture which  includes confinement 
not  suspended,  the forfeiture Milla apply,  while the article 
provides that the forfeiture 'hay" apply,  to pay and allowances 
becoming  due  on  and after the date the sentence is approved by 
the c onvening authority.  This change was made in order to give 
full force and effect both to Article  57a  -  and  to Article 13,  the 
commentary to wEch provides: 
I 
"It is felt  that a person who  has been  sentenced 
by court-martial  and is in  conf i~ment,  which  counts 
against the sentence,  should not  draw f'ull  pay for the 
period between  the date of  sentence and the date of 
final approval.  fl 
The  effective date of  a forfeiture is subject to the ccnvening 
authority's power  to defer or suspend the effective date of 
the forfeiture by  providing  specifically theref  or in  his action 
as provided in  88e(2)  -  (c).  - 
Article 57a  further provides that no  forfeiture shall  &end 
to any pay  or anowances accrued before the date the sentence 
is approved by  the convening authority.  A  sentence  to forfeiture 
other than  forfeiture  combiaed with confinement  not  suspended, 
and a sentence to fine or detention of pay becomes  effective on 
the date the sentence is ordered executed  (Art.  57c).  - 
126i  -  As provided in 126i,  sentences to suspension from rank, 
suspension from command;  and  suspension  from duty are authorized 
only in  the case of  Army  or Air Force personnel. 
Sentences to  loss of  rank or loss of  promotion are not 
authorized in  any case.  However,  in time  of  war or national 
emergency a sentence of dismissal maybe commuted  to  reduction 
to any enlisted grade as provided in Article 71b  and 100c  (1)  (b).  -  -  - 
Sentences to  loss of  numbers,  lineal position,  or seniority 
are not authorized in the case of  &my  or Air Force personnel. 
126  j  -  In addition to providing  that any person subject to trial 
by court-martial  may  be  sentenced to confinement at  hard labor 
in an  appropriate case,  126j reiterates tbat confinement at 
hard labor will  not be ad  juJged  in  the case of  an officer or 
warrant  officer unless the sentence includes dismissal or 
dishonorable discharge,  as  appropriate,  and that a  sentence 
to  confinement does not automatically result in any fine or forfeiture.  It is contrary to policy that an accused should serve 
a  sentence as serious as confinement at  hard labor without  some 
loss of  pay being adjudged, unusual circumstances excepted, 
In every instance in  which  confinement at  hard labor is 
authorized in the Table  of  &IX~UIR Punishments,  forfeiture is 
also authcrixed,  The  table prescribes limitations on the periods 
for which  codi.raement may  be adjudged in the case of  -listed 
personss arid  1263 provides that in no  case shall a  sentence to  .  ,+* 
conf'inement,  .the qase of an offices or warrant officer exceed 
the maxim-ur! pz.esc:v-ibecl for  enlisted persons by  the ta'ble. 
A  general court--martial cannot adjudge more  than six months 8 
confinement  in the case of  an enlisted person without  also 
sen-tencixg h.im to di  shonorable or b ad c onduct  discharge  (127b)  -- 
Pwsuaa;~%  tc .A:;:.tic:'l.ea  19 and  20,  neither a  special nor a  summary 
cowk--mast5.:3. cim --1Jjtdge  confinement in  excess of  theis jwis- 
dic.tional  :Li.~i;i..  tal;i..i,.nu i,  e. ,  six mon-Lhs and one  month,  respec- 
.&  '.-..< -- 
bl~~  -,y (I-26~  > ,.,  -  ~ Another  point  lo be rioteci  in this respect is the nethod  of 
executing rnulti~le  sentsnces to confinement.  When  the proposed 
joint regulation,  Wil.itary Sentences to Confines,ent,  1'  was 
revieivd,  it was  recommended  that the draft regulation be chailged 
to  provide  that: 
!When  a prisoner ser'rhlg  a  sentence to confinement 
adjudged by  a court-martial  on or after 31 Kay  1951 is 
convicted by a  court-martial  for another offense and 
sentenced 50  a term of  confinement,  the subseqaent 
sentence,  upon  beind  ordered Lito execation,  will begin 
to m as of  the date adjudged and will  interrupt the 
runl4.ng of the prior sentence.  After the subseqllent 
sentence has been  fully executedj  the prismer !?ill 
resane the service of  any unrernitted interrupted sm- 
tence to confinement.  In determining priority of 
sentences vvithin the meaning  of  this paragrrph  if  the 
sentmce was ad  judged  before 31 lhay  1951,  the datc the 
sentence  was  ordered executed will  be used;  if  the sen- 
tence Nas  adjudged  on  or after 31 Uay  1951,  the date 
the sentence was  adjudged ~~~.  be used.  &en  the sus- 
pension  of  a  sentence is  vacated,  the unexecntsd  portion 
of  the sentence to c  ~nf.hement  will begin to run on  the 
date the vacation of  the suspension becoms effective, 
and  the execution thereof  will interrqt the running 
of  any other senteuce to conf inensilt  which the prisoner 
my be  serving at  the time." 
With  reference to tnose cases i~  which one or more  sentences 
to confinement is  .adjudged prior to  31 May 1951, it was secom- 
inended  that the proposed  regulation be  chaged to provide : 
ffh' i'$ * A  sentence which  includes confinement 
without discharge,  followed by a  sentence including 
both c  onf  inement  and discharge, whether  or not the 
discharge is suspended,  will be regarded as having 
terminated upon  the date the sentence including dis- 
charge takes effect, leaving to  be  executed only the 
'  discharge and  confinement adjudged by  the second 
sentence.  d prisoner in confinement under  sentence 
including discharge,  whether  or not  the discharge is 
suspended,  who  receives a subsequent sentence or 
sentences to conf ineneflt adjudged 7rior to  31 May  1951, 
either with or  without discharge,  will serve all  of 
the sentences consecutively.  A  prisoner in c  onf ire- 
ment  under a sentence including discharge, whether  or 
not  the discharge is suspended,  who  receives a  sub- 
sequent sentence or sentences to cmfinement,  adjudged 
on  or after 31 Wny  1951,  will,  suSject to any limita- 
tion as to the designation of  the place of  c  onfinemnt, serve all of  the sentences in  the manner  prescribed 
in parazraph 3b(l)ll  Rn,ich provides for the mentioned 
interruption oT the Funning  of  the prior sentence7.  - 
Confinement wit'hout hard labor will  not be adjudged.  Article 
5%  provides that omission  of  the words  "hard labor" in  any sentence 
of  confinement  shall not be construed as depriving the authority 
executing the sentence of the power  to require hard labor as a 
part of  the punishment. 
126k  -  A  sentence  to perform hard labor without confinement  (126k)  - 
requires the accused to perform hard labor in addition to his 
regular duties for the number  of  nonths or days expressly pro- 
vided in  the sentence.  It  may  be adjudged only in the case of 
an enlisted person,  and in  no  case can  any court adjudge hard 
labor wit'nout  confinement in excess of  three months--the  juris- 
dictional limitation of  a  sumy  court is 4.5  days.  The  accused 
is not to be  excused from his assigned duties so that he may 
perfom the hard labor,  the very purgose of the sentence being 
to exact work  of a laborious natur2  from him  during such  time 
as may  be  available after he  has co~yleted  his other tasks. 
Vpon  completion of the daily assignment,  the accused should be 
permitted to take leave or liberty to which  he  properly is 
entitled. Conference  9b  - 
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This  conference will include a  discussion of  the second 
general  subdivision of chapter XXV,  the maxinum  limits of punish- 
ments  prescribed by  the President pursuant  to Article 56,  the 
principal portion of  which  consists of  the Table  of Maximum 
Punishments. 
127a  -  In 127a,  "bIaximum  Limits of Punishments--Persons  and 
Offenses,  cognizance is again taken of  the fact that all of 
the  services do  not  use the terfn "general prisoner1' and,  as 
in 1260,  that term has  been  superseded here by  the term 
"prisozers  sentenced to punitive discharge."  Recognition was 
also taken of  the  fact that the current provisions of  NC  &  B, 
sections 451  and  475,  concerning limitations of  punishments 
prescribed by  the President apply to commissioned and  enlisted 
personnel  alike.  It was  noted that Article  56 is  based on 
Article of  War  45  under  which,  in the 1949 Manual,  the Table  of 
Maximum Punishments  applies,  as such,  to "soldiers and  general 
prisoners.''  In view of  the foregoing and because  off  icere and 
warrant officers are now subject to trial by  special and  summary 
courts-lrartial  and  to non-judicial  punishrnent  under Article 15, 
it  was determined that the new  manual  should  apply specifically 
to enlisted persons and to prisoners sentenced to punitive dis- 
charge,  but that it should be used  as a guide in determining 
punishment  in the case of  officers,  warrant  officers,  air oadets, 
midshipen,  and  civilians subject to military law,  except that 
as provided  in 126d in no  case shall a  sentence to confinemnt 
in  the case of  an officer or  warrant officer exceed the maximum 
prescribed for enlisted persons  by the Table  of  Maximum Punish- 
ments,  and  exoept  that as provided  insection  B,  127c,  a fine 
may  always be  imposed upon  my member  of  the armed  fFrces as 
punishment  for contempt. 
127b  -  General  limitations.--This  paragraph specifies that the 
limitations of  127 must be  read in conjunction with all other applicable  limitations.  It is reiterated that special courts- 
martial cannot  adjudge  confinement  in excess of  six  months  nor 
forfeiture of  pay-in excess  of  two-thirds  pay  per month  for six 
months,  and  that summary  courts-martial  may  not  adjudge  sentences 
to confinement,  hard labor without  confinement,  or  reduction 
except  to the next inferior grade in the  specified cases. 
Arrny  and  Air  Force  officers will note that the 12 month 
ceiling provided  in  the 31949  Manual  has  been reduced to six 
months  both  as to the maximum  amount  of  forfeiture and  as to 
the period  of  confinement that may  be  adjudged  in a  sentence 
that does  not include a  dishonorable  or bad  conduct  discharge. 
The  six months period  of  confinement  limitation does not apply 
in the case of  a prisoner whose  punitive discharge has  been 
executed,  a  civilian,  or  a prisoner of  war. 
The  final subparagraph of  127b is a paraphrase presentation 
of  that portion of  the act of  22  Idzy  1928  (45 Stat.  698), as 
amended  (10 U.S.C.  875a;  M.L.,  1949,  sec.  1521),  which provides 
that one-third  of  an ezisted persont  s pay  must be  le ft  for his 
use  after the deduction of  authorized stoppages and  forfeitures. 
127c  -  With  the exception of  those few  offenses for which a 
mandatory  or  an  alternatively prescribed punishment  ie required, 
the new  punitive articles provide for punishment  "as  a court- 
martial  may direct."  However,  by  Article 56,  the President is 
authorized to establish linits of  punishmcmts  for offenses which 
otherwise would be  left to  the discretionary determination of  the 
court.  By  the Table of  Maximum  Punishments  set out in 127c, 
"Iikximum  punishments, " the President has  established such Timits 
for many  offenses.  The  punishment  provided  in that table for any 
listed offense is simply  the maximum punishment  that my  be 
imposed  therefor; it is not  a  required punishment  and  the court, 
in any case,  may  adjudge less than the limit set out in the table 
for the offense.  The  limit of  punishment  provided  in the table 
for an offense is applicable not only to the listed offense but 
is also applicable to any  lesser included  offense if the lesser 
included offense  is not  specifically listed,  and  is  further 
applicable to any unlisted offense which  is  closely related to 
either.  If an unlisted offense is included in a listed offense 
and  is also closely related to some  other listed offense,  the 
lesser punishment  presoribed for,  either the lesser included  or 
olnsely relatel! offense  2rsxi.l  ss  C,he  maximum 35.v.ik  5f' 
punishment. 
For  the purpose  of  achieving a uniformity of  sentences as 
well as affording a substantial protection  of  the rights of an 
accused,  it  is provided  that an offense not listed in the table &  or not  included within a listed offense,  or not  closely related 
to either remains  punishable  as  authorized by  the United  States 
Code  or the Code  of  the District of  Columbia,  whichever  prescribed 
punishment  is  the lesser,  or  in the absence of  any punishment 
prescribed by  those statutes then as  authorized by the oustom of 
the service.  To  obtain  instructions for determining the maximum 
punishment  for an offense which  is not covered by  the table,  the 
court will look to Federal  statutes for the basis  of  punishment, 
it being recognized  that the majority of  Federal  offenses are 
listed in Title 18 of  the United  States Code  but that some  are 
listed in various  other  titles.  By  requiring a  reference to the 
United  States Code  or to the Code of  the District of Columbia,  it 
is sought  to insure that comparable  offenses will not  be  punish- 
able in mfl ?tary law 4x1  any  greater sxtent "than  in civil juris- 
dictions of  the United  States. 
The  provision  that the maximum punishment  prescribed  for an 
offense should be  restricted to those  cases  in  which, due  to 
aggravating ci  rcums tames,  the greatest permissible  punishment 
should be  imposed  conforms  to subparagraph 76a(2),  "Sentence--  - 
Basis  of determining ." 
The  lhnits of punishment  prescribed by  the table  are for 
each separate offense,  not  for-each separate charge.  In this 
connection,  76a(8  -  ),  w~entence--~asis  for  determining,  reads : 
'The  maximum authorized punishment  my  be  imposed 
for  each of two or  more  separate offenses arising out 
ofthe same  act OF  transactions  The  .test to be  applied 
in determining whether  the offenses  of which  the 
accused has  been convicted am  separate in this:  The 
offenses are separate if  each offense requires proof 
of  an elemat not required to prove  the other,  Thus, 
if the accused is convf  cted of  oscape from eomfinmsnt 
(hst, 95)  and dessr-tiopa  (Art,  85)--both  offenses arising 
out of  the  name  aot 03-  trmsoc-tion--the  court may legally 
adjudge the wjmm  pmishe&  authorized for eaeki 
offe~se  because m intent to x.mla73 pernansntly %bsea&, 
is no% a  necessary  eleri8a.i; of  the offense of ascalm, 
=d  a  freeing from restraira-l; is no% a nsceasary elumezt 
of $he, o:PPease  of dsaeslisn,  Ax accused mny  no% be 
punished fcr bo-i;h a  principal offense acl  Eoi~  an offense 
ineluded therein bssause it wo~~ld.  j3.r~t be lascessary  in 
proving the included offense tc PYOCJVQ  any ele~1,sat  no% 
required  JGCP  prove .the  prirxipaj. off  &mes'" adjudge  in its sentence the aggregate of the limit of  punishment 
for each se~arate  and distinct offense in a case.  For  example, 
if an accused were  convicted  of  resisting apprehension,  for which 
the maximum  authorized punishment  is bad  conduct  discharge,  total 
forfeitures,  and  confinement  at hard  labor for one year,  and  is 
convicted  of  a subsequent breach of  arrest,  for which bad  conduct 
discharge,  total forfeitures,  and  confinement at hard labor for 
six months  is prescribed,  and  is convicted of a still later 
escape from  confinment,  for which  a dishonorable  discharge, 
total forfeitures,  and  confinement  at  hard  labor for one year  is 
authorized,  all of  the offenses being alleged under  a single 
charge  in  violation of  Article 95,  the court,  in its discretion, 
would  be authorized to adjudge  the aggregate of  the authorized 
punishments  which,  in this example,  would  be  dishonorable dis- 
charge,  total forfeitures,  and  conf'inement  at hard  labor for two 
and  one-half  years. 
In determining the maximum  punishment  for two  or nore 
separate and distinct but like offenses against property,  values 
as found  in different specifications cannot  be  aggregated,  as if 
alleged in a single  specification,  for the purpose  of  increasing 
the maximum  punishment.  For  example,  if a thief goes  into a 
room  and  takes property belonging to  various persons,  there is 
but one  larceny which  should  be  alleged in but one  specification 
and  for which  the maximum  authorized punishment would  depend upon 
the total value  of  the various articles which were  the subject of 
the one  act of  larceny.  However,  if the thief were  to steal one 
article of  a value of  $25,  and  at  a subsequent time  he were  to 
steal another article worth $17.50,  and  on  a third ocoasion were 
to steal a different article of  a value  of  $10,  and  if all three 
offenses were  charged  in separate specifications under  a single 
charge  in violation of  Article 121,  Larceny,  the court would  be 
prohibited from  aggregating the  three values,  that is,  a total 
of  $55,  for the purpos e of  ad  judging  dishonorable discharge, 
total forfeitures,  and confinement  at  hard  labor  for five years, 
as is authorized in the table upon  conviction of  larceny of 
property of  a value  of  $50  or more.  Instead,  in the example 
case,  the court would  be  authorized to adjudge  dishonorable  dis- 
charge,  total forfeitures,  and  a-total period  of  confinement  at 
hard  labor for  two  years,  that is,  one  yesr for  the larceny of 
the $25  article,  six  months  for the larceny of  the $17.50  article, 
and  six months  for the larceny of  the $10 article. 
Fihereas  the  Table  of  Uaximnm  Punishments  lists the maximum 
punishment  in terms  of  punitive discharge,  confinement  at hard 
labor,  or forfeiture,  or a combination thereof,  it contains no 
reference to lesser forms  of  punishent such as hard labor with- 
out ccrnf'inement,  restriction to limits,  or  detention of  pay whic? have  been  demonstrated to be  both  appropriate and  desirable 
punishment  for many  minor  off  ens es.  Consequently,  unless dis- 
honorable  or  bad  conduct discharge is adjudged,  the court in its 
discretion may  substitute at cert~in  prescribed rates lesser 
punishments  for those listed in the Table  of  Maximum  Punishments. 
The  prescribed  rates are contained  in a table,  commonly  referred 
to by  Army  and Air Force  personnel as the "Table  of  Substitutions," 
which  has  been  redesignated the "Table  of  Equivalent  Punishments." 
This  table is of a special importance in cases  of  minor  offenses 
in that by  substituting swh punishments  as additional forfei- 
tures,  or  hard labor without confinement,  or  restriction to  the 
limits,  the accused  will  be  adequately punished  for  the  minor 
offense and  at  the same  time  will be available for the full per- 
Tormame  of his regularly assigned duties. 
The  Table of  Equivalent Punislrments  has  been  changed  to 
include an entry concerning  confinement  on bread and water  or 
diminished  rations,  such  entry pertaining to Navy  and Coast 
Guard personnel  only. 
me,  court--but  not  the convening  or  a higher  authority-- 
my,  in appropriate cases,  make the authorized substitutions in 
the case of  enlisted personnel  only. 
Arny  and  Air  Force personnel will note that the  "restriction 
to limitsn entry has  been  changed  from  "3  days"  to "2  days."  In 
that respect,  under  Article of  War 14 a  summary  court could  not 
adjudge confinement  at hard  labor in excess of  one month  nor 
could it adjudge  restriction to limits in excess  of  3 months,  a 
ratio of  1 to 3.  Under  Articls 20,  a sumnary court-martial 
cannot  adjudge  confinement  at hard  labor in excess of  one  month 
,  nor  can it  adjudge  &striction in excess of  2 months,  a ratio 
of 1 to 2.  The  1 to  2  ratio also conforms  to the illustration 
in 16b,  "Jurisdiction of  Summary  Courts -Martial, tt  concerning 
the  aFportionment of  confinement and  restriction in one  and  the 
sane  sentence. 
The  ekample s  given in  the discuss  ion of  the Table  of 
Equivalent Punishments  were  selected at random and  are by no 
means  all inclusive of  the various  combinations  that may  be 
ad  judged. 
The  use of  substituted punishments  is subject to various 
limitations.  For  example,  in the case of  a noncommissioned or 
petty officer above the fourth enlisted pay  grade,  a sununary 
court-riir tial cannot  by  substitution or  otherwise adjudge  con- 
Tinemant  at hard  labor or hard labor without  confinement. 
Similarly,  no  court may,  by  substituted punishments,  exceed its jurisdictional  limitations in regard either to the amount  of 
OF  to the type  of  punishaent.  Thus,  if the authorized punish- 
ment  for an offense were  confinement  at  hard labor for one  month 
and  forfeiture of two-thirds  pay  for one  month,  a summary  court 
could  not  adjudge additional forfeitures in  lieu of  any part of 
the confinement  since it is  beyond  the jurisdic-tion of  a  summary 
court -to adjudge  a  forfeiture of  more  tl?an  tmro-thirds  of  one 
month's  pay.  Siailarly,  if the  authorized punishment  for an 
offense viera  confinement  at hard labor  for  two  months  and  for- 
feiture of  two-thirds  pay  per month  for two months,  no  court 
could  substitute restriction to the limits for all of  the 
codinement  (that is,  2  x  60,  or 120 days)  since in  no  case may 
restriction be  imposed  in excess  of  two months. 
As provided  in 16b, "Jurisdiction of  Summary  Courts-Wtial-- 
Punishments,"  since co2inernsnt and restriction to limits are 
both forms  of  deprivation of  liber*,  only one  of  thoso punish- 
ments may  be  adjudged  in the maxiim amount  in any  one  sentence. 
An  apportionansnt  must  be made  if it is desired to adjudge both 
coafimmnt and  restriction to limits in one  and  the same 
sentence.  For  example,  assuming the punishant to be  in con- 
formity with other limitations,  a starnary  court may  adjudge 
confinement  at hard  labor  for 15 days  (one-half  of  the authorized 
confinement),  restriction to limits for 30  days  (one-half  of  the 
authorized restriction),  and  forfeiture of  two-thirds  pay for one 
month.  It is to be  remembered  that  in such a  case the period of 
confinermnt  is served first, the less severe Porn of deprivation 
of  liberty,  that is restriction,  is served thereafter. 
Zqeriance has indicated Yhe  propriety of  continuing the 
ins-t;ruction that a  bad  conduct discharge  rnq  be adjudged upon 
conviction of  any of %ems  for which  dishonorabl  e  dis  charge is 
a=-thorized by  the tables $'  any area  controlled by,  the Commander-in-Chief,  Far East,  or 
any of  his successors in command. 
The  descriptions of  offenses contained  in  the table are 
condensed  for ccnvenience of arrangement  and  are intended solely 
to identify the portions of the manual  and  the offenses to  which 
they pertain without defining any such offense.  In the case of 
discrepancy between a heading or description in  the table and 
any other part of the manual,  such other part shall be  controlling. 
The  description of offenses in  the table does  not purport to 
define either the elements  of  proof  of or the form  of  pleading 
for the various offenses listed therein. 
It has been pointed out in  the discussion of 126h(2), 
itForfeiture,ll  that the term I1forfeiture of all  pay  an3 allow- 
ances,I1 as it appears in  the punj-tive discharge columns  of the  -  table, is construed to mean  the forfeiture of all  pay  and 
allowances becoming  due on  and  after the date the sentence is 
approved by the convening authority. 
At the request of  one  of the service representatives, it 
was  agreed that for reference purposes  all  of  the punitive 
articles except Articles 88 and  133 should be noted in  the 
table.  Article 88,  "Contempt  towards officials,  It  and  Article 
133,  "Conduct  unbeconiing  an officer and  a gentleman,"  apply 
solely to  officers,  and  as the table is not applicable,  as such, 
to  officers,  those two  articles. have been  excluded. 
In those instances where  the indicated article provides  a 
mandatory  or an alternatively prescribed punishment,  for example, 
death in  the case of  spying or death or life  imprisonment  in  the 
case of premeditated murder,  the article is listed with a  cross- 
reference to see that article. 
menever,  in  describing an authorized punishment,  the 
reference is to dishonorable or bad  conduct  discharge and  a 
period of confinement,  it is to be interpreted as including 
the total forfeiture provision contained in  the pertinent 
columns  of  the table. 
77  Article 77.--Principals.--Article  77  defines the term 
"principalH but contains no  provision concerning a punishment. 
?he  punishment  prescribed in  the table,  that is,  Itthe rnafimum 
punishment  authorized  for the commission  of  the offense,I1 is 
based  on 18 U.S.C.  2b.  - 78  Article 78.--Accessory  after the  fact.--The  lhit of 
punishrent prescribed  in Note  2  for this offense is  similar 
- 
to that prescribed in 18 U.S.C.  3.  In order to make  certain 
the  maximum period  of  confinement authorized in cases where 
life imprisonment  is authorized for the principal,  specific 
provision is made  that the maximum  period  of  confinement  shall 
not  exceed  10 years  in any  case, 
79  Article 79.--Conviction  of  lesser included  offense.--The 
first subparagraph of  127c provides  that the punishment  prescribed 
for each offense listed i'd  the table is prescribed  as the maximum 
punishment  for that offensa and for any lesser included offense 
if the latter is  not listed, 
8  0  Article 80.--,4ttempts.--Although  it was  contended that the 
punishment  for attempts  should  not  exceed that prescribed  in 
i8 U.S.C.  1113 for attempts to commit  murder  or-manslaughter, 
the service representatives finally determined to prohibit the 
death penalty and  to limit the period  of  confinement to a 
20 year maximum. 
8  1  Article 81.--Conspiracy.--It  was  determined that the con- 
certed action and  design required in  the  offense of  conspiracy 
fully justified the imposition of  the punishant authorized for 
the offense which  is the object of  the  conspiracy,  except that 
in  no  case shall the death penalty be  imposed.  See 18 U.S.C. 
371, 
8 2  Article 82,--Solicitation.--In  view  of  the differing pro- 
visions of  Article  82a and  82b, this offense is  listed in  the  - 
table in two  parts.  If the 07fenses are committed,  and  in the 
case of  desertion or mutiny,  if oomittsd or attempted,  the 
punishment  shall be  that provided  for  the commission of  the 
offense proper.  The  limit on soliciting desertion is  based 
upon  18 U.S.C.  1381.  18 U.S.C.  2387  pertains to an  offense 
comparable  to soliciting or advising mutiny  and provides  for a 
fine and confinement  for 10 years.  18 U.S.C.  2385 prescribes 
an offense  comparable  to soliciting or advising sedition and 
provides  for a  fine and  confinement  for 10 years.  Dishonorable 
discharge and  confinemsnt  for 10 years are prescribed for 
soliciting or advising an act of  misbehavior before the enemy, 
if the act is not  committed- 
83  Article 83.--Fraudulent  en1ishent.--The  first entry per- 
tains to activities in or association with subversive 
organizations,  The  five year period  of confinement  is corn- 
parable to the imprisoment  authorized by  section 15b,  Internal 
Security Act  of  1950  (P.L.  831,  81st Cong.).  The  pGishment for lti)ther cases of" is similar to that provided  in the 1949 
ivhual.  Fraudulent separation is s. new  offense prescribed by 
Article 83.  It was  considered to be more  serious than an 
ordinary case of  fraudulent  enlistment in that the accused  is 
attempting to evade  service.  Dishonorable  discharge and  con- 
finement  for five years are  prescribed. 
84  Article 84..-4nlawFul  enlishent, appointment,  or separation.-- 
This ~ 
enlistment."  On  the basis  of  the  dismissal authorized in  A'?!  55 
it was  determined that dishonorable  discharge and  the five year 
period of  confinement  authorized for the person who,  under 
Article 83,  fraudulently enlists or  fraudulently procures  his 
separation should be  prescribed as the punishment. 
8  5  Article 85.--Desertion.--The  punishment  prescribed  for 
desertion with  intent to  avoid hazardous  duty or to shirk important 
service is  the  same  as that prescribed  in thk  1949 Yanual.  It 
was  determined that the  various gradations  in the 1949 Manual con- 
cerning the time  element,  IAat  is,  desertion after not  more  or 
more  than six months  in the  service,  codld well be  eliminated in 
order to obviate the  errors that have  fhquently confronted  courts 
and  boards  of  review by  reason of  the time  computation now  re- 
quired.  The  three and two  year periods  of  confinement  in other 
cases of  desertion were  accepted as reasonable  punishments  in view 
of the  common  experience  of  the  services.  Army  and  Air Force 
personnel will note that the entries of the 1949 lihual concerning 
desertion in the execution of  conspiracy or  in  the presence  of  an 
unlawful assemblage  which  the troops may  be  opposing do  not appear 
in the new  table.  It is suggested  that the  first of  those deleted 
entries might  properly be  an  offense under  Article 81,  ltConspiracy," 
and  that the  latter appears to be  the equivalent of  desertion with 
intent to avoid hazardous  duty or  to  shirk important  service. 
Attempted  desertion is specifically prescribed in  Article 85  and, 
consequently,  is presented here rather  than in  Article 80, 
"Attempts." 
In this general respect,  the  commentary  to Article 85 
provides : 
1 
"A'S 59  (~dvising  or aiding another to desert) 
and  AW  60  (~ntertainin~  a deserter) have  been  deleted 
as they are now  covered by  Article 77  (principals) 
and  78  (~ocessory  after the fact), respectively." 
86  Article 86.--Absence  without  leave.--The  entries under  this 
offense have been presented  so  as to  show  the various provisions 
of  the new  article,  that is, without proper  authority failing to go  to or  going from his appointed place of duty,  or without 
proper authority absenting himself  from unit,  organization,  or 
other pla,ce of  duty.  The  punishments  prescribed for the various 
offenses conform  closely to  those prescribed for comparable 
oflenses  in  the 1949 ihnual. 
87  ' Article 87. --Missing  movement- --This  article is  based  on 
the proposed  AGN,  Article  9(57).  The  Navy  recommendation  as to 
punishment  for the two  entries under this article have  been 
adopted. 
8  9  Article 89.--Disrespect  towards  superior officer  .--The 
service representatives agreed to increase the six  months'  con- 
finement  and forfeitures provided  in  the 1949 Manual  to include 
bad  conduct discharge. 
9  0  Article 90.--Assaulting  or willfully disobeying ,officer .-- 
The punishments  provided under this article are common  both  to 
the 1949 Kanual  and  MC &  B. 
91  Article 91.--Insubordinate  conduct towards warrant officer 
or noncommissioned  officer.--In  view of  the new  dignity and 
importance of  the  office of  warrant officer,  dishonorable dis- 
charge and  confinement  for five years have been prescribed for 
striking or assaulting a warrant officer in  the execution of his 
office,  and  the punishment  for vsillful disobedience  of the  lawful 
order of  a warrant officer has been increased to  dishonorable 
discharge and  confinement  for two  years.  The  service repressnta- 
tives agreed that contemptuous  deportment or disrespectful 
language toward a warrant officer or a noncommissioned  or petty 
officer in the execution of  his office should be  increased to 
bad  conduct discharge and  confinenent  for six and three months, 
respectivelyo 
92  Article 92.--Failure  to  obey order or regulation.--This 
article is derived from Navy  practice,  The  Navy table provides 
for dishonorable discharge and codinement for  two  years which 
wereaccepted as the authorized punishent.  Bad  conduct discharge  . 
and  confinement for six  months,  which are  prescribed in  Article 91 
for willful disobedience of  the lawful order of a  noncommissioned 
or petty off  ker,  were also adopted as the maximum  punishment  for 
knowingly  failing to obey "any  other lawful order" under  Article 
92.  The  footnote, which  applies to the first  two  entries under 
Article 92,  is  designed to eliminate the confusion which could 
result front a contention that a  violation of  other specifically 
listed offenses,  for example,  disobedience  of a  superior officer 
under Article 90,  or willful disobedience  of  the lawful order of  ' 
a warrant officer or noncommissioned  or petty officer under 
Article 91,  or wrongfully appearing  in civilian clothing under 
Article 134,  should be punished  as a  violation of  Article 92. Article 93.--Cruelty  and eltreatment.--This  offense  is 
listed in the EBavy  table and  the Navy  recommendation  of  dis- 
honorable  discharge and  confinement  for one  year was  adopted* 
Article 94.--Yutiny  or sedition.--No  maximum  punishment  has 
been  prescribed, 
Article 95.--Arrest  and  confinement.--The  punishments  for 
the  three offenses  listed under  ~rticle-95  are the result of 
adjustments  of the punishments  currently prescribed in the 
respective tables. 
Article 96. --Relea  sing prisoner without authority.  --The 
maxirm punishment  prescribed for the offenses listed under 
bticle 96  are also the result of  adjustments  of  the punishents 
listed in current  tables. 
Article  97 ,--Unlawful  detention of another .--Dishonorable 
di.scharge  end confinement  for three years wereaccepted as 
appropriatee 
&--ti cls 98,--Noncompliance  with procedural ruleso--In  view 
of th;  hportaneo with which  Congres~,  in enaetimg this specific 
wtic  le, must  have  regarded  i..ts purpose  and  intent,  bad  conduct 
discharge and  confinement  for  six months were  prescribede 
c af~guard~  --Xc  maxiamxu  puurisl~rneat  has  been prescribed,  -.- 107  Article 107.--False  official statements.--me  commentary 
to this article provides that Article 107 is based upon  AT 56 
and  57,  for both of  which  dismissal is prescribed,  On  the basis 
thereof,  dishonorable discharge and  conf'inement  for one  year  has 
been prescribed.  With  reference to making any other false 
official statement,  the  bad  conduct discharge and  confinement 
for six'months  provided  in  the 1949 kual  have  been  increased to 
dishonorable discharge and  confinement for one  year  in  the  case  of 
noncommis sioned or petty officers, while the punishment  for any 
other enlisted person is the  same  as that now  prescribed in  the 
1949 Manual. 
108  Article 108.--1vIilitary  property of  the United States-  Loss, 
damage,.  destruction,  or wrongful dispositi  on.--The  offenses listed 
under  this article are comparable to the  offenses listed under 
ATf  83 and  84 in the 1949 Manual.  The  maximm  punishments herein 
prescribed  are based primarily upon  those prescribed in the 1949 
Manual  except that in each  instance where bad  conduct  discharge 
was  authorized,  dishonorable discharge will be  authorized in the 
new  manual.  In conformity with the discussion of the elements  of 
proof  of offenses under  Articles 108 and  109,  it is to be  noted 
that appropriate entries in  the table  include the phrase  "of  a 
value  or damagen inasmuch as,  pursuant  to the terminology of  the 
article, the measure  of  punishment  should be  related to the amount 
of  either damage or  value in  such  cases. 
109  Article 109.--Property  other than military property of  the 
United  Stat  es--Waste,  spoil,  or  des truc  tion.--The  maximum  punish- 
ment  autihorized  for violations of this article are the same  as 
those'prescribed for willfully damaging or destroying military 
property of the United  States under Article 108. 
110  Article 110.--Improper  hazarding of  vessel.--No  maximum 
punishment  is prescribed in the  table for willfully and  wrongfully 
hazarding  or suffering to be  hazarded  a vessel.  However,  negli- 
gently hazarding or  negligently suffering to be  hazarded a vessel 
is listed in the Navy  table and  the punishment  therein prescribed 
was  adopted. 
Article 111.--Drunken  or reckless  drivinq.--It  was  recommended 
that a greater variance in  punisb-me&  than that contained in  the 
1949 Manual  should be  prescribed  for the  offense of drunk  or  reck- 
less driving resulting in personal  injury as contrasted with such 
acts not resulting in personal  injury.  The  maximum authorized 
punishment  has been  set as dishonorable discharge and  confinement 
for one  year and  as bad  conduct discharge and  confinement  for 
six months,  respectively,  for  the two offenses. Article 112.--Drunk  on duty.--The  Navy table uses a single 
entry for this. offense.  The  punishment  approximates that pre- 
scribed in current  tables. 
Article 113.--?4isbshavior  of sentinel.--This  offense is 
entered as a single entry,  the more  severe punishment  of  the 1949 
Manual  being adopted. 
Article 114.--Dus  ling. --This  offense,  which  is not  entered 
in the  1949 Idaraual  table,  is  gunishable under  the Navy  table by 
dishonorable  discharge and  confinement  for one  year which  have 
been prescribed herein. 
Article 115.--%lingering  e--Tl--e  First entry,  feigning illness, 
physical disablement,  mental  lapse,  or derangement,  is punishable 
by  dishonorable  discharge and  confinement  for one  year,  the 
present Navy  maximum.  The  dishonorable discharge and  confinement 
for seven years authorized for intentional self-inflicted injury 
arecurrently prescribed  for all services. 
Art5cle ll6  .--9iot  or  breach  of' peace .--The  dishonorable  dis- 
charge  and conf'ineinmt .for ten years authorized for riot  are  based 
upon  Army  cases.  The  Air  Force  representative recommended  con- 
finement and  forfeitures for six months  for breach of  the  peace 
in  view  of  the violent aspect of this offense as described  in the 
punitive article material. 
Article 117.--Provoking  speeches  or gestures.--This  offense 
is based upon Lfl.90 for which  the 1949 Idanual prescribes  conf'ine- 
rnent  and forfeitures for three months. 
Article 118. --Xurder  .--No  maxhum is  proscribed. 
Article 11 9. --Lhanslaughter.  --The  Navy  recommended  adoption of 
the same  punishment  as that now  prescribed  in the 1949 Wual. 
Article 120.--Rape  and  carnal knowledge.--No  limitation is 
prescribed  for rap&  Carnal knowledge  is  spacifically included 
in this article.  The  punishment  prescribed-in the 1949 Manual  has 
been  adopted. 
Article 121.--Larceny  and  wrongful  appropriation.--The  punish- 
ment  prescribed in the  1949 Manual  has been adopted  for the  larceny 
entries.  'ivrongful  appropriation is specifically covered  in this 
article and  is set out in  the table in  the manner  used  in the 1949 
Xanual,  the punishments  therein prescribed having been  adopted. 122-  kticlss 122-1.25.--2obbery;  Forgery;  Mahing;  and -  Sodomy_.--  ' 
125  The  Navy  recormended  the  same  punishents as Zhose now  prescribed 
in the  1949 Xanual . 
126  Article 126.--Arson.--The  punisk9ent  for aggravated arson is 
based  upon  18 U.S.C.  81.  3ith reference to simple arson,  the 
recommended  punishments  are  derived from Title 22,  District of 
Columbia  Code,  sectton 403. 
127  Article 127.--Extortion.--18  U.S.C.  872  provides  for a fine 
of  $5000  and  imprisonment  for not more  than three years. 
128  Article 128 .--Assault.--The  entriss "Assault, " "Assault 
(consummated by  a battery),"  and  the first ontry under  "~ssault, 
aggravated,"  that is,  ''Kith a dangerous  weapon  or other means 
or force. likely to produce  death or grievous bodily harm,"  are 
siinilar to the entries under  LIT  96  in the 1349 Manual.  The punish- 
nents for the offenses are the  sane  as those pr2scribed  in the 1949 
Manual.  The  second  entry under  aggr-ated  assault,  that is, 
"Intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm,  with or without a 
weapon,  is comparable  to the offense now  denounced  under  k.V  93 
and  for which dishonorable discharge and  confinement  for five years 
are  authorized. 
129  Article 129.--Burglary.--The  dishonorable discharge and  con- 
finement  for ten years  conforms to current tables. 
130  Article 130.--Housebreaking.--The  service representatives 
agreed to adopt dishonorable discharge and  confinement for five 
years as the maximum  punishment. 
131  Article 131  .--Perjury.--The  currently prescribed punishment 
of  dishonorable  discharge and  confinemnt for five years has been 
adopted. 
132  Article 132.--Frauds  against the Government.--The  punishments 
herein prescribed are the same  as chose prescribed under &ti  94 
in the 1949 Manual.  o 
134  Article 134.--General  article.--Entries  under  this article 
consist primarily of  entries currently appearing under  Air- 96  in 
the 1949  Manual.  For tihe  pilrpOsB  of  this-conference,  the  dis- 
cussion of  entries under  Article 134 will consist of  an indication 
of  newly  added,  deleted,  or amended  entries.  In many  instances 
the entries have  been  rephrased so  as to preface each with a key 
word  in order  that  they may  be  easily located in alphabetical 
s  squence . Aiding  a prisoner  to escape has been  deleted and is noasr 
covered by  Article 77  read  in conjunction with Article 95. 
The  entry in the 1949 Manual,  "Allowing  a prisoner to 
receive or obtain intoxicating liquor, "has been  deTe tad,  but a 
more  comprehensive  entry has  been  substituted,  "Prisoner,  a1  low- 
ing to  do  an unauthorized  act." 
Simple  assault has been  deleted as that offense is now 
denounced  by  Article 128.  However  under  "Assault, " entries por- 
taining to assault with intent to comnlit  voluntary manslaughter, 
robbery,  sodomy,  arson,  burglary,  housebreaking,  murder,  or  rap 
have been  included as it was  determined that such offenses were 
covessd by  Article 134 rather than by  Article 128,  Entries have 
been added  concerning an  assault upon  a'warrant officer,  non- 
comissioned  or  petty officer,  not  in the execution of  his office, 
or 'assault upon  any person  performing  prescribed police duties, 
such person being in the execution of his office.  In this respect 
it is  to be noted  that the  current "knowing  him  to be  such"  pro- 
vision under  the &{  96  entry has  been  deleted. 
Assault and  battery is covered by Article 128 except assault 
and  battery upon  a child under  16 years of  age. 
Attempting  to escape  from  confinement  has  been  deleted. 
Attempts  are now  punishable under  Article 80. 
The  entry concerning bribes  or graft is new. 
Making and  uttering a  bad  check  has been included,  excepting 
from  its provision,  however,  a bad  check  used  as a means  of  obtain- 
ing property under  false pretenses which  is a violation of  Article 
121.  The  worthless  check  entry under  Article 134 covers  both 
deceitfully giving a check  in papent of  a pre-existing  debt,  and 
giving a  check  and  failing to maintain sufficient funds  to meet 
payman t. 
Obtaining money  or property by  check without sufficient funds 
hag been  deleted as that offense is now  covered by  Article 121. 
Conspiracy  is now  covered  in ~rtic\le  81. 
Uttering  di  sloyal statements undermining  discipline and 
loyalty is a new  entry. 
Willfully destroying private property  is  punishable under 
Article 109. Under  the entry "Drunkn appears the new  offense of 
"Incapacitating self to perform  duties through prior indulgence 
in  intoxicating liqu~r.'~ 
The  "Drunk  and  disorderlyn entry contains a new  offense 
applicable to such conduct  "Aboard  ship." 
Failing to obey  a lawful arder is covered by Article 92. 
False imprisonment  is prohibited by  Artiol  e 97. 
False official report or  statement  appears under Article 107. 
Gambling  in quarters in vi  01  at  ion of  orders  and introduction 
of  liquor into command,  quarters,  station,  or  camp,  in  violation 
of  orders are covered by  Article 92. 
The  entry pertaining to marihuana  or a habit forming drug 
has  been  changed  to provide  for both wrongful  possession or use. 
Communic ating indecent,  insulting,  or  obscene  language to a 
female  is new  as is indecent or lewd  acts with another. 
Depositing oSscene  or  indecent matter in the mails is newly 
prescribed. 
Misprision of a felony is  added. 
Obtaining money  or other property under  false pretenses is 
covered  in Article 121. 
Statutory perjury is included in the discussion of  Article 134 
in the Punitive Articles and is inserted in  the table. 
Operating a vehicle while  drunk  or  in a reckless manner 
appears under Article 111. 
Self-maiming  has been  deleted as the  offense of  self-inflioted 
injury is covered in Article 115. 
Disobedience of  a  lawful  <order of  a  sentinel is denounced by 
Article 92,  as is the offense of  failing to obey the  lawful order 
of  a sentinel. 
Communicating  a threat is new, 
Uttering a  forged instrument has been  deleted as that offense 
is denounced by Article 123  (2). 
Violation of  standing orders is covered  by Article 92. Krongf'ul  carnal knowledge  of  a  female  below 
16 is included in  Article  120. 
'firongful  taking or taking and using appears 
121. 
the age of 
under Article 
Set*  BS  Section B  consists of permissible additional punishments  not 
127c  -  provided elsewhere in  the Punishments  chapter. 
If  an  aocused is found guilty of  one or more  offenses for none 
of  which dishonorable or bad  conduct discharge is authorized,  proof 
of  two or more  previous  convictions will authorize bad  conduct  - 
discharge and forfeiture of  all pay and  allowances,  and if the con- 
finement authorized for  such offense or offenses is less than 
three months,  confinement at  hard labor for three months  is also 
authorized.  The  sentence that,  "In such a  case no  forfeiture shall 
be  imposed  for any pariod in excess of  the period of  confinement  so 
adjudged,  is designed to  eliminate that type of  sentence which 
appeared in a recently processed case wherein a  special court,  on 
the basis of  five previous convictions,  adjudged a  bad  conduct 
discharge,  confinement at  hard labor for four months,  and two-thirds 
forfeiture for six months. 
If  an accused is found guilty of  two  or more  offenses for none 
of which dishonorabla or bad  conduct discharge is authorized,  the 
fact that +he  authorized confinement,  without the operation of  the 
substitutions permitted by the Tab1  e of  Equivalent Punishments, 
for the -t;wo  or more  offenses is six  months  or more will authorize 
bad  conduct discharge and forfeiture of  all pay and allowances in 
addition to  the period of confinement so authorized.  For example, 
if  an accused were  convicted of  discharging a firearm through 
carelessness,  for which  confine~nent  at  hard labor for three months 
and  forfeiture of  two-thirds  pay per month  for three months  is 
authorized,  and were  also convicted of  allowing a  prisoner to do 
an unauthorized act,  for which  the same  maximum  punishment  is 
prescribed,  a  general court in  an  otherwise appropriate case would 
be  authorized to sentence the accused to bad  conduct discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and  allowances,  and  confinement at  hard 
labor for six months.  Of course,  the jurisdictional limitations 
of  special and  summary  courts would  not permit those courts to 
adjudge the sentence given in the example. 
A  fine may  be  adjudged in lieu of  forfeitures provided a 
punitive discharge is also ad  judged. 
The  new manual  incorporates the Navy  provision concerning 
reduction to  an inferior grade as  an additional punishment,  except- 
ing of  course those cases of noncommissioned  or petty officers 
above  the  fourth enlisted pay grade when  sentenced by a  summary 
court. 
Reprimand  or admonition may be  adjudged  as an  additional 
punishment  in  any case. Co~ducted  by 
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128  Authority-General .--The  authority to impose  disciplinary 
punishment  under Article 15 is hedged with provisions for 
depar-lmental  regulations.  The  reasons therefor are stated 
in  the conmentaAy  as follows: 
"This  recognizes  that the authority to 
administer all  the punishments  specified may be 
necessary in one  armed  force and needlessly broad 
in  another.  This problem can be  illustrated by 
reference to  one  punishment,  nmely restriction to 
specified limits,  This punishment  would  be an 
effective sanction at  a  camp  or post,  but would 
carry little  weight on a  ship at see. 
"Subdivision  (b  )  also empowers  the Secretary 
of  the Department  to pernit macabers  of  the armed 
foroe to elect trial by  oourt-martial  in place of 
proceedings under the article.  This  reoognizes a 
difference in present practice among the armed 
forces.  The  Navy  allows no  election on  the theory 
that the oommanding  officer's  punishment  relates 
entirely to  discipline, not crime;  furthermore,  in 
the Navy  the officer who  has  summary court-martial 
jurisdiction is the same  officer &o  imposes  punish- 
ment  under the article.  In  the Army,  on the other 
hand,  a  compemy  cormnander  with paver  under the 
article ordinarily will not have  summary  oourt- 
martial jurisdiction." 
An  attempt has  been made  in the preparation of the text 
to reconcile differences in policy and proceiiure  in order that 
separate departmental regulations may be kept to a min- 
The major  difference deals with the right to elect trial. by 
court-martial  in lieu of non-judicial  punishment  and  the 
separate procedural regulations necessary are contained in 
paragraph 133. 
This first paragraph has been  subdivided into subpara- 
graphs for the sake of  darity,  Matters dealing with Polioy F 
and  Effect of Errors which were  included  in  paragraph  lle, 
MCU,  1949, are treated as separate paragraphs.  a 
12Ba  -  Who  may  impose  non-judicial  1~u11ishnent.--Tho  first sub- 
paragraph  is a  restatement  of  ?revisions  of' :?rticle 15a which 
confer power  on cormqanding  officers to impose  disciplizary 
punishments.  Illustrations as to whal;  types  of  comnands  are 
contemplated as included  in paragraph 118,  MQ4,  1949,  have  been 
deleted from  the statute and  also from  the text (see AIX  104). 
Pzticle 15b provides that the Secretary of  a Department  nuq 
place limiyations on  the categories of  coding  officers 
who  are authorized to exercise these powers.  In the absence 
of  such linitations my commanding  officer may  exercise the  - 
power with respect to  any person under his comiand. 
It is not contemplated that' paver under Article 15 
extends to power  of  punishment  of  persons  of  mother armed 
force who  may  be temporarily attached to a given  command. 
For example,  air force personnel  attached to an  army  hospital 
will not  be under the comand of the army  officer in command 
of the hospital within the purview of Article 15.  On  the 
other hand,  army  personnel  of  a unit attached to another army 
comand for disciplinary purposes would  be  subject to impo- 
sition of  punishment  under Article 15 by  the officer command- 
ing the unit to which  attached. 
The  use of  "ommanding  officer" in  tl.9  statute will 
effect a  chmge in the pmr  of  a Uarine company  conmander. 
Ee  is regarded  as a  commandi~g  officer but did not,  under the 
provisions of  A.G.N.  25,  possess the power to  impose  dis- 
ciplinary punishment. 
Under the provisions  of Article 150 the Secretary of  a 
Deparbent,  rnw  by regulation provide fTr the exercise of 
powers  under Article 15 by  "officers in charge."  "Officers 
in charge" as  contemplated by  this section exist only in the 
Navy  and  the Coast Guard and as between those services the 
definition of the term differs.  Ln  the Navy  they  be  only 
cormnissioned  officers and in the Coast Guard they my  be 
warrant officers or pet-by officers in charge of  small coast 
guard  stations.  It is clear tht Congress  intended to  vest 
such petty officers with power  under  this Article  (see House 
H8ar-s  8  Tab  28  PP 953-954). 
Since the Amy and the Air Force do  not  have "officers 
in charge"  the text makes it clear that Article 150 pertains  - 
only to  the Navy an3  Coast  Guard. 
128b  -  Minor  offenses.--Since  Punishment  under Article 15 is a 
bar to trial by  court-martial  with respect to  minor  offenses 
205 only (Art.  15e), whereas it was  not such a bar in  the Navy 
heretofore, ir was  considered essential that some  discussion 
as to  what  is a minor  offense be  included in the text.  This 
subparagraph is derived largely from the second subparagraph 
of  paragraph 118,  IJCD!,  1949.  Felony type Articles are included 
as offenses which are not minor.  It  is also provided that any 
offense for which  confinement  for one  year or more  is authorized 
is not minor.  Instead ofthe  example  of  threatening or assault- 
ing a  sentinel used  in MW,  1949,  protracted absence without 
leave has been used as a non minor  military offense, 
Nonpunitivo  measures .--This  is Oerived from the third sub- 
paragraph  of paragraph 118,  16CX,  1949. 
Policies generally applicable  .--The  first subparagraph is 
derived from MCM,  1949,  and  is in accord with the long standing 
policy of  all  the armed  services, 
The  second subparagraph is new,  but  also is in accord with 
the long standing custom of all the armed  services particularly 
insofar as it encourages  a superior commander  to call infrac- 
tions of  discipline on  the part of  ealisted persons to the 
attention of the accused's  immediate  commanding  officer rather 
than take action himself.  The  converse of the policy,  relating 
to the Army  and Air Force practice of  notifying an officer 
exercising special court-martial  jurisdiction  (i.e.,  Regimental 
or Group  commander)  of  offenses committed by  officers,  is not 
as  pertinent to the Navy  as it is to the other services since 
the immediate  commanding  officer of  the ship also exercises 
special court-martial  jurisdiction,  Hmever,  the policy is 
as pertinent to  the Marines  es to the Arq  or the Air Force. 
The last sentence provides  that  if the commanding  officer to 
whom  a case is so forwarded deems  that a punishment  beyond 
his jurisdiction to  impose  (i.e.,  reduction of  noncommissioned 
officers or forfeiture of pay with respeot to officers) is 
indicated,  he  may  forward the matter to a competent  superior. 
Effect of  errors.--This  is derived from the last sub- 
paragraph. of  ~aragraph  118,  MCM,  1949,  . 
Punishments.--In  the paragraph are stated the punishments 
authorized to be imposed under Article 15.  These  punishmeni;~ 
enumerated may  be  imposed  upon  milita  personnel  of  any of  the 
services unless otherwise restric  7-F  .ed  y departmental regula- 
tions.  For Army  and Air  Force people it is  well to note here 
that a  selection of  punishent must  be made  as no  combination 
of  punishments  is allmed,except that admonition or reprimand 
may  be  imposed  in any case.  Withholding  of  privileges and R.  extra duties may  bo  imposed  for two weeks  instead of one 
and  forfeitures imposed  in officer cases are limited to  one- 
half  of  one  month's  pay  instead of the three months  authorized 
under Article of  War 104.  Relative to extra duties,  extra 
fatigue has not been used  in  the Army  as a punishment  for 
nonconrmissioned  officers because  of the consideration of  de- 
gradation of re&.  However,  the Navy  has exercised extra 
duty punishments  for petty officers upon the theory that  cer 
tain duties would  not affect or degrade the rank of the 
individual.  Theref  ore,  a limitation is included that the 
punishment  of extra duty not be  such as to degrade the rank 
of  a noncomnissioned  or petty officer.  For noncommissioned 
officers and petty officers there is a punishment  added whioh 
has been used in the Navy  but is new  to  the &my and Air 
Force--that  is, a reduction in  grade . The  limitation of the 
reduction to the next  inferior grade is that the grade from 
which demoted  is, under departmental regulations,  within the 
promotion authority of the commanding  officer imposing the 
punishment  or within the authority of a  commander  subordinate 
to  him.  Several questions arose when  this paragraph ms  being 
written as to promotion and  demotion authority.  For  e~mple, 
urder Axmy  regulations the commmding  officer of an  Infantry 
Regiment would  have  promotion authority of  certain non- 
commiss ioned  officer grades whereas  his division commander 
would  not.  This would  seem to indicate -that the division 
comander could not  therefore impose punishment  under Article 
15 of a  reduction in grade whereas  a regimental  comnander 
could.  A  study of the code and the Congressional  hearings 
indicates,  however,  that the intent of  the Congress was  that 
stated in the paragraph,  that any senior copmnder may  impose 
the seme  punishment  as a comder  subordinate to him.  In 
the Army  a further limitation is placed on one  grade reduc- 
tions of  noncommissioned officers--that  is, the rank  of the 
commder imposing it must  be  at least the rank of  major. 
As  we  have  discussed before,  however,  a reduction could be 
accomplished under the article by,  for jnstance,  a captain 
company  commander  referring a particular case to his lieu- 
tenant colonel battalion commander. 
As to  other enlisted personnel,  all the previous 
punishments  discussed--wi  th the exception of  forfeitures-- 
may be imposed  and  in  addition,  if a person is attached to 
or embarked  in a vessel he' may  be confined for a period of 
seven consecutive days  or for a period of three oonsecutive 
days  on bread and water or  diminished  rations.  Confinement 
on bread and water has been  used by  the Navy  for some  time. 
It  is new  to the Amy  and  Air Force and at the Congressional 
hearings it was  indicated that the Army  and Air  Force did not desire to employ  this kind of  punishment.  The  Navy,  on 
the other hand,  had  a point of  great merit in the fact that 
restriction,  to a man on  a vessel at  sea,  was  hardly a punish- 
ment  and  same  special type  of  confinement  or other punishment 
might be  necessary  in  some  cases for the sake of  discipline. 
The  law is now  so written that punishen-ts of  the nature described 
may  be  imposed upon  any militaiy person while  embarked  in a 
vessel.  Thus,  in a proper  case,  Amy  or Air Force  personnel 
could be  punished by  confinement  on  diminished rations while on 
a trans2ort or other ship.  Tk  nay note here that while Amy  and 
Air Force  courts-martial  cannot adjudge  such punisbent a cmand- 
ing  officer may,  in an appropriate  case,  under  Article 15. 
Right to denand  trial.--Article  15b of  the code  gives  the 
Secretary of  a  Department  the power  to Timit  the right of  an 
accused to refuse punishment under  the article and  demand  trial. 
Such regulations are set forth in paragraph  132,  In  the Army 
and Air Force no  punishment may  be  imposed upon  any menber  of 
the Army  or Air Force under  Article  15 if the accused has  demanded 
trial by  court-martial.  Punishment may  not be  imposed while the 
demand  is in effect, but acceptance of  punishment  is a waiver  of  , 
any  right to demand  trial.  As to the Xayy  and  Coast Guard no 
person may  so deniand  trial in lieu of  Article 15 punishment. 
Eecause  of  this difference in rights to demand  trial between  the 
services separate procedures  relative to imposition of  punishment 
have  also been  included in the nanual. 
3 
Procedure.--Procedures  set forth for the Army  and  Air Force 
are similar to those which  now  05tain including a notification to 
the indivddual  concerned  as to what  the charge  is, an  instruction 
as to his right to demand  trial, warning  in an appropriate case 
as to self-incrimination,  and  the right to subnit matters  in 
defense or mitigation.  This  matter may  be  in writing in any  case 
and  will be  in wri-king as to officers or warrant  officers. 
ah the Navy  and  Coast Guard  in the ordinary case,  the com- 
manding  officer will inquire at  mast  as to any minor  offenses 
allegedly committed.  The  Navy  commander  also will inform the 
accused of  his right against self-incrimination  and  after hearing, 
in which  the accused may  submit matters in defense  or mitigation, 
the commander  may  impose  punishment.  As  we  have  said before,  in 
the Navy  and  Coast Guard  there is no  right to demand  trial.  If 
the findings of  a board  or a  court of  inquiry indicate punishn~snt 
under  Article 15 to be  appropriate,  the commander  may punish the 
accused after calling him  to the mast  and  informing him  of  the  -  facts. 
Appeals.--Paragraph  134 deals with appeals and  is a restat'e- 
ment  of  Army  rules.  All persons  the subject of  punishment  under Article- 15 may  appeal  to the next Puperior authority if they 
think the punishment  is unjust.  The  next superior comander 
may  confirm or remit  or mitigate any punishment  &posed,  but 
during the appeal the accused will continue  to undergo  the 
punishment. 
135  Restoration.--Paragraph  135 contains new matter.  Article 
15d not only permits  an  officer v~ho  has  imposed  punishment- to 
rezit or suspend the unexecuted  portion thereof but also to set 
it aside completely and  restore all rights adversely affected by 
that portion of  the punishent  already executed.  This  provision 
will serve to afford a  reinedy  to an  accused  in that rare case 
where  punishment  T~.S  imcosed  upon  an  innocent person.  Some 
slight d.ifficulties might  arise in some  few cases.  It would  be 
a  simple matter,  for instance,  to restore a forfeiture or restore 
rmk to a  reduced nonconm~issioneci officer, but not quite so easy 
to restore diminished rations,  except perlmps  over  a  period of 
time. 
135:  Records  of  punishilent.--This  paragraph provides  that all 
punishments  will be  recorded.  In  the case of  officers or non-  - 
commissioned  officers this is a  simple matter inasmuch  as the 
entire case mill already have  been  reduced  to ~witicg. In 
the case of  enlisted persons,  however,  the great majority of 
cases will be  conducted  orally and  a  record op the case must 
be  accomplished.  Such records  have  long been used by  all the 
services--the  so-called  company  punishent book  of  the Amy 
and  the log of  the Navy.  The  Navy  log,  however,  vas a  chrono- 
logical record and  the Pmy company  punishment book  had  the 
advantage  of  being a  record. p.ertaining solely to non-judicial 
punishent. 
APP*  3  Appendix  3  sets forth the fornls  of records  of  punishment 
for all the services--paragraph  a for enlisted persons  and b  - 
for officers.  The  unit punishme&  book  in appendix 3a is 
practical]-y identical to the type of  record long kept-in  the 
Amy.  There  is one addition which it has been  found  through 
experience will  be  helpful--that  is a  column which  indicates, 
through the insertion of  his initials by  the  accused,  that his 
rights have  been  explained to him,  and he  understands them, 
Some  commds in the Army  have  been  plagued  with conplaints 
to Inspectors General  by various persomel that they have  been 
forced to undergo  punishment  supposedly administered under  the 
104th Article of  i:ar of  which they had  no  prior knowledge. 
This  additional column  is designed to obviate that difficulty. 
Appendix  3b  contains forms  appropriate to the Army  and Air 
Force  in which-demand  for trial'rnay be made,  and  aseparate 
forn for  ,the Eavy which  contains no  provisions as  to tsiaL '2 
exluded for the reason that it is too far-fetched  or remote  to 
have  any appreciable value as proof  and  consequently might tend 
to mislead  or confuse the triers of  fact.  Although  relevant in a 
logical sense,  such evidence  is often characterized by  the courts 
as being "irrelevant, " meaning  irrelevant in  a legal sense.  The 
legal sense of the word  is the mennir-g which  is to be  given  to 
the word relevant wherever  it appears  in this chapter. 
The  last subparagraph of  paragraph 137 provides that the 
court may  in the exercise of  a  sound discretion refuse to receive 
evidence which  is  merely  cumulative.  The  adverb  "merely"  is 
intended to  be  a  rigorous  limitation upon  the power  of the court 
in  this respect,  and  thak power  should be  exercised only when  it 
appears that the cu~ulative  e~idence  excluded. would  clearly have 
no  effect on  the outcome of  the case,  and when  to receive it would 
be  nothing but a waste  of  the courtrs time. 
138a  -  Presumptions.--At  the outset it has  been  indicated that ordi- 
narily presumptions are nothing but logical inf'erances  of  fact 
which may  be  drawn from  a showing of  other facts.  It has  also been 
indicated that once  the facts &om  which  an  inference may  be  drawn 
have  been  shown,  the inference does  not autamatically disappear 
merely because  evidence tending to contradict the inferred fact 
or the  facts upon which  the inference  is based has been  introduced. 
However,  if the contradicting evidence is such that reasonable 
men  could not disbelieve it, then the inference so  contradicted 
may  not properly be  drawn;  and  if it is drawn  in the fact of  con- 
tradicting evidence of  this kind,  any finding based .on  the infer- 
ence will be  upset on appellate review.  This  latter rule is that 
laid down  in CM 335898,  Charles,  2 BRJC 311,  313,  8 Bull.  JAG  127. 
Some  examples  of  those presumptions which  are nothing more 
than justifiable inferences have  been set forth.  All  but two  of 
them come  from paragraph  125a of  the hnual for Courts-Wtial,  1949. 
The  two  added  presumptions a?b  the presumption applying to the res- 
idence of  a deponent  and the presumption  in  bad  check  cases.  The 
presumption as to the residence of  a deponent  rmaining unchanged 
has been taken from ACU  2080,  Thompson,  and  the presumption as to 
intent in bad  check  cases is one which has  often been applied in 
military cases  (CM  330282,  Dodge,  78  BR  345,  354;  CM  307125, 
Keller,  60 BR  335,  345,  5  Bull.  JAG 213). 
The  last subparagraph of  paragraph 138a points out that there 
are so-  matters which  courts are bound  to  presume  in the absence 
of  proof  to the contrary,  that is, that there are some  presumptions 
which are more  than mere  justifiable inferences.  An  example  of 
such a presmption would  be  the presumption of  innocence. 138b  -  Direct and  circumstantial evidence.--In  this paragraph the 
definitions of  direct evidence and  circumstantial evidence  are 
set forth.  It has also been  indicated that there is no  general 
rule for contrasting the weight of  circumstantial  and direct ev-i- 
dence,  even though a unique  rule doe8  apply in weighing  the cir- 
cumstantial evidence itself.  See the last subparagraph of 
# 
paragraph  74a(3)  -  . 
138c  -  Real  evidence.--The  main purpose  of  this paragraph is to 
indicate that when  real  -  evidence is introduced  in a  case  a descrip- 
tion thereof  should be  preserved  for the record so  that appellate 
authorities can  consider it intelligently. 
138d  -  Testimonial  knowledge.--It  will  be  noted that under  the tes- 
timonial kncmledge rule it has  been  stated that a witness may 
testif'y as to his own  age,  including the date of  his birth.  "Suoh 
evidence is generally held admissible not becauee it is an  excep- 
tion to the hearsay rule,  or bemuse it is an exception to the 
opinion rule,  but rather beoause throughout  his entire life the 
witness has had  such an intimate acquaintance with the matter of 
his age  that it may  be  said that he  speaks thereof  as of  his own 
knowledge  (Wigmore,  8  667). 
I 
1388  -  Opinion testimony.--The  first subparagraph  states the general 
rule relating to the expression of  opinion by a witness,  but points 
out that if an impression gathered by  a witness is of  a kind corn- 
=only encountered  and is such that it cannot adequately be  conveyed 
to the court by the mere  recitation of  the facts which were  respon- 
sible for his forming the impression,  such impression may  be  stated 
by  the witness even  though it amounts to an opinion.  This  exception, 
if it may  be  called an exception,  indicates quite clearly that the 
so-called  opinion rule is nothing but a  rule of  thumb  which is  to  ' 
be applied with comon  sense in each particular case rather than 
with any degree of  technioal precision based  on  an attempted logi- 
cal distinction between what is fact and what  is opinion.  The 
exaiiples  of  admissible impressions  of  the kind mentioned  above  have 
been  taken from paragraph 125d of  the 1949 Manual.  See also Wigmore, 
8  1918.  It is also indicatedoin  this subparagraph that witnesses 
are not  expected  to be  able to testify  with positive or absolute 
certainty with respect to matters concerning which  they are quali-  - 
fied to testify.  This rule is expressed in paragraph  68  of  chapter 
VI of  the  British Manual  of  Military Law in language somewhat  sim- 
ilar to that used  in the text of  the Manual.  It is also recognized 
in  Wigmore,  Ijt  658. 
  he  matter relating to expert witnesses set forth in the second 
and  third subparagraphs has been taken largely from the similar 
material  found  in  paragraph  1L5b  of  the 1949 Manual.  However,  them 
has been  added  a statement that-ee  law officer (or the president 'r , 
of a special court-martial)  should instruct the court as to the proper 
emphasis  to  be  placed  on  expert testimony when  such testimony 
appears to be  itself evidence  as to some  issue in  the case but is 
actually inadmissible as evidence on that issue and  might  improp- 
erly influence the court if it were  cansidered as such evidence, 
as when  a psychiatrist in  his testimony on the question of  mental 
responsibility delves into the background  of the accused  and  inci- 
dentally discloses matters which would be  inadmissible and  prejudi- 
cial for any  purpose  other than to test the accuracy of  the expert's 
opinion.  The  rule as to eliciting an expertfs opinion without  first 
asking him a hypothetical question is that set forth in Rule  609 
of the American Law  Institute's Xodel  Code  of  Evidence. 
138f  (11  -  Character evidence*--Pros% of  characterd--It  d31  be noted  C4h%' 
under  the rule set forth in this paragraph,  character may  be proved 
by  the opinion of  a person who  has personal knowledge  of  the chrac- 
ter of  the individual in question as well as by  evidence of  reputa- 
tion.  In short,  the old rule  (see par.  139b,  MCM  1949,  and  8  302, 
WC &  B)  that character is reputation,  and  oay  reputation,  hers  been 
abandoned.  Character rxates to what  a  person is, not merely what 
he  ie reputed to be.  Of course,  reputation may still be  shown  for 
the purpose  of  raising an  inference as to the actual existence of 
the  character involved,  The  rule here announced  is not a new rule, 
but was  the early common  law rule.  In the United  States,  because 
of  some  misunderstood passages  found in early textbooks,  character 
sme to be  understood  (by,  as Wigmore  puts it,  "same  obscure pro- 
ceesn) as meaning  exclusively "reputation"  and  not a person's  ackual 
qualities.  On this subject Wigmore  states (S  1986): 
"The  Anglo-American  rules of  evidence  have occasionally 
taken some  curious twistings in  the course of  their develop- 
ings;  but they have  never  done  anything so  curious in the way 
of  shutting out judicial light as  when  they decided to exclude 
the person who  knows  as much  as can humanly be  known  about 
the character of  another,  and have  steadily admitted the second 
hand,  irresponsible product of  multiplied guesses and  gossip 
which  we term 'reputation.'" 
The  rermarke  concerning the necessary qualifications of reputa- 
tion witnesses have  been  taken from Commonwealth v.  Baxter,  nsa. 
.  -  - 
591,  166 NE  742. 
138f( 2)  Character of  the accusede--The  material here set forth has been 
taken from paragraph 125b of the 1949 Manual.  - 
138f  -  (3)  Character of  persons  other than the accused.--It  was  thought 
desirable to insert a discussion of  thie matter in the Kaurual  because 
cases  in  which this point is raised are by no means  of infrequent  $ 
occurrence.  The  text has  been derived from Wigmore,  sections 63 and  246.  It  will be  noticed that if the issue of  provocation, 
&elf-defense, or defense of  another is raised,  the prosecution 
may  introduce evidence' of the victim1  s peaceable  character even 
if the defense has not first introduced evidence  that the victim  , 
had  a violent character. 
Evidence  of  other offenses or acts of  misconduct of  the 
accused,--Usually  evidence that the accused has  committed  other 
offenses or acts of misconduct  is inadmissible,  for such evidence 
would  ordinarily run afoul of  the rule prohibiting the raising of 
an  inference of guilt by  showing that the accused  is a bad  or 
vicious person and  might well have  committed the act charged.  How- 
ever,  if evidence of  other acts of  the accused has  some  relevant 
value other  than to  sham  the disposition of  the accused,  then suoh 
evidence  is generally admissible.  The  examples given in this para- 
graph have  been  largely taken from paragraph  125b,  MCU 1949.  The 
example  involving evidence of  the stolen pistol Teft at the scene 
of  the burglary in (1) is new  and may  be  found  in Eagles v.  U.  S., 
25  F.  (2d)  546.  The  third example  in (l),  relating to iden- 
tification of  the accused as the offender by  evidence of prior use 
of  the same  fraudulent soheme  used in  the case  in question;  the 
example  under  (2), relating to proof  of  plan or design;  and  the first 
and third examples under  (3), relating to proof  of  howledge in a 
receiving case and  to  proof  of  intent in a larceny case,  respeo- 
tively,  are all new,  but are of  familiar application.  The  example 
under  (5) which deals with proof  of  prior poisoning to show  absence 
of  accident or mistake  in the poisoning  case in question has been 
taken from  a long  line of  Ehglish cases all of which  are cited and 
discussed in People v.  Molineux,  168 I?.  Y.  264,  61 NE  286,  297. 
As was  pointed out in  the Molineux case,  in  cases of  this kind a 
claim of  accident or mistake  must  be  raised,  at  least by  implica- 
tion,  before evidence of other acts to show  absence  of  accident 
or mistake  can be  received. 
Hearsay rule.--The  definition of  the hearsay rule is appsoxi- 
mately that set forth in paragraph 126a of  the 1949 Manual  except 
that the definition of the rule set fo&h in  this Edanual points 
out more  clearly the fact that a statement is  hearsay if it is not 
made  by the author before  the court at  the  trial in 
which it is offered to prove  its truth.  It has also been  indi- 
cated that statements to which the hearsay rule may  apply may 
consist of  acts as mPP  as words,  and an exmple of  a hearsay 
statemnt cansisting of  acts may be  discovered  in the third sub- 
paragraph  of  paragraph 139b.  It will be noted that the Army  and 
Air Force  rule that hearsay does not become  competent  evidence 
because  received without objection has been  retained.  Although 
no  such rule is expressed in NC  &  B,  aubetantially the same  result 
is achieved by Navy  case  law holdings to  the effect that hearsay 
evidence  will  not sustain a conviction even though no  objeotion ms 
made  to its introduction.  See MM-MIMS,  Solomon  ~ee/~  17-20,  I 
(1-16-50).  CMcK;  mas  169447. ,  - 
The  illutatrations of  the application of  the hearsay rule 
found in  paragraph 139b have,  for the most  part,  been  taken from 
paragraph  12Qb  of the -2949 Manual,  except that they have  been 
rephrased so that they will be more  accurately stated. 
Confessions  and admissions.--No  attempt has  been made  to 
draw any  strict line between what  may  be  considered  an admission 
as dis  t&uished  from a  confession in  any particular case.  If it 
is apparent that a person's  statement,  although self-incrimina- 
tory,  does not amount  to  an acknowl-edpent  of  guilt of  an offense -  in 
the light of  all the circumstances  in the case  such a  statement 
may  be  considered a mere  admission.  It  will be  noted that para- 
graph  140a also does  not  attempt to lay down  any hard and  fast 
rules for-determining  whether  a confession or admission was  volun- 
tary.  It will usually be  found necessary,  in each case,  to con- 
sult all the  facts and  oircumstances surrounding the making of  a 
statement by  the accused  to deter:nine  whether  or  not  the statement 
was  or was  not in faot the result of  alleged duress or coercion. 
Some  general guides in this respect are set forth,  hmever.  The 
instances of  coercion,  unlawful influence,  and  unlawful  inducement 
found  on  page  158 of  the 1349 1,lanual  have  been  retained,  and  two 
other instances  (obtaining the statenent without preliminary warn- 
ing in certain oases,  and obtaining the statsment in  violation of 
Article 31) have been added. 
As  to obtaining a confession or  admission by  interrogation or 
request without  giving a preliminary warning  of  the right against 
self-incrimination,  it should be  noticed that -Article 31b  does not 
expressly deal with the admissibility of  confessions or zdmissions 
so obtained by  persons  other than those "subject to this cede." 
It should also be  noticed that the kind of  interrogation or request 
subject to the prohibition of 31b  is obviously an  interrogation 
or request made  during -&e coursF of  an official investigation in 
which the accused is at least a suspect.  Article 31b  could not 
reasonably be  construed to require that a warning begiven in  the 
course of  an  investigation in  which  the accused was  considersd to 
be merely  awitness,  a. that a warning be  given  in the course  of 
a casual conversation betwoen two  barracks mates.  It remains  to 
be  considered why  Congress  limited the force of  this legislation 
to interrogation or request by  a  "person  subject to this code." 
Although  this question was  discussed  in the Congressional hearings 
upon  the Uniform  Code  of  Military Justice (see pages  983-993  of 
the House  ~earings),  there appears to  have  been no  general agree- 
mnt on the  subject.  It may  well be  that the words  "person  subject 
to this coden in Article 31b  were  used merely because  Congress did 
not desire in this military-code  to legislate with respect to 
policemen who  are not subject or could not be made  subject to the 
code,  espeoially having  in  mind  the provisions of Article 98  (non- compliance with procedural  rules). bince it would  appear to be 
both logically and  morally indefensible,  from the standpoint of 
malcirg  rules for determining the admissibility of  confessions  and 
admissions,  to require that the accused or  suspect be  advised of 
the right against self-incrimination when  he  is interrogated or 
requested to  eke  a statement by  persons who  are subject to the 
code,  but to dispense entirely,  and  in every case,  with such a 
requirement when  he  is interrogated or'requested to make  a state- 
ment  by  persons  (who  may  be  military investigators) who  are not 
subject to the code,  the text of  the Xanual  has been  so phrased 
that civilian military investigators not  subject to the code,  and 
other investigators not subject to the code who  are. acting in an 
official capacity, must  give a warning  in those cases of  inter- 
rogation or request  in  which the accuse  r  suspect is  not aware 
of  the right against self-incrimination.  It  will be  noticed that  3  in the case of  an interrogation or req est by  a  person who  ie 
subject to the code  the fact that the person interrogated,  or 
requested to  make  a  statement,  may  have  been well amre of  his 
right not to incriminate himself  (an accused lawyer,  or example) 
is immaterial,  and  if a statement is  obtained from such a person 
in violation of  Article 31b it is,  by  reason of  the express pro- 
visions of  Article 31d,  inadmissible.  - 
The  third subparagraph of  paragraph  140a indicates that all 
promises  and  threats are not  per se coercion,  unlawful  influence, 
or unlawful  inducement.  See  Lyons  v.  Oklahoma,  322  U.  So 596, 
603,  and  Bayer v.  United  States,  331 U.  S.  532,  both  of which 
cases deal with the admissibility of  confessions taken after prior 
inadaissible confessions were  obtained. 
It  will be  noticed that the fifth subparagraph sets forth the 
procedure for introducing evidence of  a confession or admission, 
In the ordinary case a confession must  affirmatively be  shorn to 
be  voluntary before it can be  received in  evidence,  whereas mere 
admissions  can usually be  received without such preliminary proof. 
The  rsason for the distinction is that admissions  are generally 
only minor  links in the  chain of  proof  of  guilt.  With  the excep- 
tion of  Chos  cases in  which a definite issue with respect to 
voluntariness is raised by  some  indication that the particular 
admission in question was  in fact involuntary,  it would be  imprac- 
ticable,  from  a procedural  aspect,  to require a preliminary showing 
of  the voluntary nature of  admissions. 
The  remainder  of the text concerning  coafessions  and  admis- 
sions contains various rules of  common  appli,cation in the Federal 
courts. 
The  rule as to failure to deny an accusation being considered 
incriminating evidence under  certain circumstances may  be  found 
in Sparf  and  Hansen v.  United  States,  156 U.  S.  51,  56,  and  the 
limitation upon  that rule in the case of  silence wheo  in  arrest or custody or under  investigation is expressed in United  States v. 
LoBiondo,  135 F.  (2d) 130.  It will be  noticed that in  the 
eleventh subparagraph of  paragraph of  140a the "best evidencetP 
rule which was  formerly applied in the  and  Air  Force  to 
oral confessions or admissions which had been reduced to  writing 
(see the next to  the last subparagraph of  127a, MCEd  1949) has 
been  abandoned,  for it was eeaentially as illzgioal application 
of  the  arol evidence >ule to criminal practice (see Wigmore, 
1  1332h  In the subparagraph dealing with corroboration of 
confessions and  admissions it has been  indicated that judicial 
confessionrs  and admissioas need  not be  corroborated,  nor need 
statemnta made  before or in pursuance of the act (~arszower  ve 
United  States,  312  U.  S.  342). 
It has been pointed out that a  confession or admission not 
made  at  the trial and  not made  by the accused is not admissible 
as a  confession or admission  (~onnel1y  v.  United  States,  228  U.  S. 
245,  272).  In the case  cited it was  held that an accused  oould 
not  show  in  his defense  that another person had made  an extra- 
judicial  confession as to the offense charged.  Obviously,  however, 
this rule does not forbid the reception in evidence of  hearsay 
statements which  are admissible without regard -to the fact that 
they are confessions or  admission^. 
The  last subparagraph of paragraph  14-  has been taken *om 
the opinion of  the Judicial Council of  the hy  in CM  339494, 
Clifford,  9  Bull.  JAG  16.  The  interpretation given in that case 
to Article  of  War  24,  as amended,  would  seem  to apply with equal 
force and  effect to Article 31b  of the Uniform  Code.  - 
140b  -  Acts  and  statements of  conspirators and  accomplices.--In  this 
paragraph the principles of  law applying to the admissibility of 
acts and  statements of conspirators and~accomplices  have been 
stated.  It  will  be  noticed that a statement made  by  an accomplice 
in pursuance of  -he common  venture  is admissible under  this rule 
even  -t;hough no  conspiracy is charged.  It should also be noticed 
that in a trial of two  or more  acoused,  if a statement of  one  of 
them which  is  admissible  against him  but not against the other or 
others is received,  the law officer  (or the president of  a special 
court+mrtial) should  instruot the court as to the limited use of 
the statenent.  It  has been held that failure to give such an 
instruction may,  under  certain circumstmces,  amount  to fatal 
error (CU 275792,  Blair,  48  BR  151;  CM 287995,  Nichols,  29 BR  (ETO) 
67).  The  prohibition against using against an accused a  conviction 
of an accomplice  is talcen  f'rom Kirby v.  United States,  174 U.  Se 
47.  In this respect it should  be  noted that paragraph 157 of the 
Manual  forbids use  of  the conviction of  the principal to establish 
against an alleged accessory  after the fact the essential fact that 
the offense has been committed by  the principal. 141  Statemente made  through  interpretere.--This  subjeot is of 
considerable  importance in trials  by  courts-martial,  especially 
those taking  in foreign lands,  for in such trials the &e 
of  interpreted testimony is a common,  rather than ah unusual, 
occurrence.  The  agency rule is that mentioned  by 9f5gmore  in 
section 1810(2) of  his mrk.  The  rules as to what makes  an inter- 
preter anather person's  agent have been  taken from Commonwealth 
v.  Vose,  157 Mass.  393,  32  ETE  355;  Gum Lee  v.  United  States, 
138  Fo  596;  and CIYI 325416,  Pierce,  77  BR 71,  86,  7 Bull.  JAG 130. 
The  principles applying to -the admissibility of  evidence  given 
through an interpreter at a former trial are stated in Wigmore, 
section 1810(1).  In this conmotion it should be noted that if 
the interpreter is available as a witness at  the instant trial 
but the opitness  at  the former  trial is not available,  then the 
testimony at the former trial is  proved by calling the interpreter 
as a witness,  although,  of  course,  he may  use the record of  the 
fomr  trial as an aid to his memory.  People  v.  Lesandowarki,  143 
Cal.  574,  77  Pac.  467,  is  authority for the proposition that a 
deposition taken through an  interpreter is  admissible when  the 
deposition is otherwise receivable under  statutory authority. 
142a  -  Dying declarations.--This  paragraph has been taken almost 
verbatim from  the second subparagraph under  Proof  in  Paragraph  - 
179a  (~urder),  MCM,  1949,  except that the apparent reference  in 
tha7 paragraph to the applicability of  the best evidence rule has 
been omitted,  for that rule should have no  application to an oral 
dying declaration which  has  been  reduced  to writing.  See  CM 
313689,  Davis,  63 BR  215,  226.  This  paragraph is also in substan- 
tial accordance  with section 188,  NC  &  B. 
142b  -  Spontaneous exclamations.--The  matter concerning spontaneous 
exclamations  is new,  and will supplant the material  concerning res 
gestae found  in  paragraph  128b,  XW,  1949,  and  section 189,  NC  &  B. 
In this paragraph it has  beenstated that the term res gestae is 
not  to be  used  as descriptive of  any rule of  evidence.  Modern  text 
writers and  modern  decisions of the  courts recognize that the term 
has been misleading,  in  that it encompasses a wide variety of 
rules which  concern  the admissibility of  extra-judicial  statements 
and  acts.  The  real difficulty en,countered by  considering  the term 
res gestae to be  descriptive of  a rule of  evidence lies in  the 
fact that the various and  sundry items  of  evidence encompassed 
in the tern res gestae often have separate and  distinct require- 
ments  and  limitations as to admissibility.  Says Kippore  (g 1767): 
"The  phrase  'res  gestaer has  long been not only entirely 
useless,  but even positively harmful.  It is  useless,  because 
every rule of  evidence  to which it has  ever been  applied exists 
as a part of  some  other well-established  principle  and  can be explained in  terns of that principle.  It is harmful,  because 
by  its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with 
another and  thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of 
both.  It ought therefore wholly to  be repudiated,  as a 
vicious elenent in  our legal phraseology.  No  rule of  evidence 
can  be created or applied by the mere muttering of  a  shibbo- 
leth.  There are words  enough to describe the rules of 
evidence.  Even if  there were no  accepted name  for one or 
another doctrine,  any name  would  be preferable to an empty 
phrase so encowaging to looseness of thinking and  uncertainty 
of  decision. " 
See also United States v.  Matot,  a6  ~(2d)  197. 
It w5i1 be noticed that an utterance,  to be admissible under 
the spontaneous  exclamation exception to the hearsay rule,  need 
not be contemporaneous  with the event which  brought it forth,  so 
long as the exciting influence of the event  has  not  been  dissipated. 
Also,  the person who  made  the utterance need  not have been a parti- 
cipant in  the act, it being sufficient if he was  a mere  spectator. 
Of  course,  the person who  heard the spontaneous exclamation being 
made  and  who  relates it to the court need  not even have been  a 
spectator to the event.  See Wigmore,  ￿˜B  1750,  1755,  and  United 
States v.  Edmonds,  63 F.  Supp.  968. 
It is not necessarg to the admissibility of a  spontaneous 
exclamation that the person who  made  it be dead  or otherwise un- 
available as a witness.  Also,  unlike dying declarations which may 
be contemplative utterances,  spontaneous exclamations may  be ad- 
missible even if made  by persons who  would  have been incompetent 
as witnesses  (Ttigmore,  B 1751).  However,  if  the utterance would 
have been inadmissible as testimony aside from the question as to 
the competency  as a witness of  the person who  made it, as when  the 
witness had  no  personal knowledge  of the matter stated or could 
not  have testified because of the privilege prohibiting the use 
of  one spouse as a witness against the other ('Xigmore,  %  1751(a) 
and  (c)(3)),  then the utterance is not admissible as a  spontaneous 
exclamation.  The  event which  gave  rise to the utterance need  not 
be the act charged  (Figmore,  B  1753). 
At  the time this manual was  being written it was  suggested 
that a purported exception to  the hearsay rule,  found  in  Rule 
5l2(a),  Model  Code  of  Evidence,  be adopted.  This rule indicates 
that an observer's  description of  an event while it is taking place 
in  his presence is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
even if  the event is not an  exciting one.  The  suggestion that 
this purported  exception be incorporated in  the Manual was  not 
adopted,  fos it would  appear not to have  the sanction of the oath 
substitute which  is present' in  one  form or another in  all  true 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Fresh com2laint.--The  paragraph  on  fresh comp'laint  has  been 
taken from  paragraph  128c,  I;CM,  1949.  It will be  noticed from a 
perusal of  the text that-evidence  of  fresh complaint which  is 
admissible as evidence  ofa  spontaneous  exclamation may  be  received 
as an exception to the hearsay rule.  In this connection,  see 
Beausoliel v.  United  States,  107 F.  (2d) 292,  and  Brown  v.  United 
States,  152 F.  (2d) 138. 
Statements of  motive,  intent,  or state of  mind  or body.--The 
rule as to statements of  motive,  intent,  or state of  mind  or bodv 
has  been  largely takeh  from 'ib'igmore,  8  1714-  Says Wigmore: 
U 
"Applied  specifically to the present Exception,  the 
judicial doctrine has  been  that there is  a fair necessity, 
for lack of  other better evidence,  for resorting to a 
person's  om contemporary  statements of  his nental or 
physical  condition.  It is indeed  possible to obtain by 
circuastantial evidence  (chiefly of  conduct) some  knowledge  - 
of  a human  being's  internal state of  pain,  &notion, motive, 
design,  and  the like;  but  in directness,  amount,  and  value, 
this source of  evidence must  usually be  decidedly inferior 
to the person's  own  contemporary  assertions.  It might be 
argued,  however,  that the person's  own  statements on  the 
stand would  amply  satisfy the need  for his testimonial evi- 
dence.  The  answer  is that statements of  this sort on  the 
stand,  where  there is ample  opportunity for deliberate 
misrepresentation and  small means  for checking it by  other 
evidence or testing it by  cross-examination,  are compara- 
tively inferior to statements made  at thes  when  circum- 
stances lessened the possible  induoement  to misrepresentation." 
The  rule of  exclusion prohibiting the reception of  evidence 
of  statements of  motive,  intent,-.or-  state of  mind  or body which 
amount  to an accusation that the accused committed  the act charged 
or that the act charged was  cormnitted  has  been  taken from Sheppard 
v.  United States, 290  U.  S.  96.  In  that case,  Sheppard had  Seen, 
tried and  convicted for murdering  his wife by  poisoning her.  There 
had  been  admitted in the trial certain statements made  by  the de- 
ceased to her nurse to the effect that her husband  had  poisoned 
her.  Although  these statements were  not received for the limited 
purpose  of  showing  the deceased's  will to live and  to negative 
thereby the contention of  the accused  that his wife had  committed 
suicide, it is quite obvious  from a  reading  of  the case that the 
Supreme  Court would not have  sanctioned the admissibility of  the 
statements even  if they had  been  offered for such limited purpose. 
After deciding that the statements were  not admissible as dyinx  -  "  - 
declarations,  the court said: "It will  not do to say that the jury might accept 
the declarations for any light that they cast upon  the 
existence of  a  vital urge,  and reject them  to the extent 
that they charged the death to soaeone else.  Discrimina- 
tion so subtle is a  feat beyond  the  compass  of  ordinary 
minds.  The  reverberating  clang of  those accusatory 
words would  drown all  weaker  sounds..  It is for ordinary 
minds,  and not for psychoanalysts,  that our  rules of 
evidence are framed.  They  have  their source very of ten 
in considerations of  administrz  tive convenience,  of  prac- 
tical expediency,  and not in rules of  logic.  When  the 
risk of  confusion is so great as to upset the balance 
of  advantage,  the  evidence goes out.lt 
The  admissibility of  evidence of  a  statement disclosing motive, 
intent,  or state of  mind  or body may  or may  not constitute an ex- 
ception to the hearsay rule,  depending upon  the nature of  the 
statement (Wigmore,  8  1750). 
It has been  pointed out that the rule providing  for the ad- 
missibility of  evidence  of  a  statement as to motive 
intent,  or state of  mind  or body  does not authorize proof  of 
these ~natters,  as they pertain to one person,  by  evidence of  a 
disclosure thereof  made  in another person1  s  statement.  The  ex- 
ample  given  (but not the result) is that found  in the case of 
State v.  Farnam,  82  Or.  211,  161 Pac.  417,  427.  In that case 
the statement of  the victim of  the homicide  to the effect that 
the accused intended to visit her on  the night of  the homicide 
was  received  in evidence for the purpose  of  proving that  the 
accused did in fact intend to visit her  on  that night,  thus 
raising an  inference that the accused was  present at  the scene 
of  the homicide  at  some  time during the night on which it was 
comiitted.  The  case has been much  criticized,  and had  apparently 
been  based upon  a  misunderstanding  of  the principles laid down 
by the Supreme Court  of  the United  States in Mutual  Life Insurance 
Company  v.  Hillmon,  145 U.  S.  285,  295.  In  that case evidence of 
a  declaration .by a  person  that he  intended to go upon  a  journey 
with another was  admitted for the purpose  of  showing  the proba- 
bility that he  did go  upon  the journey.  In the Hillnon  case the 
intent shown  by the statement was  the intent of  the person who 
made  it, whereas  in the Farnam  case the  intent shown  was  that of 
a  person  other than  the one  who  made  the statement.  Tba t the 
Farnam  case is not  in accordance with the views of  the Supreme 
Court is  apparent from remarks concerning the Hillmon  case made 
by that court in the Sheppard  case,  supra.  In  the Sheppard case 
the Supreme Court stated,  "The  ruling in that case fihe  Hillmon 
casd  marks  the high-water  line beyond which  courts have  been unwilling to go.  It has  developed a  substantial body of  criti- 
cism and comment. *  Of  course,  if the statement in question is 
one  supplying or producing,  rather than disclosing,  a  relevant 
motive,  intent,  or state of  mind  or body on  the part of  a  person 
other than the one who  made  the statement,  then evidence of  the 
statement is admissible under  general principles,  there being no 
atteizlpt  here to use the statement to prove  facts by considering 
the statement to be true.  An  example which  clearly points out 
why evidence of  such a  statement would be admissible is given  in 
the illustration in the second subparagraph of  paragraph 139b. 
The  last subparagraph of  paragraph 1424 relating to the in- 
adnissibility of  evidence of  a  person's  statement as  to his 
memory  or belief  of  a  fact,  offered as tending to prove  the fact 
remembered  or believed,  has been  taken from Rule  513,  Model  Code 
of  Evidence. Conference No.  llb  - 
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1435( 1  )  Proving  contents of  a writing.--The  rule set forth in sub- 
paragraph  (1) of  paragraph  143a is the rule known  as the Hbest 
evidence rulev.  The te&  has geen taken from paragraph 129a,  MCM, 
1949.  It will  be noticed that if  a  document is inadmissiblg for 
the purpose of  proving the truth of the matters stated therein 
because it is hearsay,  a  copy of  the document  or other secondary 
evidence concerning it does not become  admissible for that purpose 
merely because no  objection is made  on  the ground  of  the best evi- 
dence rule.  See Baltimore American Insurance  Company v.  Pecos 
Mercantile Company,  122 F(2d)  lk3,  116. 
a35(2  subparagraph (2) of  l43a sets forth certain exceptions to the 
best evidence rule.  Most  of-these  exceptions have  been taken from 
the subparagraph  entitled NExceptions"  in  paragraph 1292,  Ma, 
1949.  Added  to the exceptions set forth in  the 1949 Manual is the 
exception appearing in  the first subparagraph under  (2) pertaining 
to documents  in  the hands  of the accused.  See MtKnight v,  U,  S., 
115 F  972,  980. 
The  exception to  the best evidence rule relating to calcu- 
lations made  from  numerous  or bulky documents  has been  phrased 
with a  view to  pointing up  the fact that the wrLtings used in  the 
calculations must  themselves be admissible.  This  principle was 
brought  out by the Judicial Council  (Army)  in  the recent  case of 
CM 334097,  Anderson,  4  BR-JC  347,  366,  8 Bull  JAG 122. 
In the exception relating to official records it has  been 
indicated that a military office is a  "public  office."  The 
exception as to certificates of  the chief  custodians of personnel 
records,  and  their deputies and  assistants,  concerning  fingerprint 
comparison is similar to that found  on  page  163 of  the 1949 Manual, 
expanded to take into consideration all  the armed  forces,  and it 
will  be noticed that this exception has  been  further expanded so 
that such a certificate may  emanate  from any department,  bureau, or agency  of  the United  States in  whichfingerprint records are 
officially kept on  file.  The  reason for this is  that military 
fingerprints are sometimes kept  by  the FEE,  The  rule relating 
to the admissibility of  a certificate of  lack of  public record 
is the same as that found in  the last subparagraph of paragraph 
1.293  MCBB,  1949.  Xowever,  there has been  added a statement to 
the effect that if  a purported fact or event is of  a kind. required 
law,  regulation,  m custom to be  recorded,  proof  that there is 
no  official record thereof rnw  be received as evidence that the 
fact did not exist or that the went did not;  occ-LLP  (Ches.  and Del. 
Canal Co.  v.  LS.,  250  U.S.  123,  129).  See also ChJ  337950,  Deyo, 
4  EMC  175,  182,  8  Bull JAG 191. 
143i(  1)  Authentication of  writingsb--General.-The  first subparagraph 
of  (1)  contains a  short and concfse statement as to what is  meant 
lgT atrthentication and a warning as to  when  a writing may  and may  not 
be  authenticated  hearsay certificates.  The  second subparagraph 
of ' (l),  relating to proof  of  the genuinenass of  letters and tele- 
grams,  has been  taken frcm the first subparagraph of  paragraph P29b 
MCM,  1949.  With  respect to telegrams,  section 205,  NC  &  B,  provides 
nIn  court-martial  cases the original telegram,  and consequently the 
one that must  be  produced  to  satisfy the !best  evidencef rule,  is 
the one  deposited at  the sending office.  The  received copy  can  , 
only be  given in evidence on a showing  that the original is Post,  - - -at!  This rule has been  abrogated by  the second subparagraph of 
paragraph l4.3&(1)  of  the 1951 Manual,  for,  if the telegram can  be 
considered to b  genuine,  its contents can be  proved not only by 
the original but also,  mithout accounting for the original,  by  the 
received or any  other copy  made  in  the regular course of  business 
of  a transmitting or receiving agencyo since all  are Welegrams. 
The  third subparagraph of  (1) has been  taken from the second and 
third subparagraphs of  paragraph 129b  MCM,  1949,  and added to that 
material has been  the rule pertaining to opinion evidence concerning 
handwriting found in  section 228,  NC  &  B.  The  fourth subparagraph 
of  (1) sets forth the rule relating to the admissibility of  altered 
writings.  The  law there expressed is that generally follmed in 
the civil courts (Wigmore,  8 2525,  and  see 8 199,  NC  &  B).  The 
fifth subparagraph  of (1)  contains provisions for a preliminary 
presentation of  evidence re authentication. 
143&  Official record-General.  -'TJnder  this title  has been  inserted 
(2)(5) a discussion of  the rules applying to authentication of  official 
records.  This discussion has been  extended considerably beyond  the 
scope of  the comparable matter found in  paragraph 129b MCM,  3.949,, 
and in section 196,  NC  &  B,  but  the extension was  deemed  advisable 
because  of  the very  frequent use of  official records as evidence in 
court-martial  practice. At the outset, it may  be stated that consideration was  given to 
proposing a simplified  rule for authentication of  all  official 
records,  foreign and  domestic.  However,  no  such  simplified rule 
was  adopted,for  to do  so would  certainly be barren of results and 
would  probably add to  the confusion which  already exists in  this 
area of  the law of  evidence.  The difficultyinherent in  adopting 
such a rule is that the people who  would  read and  have  authority to 
follow it would  not alGays be,  and  indeed infrequently would  be, 
the persons who  do  the authenticating.  Obviously,  officials of 
States of the United States and  of  foreign countries must  abide by 
their own  laws pertaining to authentication of  documents  and would 
ordinarily have no  authority to follow other rulss.  Furthermore, 
recourse to  the various Federal statutes or rules of  court on the 
subject has  not been a particularly satisfactory way of  solving the 
problem,  In  the case of  records  of 3  State of  the Untted  States, 
the Federal statutes simply provide for a  mode  of authentication 
which other States must  accept under the full  faith and  credit clause 
(28  USC  1739;  10 RCL,  Evidence,  El  311),  and in  the case of  foreign 
official records,  a form of authentication is provided  (28  USC  17bl) 
which  diplomatic and  consular officj~ls  quite often do not follow 
because of  long-standing  custom to  the contrary (~ew  York  Life Ins. 
Co.  v.  Aronson,  38  F.  Supp.  587;  Duncan  v.  U.  S.,  68  F (2d) 136, 
IkO;  Chi  3261b7,  Nagle,  75 BR  159,  169,  7 Bull JAG 16).  Rule &(a) 
of the Civil Rules  (adopted by Rule 27  of  the Crtzinal ~ules) 
provides several methods  of authenticating official documents, 
foreign and  domestic,  but quite often the?  particular authentication 
in  question is not done  in  accordance with the rule and a  legal 
problem  as to the document's  admissibility remains.  In short,  for 
many  years Federal courts have been accepting certain types of 
authentication which are  well known  to the common  law and which are 
relied upon  as being legally efficacious by public officers who 
actually make  the authentication,  but many  of  these rules are not 
found  in  the statutes or rules of procedure and are discovered only 
be extensive legal research,  the facilities for which  are sometimes 
not available to commands  in  the field.  The use of  comnon  law 
methods  of  authentication is authorized by Rule h(c) of  the Civil 
Rules,  which  rule has been  adopted by Rule  27 of the Criminal Rules. 
%ith this in  mind  the text rebating to  the authentication of  offi- 
cial records combines,  under separate headings  for Federal,  State, 
and  foreign records,  the rules of  the common  law (as accepted by 
the Federal courts),  the Federal statutes, and the Federal rules of 
court. 
In the first subparagraph under  (2)(a)  the terms to  be used 
in  the discussion of  authentication are defined in  much  the same 
manner  as they were in the first paragraph  appearing under the title 
llOfficial RecordsN in  paragraph  129b,  MCM,  1949.  The  second  sub- 
paragraph under  (2)(a) contains inf&nation as to  who  may  be considered  a custodian of  an official record, .and as,.to the 
presumption  c-f  an  attesting officer's  authority arising from 
a duly authenticated attestation.  See Wigmore,  8  2151-2162. 
43b  Military records.--The  paragraph  under this heading sets 
(2)(bT  forth the mode  of  authenticating military records,  and  records 
of  the Department  of  Defense  and  of  United  States military 
agencies in general.  This paragraph  has been  taken from the 
second paragraph  appearing under  the title "Official Recordsn 
in  paragraph 129b,  MCM,  1949,  except that the rules respecting 
the aut  henticatizn of  records of  non-military  governmental 
agencies of  the United States will  be  found  under  the following 
discussion of  authentication of  official records of the United 
States (see particularly the next to  the last method  of  authen- 
tication under  United States records). 
l43b  United States records.--Under  this heading,  the rules 
(2)  (cT  concerning authentication of  official records  of  the United 
States,  its Territories and  possessions, and  the District of 
Columbia  are set forth.  The  first and  second methods of 
authentication Mve been  taken from the rules relating to the 
authentication of  United  States records appearing on  page  165, 
MCM,  1949.  The  third method concerns authentioation under 
seal of a court of  record.  This is a common  law method  of 
authentication which  can  be used  when  the forum  can take 
judicial notice of  the seal of the court of record in question 
(that is why this method  is omitted in the case of  records of 
foreign countries).  Records  thus authenticated are admissible 
even  though  the judge  of  the court does not certify that the 
attesting official is who  he  purports to be,  the seal alone 
supplying this verification.  See Wigmore,  f ￿˜  1679(1)  (  c) ,  and 
2l64(2);  Soo  Hoo  Yee  v.  United  States,  3  F(2d)  592,  596;  and 
Turnbull v.  Peyson,  95  U.  S.  W8, 423.  The  fourth method pro- 
vides for authentication by  attesting certificate under  seal 
of  the governmental agency in  which,  or under  the supervision 
of  which,  the record is kept.  This method  includes the several 
means  of  authentication provided by  the various Federal statutes 
relating to records kept  in Federal agencies  (28 USC  1733-- 
Government  records and  papers;  28  USC  17b-Patent Office 
docuaents ;  31 USC  46--Records  of  General Accounting  office) . 
This method  also provides for attestation not under  seal in 
the case of records kept under the authority of  Federal govern- 
mental agencies,  such records being considered to be on a par 
in this respect with records kept by agencies of  the Departnent 
of  Defense.  The  fifth method  concerns authentication by 
attesting certificates authenticated under  the seal of public 
officers having  a seal and  having  duties where the record is 
kept.  This method has been  taken from Rule u(a) of the Civil 
Rules,  adopted by Rule 27 of  the Criminal Rules. State records.--The  material under  this heading  sets forth the 
rules applying to the authentication of  the official records of 
States and their political subdivisions.  The  first and  second 
methods  of authentication have been  taken from  similar rules found 
on  pge  165,  MCM,  19&.  The third method is the same with respect 
to  State records as the third method  under  United States records, 
and  the authority for each is the same.  The  fourth method  comes 
from Rule  h(a)  as did the fifth  method  under United  States records. 
l435  Foreign records.--Under  this heading,  the rules pertaining to 
authentication of  foreign records are set forth.  The  first three  (2)(L)  rules have been taken from similar material found  on  page 165,  MCM, 
1949,  except that with respect to the third rule--which  comes  from 
Rule &('a)  and  28  USC 1741-it  has been pointed  out that there 
must  be an attesting certificate which  the authenkicating certiff-  , 
cate accompanies.  The  reason  for this qualification is that 
diplomatic officials do not  attest true copies;  they merely 
authenticate the certificates of  those who  have  attested or,  in 
some  cases,  have authenticated.  Diplomatic officials do not 
examine registries and make  true copies. 
The  fourth rule provides for sweral common  law methods  of 
authenticating foreign records.  Despite all  the statutes enacted 
by  Congress and  the rules of  procedure adopted by the Supreme 
Court,  it seems that these methods  of  authentication have  become 
so customary in  international practice that they are the usual, 
rather than the exceptional,  methods  used.  It will  be noticed 
that Rule &(a)  is not  complied  with in the case of  an  authenti- 
cation under  the provision in question,  for the diplomatic official 
has  not certified that the custodian is the custodian but  certi- 
fies only that the foreign authentication of the attesting 
' 
certificate is genuine.  Nevertheless,  this provision  does  set 
forth proper  common  law means  of  authentication.  See Barber v. 
International Company,  73 Conn.  584,  48  Atl.  758,  764;  New  York 
Life Insurance Company  v.  Aronson,  38 F.  Supp.  687;  Duncan v, 
United States,  68 F  (2d) 136,  lh0;  CM 326l.47,  Nagle,  75 BR  159, 
169, 7 Bull JAG 16. 
The  second paragraph  under  (e) sets forth a permissible manner 
of authenticating the records of a foreign country in  which  armed 
forces of  the United States are stationed or through which  they are 
passing,  or which is occupied  by  armed  forces of the United States 
or an ally  thereof.  This provision has been taken from the pare- 
gra2h appearing on the top of  page 166,  MW, 1949,  except that 
again it has been  stated that there must  be a basic attesting 
certificate. lh3b  Miscellaneous.--Wth  some  amplification  and  clarification,  the 
(2)  (fr  rules contained under  this heading  have been taken from the similar  -  rules set forth in  the last three subparagraphs  of paragraph l29b, 
MSM,  1949.  -  Official writings. --This  paragraph  has been taken from para- 
graph 130a,  MCU,  1949.  The rule there stated is  merely an appli- 
cation of-the  hearsay rule. 
l.44b  -  Official records.--The  official record exception to the 
hearsay rule has been stated in  much  the same manner  as it was 
stated-  in  paragraph 130b of  the 1949 Manual.  However,  the statement 
of  the rule in the 1949-Manual  was  considered to be somewhat  open to 
question in  that it included within the statement of  the rule itself 
the presumption  that the person having the duty to make  the record, 
and  to know  or ascertain the facts,  performed  that duty properly. 
This matter has been  clarified in  the 1951 Manual by' deleting this 
presumption  from  the statement of  the rule and-  inserting in that 
statement the requirement that the record be made  Itin the perform- 
ance of1' the official duties.  Folluwing  the statement of  the rule, 
the various prima  facie presumptions which  are applied in  the case 
of  official records have been  set forth,  The  first presumption is 
that a  person who  had  a  duty to  record,  and  to know  or ascartain 
the truth of  the matters recorded,  performed  that duty properly. 
It has been  held that when  this presumption  of  regularity is 
conclusively rebutted by  evidence which  cannot  reasonably be  dis- 
believed showing that the record was  not in fact made  pursuant to 
the duty,  then the record  cannot be  received in  evidence as an 
official record  (see CM 331033,  Alvarado,  80 BR  1).  The  second 
presumption  applying to official records is that a  duly authen- 
ticated record  (or copy of  a record)  of  an event required to  be 
recorded by  law,  regulation,  or custom itself serves as a prima 
facie indication that the record  was  made  by  a person so required 
to  make  it.  This  must  be  so,  for some  official records are not 
required to be  signed by the person who  made  them,  and  the only 
signature wbich may  appear with respect to a given copy of  an 
official record may  be  that of  the custodian of  the record appearing 
in his attesting certificate.  See FSigmore,  8  2158.  The  third 
presumption is that relating to recoras of vital or other 
commonly  recorded  statistics.  This  presumption was  also stated in 
the last subparagraph of  paragraph  130b,  -  MCV,  1949. 
In the 19L9 Manual it was  stated that although a  service 
record might  be  an official record certain entries therein were 
nevertheless subject to  objection on the ground  that they were 
secondary evidence;  that is, on  the ground that such  entries were compiled from other records.  The  new  text states that no  such 
objection is available in the case of a  record which meets the 
requirements of  the official record  exception to  the hearsay rule. 
This would  appear to  be the general law on the subject (Wigmore, 
8  16U).  In this %onnection it is interesting to note that the 
Navy  customarily proves absence vbithout  leave by entries in  the 
service record,  even though t.hese entries are usually derived from 
an original entry in a  log or other record (a0  5-19L6, p.  182, 
183  ) 
Business  entries  .--The  matter concerning business  entries 
found in  paragraph l30c of  MCM,  19b9, and based  on  28  USC  1732, 
has been incorporated 'in  the tact of paragraph lWcc  of the 1951 
khnual,  There has been added,  however,  an admonftTon  to  the 
effect that copies of  business  entries,  if not themselves made 
as business entries,  are generally subject to objection on the 
ground  of  the best evidence rule.  See (3  338303$ Pierce,  6  B~JC 
237,  9  Bull* JAG  19s 
J.442  Limitations as to the admissibility of  official records 
and  business  entries.--The  first limitation,  that is the opinion 
limitation,  has been taken from the first paragraph of paragraph 
P30d, Em,  19&9, and  en example to the effect that a psychiatric 
rep;&  as;  to  mental condition falls  within the opinion limitation 
has been inserted.  Records  as to  mental condition have been held 
not to  be  admissible under the business entry rule in  New York 
Life Insurance Cornparmy.  v.  Taylor,  lh7 F(2d)  297,  303,  and in 
&gland  Ve United  StatesS 17b ~(2d)  466,  469.  See also on the 
question of psychiatric reports,  paragraph 122c,  -  KCM,  1951. 
The  second Emitation,  cr group of two  limitations,  groPling 
out of  the requirement  that there be a  duty to know  or ascertain 
the truth in the case of  official records,  and  that the entry must 
have been made  in  the regular course of  a  business in the case of 
a  business entry,  was  not stated in  the 1949 Manual.  The  remarks 
with respect to  the duty to  know  or ascertain the truth are based 
on the very nature of the official record  exception to  the hearsay 
rule.  The  remarks as to  the regular course of  business lwtation 
are based  on Palmer v.  Hoffman,  318  U.S.  109.  Palmer v.  Hofhan 
was a  negligence case growing out of a  grade-crossing  accident. 
The  railroad company defendant offered in evidence a written state- 
ment  made  by the engineer of  the train concerning his version of 
the accident and contended that the statement p.ms  made  in  the 
regular course of business in  accordance with 28  USC 695 (now 
28  USC  1732).  Because of statutory provisions in  the State where 
the  accident occurred,  it ms apparently the custom of the rail- 
road to  require such statements from employees  involved in  accidents. 
The  trial court excluded the statement and both the Circuit Court 
of  Appeals  and the Supreme  Court held that it was  properly excluded. 
The Supreme  Court said: "If the Act is to be extended  to apply not only 
to  a  Iregular course1 of  a business but also to any 
lregular course1 of  conduct which may  have  some  rela- 
tionship to  business,  Congress,  not this Court,  must 
extend it.  Such a  major  change which  opens wide  the 
door to avoidance of  cross-examination  should not be 
left to  impUcation.  Nor  is it any answer  to say that 
Congress  has  provided  in  the Act  that the various cir- 
cumstances of the making  of  the record should affect 
its weight,  not its achnissibility.  That  provision 
comes  into play only in case the other requirements  of 
the Act  are met.  * * * It Ehe  Act7 should of  course 
be liberally interpreted s:  as to-do  away  with the 
anachronistic rules which  gave rise to its need  and  at 
which it was  aimed,  But  'regular  course1 of  business 
must  find its meaning in  the inherent nature of the 
business in  question and  in  the methods  systematically 
employed  for the conduct  of  the business as a business." 
The example  given to  which these limitations apply is the 
familiar one of  the pathologistls entry in  an autopsy report as 
to  whether the death was  caused by homicide,  accident,  or suicide. 
It Rill be noticed that in paragraph 130d of the 1949 Bhanual  such 
an entry was  excluded on the ground  that-it  was  an expression of 
opinion.  That  ground,  however,  would  not  have been  sufficient to 
exclude such an entry had it been based  on  reports made  to the 
pathologist by others,  for it is expressly stated in  the business 
entry rule that the fact that a particular entry mas  not based  on 
the personal knowledge of  the entrant shall not affect its admis- 
sibility,  The  ground upon  which the pathologistls entry as to 
1  homicide,  accident,  or suicide is excluded is,  as stated in  the 
present text,  a  combination of  the opinion limitation and the 
limitations discussed in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1hd.  - 
See CM 323197,  Abney,  72  BR  49, 156,  7 Bull JAG 17. 
The third limitation is that applying to  writings or records 
made  principally with a vim to prosecution  or other disciplinary 
or legal action,  This limitation has been taken from the second 
subparagraph of  paragraph 130tl,  MCM,  1949.  It has been indicated 
that certain records used  by  the armed forces to prove absence 
without  leave and  escape from  confinemat are not subject to the 
limitation,  and  that depositions and  records of  trial (former 
testimony) are also not subject thereto. 
The  last subparagraph of paragraph  l&d  points out that a news 
account  of  an incident is not admissible asdan  official record or 
business  entry to prove the incident,  and  the authority for this 
rule is  contained in  New Pork  Life Insurance Company  v.  Taylor, 
47  F(2d)  297. I!+ 
I 
Maps  and  photo~ra~hs.-This paragraph has been  taken from 
paragraph  1308,  Ma!,  1949. 
' l.452  Depositions. -The  material concerning depositions is  much  the 
same  as that contained in  l-ragraph  131%  YCX,  1949.  A  few  changes 
have  been  made,  however.  In the first place it has been  pointed 
out that in atrial  on  several spscifications the proceedings as to 
each constitute a separate tlcase,lt and that deposition testimony not 
for the defense may  be achitted without the consent of  the defense 
in  a case not capitaltried with  a capital case if such testimony 
is  not material to the capital case,  or (when it is  material to the 
capital case) if the cases do  not involve the same  criminal trans- 
action and  the law officer instructs the court in open  session that 
such  testimony is not to be  considered as material to the capital 
case.  This  is,  generally speaking,  the law as set forth in  (34  2-42082, 
Reid,  26  BR  391,  399,  3 Bull JAG 54.  The  Reid case,  however,  did not 
impose  any  limitation excluding deposition t&timony  because of  the ' 
cases involving  !#the same  criminal transactionyn  as does the text in 
.the 1951 Manual.  This limitation has been  inserted so that the court 
may  not be  confronted with the necessity of  attemptjag to perform a 
mental feat beyond the compass  of  ordinary minds. 
In the fourth subparagraph of  paragraph  l45~  it has been  stated 
that certain objections may  be  considered to have  been waived  under 
certain circumstances if not presented at  the time interrogatories 
were  presented to the opposite party cr to the court or at  the time 
the deposftion was taken.  This rule has been  taken from  Rule 32(c) 
of  the Civil RtiLes,  adopted ly  Rule l5(f) of  the Criminal Rules.  If 
a party was  not present by  counsel or other represehtative at  the 
taking of  the deposition,  he  cannot  be  considered as having  failed, 
at the taking of  the deposition,  to  nake  an objection. 
The  material as to  waiver of  objections appearing in the next 
to  the last  subparagraph of  paragraph 1.452 follows to some  extent 
the similar material fo-id  in  the last subparagraph of  1312, UCM, 
1949.  The  variance  between  the present text and  the 1949 version 
results fron a com,mrison  of  Article of  War  25 with Article 49  of 
the Uniform  Code.  The  1  49 Manual  spoke of  waiver of  an  objection 
"on the ground  that it ?  the depositio$  was not authorized ky 
Article 25"  because that Article authorized the taking of  the 
deposition only when the witness was,  at the time of  the taking, 
unavailable at the place of  trial or  about to become  so.  See also 
Article 68 of  the Articles for the Government of  the Navy.  Article 
49  attacks the pmblem  from a different angle-it  must appear & 
the trial that the mitness is then unavailable,  the question of 
~ 
his availability at the place of  trial at the time of  taking the 
deposition being  immaterial.  Hence  the different wording  in the 
text of the 1951 Manual. It all be of particular interest .to the Navy  to  note that it 
is  no  longer requiredp as it was  under  section 215,  NC &  B,  that 
the trial counsel take the stand as a  witness to identify the 
deposition.  This  requirement  has been omitted from the 1951  Manual 
because of the fact that depositions are docuhents which authen- 
ticate th€msef~eS  by  reason of the court being able to take judicial 
notice of the seal or signature of the official who  took the deposi- 
tion. 
The  last subparagraph of  paragraph IhSa,  concerning statements 
made  by deponents which  are admissible for some reason other than 
the fact that they were made  during the course of  the taking of  a 
deposition,  has been inserted to obviate the confusion which  often 
exists with respect to this matter,  See Wigmore,  @I  1387 and  l.416. 
,-The  discussion of former testimony in 
Para  s generally the discussion of  the same  subject 
matter appearTng  in  paragraph 1315,  MCM, 1949*  It will be noticed 
that fomer testimony given at  a &ial  shown  by the objecting party 
to  be void because  of  Pack  of  jurisdiction cannot be used.  The 
reason for this is that the oath upon which  the so-called  testimony 
was  given was  void and  there really has been no  fomer testimony. 
See Jessup v.  Cook,  6  N.J.L.  435,  l-138~ and  see also CBlI 321643, 
i 
Rowell,  70  BR 327,  6  Bull JAG 179.  However,  since such a  collateral 
attack cannot,  as a practical matter,  be permitted to  be  raised for 
i  the first time on appellate review,  the burden  of thus collaterally 
I  atlacking the fonnsr proceeding  falls on the objecting party at  the 
I 
1  i 
A  provision for  r  has been inserted in  the  first subpara- 
graph which is  that provided  in  case of  depositions. 
1  Also9 in  the second  subparagraph,  it has'been indicated that former 
'  testimony may be proved  by any person who  heard it being given,  even 
\  when  the record  of  the former trial is available to prove the testi- 
\,  mony.  The  best ddence  rule does not apply with respect to pmvin& 
former oral testimony,  See Meyers  v.  United  States,  171  ~(2d)  800, 
812;  Wigmore, I  1330--fact  that stenographer is official does not 
make  transcript preferred mode  of proof, 
The  next.  to the last subparagraph of  paragraph 1&b,  relating 
to statements made  at  a  former trial  which  are admissibre under 
some rule of  ~idence  other than that pertaining to former testi- 
mony,  has  been inserted for the same reason,  and  has been based on 
the same authority,  as applies in  the case of  the similar provision, 
in paragraph 4S2,  relating to statements made  by  deponents which 
are admissible for some reason other than the fact that they were made  during the course of the taking of  a  deposition.  The  last 
subparagraph of section 218,  NC  &  B,  arrives at  the same  con- 
clusion with respect to  the question here discussed.  See  also 
Boitano v.  United States,  7 ~(2d)  325. 
The  last subparagraph of  paragraph  llcsb,  that dealing with 
the introduction of  records of a  court of  iEquiry,  is derived 
from the Morgan  Report  Commentary  under Article 50 and  from  . 
section 220,  NC &  B. 
Memoranda.--Paragraph  132~1,  PACU,  1949, has been used as the 
basis for the text of  pragrapE 146~1. A  learned discussion on 
the subject of memoranda  may  be  foGd in  Bendett v.  Bendett, 
315 Uass.  59,  52  ~.E.  (2a)  2,  although in Bktssachusetts  a  meno- 
randua of the first kind  is not physically received in evidence 
but is merely read to the court or jury. 
12r6b  -  Affidavits.--This  paragraph has been taken from paragraph 
132b,  MCM,  1949.  It will  be noticed that with  respect to  the 
character of the accused and matters  in  extenuation of  a possible 
sentence,  the defense,  if it so desires,  may  introduce affidavits 
or other written statenents.  This  has been a long-standing  custom 
in  both the Army and  the Air Force  (see 3'Greenleaf  on Evidence, 
16th Ed.,  8  501)  and  now becornes  law for all  the armed  forces. 
The  reason for the rule is that in  the nilitary service accused 
persons are frequently tried thousands  of miles  away from home, 
and  in  such cases it would  hardly be reasonable to require the 
defense to  go through the foraalities of  procuring  depositions 
from the accused  1 s home  community with respect to his character 
and matters in  extenuat2on of  the sentence. 
lL7:  Judicial notice.--Ws  paragraph is approximately the same  as 
paragraph 133, NIZId,  1949.  Added  to  the examples  (in MCM,  19h9) 
of  matters of-~ch  a  court-martial  mag  take judicial notice are 
the signatures of  the Judge  .4dvocates  General and  their deputies 
and  assistants, the signatures of  the chief  custodians of  the 
personnel records of  the various armed  forces and their deputies 
and  assistants, and  the signatures of  the custodians of  finger- 
print records of any department,  bureau,  or agency of  the United 
States and their deputies and  assistants,  The  signatures of the 
Judge  Advocates  hneral and  their deputies and  assistants were 
added  as being proper matters of judicial notice because of the 
fact that many  communications having to do  with the adrpinistration 
of  military justice are signed by  then.  The  signatures of  the 
chief  custodians of personnel records,  the signatures of the 
custodians of fingerprint records of  departments,  bureaus and 
agencies of the United States,  and  the signatures of the deputies 
and  assistants of  both categories of officials had  to be included because  under  paragraph 143a(2) such persons have been given author- 
ity  to sign certificates as-to  fingerprint comparisons.  Also added 
are the signatures of  persons authorized to  administer oaths by 
Article 136 or by any of  the provisions of  law referred to in 
chapter XXII,  when  affixed to a deposition or any sworn  document 
to  indicate the execution of  such authority.  The  reason for this 
addition is  that as a practical matter it would,  in  the ordinary 
case,  be futile to authorize such persons to administer oaths, 
especially in  the case of  such persons who  do  not have a seal of 
office,  if judicial notice of their signatures could not be taken. 
It has been  further provided that courts-martial  will  be able to 
take judicial notice of  the signatures of  persons authenticating 
records of  the proceedings of  military courts and  commissions ofthe 
arined  forces of  the United  States,  and  of the signatures and  duties 
of United  States military officers who  authenticate foreign official 
records and  copies thereof pursuant to  the authority contained in 
paragraph 143h(  2  ) (2). 
It should be noticed that section 309,  NS &  B,  limits the taking 
of  judicial notice of the laws of a State,  Territory,  or possession 
to taking judicial notice of  the laws of the State,  Territory,  or 
possession within which  the court is sitting,  and  restricts taking 
judicial notice of  military regulations and  orders to  taking judicial 
notice of those published local regulations and  orders that apply 
generally in  the command  which  convened  the court.  No  such restric- 
tions are imposed by the provisions of  paragraph  47a, MCM,  1951. 
In the final paragraph under  judicial notice the vaxous provisions 
contained in  paragraph 133a,  MCA{,  1949,  concerning the duty of  the 
court to include in  the reFord  of  trial  certain documents  of  which 
it has taken judicial notice,  have  been  combined  so that they will 
all  be  found  in  one place.  These  provisions,  in  MfX,  1951,  are 
directory and  not mandatory. 
1Q  Foreign law.-No  substantial change has been made  from the 
material on  this subject appearing in  paragraph  133k,  MCTrlI,  1949. 
In the second subparagraph it has been indicated that public 
libraries are proper public  offices from which  to  obtain legal 
publications  containing evidence of foreign law.  The  various 
applications of the best evidence rule to proof  of foreign law 
are discussed in  I=NI  330803,  Berechid,  79  BR  171,  7  Bull JAG 180. Conference No.  llc 
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a8a  -  Competency of witnesses.--General.--It  has been  stated that 
the general competency,  mental and moral,  of a witness of  lb or 
more years of age is always  presumed.  The  comparable paragraph 
(13ha) iii  the 1949 Manual.  speaks of the presumption  of  competency 
of  an Itadult" witness,  but does not define the term  Itadult  .I1  It 
was  thought advisable to be more  explicit in  the 1951 Manual,  and 
the age of  l.4  was  chosen,  of course,  because of  the rule that the 
fact of  capacity is not presumed  in the case of  a person under 
the age of  14.  See IVigmore,  8  508.  This matter had,  however, 
been covered under the heading  Children in  paragraph  134b  -  of  the 
19h9 Manual. 
148b  -  Children.--This  paragraph has been taken from paragraph 134b, 
IdCE, 'm  similar statement of  the law appears in  section 2n, 
NC  & B. 
l48c  -  Mental infirn5ty  ,--This  paragraph sets forth the law relating 
to  mental infirmity as affecting the competency of a witness.  See 
Whartonts Criminal Evidence,  11th Ed.,  8- 1174,  and the cases 
therein cited. 
a8d  -  Conviction of  crime.--The  law pertaining to  this subject is 
stated in  the same manner  as it  was  in  paragraph 134c,  MCM,  1949, 
except that it is stated in  the new  text that certaig convictions 
may  be shown  to diminish the credibility of the witness.  This, 
of  course,  is in  accord with the provisions of paragraph 153b(2)  - 
(b),  -  May  1951. 
148e  -  Intere'bt or bias  .--Generally  speaking,  the discussion appear- 
ing in  this paragraph was  taken from paragraph 134d,  MCM,  1949. 
It will  be  noticed that in  the 1951 text,  as in  thg 1949 text, 
the general rule prohibiting the use of one spouse as a witness 
against the other is treated'as a privilege and  not as a rule of 
competency.  See Viigmore,  ￿˜  2227  et seq.;  United  States v,  ~tchell, 
137 P  (2d) 1006,  1008.  It will  also be noticed that this privilege 
does not  exist,  and  that the sponse--if  he or she is otherwise 
competent  as a witness-occupies no  exceptional status and  may be 
required to testify,  if  he  or she is the victim of  the trans- 
gression with which  the other spouse is charged.  See Rex  v. 
Lapworth,  (1931) 1  KB  117;  28  RCL, Witnesses,  section 68.  It 
has been  indicated that the privilege prohibiting the use of  one 
spouse as a witness against the other applies whether the witness  . 
was  sworn or unsworn.  Says Wigmore  (8 2233),  "So,  too,  it would seem that hearsay declarations by the wife or husband  such as 
mould  ordinarily be receivable under  some  exception to  -the 
hearsay rule should  be  excluded when  offered against the other 
spouse."  Of course,  Wgmore does  not mean  to say that such 
declarations may  not be receivable when  the privilege does  not  . 
exist,  for instance,  in a case in  which  the declarant is  the 
injured spouse.  Added  to  the instances in  which  the pri-vilege 
does  not exist has been forgery by one spouse .of the other's 
signature to  a  writing when  the writing .would,  if genuine, 
apparently operate to  the prejudice of  such other.  Also  added to 
the discussion of the husband  and  wife privilege is a  statement 
to  the effect that when  one spouse testifies in favor of the 
other,  the privilsge cannot be asserted to  defeat cross-exaq&na- 
tion ('?jigmore,  3  2242). 
The  rmainder of  the discussion in  paragraph 148e is similar 
to  the discussion found  in the last three s~b~ara~ra~5s  of  para- 
graph  13bd,  -  UCM,  1949. 
1495  Ehamination of  dtnesses.-General.--This  paragraph has  been 
taken from  paragraph 135a9 MXA-  and  3edls for the most  part 
merely with the order ofmexainining witnesses. 
Cross-examination;  redirect and recros  s-exarninatiori;  exaxima- 
tion by the court or a  manber.--Cross-examination.--The  discussion 
of  cross-examination  has been largely taken from paragraph  135b, 
?lCkI,  ' 1949 ,  although the second subparagraph,  relating to the &ent 
of  cross-examinaticn,  has been  somewhat  amplified with respect to 
matters which may  be gone into in testing the credibility of a 
witness.  See generally Alford v.  United States,  282  US  687,  and 
0.I  31732T9 Durant  (~athleen)  ,  66  BR  277,  3009  7 Bull JAG 181,  The 
last subparagraph of  paragraph lb9b(l) deals in  detail ~5th  the 
limitations upon  cross-examinationof  an accused. 
lk9b(  2  Redirect and  recross-examination.--It  has  been pointed  out 
that n,?w matters mag  be developed  on  redirect examination,  and 
that the recross-examination  ;;lay  extend  to the issues brought out 
on  the redirect  examination,  so that with respect to matters 
developed  on  redirect examination the cross-examiner  will  have the 
same latitude on  recross-examination  as he has  on  cross-examination.  . 
1493  3 1  Fxamination by the court or a  member.--This  material follows 
cl-osely the similar material set forth on  page 178,  IVCV,  1949, 
except that it has  been  necessarily rephrased because of  the faqt 
that the lax  officer is not a  manber  of the court. 
14920)  Leading questions;  ambiguous  and  misleading questions;  other 
objectionable questions.--Leading  questions.--Subsection  (a) of  -  - this paragraph  states the general rule prohibiting the use of 
leading questiom on  direct examination and  subsection (b) sets 
forth the exceptions to this rule.  The  exceptions are e%entially 
the same  as those found  in  paragraph 13Sc,  1\4C!d,  1949,  and in 
section 277,  NC  &  B.  However,  added to  The discussi.on in the 1949 
Manual  concerning the exceptions to  the general yule prohibiting 
leading questions on  direct examination is the rule which permits 
refreshing the recollection of  the witness,  or establishing his 
past recollection,  when  the memory  of the .Nitness  has been  exhausted. 
See section 280,  NC  &  R;  Hyde  v.  United  States,  225 U.S.  347,  377; 
United States v.  Freundlich,  95 ~(2d)  376;  United States v.  Rappy, 
157 F(2d  j  964;  !"iigmore,  fffj 744 and  777. 
1490  -  Anbieuous  and  misleading questions ;  other objectionable 
(2),(3T  questions  .--'l"ne  material set forth under these headings has been 
.taken from paragraph  135c,  -  XCM, 1949. 
1sOa  -  Com~ulsor~  - .  self-degradation- --!This  paragraph sets  forth the 
mannener  questions based  on Article 31c  - 
are to be handled.  It lmill be noticed that even though the 
question +is material only with respect to  the credibility of a 
witness, it must  nevertheless be answered.  This  was  the rule 
adopted with respect to  the privilege against compulsory self- 
degradation in  paragraph  136a  of the 1949 Manual,  and the 
difference in  wording betwee;  Article 31c and Article of  Xar  24 
does  not aFpear to require a  different rL1.e.  Section 261c,  NC  & 
B,  allowed a witness to claim the privilege against self-?egra- 
dation  Ifin a  case vhere his answer could  have no  effect upon the 
case except to  inpair his  credibility."  Under  the rule set forth 
in  the 1951 Manual,  the witness  cannot assert this privilege in 
such a  case. 
Complsory self-incrimination. -This  para  graph has been taken 
from paragraph  136b,  XCM,  1949,  and the only material departures 
from that pdragrapE appear in  the fourth and fifth  subparagraphs 
of  paragraph  lSOb,  MGM, 1951.  In the fourth subparagraph it is 
stated that a wirness who  answers  a  question without having asserted 
the privilege and thereby admits a self-incriminating  fact may  be 
required to  make  a full disclosure,  however  self-incriminating,  of 
the matter to  which that fact relates.  This provision is based 
on the theory of waiver and was  taken from Wigmore,  8  2276,  and 
United States v.  St.  Pierre,  132 ~(2d)  837.  This provision was 
written,  and  the manual was  promulgated,  before the decision of the 
Supreme Court in  the case of  Rogers v.  United States,  U.  S. 
,  ms announced.  In that case the court appearmay 
down  the rule that a witness vho  admits a  self-incriminating  fact 
without having asserted the privilege may  be required to disclose 
the details,  so long as,  with regard to  each succeeding question 
concerning any such detail,  there is no real danger of  further 
self-incrimination.  It is believed that the rule as stated in the 
1951 Manual  may  readily be interpreted,  and  should be interpreted, 
in  accordance with the  rule laid down  by the Supreme Court in  the 
Rogers case. In the fifth subparagraph of  paragraph  150b it has been  stated 
that the prohibition againsf  compelling a pers 05 to give evidence 
against himself  relates only to the use  of  compulsion in  obtaining 
from  him a verbal or other conmunication  in  which  he  expresses 
his knowledge  of  a matter and  does not forbid compelling  him  to 
exhibit his body  or other physical characteristics as evidence 
when  such evidence  is  material.  This rule is  derived from Holt 
v,  United States,  218  US  245,  in  which  the court stated: 
"bother objection is based upon  an  extravagant extension 
of  the Fifth Amendment.  A question arose as to whether  a 
blouse  belonged to the prisoner.  A  witness testified that the 
prisoner put it on  and it fitted him.  It is objected that he 
did this under the same  duress that made  his statement 
inadmissible,  and  that it should be  excluded for the same 
reasons.  But  the prohibition of  compelling a man  in a  criminal 
' 
court to be  witness  against himself  is  a prohibition of  the 
use  of  physical or moral  compulsion  to extort communications 
I 
from him,  not an exclusion of  his body  as evidence when  it may 
be  material." 
In those jurisdictions which follow the doctrine of  the Holt case 
(some  States of  the United States do  not),  objections based upon 
a contention that forced exhibitions of  bodily characteristics 
violate the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination 
are not  sustained.  See,  for example,  McFarland  v.  United States, 
150 ~(2d)  593--"benzedrinen  blood  test performed  on accused by 
military order and without his consent  to determine whether  certain 
stains on his body were  blood  stains not violative of  prohibition 
against compulsory self-incrimination;  People  v.  Tucker,  Cal. 
APP* -  ,  198 Pac  (2d)  941--blood  sample  taken from accus~while 
unconscious  and without his consent for purpose  of making  blood 
alcohol test not  violative of  prohibition against compulsory self- 
incrimination;  Schmidt v.  District Attorney of Monroe  County,  2  55 
App.  Div.  353,  8 NYS  (2d) 787,  and Green Lake  County v.  Domes,  247 
Wis.  90,  18 WVB  (2d)  348--compulsory physical examinations  of  sus- 
pected drunken  drivers admissible.  See  also,  for military cases, 
CM  326834 Kendall,  75 BR  313,  and  CNO  1-1944  (Navy),  p 15--taking 
blood sample  from person without his consent dws not violate prohi- 
bition against compulsory self-incrimination;  CM  337189  Harris, 
7 BR-JC  393,  414--held  by Judicial Council (Army)  that requiring 
person to utter words  for purpose  of voice identification not 8 
violation of  prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination. 
151a  -  Privileged and nonprivileged communications.--General.--This 
paragraph hers  been taken from paragraph 137a,  MCM, -he 
wording  having  been  somewhat  changed to indTcate more  clearly that 
the privilege pertaining to the communication in  question may be 
waived by the person or government  entitled to the benefit of  the 
privilege,  and  also that the communication may  be  disclosed through 
evidence  emanating  from a person or a  source not bound  by the privilege, 
1519)  Certain privileged communications.--State  secrets and  police 
secrets.--In  this ~aranra~h  the meral  rules Pertaining to  state 
secrets and  police-  secFeti are set forth,  In accordance with the 
federal law on the subject it  has been pointed out that the 
informant privilege does not warrant the exclusion from evidence 
of statements of informants which are inconsistent with or might 
otherwise be used to impeach their testimony as witnesses.  It 
follows that this privilege cannot be applied in  opposition to  an 
attempt to cliscover or disclose such a statement through an exami- 
nation of a  witness or otherwise.  See United States v,  Krulenitch, 
45  ~(2d)  76. 
15'132)  Comunications between  husband  and wife,  client and  attorney, 
and penitent and  clergyman.--The  privilege pertaining to con- 
?identi&  oamunications between  husband  and wife,  and  client and 
attorney,  have been stated in  much  the same  way  as they were in 
paragraph 137b,  MCM,  1949,  and in  sections 238(3) and  239  of  NC & 
B.  It has be&  pointed out that the privilege pertaining to con- 
fidential conmuni cations between  husband  and wife  appli  es only 
when  the communication was  made while the parties were husband 
and wife and  not livhg  in  separation under  judicial decree 
(Vigmore,  B  2335).  The  privilege relating to conf'idential  com- 
munications between penitent and  clergyman was  not recognized in 
NC  & B  but was  stated in  a more  limited fom  in  paragraph  137b, 
MCE,  1949.  It mill  be noticed that in  the 1951 Manual the peatent 
and  clergyman  privilege is not limited to a  comunication made to 
a  chaplain as it was  in the 1949 Manual, 
The  second paragraph of  (2) states the general rule prohibiting 
disclosure of  such privileged communications and  sets up  some  of  the 
exce;?tions  to that general rule which might  be encountered in 
trials by couPt-nartial,  The  first exception,  that applying in 
cases in  which  one of the spouses is an accused,  has been taken 
fron Wigmore,  8  2338(4).  In the cited section of his mrk  Wlgmore 
states,  "In many cases involving a  charge of crime brought against 
a  spouse,  marital comunications may become  the key to the case. 
It is plain that where- either spouse needs the evidence of  am- 
munications  (by either to the other) in  a  trial  involving a  con- 
troversy between  them,  the privilege should  cease,  or a  cruel 
injustih  may  be done."  Although the cases arising under this 
exception often do  involve a  controversy between  the spouses,  there 
would  seen to  be no  reason why  this should be a necessary element 
of  the exception. 
The second exception has been taken from paragraph 137b,  MCM, 
1949,  and it has been indicated that this exception applies not 
only with respect to  testimony by an outside party concerning the 
communication  overheard or seen by him,  but also with respect to 
receiving in evidence the communication  itself when it is contained 
in  a  w-riting  which was  obtained by an outside party.  See 63  ALR 120, 1512(3  )  Confidential and  secret evidence.--This  matter has been taken 
from similar matter appearing on  pqe  182,  MCM,  1949.  The  privilege 
relating to investigations of  the Inspectors General has been 
enlarged so as to include all  the armed  forces.  Added  to the dis- 
cussion of  confidential and  secret evidence as it appears in the 
1949 Khnual  is the paragraph concerning the procedure which  may  be 
followed by  the court when  confidential or secret evidence must  be 
received,  with a cross-reference  to'paragraph 33f  indicating that 
there may  be certain cases which,  because  of  thesecurity risks 
involved,  should not be brought  to trial at all. 
1slc  -  Certain nonprivileged comunications.--The  discussion con- 
cerning the nonprivileged character of  co~umunications  by wire or 
radio and  comrmications to medical  officers and civilian physicians 
found in  this paragraph  has been taken from paragraph 137c,  MCM, 1949. 
In section 240,  NC  & B, it had  also been  stated that comm&.cations 
to medical officers and  civilian physicians are not privileged. 
152  Certain illegally obtained evidence.--In  this paragraph  the 
rules pertaining to the ina&nissibili'cy of evidence  obtained as a 
result of  an unlawful  search and  seizure,  and as a result of  "wire 
tapping,ll  have been  discussed.  The  rule relating to the ins-&miss i- 
bility of  evidence obtained as a  result of  unlawful  search and 
seizure is laid down  in  Silverthorne Lumber  Company  v.  United States, 
251 U.S.  385,  and  the rule relating to the inadmissibility of 
evidence obtained as a result of  %ire  tappingB1  may  be found in 
Wardone  v.  United States,  308 U.S.  338.  No  attempt has been made 
in  this manual  to lay  down  any independent military rules to be 
followed by courts-martial  with respect to evidence  obtained as a 
result of  %ire  tapping,I!  for the inadmissibility of  evidence 
obtained by Ihvire  tappingll appears to rest solely upon  a  statutory 
foundation and that foundation may  be shaken in  the future by 
amendatory legislation.  Consequently,  those who  read the manual 
are referred, in this respect,  to the Federal law on  the subject 
as it may have application to  wire tapping  cases at  the time in 
question.  It has been indicated that courts-martial  have no  author- 
ity  to suppress illegally obtained evidence  (as distinguished from 
excluding it), and  that consequently the rule applied in the Federal 
civil courts to the effect that an objection on  the ground that 
certain evidence was  Fllegally obtained  may  be waived if not 
made  on a motion  to suppress before trial does not apply.  The 
statement that evidence obtained by a lawful search is inadmissible 
if that search was  conducted because of information derived from a 
preceding unlawful  search of  the proscribed kind has been'taken 
from a Navy  case (~dvance  ClilO  No.  11-Navy-22  Dec  1949,  p.  85). The  remarks  of Mr.  Justice Jackson in United States v.  Bayer, 
331  U.  S.  532,  540,  would  appear to  be an indication that the doc- 
trine of  the Silverthorne and  Nardone  cases will  not be applied to 
evidence derived from information supplied by an illegally obtained 
confession, 
The  second  subparagraph of  paragraph 152 sets forth certain 
examples  of  searches which are lawful.  All  these examples,  with 
the exception of the military search example,  may  be found set forth 
in  the table of  search cases in Harris v.  United  States,  331 U.  S. 
5.  The  example of  a  lawful military search is derived from the 
similar example  set forth in  the second  subparagraph of paragraph 
138,  ~~~,1949.  Military searches of this kind have been  held law- 
ful in Grewe  v.  France, "I  I?.  Supp.  433,  and  in  Best v.  United 
States,  184 F  (2d)  131.  It will  be noticed that the example of 
a  lawful military search given is not intended to  be all  inclusive 
or to  preclude the legality of  other types of military searches 
made  in  accordance with military custom. 
1535  Credibility of  Pvitnes ses  .--Generally speaking,  this paragraph 
is  but a paraphrase of paragraph  139a,  -  ~  b~~~11,1949.  The  statement 
that a  conviction cannot be sustaine3 solely on  the self-contradic- 
tory testimony of a  particular witness,  even though motive to comIt 
the offense is shown,  if  the contradiction is not adequately 
explained by the witness in his testimony  is taken from CM 319322, 
Spencer,  68  BR  2b3,  2b6,  and  the authorities therein cited.  It has 
also been mentioned  that a  conviction cannot be based yon  the 
uncorroborated  testimony of an alleged victim in  a trial for a 
sexual offense,  or upon  the uncorroborated testimony of a purported 
accomplice in a trial for any offense,  if  in either case such 
testimony is self-contradictory,  uncertain,  or hprobable.  This 
rule has  often been applied by the boards of  review,  See CM 2606ll, 
WiMnson,  39 BR  309,  326;  CM 243927,  Strong,  28  BR  129,  a6;  z. 
CM 298630,  Pridgen,  7  BR  (ETO)  225,  245;  ca4 267651,  Bowell, & BR 
35,  42;  and  CM 259987,  Loudon,  39 BR  104, la. 
The  rules  set forth in  the next to the last subparagraph of 
paragraph 153a as to reestablishing the credit of  a witness whose 
testimony has-been  impeached,  or attacked,  have been taken from 
I  Rule 106,  Comment  c(7)(a),  of  the Model  Code  of  Evidence.  See also 
Ellicott v.  Pearl,  10 Pet.  411,  438,  440-=-may  not show  consistent 
statement made  after inconsistent statement.  - 
In the last subparagraph of paragraph  153a the rule relating 
to corroboration of  the testimony of  an identiTying witness by a 
showing that he made  a previous similar identification is set forth. Such corroborative evidence is  admitted,  even  though the credibility 
of  the identifyingwibess has not been  directly attacked,  on  the 
theory that since identification testimony is so inherently suscep- 
tible to  mistake  and.  suggestion,  proof  of  a previous similar iden- 
tification by  the witness has substantial evidential value.  See 
CM  316705,  Hayes,  65 BR  373,  388,  and  CM  3183k1,  Wolford,  67  BR  233, 
235,  6 Bull  JAG 9. 
153$)  Impeachmnt  of  witnesses.--General,--The  discussion under the  , 
heading  'lGeneraln is  much  the same  as  the similar discussion in 
paragraph 139b3 hriCM,  1949,  and  the matter relating to impeaching 
one's  own  witKess is not materially different from the similar dis- 
cussion in section 303,  NC  &  B.  An  indication as to what  constitutes 
such  surprise as will  permit a party to  impeach his own  witness has 
been  inserted.  See,  with respect to this question,  CM  258070,  Smith, 
1  BR(ETO)  377,  388. 
The  rule that witnesses for the court are not witnesses for the 
prosecution or defense and nay  be  impeached  by  either side is a rule 
applied by  the Federal  Courts  so that tho court ma  with fairness 
to both sides,  obtain the testimony of  an importan%'witness whom 
neither side desires to call as his own  witness.  See Litsinger v. 
United  States, 44 F  (2d) 45. 
Various grounds.-General  lack of  veracity.--In  addition cto 
setting forth the general rules pertaining to proof  of  the character 
of  the witness as to truth and veracity,  this paragraph  contains a 
provision permitting the introduction of  proof  of  the good  character 
of  the witness as  to truth and veracity after a showing that the 
witness has been  convixted  of  a crime affecting his credibility,  or 
that the witness has an unchaste  character,  as well  as after a  shuw- 
ing that the witness has a bad  character as to truth and veracity. 
See Wigmore,  a  1106. 
153b  Conviction of  crime.--It  has here been  stated that before 
(2)Q)  introducing proof  of  a conviction of  a crime affecting his credi- 
bility,  the witness nay  first be  questioned with reference to the  - 
conviction  sought to be shown.  The  requirement in paragraph  139b, 
page  186,  of  the 1949 Manual  that the witness must  first  be  quesTioned  - 
with  respect to the conviction does not appear to  be good  law 
(~rfigmore, 8  980, Note  5).  No  such  requirement  had b  eq  set for-& 
in the discussion of  this question in section 301,  N! & Be , 
With  respect to the second subparagraph of  (2)  (b) it has been 
indicated (in the first sentence) that cross-examinaxion  is  not 
limited by the general rule requiring proof  of  the conviction in 
order to impeach a witness by  showing  that he has committed a crime. 
Authority for this proposition is set forth in Wigmore,  I  981-The rule permitting the raising of an inference of consent in  rape and 
similar cases by  showing the whole  catalogue of  the alleged victim's 
lascivious propensities is not,  with respect to some  of its aspects, 
the majority rule amodg  the States of the United  States.  However, 
the rule stated is one wNch has  obtained considerable recognition. 
It was  adopted by the board  of  review in  the Amy  in  1947,  and was 
inserted in  the 1949 Manual,  because it seemed  more  suitable to the 
requirements of military jurisprudence than did more  restricted rules 
on  the same subject,  and it was  accepted by all  the services for 
insertion in  the 1951 Manual  for the same reason.  See  CM  318548, 
Hernandez,  71 BR  403,  405,  6 Bull JAG 67,  and  (34  324987,  Whaley,  74 
BR  43,  4k.  It has  also been  indicated in  this paragraph that evidence 
of  the lewd  character of the alleged victim in  any sexual offense may 
be  shown  for the purpose ;f  4impeachment,  and  Lha'c  evidence of good 
character as to chastity may  be shown  either for the purpose qf 
indicating the probability of  lack of  consent when  lack of  consent 
is material or to rebut the implications arising from  contrary 
evidence.  See Wigmore,  BB  62  and  924(a). 
Inconsistent statements.--The  discussion of impeachment  by 
proof  of  inconsistent statements has been taken more or less from 
the similar material found, on page  187,  MCM 19k9.  The  1949 Manual, 
however,  did not clearly differentiate between the procedure  used 
in the case of  oral inconsistent statements and  that  used  in  the 
case of  written inconsistent statements.  In the corresponding 
discussion found  in section 299,  NC  &  B,  it was  indicated that the 
procedure applicable  with respect to oral statements must  also be 
used in  the case of inconsistent written statements.  The rule 
stated in the 1951 Manual will permit the use of  either (or both) 
of two methods  of  Laying a foundation in  the case of  a written 
hconsistent statement: 
(1)  The procedure  followed ~5th  respect to oral 
inconsistent statements may  be used  in  which 
case the writing need  not be shown  to the 
witness;  or 
(2)  The  writing may  be shom to the witness and 
he may  be asked whether  he made  the written 
statement. 
The  latter procedure was  at one time,  but is  not now,  the only 
procedure which  could be used  to lay a  foundation for proof  of  an 
inconsistent written statement  (see 'Rimre,  1 1259 et seq.) and, 
of  course,  satisfies the principle of  fairness to  the witness 
because of the fact that if he is  the author of  the written state- 
ment  he will ordinarily recognize it  when it  is shom to  him. The  second  subparagraph under the heading  Inconsistent state- 
ments  provides that an ora1,inconsistent statement of  a witness may  - 
be proved  by  anyone who  heard  him make  it, even though the statement 
was  reduced to  writing and  the writing is not accounted  for.  The 
best evidence rule has  no  application to  proof  of  such a  statement 
(Egmore,  ￿˜\1332) . 
The  third subparagraph under  Inconsistent statanents in  the 
1949 Manual  stated that proof  that a witness not the accused made 
an inconsistent statement is admjgsible only for the purpose of 
impeaching  him.  This  statement is not entirely correct.  Some 
inconsistent statements made  by  witnesses who  are not accused 
persons in  the case might well be admissible under  some  exception 
to  the hearsay rule to prove the truth of  the matters stated- 
for example,  a statement of  a witness who  was  an accomplice of the 
accused which was  made  in pursuance  of the joint venture.  The 
use of  the phrase "not the accusedn in the 1949 Manual  also indi- 
cated that if the witness was  the accused  his statement would  be 
admissible to prove the truth of  the matters  stated.  Although  in 
most cases this would  be so, it  would  not .be so if the statement 
was  involuntary.  The  new  text (third subparagraph)  has taken care 
of  these defects and also contains an admonition to  the law officer 
(or the president of the special court-martial)  as to the instruc- 
tion to be given when  inconsistent statements are received  only for 
the purpose of  impeachment. 
The  last subparagraph under Inconsistent statanents in  the 195'1 
Manual has been  somewhat  rephrased  (with respect to the form in 
which it appeared on  the top of  page 188 of the 19h9 Manual)  for the 
purpose of  permitting the impeachment,  in  some  cases,  of  a witness 
who  testifies that he  has a failure of recollection.  If such a 
witness,  for instance,  had  given material testimony in  the case 
which was  subject to impeachment,  and  a  day or two  before the trial 
had  made  a statement indicating that his recollection was  perfectly 
clear at that time with respect to a matter as to  which he now 
claims a  failure of memory,  proof  of that statement should  certainly 
be admissible to impeach  him.  See  mgmore,  B  1043. 
U'3b  Prejudice and  bias.--This  parapaph is essentially the same  as  (2)(z)  the comparable paragraph appearing on  page  188,  MCM 1949. 
153iC  3 )  Effect of  impeaching  evidence.--The  text with reference to thfs 
matter has been taken from  similar material found  on  page 188,  MCM 
1949,  with some  amplification in  the interest of  accuracy and- clarity* 
1542(  1)  Intent  .--General  .--This  paragraph contains a  general discussion 
with respect to  intent. 154&(  2  Drunkenness.--The  statement as to ordinary drunkenness not 
being an excuse for cfime  on the ground  of insanity has been taken 
from  CM  319168,  Poe,  68  BR lb, 171.  The  rule stated in  the text 
with respect to  voluntary drmkenness being  considered  as affecting 
mental  capacity to entertain a  speciAic  intent,  or to premeditate 
a design to kill,  approximates the rule on this subject laid down 
in section 152,  NC  &  B.  It will  be noticed,  however,  that paragraph 
40a, MChl  1949,  states that voluntary drunkenness may  be considered 
as zffecting mental capacity to entertain a specific intent or state 
of mind.  The  phrase  "state of mindt' was  apparently used  because in 
Army practice drunkenness,  if sufficiently severe,  could  reduce the 
offense of murder  to the offense of voluntary manslaughter.  See 
CU 284389,  Creech,  16 BR  (ETO)  249,  258,  and  Cld  305302,  Mendoza, 
20  BR  (ETO)  341,  34.b.  It  appears that this Arny  practice derived 1-c~ 
impetus  from the fact that before the passage of the revised Articles 
of  War,  effective 1  February 1949,  there had  been no  degrees  of 
murder  and  the mandatory sentence was  death or life  imprisonment. 
Even though the revised Article of Xar  92  did provide for punishment 
as a  court-martial  might  direct in  the case of  murder  not premedi- 
tated,  the 1949 Manual  carried on  the old tradition.  The  1951 Manual 
follows the rule of  the Federal  courts that voluntaq intoxication, 
however  gross,  is not to be considered as bearing upon  the ability 
of  the accused to harbor general criminal intent.  For example,  in 
the Federal courts,  voluntary intoxication is  not  considered as 
affecting a person's  mental  capacity to entertain malice aforethought. 
In such  courts,  as  will  now  be the case in  military courts,  voluntary 
drunkfnness may  be raised as a defense only in  cases involving 
specific intent or premeditation.  See Bishop  v.  United States,  107 
F(2d)  297,  and  TdcAffee  v.  United  States, 111  ~(2d)  199,  205. 
15lra_( 3)  Ignorance of fact.--It  has been indicated that there may  be 
some  offenses as to  which  imorance of  fact is  not available as a 
defense.  See United states-v.  Balint,  258  U.  S.  250. 
Ignorance of law.--The  1949 hnual (page 189) stated that 
ignorance of law was  not an excuse for a  cminal  act.  Section 4, 
HC & B,  contained the same implication with respect to certain kinds 
of  Naval law.  The  maxim,  "Ignorantia  legis nemine  excusat,"  is not 
of  quite so broad an application.  It is a  general rule that if a 
special state of  mind  on the part of the accused,  such as a  specific 
intent,  constitutes an essential element  of the offense charged,  an 
honest and  reasonable mistake of law,  including an honest and  reason- 
able mistake as to the legal effect of known  facts,  may  be shown  for 
the purpose of indicating the absence of  such a  state of mind.  See 
Cotter v.  State,  36  NJL 125,  and  cases there cited.  ?his paragraph. 
(Ignorance of  law)  also indicates that there are certain military regulations of which  a person is not presuaed to  have knowledge. 
This  latter material was  talcen  from  the similar material found 
under the heading  "Ignorance of  lavF appearing on  page 189,  MCM 
1949,  and  is somewhat  broader,  with respect to the categories of 
those regulations of  which  knowledge  may  be presumed,  than the 
rule relating to  this subject set forth in section 4,  NC  &  B. 
lS4b  Stipulations.--The  provisions concerning stipulations are 
practically the same as those set-  forth in  paragraph  140b,  UCX 
1949.  NC  &  B  did not provide for the use of  stipulations, but it 
appears that stipulations both as to facts and  testimony were made 
use of in  actual practice before Naval  courts.  See  CfdO  9-1946, 
p.  327. 
1.54~  -  Offer  of  proof.--MC  & B made  no  provision for offers or" proof. 
Paragraph 140c,  MCM 1949,  on  the other hand,  per-xitted both  the 
prosecution aEd  the defense to  make  offers of proof.  However,  there 
muld appear to be no  reason for extending this privilege to the 
prosecution,  since the government  has  no  appeal as to evidence 
rulings,  and  the possibility of prejudicial error might be  greatly 
incrased by  so extending it.  One  wonders,  for example,  what  would 
be the effect of  the prosecution making  an  offer of proof  in open 
court as to a  confession of  the accused.  It is for these reasons 
that offers of  proof  have been restricted,  in  the 1951 hknual,  to 
the defense. 
lS4d  -  lVaiver  of  objections.-This  paragraph amounts  to a sort of 
catch-all  provision to cover all Gases  of obvious waiver which  do 
not fall  &thin  any of  the explicit provisions for waiver  found 
elsewhere in  the chapter on  evidence.  The  wording  of  the paragraph 
follows that of paragraph lbOd,  MCN  1949.  Tnere is no  comparable  - 
paragraph  in  NC  &  B. Conference 32a-b 
PUNITIVE ARTICLES  (77-87) 
Conducted by 
COMMAPIDER  WILLIAM  A.  COLLIIB 
References : Chapter XXVILI,  Paragraphs  156-166 
In general the punitive  articles cover offenses which  are 
familiar by name  to  the members  of  all the armed forces.  Their 
specific prov5sionst  however,  present many changes,  In some 
instances the fundamental concepts  of  the offense  are different 
from those now  held.  In others the changes,  while not so far- 
reaching,  contain important departuxes frm  the present laws 
governing the med  forces. 
156  Princ~~~~o-l'he  first of  these,  Article 77,  is titled 
Principals.  1:  an  exact sense this is not a punitive  article 
but instead constitutes a definition of  principals.  This 
statutory definition of  principals,  which embraces  persons 
other than the actual perpetrators of  the  offense,  is fairly 
new to the md  services.  However,  the legal concept which 
this definition sets forth is one  fich  has become  well established 
in  military law,  %e  1949 Manual for Courts-Jkrtial  contains a 
similar definition of  Principals,  and  the judicial opinions 
defining the culpability of  aiders and  abettors have  been  con- 
pzrable  among  the  armed forces and are in accord with Article 77. 
Therefore  the provisicns of  Micle  77  and  of  the text in  the 
1951 ?huaL  which  discuss this article present no  substantial 
change  for any  of  the services.  It is  clear that mere  presence 
at the scene  of  an  offense is not enough  to constitute one  an 
aider or abettor.  The  aider or abettor must  have  an intent to 
aid or encourage the commission of  an  offense and must share 
the criminal intent or purpose  of  the perpetrator,  The  person 
who  executes the ~01il.d  of  a principal may  himself  be  innocent 
of  any offense.  For example  a soldier muld not be  culpable 
under  the article if, at the comand of  a superior,  he  shoots 
a man  who appears to the soldier to be  an  enemy  but who  is 
knm  to the superior to be  a friend.  A  similar result would 
obtain when an  irresponsible child or an  insane person is the 
one  counseled or commanded  to commit  an  offense. 
157  -  Accessory After The  Fact.-Article  78 provides a statutory 
definition of  an  accessory after the fact in  language which  is 
derived from title 18,  U.  S.  C.,  3  3, and which  conforms in 
general to  the present views  of  the  armed  forces on  the subject. 
It does  present a change  for the Army  and Air  Force in that 
under  Article of  War  60,  the offense  of  receiving or entertain- 
ing deserters could be  committed  only by  a commanding  officer. Under  Article 78 any person subject to the code who  cormnits  such 
an  act will be  punishable  as an accessory after the fact.  The 
broad  scope  of  this article is stressed in the Xanual by  pointing 
out that the assistance given to a principal 3y  an  accessory 
aftsr the faot includes not  only assistance designed  to effect 
the personal escape or concealment  of  the principal but also 
those acts which  are performed  to conceal  the comission of  the 
offense.  It is to 3e noted that a mere  failure to report a 
knm  offense will  not constitute one an  accessory after the 
fact under Article 78.  It is an  essential elemmt of proof 
that the accased  actually or constructively knew  that the person 
received,  comforted,  or assisted was  the offender.  Under  a 
speoification alleging the accused to be  an accessory after the 
fact, the Governnent  has  the burden  of  establishing beyond  a 
reasonable doubt that  a principal had  committed  the offense as 
to vihich the accused  is allegedly such  an  accessory.  In order 
to establish this essential fact it is not necessary to prove 
the conviction or arrest of  the principal,  but evidence of  con- 
viction of  the principal (such as a record thereof) cannot be 
used  to establish against an alleged accessory the fact that 
the principal actually comitted the offense.  There are opinions 
of  Federal district courts which  hold otherwise,  but the 1951 
Manual  follows a principle laid down  by  the supreme  Court  the 
case of  --  Kirby  -.--  v.  United  ---  States  .- --, 174 U.S.  47  (1899).  . 
158  Lesser  included offenses.--Article  79  follows the language 
of  Rule  31(c),  Federal  Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure,  and  also is 
in accord with the present views of the armed  forces,  including 
the concept that the accused may,  with certain exceptions,  be 
found  guilty of  an  atteiapt  to conmit  either the offense charged 
or an  offense necessarily included therein.  The  derinition of 
a lesser included  offense which  is set forth in the 1951 Manual 
anbodies the definition contained in the judicial decisions of 
the amed forces and prosents no  substantial change.  Appendix 
12 presents a Table  of  Comonly  Included Offenses listing cer- 
tain principal offenses and  offenses necessarily included in 
them.  The  list is  not  all-inclusive and cannot be  applied 
nechauically  in  every  case.  The  table is a general  guide only, 
and  each  case nust be  tested by the definition of  a  lesser in- 
cluded offense vhioh  is set forth in the discussion of  Article 79. 
159  --  Attempts.--Thile  Article 80 provides  for the specific 
s~~bstantive  offense of  an  "attanpt,"  certain exceptions to 
charging  an  attempt  as a  violation of  this article are found 
in Articles 85,  94,  100,  104, md 128 (tha-t; is, Desertion, 
llutiny or Sedition,  Subordinate compelling surrender,  Aiding 
the enemy,  and Assault).  These  articles specifically include 
the offense of  an attempt to commit  the principal offenses 
&ioh they denounce.  The  provision of Article 80 that "Any 
person subject to  this code may be  convicted of  an  attempt to commit  an  offense  although it appears on  the trial that the 
offense was  consummatedn is in accord with the judicial decisions 
of  the Amy  and the Air  Force,  but is different from naval 
practice which  has been  that Ifone proven actually to have 
committed  an  offense cannot be  found  guilty of  an attempt to 
do  sot1 (Sec.  43  NC&B),  Subject to  this exception the provisions 
of  this  article conform to the concepts of  this offense which 
are presently held by the armed  forces and expressed in their 
judicial decisions.  Accordingly an  accused is guilty of  an 
attempt under  the Uniform Code  if he  has committed  acts requisite 
to constitute an attempt even though of  his  own  accord he  desisted 
before the consmation of  the intended offense.  (See  F.B.  Sap, 
Criminal Attempts,  (1927-28)  41 Harvard  Law Review 821,  847.) 
It should be  noted that soliciting another to commit  an  offense 
does not constitute an  attempt. 
160  Conspiracy.--Article  81,  Conspiracy,  provides that "Any 
person subject to this code who  conspires with any  other person 
or persons to cormnit  an  offense  under  this code  shall,  if om 
or more  of  the cmspirators does  an  act to effect the object 
of  the conspiracy,  be  punished as a co~artial  may  direct." 
Under  the last provision of  the article,  an  agreement  to do  an 
unlawful act or to do  a lawful act in  an  unlawful way  will  not 
constitute the offense of  conspiracy under Article 81 unless 
some  member  of  the conspiring group does an overt act to  effect 
the object of  the  conspiracy,  Article of  War  94,  Article  1LS. 
of  the A.G.N.,  and kticle  213 in the Manual for Courts-Eartidl 
of  the Coast Guard all provide  that the mere  entry into a 
corrupt agreement  for the purpose  of  defrauding the United 
States Government  constitutes the offense  of  conspiracy even 
without the performance  of  an wert  act.  As to this offense 
under Article 132 of  the Vnifonn  Code  the Morgan  Report 
specifically states : 
"The  ccnspiracy clause has been omitted as  that 
offense is now covered by Article 81.  It is to be 
noted that an  overt act to effect the  object of  the 
conspiracy is nm  required.ft 
Hmver,  because  of  the serious nature  of  certain offenses, 
the mere  agreement to conrnit  them  is considered to be  so rep 
rehensible as to rzquire punishment  in civilian life and,  from 
the military standpoint,  to constitute a  pu_nishable-offense 
under  Article 134.  Some  of  the more  cmon offenses of  this 
nature are proviad for as statutory conspiracies in title 
li  18,  U.S.C.,  1946 ed,,  which  includes Section 241,  flConspiracy 
against rights of  citizens";  Section 757,  procuring escape 
of  "Prisoners of  war or eneroy  aliensit;  Section 2271,  "Con- 
spiracy to destrqy vesselsu;  and Section 2384,  ItSeditious 
conspiracylt;  and no  overt act is required to consmate those offenses.  As  these offenses are still  on a comnon  law footing, 
of  course they may  be tried by military courts under the general 
Article 134. 
161  Solicitation.  Article 82 provides  for the offense of 
solicitation,  but limits its application to  the solicitation 
of  only four offenses,  that is, to any person subject to the 
code who  solicits or advises another  (a) to desert in  violation 
of Article 85,  (b) to  mutiny in violation of Article 94,  (c) to 
commit  an act of  misbehavior before the enemy  in violation of 
Article 99,  or (d) to cammit  sedition in violation of Article 
94. 
Neither the Articles of  War nor  the Articles of  the Govern- 
ment  of  the Navy  provided for "Solicitationm as a general sub- 
stantive offense,  although both of  the applicable statutes 
denounced  the persuading  or enticing of  another to  desert. 
While-Article  82 is limited in its  application to the enumer- 
ated offenses,  solicitation to commit  some  other offense may 
constitute conduct  to the prejudice of  good  order and  disci- 
pline or service discrediting conduct and as such may  be charged 
under Article 134.  It is  not necessary that the person  or 
persons solicited or advised act upon  such solicitation or 
advice in order to constitute the offense  (united States v. 
Galleanni,  245 F.  977;  Commonwealth  v.  Flagg,  135 Mass.  545). 
However,  that fact may  affect the punishment  which may  be 
adjudged,  for if  after the dicitation or advice the offense 
of  desertion or mutiny is  attempted or committed,  or if there- 
after the offense of  misbehavior before  the enemy  or sedition 
is  committed,  the accused shall be punished with the punish- 
ment which  is  provided for the commission  of  the offense 
solicited or advised.  If the offense of  desertion or mutiny 
is  not  attempted or committed,  or if the offense  of  nisbehavia. 
before the enemy  or sedition is  not  committed,  the accused 
shall be prlnished  as a court-martial  may  direct. 
Solicitation may  be  accomplished by means  other than by 
word  of  nouth or by witing.  Any  conduct which reasonably may 
be  construed as a serious -request or advice to commit  an  of- 
fense may  constitute solicitation. 
162  Fraudulent Enlistment, Appointment,  or Separation.  Sub- 
division (1) of  Articls 83 is in  substance the same  as Article 
of War  54,  but with the addition of  the wording which makes 
the offense applicable to officers as well  as  to enlisted 
persons;  and the,  1951 Wual  adopts in general the language  of 
paragraph  142 in  the 1949 Kanual which  is  also in general 
accord mith the present provisions of  NC&E.  Sec.  103,  Naval 
Courts  and  Boards,  in part provides that where  the accused 
fraudulently enlists without a  discharge from another e-rrt in the Naq  or  Marine  Corps,  the of fense is  complete without 
the accused's  receipt of  pay 'or a1lov:ances  under his new  enlist- 
ment.  Article 83 provides  that in all offenses  of  fraudulent 
enlistment or appointment,  the receipt of  pay  or allowances 
under  the f rauduhnt enlistment or appointment  is  an  essential 
element.  Acceptance  of  food,  clothing,  shelter,  or trans- 
portation from the Government constitutes receipt of  allawances. 
However,  whatever  is  furnished the accused while in  custody, 
confinement,  arrest, or restraint pending trial for fraudulent 
enlistment  or appointment  is  not considered an  allowance. 
Article 22(b),  A.G.N.,  requires that all offenses of  fraudulent 
enlistment  must be tried by  GCM,  but there is  no  such juris- 
dictional limitation in  Article 83 of  the Uniform  Code. 
Subdivision (2) of  Article 83 incorporates the proposed 
A.G.IT.  Article 9  (34) which relates to one  who  procures his 
own  separation by fraudulent means. 
164  Effecting unlawful  enlistment,  appointment,  or  separation. 
Article 84 prohibits any person  subject to  the code  from 
knowingly  effecting an  enlistment or appointment in or sepamtinn 
from the armed  forces of  any person who  is ineligible for such 
enlistment,  appointment,  or  separation because it is  prohibited 
by  law,  regulation,  or order.  This  article is derived from 
Article of  War  55,  but its scope is expanded to apply to all 
persons  subject to the code  instead of  to officers only,  and 
also to include the unlawful  appointment  of  officers and  the 
unlawful  separation of  men  and  officers,  The  comparable 
statute in the Navy,  Article 19,  A.G.N.,applies  only to officers 
who  knowingly  enlist into the nawl service war  time  deserters, 
insane or  intoxi  cat  ed persons ,  or minors  (under certain conditims). 
164a  -  Desertion.  The  Morgan  Report  states that Article 85 
defining "Desertion"  consolidates the provisions of  the Articles 
of  mar  and  the Articles for the Government  of  the Navy  relating 
to desertion,  with the exception of  Article of  War  59  (Advising 
or Aiding Another  to  Desert) and Artiole of  War  60  (Entertain- 
ing a ~eserter)  the provisions of  which  are now  carried forward, 
respectively,  by Article 77  (principals) and Article 78CAccesso- 
ry after the fact). 
In general,  this article presents few changes  over  the 
present  law in the Army  and Air Force,  but it presents a major 
change in the Navy's  conoept  of  the offense of  desertion as 
now  denounced by Articles 4 and  8,  A.G.E.  One  of the essential 
elements of  the offense under  these naval articles is that the 
deaertion be  from  the naval  service and not merely from a 
certain ship or atation.  None  of  the provisions  of  Article 
85 of  the Codemakes such total absence from military control an element  of  the offense of desertion,  In the Army  and Air 
Force absence from the service of  the United States is  an 
element  of  desertion,  but for a member  of  those forces the 
particular place of  service is the "service  of  the United  State&" 
and total absence from military jurisdiction and  control is 
not a requisite factor of  the offense. 
Subdivision (a)(l) of ~rticle  85 provides  that any 
member  of  the  armed  forces of  the United States who  without 
proper authority goes  or remains  absent from his place  of 
service,  organization,  or place of  duty with intent to remain 
away  therefrom permanently  is guilty of  desertion.  This  is in 
accord with Article of  War  58  but,  as mentioned,  differs from 
Articles 4 and  8,  A.G.N.,  in that it will  not be essential to 
prove  that the accused absented himself  entirely from military 
jurisdiction and  control.  If a man  leaves his ship without 
authority and  has  the intent to remain away  from her perm-+, 
he  is guilty of  desertion under  subdivision (a)(l) even though 
he  steps ashore on  a naval base  and does  not leave th~t  base 
thereafter,  Both  the absence without  authority md  the intent 
to remain  away  permanently from his place of  service,  organi- 
zation,  or place of  duty,  are essential elements  of the offense. 
Subdivision  (a) (2~  Article 85  provides  that any member 
of  the armed  forces  0-d  St&e  ----  s who  quits his *.t  / 
-m"o=imited  naval  on this matter is  contaihed in 
Subdivision (14)  of Article 4,  A.G.N.,  which  provides  that 
the punishnt of  death,  or such other punishment  as a court- 
martial may  adjudge,  may  be  inflicted on  any person in the 
naval service who,  in time  of  battle,  deserts his duty or 
station,  or  entices others to do  so. 
The  concept  of  hazardous  duty  or  importarit  service is 
not limited under  Article 85 to duty or  service in a  combat 
area,  These terns embrace  a wide  field, including  employment 
in aid of the civil power  in protecting property,  or quelling 
or preventing  disorder in time  of  great public  disaster,  and 
embarkation for foreign, duty or duty beyond  the continental 
limits of the United  States or for sea duty, 
Subdivision (a)[3)  of  Article 85 provides  that a member  of 
the armed forces is  guilty of desertion if, without being 
regularly separated from one  of  the armed  forms,  he  enliets 
or accepts an appointment  in the same  or another  one  of  the 
armed  force6 without fully disclosing the fact that he  has  not been  so regularly separated or errters  any foreign armed  service 
except *en  authorized by the United States . In the Army  and 
Air Force,  Article of  War  28  denounced  similar acts when  such 
were  committed by  enlisted persons,  but did not apply to  such 
conduct  of  officers or warrant officers as does  the Uniform 
Code.  This is  not to say that an  officer's accepting an ap- 
pointment  in one  armd service without having been regularly 
separated from another would  not have  been a triable offense 
under the Articles of  Mar;  but  of  itself it would not have 
constituted desertion.  Subdivision (a)  (3) of  Article 85 has 
no  exact counterpart in  the Articles for the Government  of  the 
Navy,  under which  a person who  has  the intent to  permanently 
abandon his pending  contract of  enlistment and who  absents  1 
himself  without authority or is then absent without authority 
from naval jurisdiction is guilty of',desertion. 
Under  the Uniform Code  a member  of  an armed  force who 
is  absent without proper  authority,  and &o  then enlists or 
accepts an  appointment  in  the same  or another armed  force, 
mag  be guilty of  committing desertion under  Subdivision (a) 
(1) of  Artiole 85,  that is, by being absent without authority 
with intent to  remain  away  permanently,  the intent being 
evidenced by his act of  enlisting or accepting an  appointment 
or entering a  foreign armed  service.  Subdivision (a)(3) 
covers the situation where  an unauthorized absence is  not 
necessarily involved;  the accused could be  on  an authorized 
leave or liberty and his wrongful act of  enlistment or 
aocepting an appointment,  or entry into the  service of  a 
foreign armed  service, without more  would  complete the of- 
fense of  desertion, 
The  provisions of  subdivision (b) of  Article 85 
correspond $0  the current provisions of  the Articles of  War 
-  and the A.G.N.  and disciplinary laws  for the Coast Guard, 
164b  -  Attempting to Desert,  As  in  cases of  attempts generally, 
here also under  subdivision (c) of Article 85 in the particular 
case of  an attempt to desert there must be  an  overt act which 
is more  than mere  preparation toward accomplishing that of - 
fense.  However,  once the attempt is  made,  the fact that 
conscience or some  more  tangible force causes the offender 
to stop short of  aotual desertion does  not cancel the offense 
inherent in the attempt. 
165  Absence  Xithout Leave.  With a few changes  in  wording, 
article 86  corresponds  to  Article of War  61.  fi ails to  repair" 
as used in Article of  Nar  61 is  expressed in  Article 86  as 
"fails to go,"  and  "absents  himself  from  his command,  guard, 
quarters,  station, or camp"  is  now  expressed as "absents himself  or remains  absent from his unit,  organization,  or other 
place of  duty at which  he  is required to  be at  the time pre- 
scribed."  The  essential element stated in  Article of War  61, 
that the absence must  be "without  proper leave,"  is  stated in 
the text of Article 86 as absenoe "without  proper authority." 
To  the Navy  the provisions of  Article 86  present the new 
concept  of  having  an  unauthorized absence without necessarily 
involving a total absence  from military control.  One  who 
left his ship or other specifically appointed duty,  but who 
remained  within the confines of  a naval  shipyard or naval base, 
might be  guilty of  conduct to  the prejudice of  good  order and 
discipline--but  he  was  not guilty of  an unauthorized absence. 
Under  the Uniform  Code  a  sailor ordered to report at  a certain 
time to a cleaning station on  the forecastle of  a  destroyer and, 
without proper authority,' fails to so report or having  so 
reported 1  eaves that cleaning station without proper authority, 
may  be guilty of  absence without leave although he  is  at that 
time physiaally present  on  the fantail of  that same  ship.  This 
is  equally true of course of  the soldier or  airman,  who,  though 
still on  a post or base,  without proper  authority fails to 
report for kitchen police at the time ordered,  or who  without 
proper authority leaves such duty after reporting.  To  the 
Array  and Air Force  this of  course is  a  familiar view of  the 
off  ens e of  Absence without  leave. 
\ 
Under  subdivision (3) of Article 86 if it ie charged that 
an  accused absented himself  from his ship (that is, frm  his 
"unit")  without proper authority, it would  be  a defense that he 
actually was  at  that time  on board her although it would be  no 
defense that he  was  at that time  on  a Navy  dock  adjacent to 
that ship.  The  phrase  "place  of  duty,"  as used  in  Article 
86  subdivisions (1) and  (2),  refers to a  specifically appointed 
place such as the first floor of barracks A  or compartment  C-105,  '  on board the U.S.S. 
-  ,  whereas  the phrase  "other.  place 
of  duty,"  as used in conjunction with the terms  "unit"  and 
"organizationft in  Article 86  subdivision (3), is  a generic term 
designed to cover  the broader  concepts  of  a-general-place of 
duty as might  be  contained within the terms "~ommand,'~  "quarters," 
"station,"  "base,"  "camp,"  or "post."  Article 86  is  designed 
to cover  every  case not elsewhere  ~rokided  for in which any 
%ember  of the armed  forces, through his om  fault, is not at  I  4 the place where  he  is  required to be  at a prescribed time. 
\Specific intent is not  an element of  this offense, 'and  proof 
of  the unauthorized absence is  alone sufficient to  establish a 
prima  facie case.  Under  subdivisions (1) and  (2) of  Article 
86,  a place  of  duty is  not  an  appointed one  unless the accused 
has  actual or constructive knowledge  of  the order purporting to appoint such place of  duty.  Knowledge  is "actual" when  it is 
conveyed directly to the accused.  It is "constructiven when  it 
is shown  that the order was  so published that the accused in 
the ordinary course of  events,  or by the exercise of  ordinary 
care, would  have  seoured knowledge  of  the order.  The  place  of 
duty,  of  course,  may  be  appointed for one  person  only or as 
a rendezvous  for several. 
I 
As  to  members  of  the armed  forces who  either are turned 
over for trial by  the military to the civil authorities or are 
apprehended and tried by civil authorities without  the member's 
prior return to  military jurisdiction,  the new  manual  restates 
the rules currently followed in all of  the armed  forces.  As 
is  now  true in all of  the services the status of  absence with- 
out leave is  not  changed  by  his inability to return through 
siclcness,  lack of  transportation,  or other disability.  But 
when  a man on  an  authorized leave is  unable to return at the 
expiration of  his leave through no  fault of  his own,  he  is  not 
guilty of  absence without  leave. 
166  Missing Movement.  As  a specif~c  statutory provision, 
the offense of  missing movement,  Article 87,  is new  to all of 
the services although-acts  such as thoae  denounced  by Article 
87 have not gone  unpunished in any of them.  In the Navy  the 
o~ffense  of  deliberately missing  ship is now  tried under  Article 
22,  A.G.N.,  and  in  the Army  and  in the Air Force  similar  offenses 
are tried under Article of  War  61.  As  stated in  the Morgan 
Report Article 87  is  taken from  proposed A.G.N.,  Article 9  (57). 
/,  Article 87  encompasses  not only a deliberate missing of 
som  required movement  but also one  which  occurs  through neglect. 
The  definition c'ontained in  the 1951 34anual  is derived from 
definitions of  "through neglectn which  appear  in paragraphs  171 
and  172b,  1949 Manual,  and Section 69,  Naval  Courts  and Boards. 
To  be  &lty  of  the offense of  missing movement  the acaused 
must  have  known  or had cause to know  of  the prospective move- 
ment  he  is  alleged to have  missed,  although it is  not necessary 
that he know  the exact hour  or even the exact date of  the 
scheduled movement.  It is  sufficient if the approximate  date is 
known  to the accused,  and proof  of  general knowledge  in  the 
aocused' s organization 'of the prospective movement  would  justify 
the assumption  by a court of  the necessary knowledge  on  the part 
of  the accused. Conference No.  12c-d 
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167  Contempt  towards  officials.-Article  88  is derived from 
Article of  War 62.  Article of  War 62  and the discussion thereof 
contained in paragraph  150 of  the 1949 Manu31  are in accord with 
the present naval  practice on  this subject,  although there is 
no  specific provision in the Articles for the Government of  the 
Navy  regarding this  offense . In the Navy  the offense is now 
triable as a  violation of  one  of  the general articles.  Article 
88  is more  restrictive than Article of  Xrar 62  in that the former 
applies to officers only while the latter a.pplies to ell  persons 
subject to military law. 
168   isr respect  towards  a  superior officer.--Article  89 is 
prilrarily a restatement  of  the pr ovisi  ons  of  law  currently 
governing the armed  forces in regard  to this offense.  The 
article,  however,  does not ind  ude  the provision  contained  in 
Article 8  (6),  A.G.N.,  t%rhile  in the execution of  his office1$, 
and  the present requirement  of  nava.1 law,  that the superior be 
present  and in the execution of  his office a.t the time  the offense 
is committed,  will  no  longer apply.  In the 1951 BBanua.1 the 
analysis and definition of  the terms  Hsuperior officer" and  "his 
superior officern are in accord with t.he present holdings of  all 
of  the armed  forces except for the provisions relating to 
superiority as between  personnel of  different armed  forces,  and 
except that, at  present,  the Navy  includes warrant officers and 
petty officer in the term nsuperior officerN.  A.principa1 
defense still available to  a person accused  of  this offense is 
that the accused  did not know  that the person against whom  the 
acts or words  were  directed was  his superior officer. 
169a  -  Striking or assaulting  superior  officer.--The  provision of 
subdivision (1) of  Article 90 is essentially the same  as the 
one  now  contained in Article 4  (3  ),  A.C.N.,  and  in  Article of 
fiar  64.  The  word  rfassaults" as  used in Article 4,  A.G.N.,  is 
supplanted in the Uniform  Code  by- the phrase  ndraws or lifts 
up  any weapon  or offers any violence against himu  in conformity 
with the present terminology  of  Article of  War a;  but the 
change is only in  wording  and not one  of  substance.  Article of  War 64  provided t.hat this offense was  punishable when  the 
assault or battery wa.s  comiitted Iton any pretense whatsoeverI1. 
This  last phrase has been  omitted from Article 90,  but the 
orrLssion  presents no  real change to  the Armx or Air t'orce 
because  those services have  always  recognized certain defenses 
to the offense.  It is  to be  noted that a discharged prisoner 
or other civilian subject to military law and under  the command 
of  an  officer is subject to this provision. 
169b  -  Disobeying superior officer.  Subdivision  (2 ) of  Article 
90 is identical  with the provision  -L  of  Article of  War  64  and 
Article 4(2),  A.G.N.;  and  the discussion of  this offense 
appearing in  the 1951 Manual is derived from that contained in 
paragraph 152 of  the 1949 Manual  and  section 47,  NC  &  B,  as 
modified by Change #lh,  The  mentioned  Change  #ll established 
the fact that  if the order to a person is to be executed in 
the future,  the failure to execute that order when  the time 
comes  constitutes the offense of  disobedience of  orders,  and 
not  conduct  to the prejudice  of  good  oder and discipline as 
had been held previously by -be  Navy. 
170  Insubordinate  conduct  towards noncommissioned  officer.-- 
As mentioned  above,  sect~on  47,  NC  &  By  defines the words 
Ifsuperior officern as including petty and noncommissioned 
officers.  This is not the case under  the Uniform  Code where 
the term officer, defined by sta+xte, is construed to refer 
to a  comLssioned officer.  However,  the offenses aga.inst 
petty and noncommissioned  officers contemplated by section 47 
are encompassed within the offense of  insubordinate conduct 
towards  a noncommissioned  officer under  Article 91 which has 
the same  general objects with respect to  warrant officers, 
noncodssioned officers,  and petty officers as Articles 89 
and  90 have with respect to commissioned  officers.  It does, 
however,  limit the offenders against whom  it is directed to 
warrat officers or enlisted persons instead of  including 
"any person subject to the codeR, as  provided  in  Articles 89 
and  90. 
Article 91 denounces those offenses committed by a sub- 
ordinate in his relations tc one  senior to  him.  A  military 
senior,  of  course,  may  be  punished  for assaulting or striking 
a subordinate,  and  in certain instances (e.g.,  when  the 
subordinate is an  armed  force policeman) for disobeying his 
lawful mder,  but these are offenses under  other articles such 
as Articles 92,  93,  128,  or IJh.  Similarly,  an assault by a civilian subject to military law upon  a warrant officer, a 
noncommissioned officer,  cr  petty officer should be  charged 
under  Article Ub.  Subdivision 3  of  Article 91,  denouncing 
contemptuous  and  disrespectful language  or deportment  toward 
a warrant  officer,  or noncommissioned or petty officer,  employs 
the phrase  nwhile such officer is in  the execution of  his 
officeN.  This limits the application of  this part of  the article 
to language  or beha-vior within the sight or hearing  of  the 
person toward whom  it is used. 
17  1  Failwe to  obey order or regulation.--Article  92  is 
derived from  proposed  Articles 9 (30)  and  9  (19  ),  A.G.N.  ,  and 
is broader than the present Article 8  (20),  A.G.N.,  Violating 
general order or regulations and  Article 8 (9),  A.G.M.,  Neglect 
of  orders and  culpable inefficiency.  Under  the present Army 
and Air Force practice offenses of  this natwe would be cherged 
under Article of  War 96.  Article 92  is made  up  of  three parts, 
the first part being directed against any person  subject to the 
code who  violates or  fails to obey any laorrful general order or 
regulation.  The  second  part is directed against any such person 
who  having  knowledge  of  any other  lawful order issued by  a 
member  of  the armd forces, which it is his duty to obey,  fails 
to obey the same,  this section contempla.ting all other lawful 
orders which  may  be issued by a member  of  the armed  forces, 
violations of  which are not chargeable under Article 90 or 91. 
The  third part is directed against any  person subject to the 
code who  is derelict in  the performance  of  his duties.  As a 
specific punitive provision,  this latter subsection is new  to 
the Army  and Air  Force,  but has been  known  to the Navy  as 
neglect of  duty (~ec.  105,  NC &  B)  and  culpable ineffiency in 
the performace of  duty (Sec.  67.,  NC  & B). 
Dereliction in the performance  of  duties may  be  evidenced 
either by a willful or negligent failure to perform a  duty im- 
pcs ed by  reguktion., lawful order,  or custon of  the service or 
by performance  of  such duty in a  culpa.bly  inefficient manner. 
Culpable  ineffiency is inefficiency for which  there is no 
reasonable  or just excuse,  and  if it appears  that the accused 
had  the  ability and opportunity- to perfom his duties efficiently 
but nevertheless  performed  them  inefficiently,  he  may  be  found 
guilty of  this offense.  It is no  offense,  however,  if the 
failure to perform the duty is caused by ineptitude or incapacity 
alone. Cruelty and maltreatment.--Artiple  93 is derived from 
proposed Article 9 (12),  A.G.N.,  and is identical with  the 
present Article 8  (2),  A.G.N.  The  present Arm~GL~d,.&.r  Force 
practice is to charge an  offense of  this nature under  Article 
of  Zar  96.  The  discussion in the 1951 Xanual  defining the 
phrase  "any  person subject to his orders'  is based  on 'present 
holdings by the,amed  forces regarding such offenses,  and 
although the ma.ltorea.tment, oppression,  or cruelty ]nut  be  real, 
it mag  be  inental as well as  physical. 
173  Mutiny acd. sedition.--Article  94  is derived frcm Articles 
of  War  66  and  67,  and  the text of  the 1951 Manual  adopts in 
general the language  of  paragraphs 1%  and  155 of  the 1949 
Manual which  discuss these articles of  war.  The  dezth penalty 
has been  removed  for the offense of  @attempted  sedftlodg, and 
the words  nexcites, causes,  or joins"  have  been  omitted as 
being unnecessary since persons taking such actions are triable 
either as principals under  Article 77  or as guilty of  solicitation 
under  Article 82. 
A  change  in the Navy's  definition of  "mutiny"  is effected 
by the provision in  Article 9b that the offense must  be committed 
"in  concert withtt another person  or persons,  except when  violence 
or disturbance is created.  Section 46,  NC  &  B  holds: 
"To  constitute routiny,  it is  not  necessary that there 
should be a  concert of  several persons,  though it will 
be rare that this is lacking 
A  change for the Army and Air Force is effected by the applic- 
a5ility cf  subdivision (a) (3) of  Article 94 to all  persons 
subject to the Uniform  ~&e  instead of  only to officers and 
soldiers as was the case under Article of War  67.  All  other 
persons presently subject to rnilita-y law who  are guilty of 
failure to suppress mutiny or sedition are chargeable under 
Article of  War  96 in the Army and  Air Force. 
The  word "utmost"  as it is used  in subdivision (a) (3 ) 
of  Article 94  should be  given a reasonable  interpretaxion 
based  on  the action that properly may  be called for by the 
circumstances of  the situation,  having  in  mind the rank and 
responsibilities or the employment  of  the individual concerned. 
.A failure to  take Itall reasonable means"  to inform his superior 
or commnding  officer includes a failure to take the most 
expeditious means  available,  and whether  an  accused had Itreason to believet'  that an  offeqse of  mutiny or sedition was  taking 
place is to  be tested by whether a reasonable man  knowing  the 
same  facts as  the accused and  being  in  the same  or  similar 
circumstances would  have believed that a mutiny or sedition was 
takhg place.  It should also be noticed that Article of  War  67 
used the phrase  "having  reason to  believe that a mutiny or sedition 
is to take placer1, whereas  Article 94  (a) (3) uses the-phrase 
nhas reason to  believe is taking place,t* 
17&  Arrest and  confineraent.-Article  95 is derived from the 
punitive aspect of  Article of  War  63  and is in accord mith st-ilar 
provisions in the Navy  and Coast  Guard.  Resisting apprehension 
is now  known  to the Navy  as  resisting arrest and is tried under 
Article 22,  A.C.N.  At present there is no  specific punitive 
article in the Army or Air Force comparable  to Article 95  covering 
resisting a.pprehension.  In the past,  although similar  offenses 
could have been  tried by  the Amy  and  Air Force under  the general 
article, few  cases of  this nature seem to have  arisen,  and  therefore 
the first part of  this article my  present a  comparatively new 
field of  offenses in the Army  and Air Force.  It should be specifi- 
cally noted that a person  cannot be convicted of  resisting appre- 
hension  if the attempted apprehension was  in fact illegal. 
17  5  heleasing prisoner without proper authority.--Article  96 is 
derived from Article of  bvar  73  znd  is in  accord with the comparable 
Navy  provisions.  Article 8  (lo),  A.G.N.,  limited the specific 
offense to  those of fenders who  were  "rated or acting as master  at 
armsR, but in  the case of  persons  other than those rated or acting 
as master at arms,  the offense would  have been alleged in  the Navy 
as  culpable inefficiency in the performance of  duty or as aiding 
the escape of  a person under  arrest.  Aside from this difference, 
Article 96 presents no  change  in the current concepts of similar 
offenses held by  all of  the armed forces. 
17  6  Unlawful  detention of  another.--The  provisions of  Article 97 
are in accord with those presently discussed in Section 101, 
NC  &  B,  and with the opinions in  the Army  and Air Force discussing 
similar  offenses which  are now  tried under Article of  Vfar 96. 
Any unlawful restraint of  another's  freedom  of  locomotion will 
result in a violation of  this artic1.e. 
17  7  Noncompliance  with procedural rules.--The  first  provision 
in  Article 98  against unnecessary delay embodies  the substance of 
Article of  War  70 but is enlarged to include persons other than 
officers.  An  offense in violation of  the first part of  this 
article can occur,  for instance,  when  an officer who  has  been assigned the investigation of  an  offense unnecessarily delays the 
the investig&tion  or when  a cornanding  officer unnecessarily delays 
the proper disposition of  charges. 
Paragraph  (2) of  this article is directed against a failure 
to cuqly  with :?rocedural provisions  and is new  as a specific 
punitive clause.  It will  provide'a means  for enforcing such 
provisions  as are contained in Article 37  which  prohibits un- 
lzwfully influencing the action of  a court or Article 31 which 
prohibits conpulsory self-incrimination.  Under  the Articles of 
Viar  or the Articles for the Gwerment of  the Navy,  deliberate 
interference with the functions of  a court-martial  or  other 
intentional violations of  this knnd  would  fall under  the general 
articles (A.w,  96,  A.S,N,  22);  thus the new  code  reflects the 
increased emphasis  placed on  prohibitions against conpulsory 
self-incrimination  and  unlawfully influencing the court, 
17  8  Esbehavior before the enemy.-The  provisions of  Article 99 
correspond with those in  Article of  war  75 and Article 4  (12-201, 
A.G.N.  The  generic provision of Article of  liar 75  against an 
officer or soldier "who,  before the enemy,  misbehaves  himself"  has 
not been  incorporated in  Article 99,  but  it is believed that the 
new  article specifically covers all  conduct punishable  in this 
respect;  note,  for instance,  the broad  scope of  item (3) directed 
against endangering the safety of  a command,  unit, place, or military 
property through disobedience,  neglect,  or intentional misconduct. 
Attention may  be  invited to the fact that the clause "before  or in 
the presence of  the enemy"  applies to each of  the nine subdivisions 
of  the article. 
179  Subordinate compelling surrender  .--Article  100 consolidates 
Article of FIar  76 %Subordinates  Compelling  Commander  to Surrendertt 
and Article 4  (12 ),  A.G.N.,  "striking flag or treacherously 
yieldingtt, but its heading is indicative only of  the first portion 
of  the article.  The  second part of  the article deals with the 
offense ,of  any person subject to  the code who  surrenders or attempts 
to  surrender a military force or position when  he  is not authorized 
to do  so  either by  competent  authority or by the necessities of 
battle.  (In this connection,  it is to  be noted that section 3  of 
Public Law 506,  5 May  1950,  provides  that no  inference of  a 
legislative construction is to be drawn  from catch lines in the 
Uniform  Code. ) 
18  0  Improper  use of  countersign.-The  provision against improper 
use of  countersign in  Article 1C1 is based  upon  Article of  War  77 and is new  to the Na.vy.  In the second part of  this article, 
directed against giving a parole or countersign different from 
that authorized,  the words  "to his knowledge"  have  been added  to 
cover  the situation when  a person misunderstood  the countersign 
or parole received by him.  Article 101 is directed against a 
negligmt as well as a deliberate of'fender. 
181  Forcing a  safeguard  .--Article  102  corresponds  to Article of 
War  78,  but  the words  time of  warw have been deleted in  order 
to cover situa.tions where  a safeguard has been placed but a formal 
state of  war does not  exist.  The  provision is new  to the Navy, 
but the subject was  considered in  the Septerber 1950 issue of the 
JAG Journal.  The  discussion in  the 1951 Manual is extended 
considerably to provide a more  detailed definition of  a "safe- 
guardn and is based  upon  materiel set forth in paragraphs 241-2k2 
of  the Kules  of  Land  Narfare  (FM  27-10)  and  CMO  XCO  k8h6  Owens. 
Captured  or abandoned  propertx.--The  provisions of  Article 
103 regarding  captured or abandoned  property consolidate Articles 
of  War  79 and  80 and  correspond  to parts of  Articles 8  (16), 
16, and  17,  A.G.N.  Paragraph 3 of  subdivision (b),  directed 
against looting and pillaging,  has been added  since "it was  felt 
tha.t, conduct  of  this nature should be specifically covered.It 
The  definition in  the new  manual  of  lcoting or pillaging is based 
in part upon  the case  of  CU 31046, Huppel,  61 BR  291,  5 Bull JAG 
205,  which  indicated that looting or pillaging need not necessarily 
be  a.cconplished by force or violence. 
Aiding  the en en^.-Jurisdiction of  a court-nizrtial  or military 
conmission under  Article 104 extends over  all  persons  regardless 
of  whether they are otherwise subject to  militmy law.  The  article 
correspcnds to  Article of  War  81 but is in  terms  of  "aiding"  rather 
than  "relievingti the enemy.  Related provisions in the A.G.W.  are 
Articles b  (4)  and  (5). 
hiisconduct  as prisoner.--Article  105 denounces  acts which  will  -- 
constitute an  offense new  to all  of  the armed  forces  and stems 
fron abuses which  arose during World Naz-  11. 
The  first part of  the article is directed against any person 
subject to the  code who  while in the hands  of  the enemy  in time 
of  war,  without  proper authority and  in a manner  contrary to law, 
custom,  or regulation,  acts to the detrinient  of  other persons  of 
whatever  nat>ionality  held by the enew as civilian or military 
prisoners,  for the purpose  of  securing favorable treatment to himself.  Escape  from the enemy,  however,  is regarded as 
authorized by custom,  and therefore an  escape which  results in 
punitive measures  being taken against fellow prisoners still in 
the hands  of  the enemyis not an offense under  this article. 
Obviously,  too,  an  escape is not an act done  "for  the purpose  of 
securing favorable treatment by his captorsM.  The  second part 
of  the article concerns  any person subject to the code who,  while 
in the hands  of  the enemy  in time  of  war  and while in a position 
of  authority over other persons  of  whatever  nationality held by 
the enemy  as civilian or military prisoners,  maltreats such persons 
without justifiable cause. 
185  Spies-.--Article  106 is derived from Article of  War 82 which 
is generally in  accord with naval law on the same subject.  The 
specific provision of  this  article relating to a person's  lurking 
as a spy or acting as a spy in  or about any shipyard,  any manu-  - 
facturing plant,  or any other place or institution engaged  in 
work  in  aid of  the prosecution of  war by the United  States is a 
recognition of  the importance of  industrial plants and  other 
manufacturing  units engaged  in  the war  effart.  This article 
applies only in  time of  war.  In time  of  peace  spies would be 
charged under  Article 134 for the acts which  are denounced by 
t5e espionage provisions  of title 18,  U.S.C. Conference Xo.  126-f 
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186  False official statements.--Article  107 is derived in 
part from  Articles of War 56 and 57 and is closely related 
to similar provisions of law  now governing the Navy and the 
Coast Guard.  This article is broader in scope than the 
specified articles of war  in that it applies to all persons 
subject to the code instead of only to officers, and also it 
is not limited (where documents are involved) to particular 
types of documents and extends to oral statements.  On  the 
other hand, it does not oover the second sentence of Article 
of War 57 which is directed against a deliberate or negligent 
failure to  render a return, nor does this artiole include the 
clauses of Articles of  War 56 and 57 which provide for the 
mandatory punishment of dismissal. 
Articles 8 (4)  and 8  (I),  A.G.W.,  (~alse  musters, 
Falsehood),  which are comparable to Article 107 do apply to 
every person in the Navy. 
187  ldilitary property of United States.--LOSS, --  d 
destruction. etc.--Article  108 consolidates Art~  es of War 
B3 and 84  &d  corresponds to Article 8  (15) and part of 
Article 4 (8), A.G.N.  As  far as its first subdivision is 
concerned (selling or otherwise disposing of military property), 
the offense denounced is separate  and distinct from that of 
larceny, which is punishable under Article 121.  The distinc- 
tion made by Article of Tiar 84 between issued and nonissued 
militwy property no longer exists.  However, the faot that 
the property in question was of a type and kind issued for 
use in the  military service might, together  with other cir- 
cumstmces,  raise an inference that the property was  military 
property.  See generally on this question, CIA  319591, Pogue, 
68  B2 385,  398,  and mi 327060, Graulau,  ' 76  BR 35, 7  Bull JAG 34. 
Brticle 108, applying to all persons subject to the 
Uniform Code, is more extensive than Article of War 84  mhich 
applied only to  soldier^.^  With reference to the  maximum 
punishment for offenses under this article, the Table of 
Maximum  Punishments in the new manual varies the punishment according  to  the value of  the proper%  involved,  following 
the current Axmy  and  Air Force practice.  Furthermore,  as far 
as  damage  (as distinguished from loss) is concerned the punish- 
nent is modified by regarding as  controlling the amount  of the 
damage rather than the total value of  the property, 
Pro  erty other than military property. --Waste,  spoil, 
destruc  -+k--"  lon --Article  109 is derived from Articlo of War 89 
and  encompasses  private property  as well as nonmilitary 
Government  proper-t;y.  As  far  as the offenses of wasting and 
spoiling are concerned,  the offenses involve real property 
only,  this restrictive interpretation being  in accord with 
current Army  law and based upon  the historical concept  of 
'hstetl  and.  "spoil." 
The  provisions  of Article of War  89 relating to orderly 
behavior,  reparation,  and riot have not been  included in 
Article 139 as the reparation aspect is dealt with in Article 
139,  corresponding to  Article of-War 105,  and  riot is covered 
by  Article 116.  Corresponding to the provisions implementing 
Article 108,  the new manual  varies the maximum punishment  for 
offenses in violation of  Article 109 according to  the value 
of  the property destr-oyed .or,  in cases of  damage,  aocording to 
the amount  of  damage. 
Improper hazarding of  vessel.--Article  110 is derived 
from mchs  4(10) and  8(11),  A.G.X.,  and  is directed against 
willful as well as negligent acts or omissions.  The  tern 
"hazarding"  embraces  stranding and destruct  ion,  and  stranding 
is conclusive'  evidence of the fact that the  vessel was  hazarded 
although not  of  the fact of  culpability on the part of  any par- 
ticular person,  Cases  of  hazarding a vessel,  though  involving 
actual damage  or destruction,  should be pleaded uder Artiole 
110 as the more  serious offense rather than under Article 108, 
The  high standard of  strict responsibility for the safety 
of  a  ship and  her crew that is  imposed u  on naval officers 
was  expressed in  Naval  Digest,  1916,  p.  &LO,  "Navigation,' 
paragraph 16,  end  in CMO 5-1930,  3.  The  disoussion of  negli- 
gence and the other definitions contained in the nm  mual 
are  taken from the corresponding provisions of Naval  Courts 
and  Boards  (~ec.  69),  and the qualifying remarks  as to  the 
distinction between negligence and mere  error of  judgment  are 
in accord with the present provision of the Coast Guard 
Nenual  for Courts-martial  (Article 245).  The  definition of 
"suffertt is taken from  CMO  -186-1919, '&. 
Drmken,or  reckless driving.--The  word 
in Article 111  has the meaninn  set forth in 
the 1951 Manual.  It will be noted that the 
ndrunk"  as used 
paragraph 191 of 
text of  this article uses the term "operates"  rather than the word 
"driving" which appears  in the catch line.  The  term "operaten 
is controlling, and  is s omemhat  wider than the word  "drive". 
In  Commonwealth  v.  Clarke,  192b,  254 Mass.  566,  150 NE 829, 
for instance,  the defendant  was  held to have  "operated"  his 
car in a situation in which  the engine was not running,  when 
he  entered the  car to lock the transmission and  in  order to 
do  this threvrthe  clutch over  from  the  revorse to  neutral, 
causing the car, ' then at rest on  a slight incline,  to  move 
forward  about four feet.  The  definition in the new  mama1 
of  the term 'fvehiole" follows the Federal  definition of  that 
term contained in Title 1 U.S.C.  8 4 in that it is not limited 
to motor  vehicles;  hap~ever, it  is not  limited as  is the 
Federal definition to means  of  transportation on  land. 
191  Drunk  on  duty.--The  provisions of  Article 112 are derived 
from Article of  War  85,  although the phrase  "other than a 
sentinel or look-outn  has been  inserted beoause  drunkenness 
on  duty of  a sentinel or look-out  is punishable  under  Article 
113.  Article 112 differs somewhat  from cwrrent Navy  law, 
Article 8(l), A.G.N.,  which  denounces  drunkemess  in general. 
Under  this naval  provision the fact that the offender was on 
duty at the tine oonstitutes merely  an aggravating cisuum- 
stsnce; but under Article 112 the faot that the offender is 
on  duty &en  found drunk  is an essential element.  Drunkenness 
in certain other situations is obargeablo under Astioles 133 
or 134  (see app.  6c,  Forms  #115,  #132,  et seq.,  1951). 
It is an element  of  the offense of  being found drunk on  duty 
that the accused wan  found  drunk while aotually on  the duty 
alleged;  and  if an  accused while sober absented himself  from 
his duty md was found  drunk while so  absent,  his conduct 
would not be  chargeable under  this article. 
192  Misbehavior  of  sentinel or look-out.--The  language use 
in  Article 113 is substantially that of  Article of War  86, 
though  the word  "look-out"  has been  added to cover Navy 
terminology.  Although the general provisions of  Article 8(1), 
A.G.N.,  encampassed drunkenness by  sentinels as well as other 
persons  in the Navy,  the first part of  Article 113 has  no 
specific counterpart  in Navy  law.  Article 4(8),  A.G.I!.,  is 
a  provision broader than the second part of  Article 113 since 
it encompasses  sleeping while  on  any kind of watch duty,  +"or 
instance,  while on watch as officer ofthe deck,  but such 
offense should now  be  charged  as a  violation of  either Article 
92  or Article 134.  Similarly,  Article 4(9), A.G.K.,  is 
broader than the third part of this article which  is directed 
, 
specifically against a sentinel or look-out  who  leaves his 
post before being regularly relieved.  Under  the Uniform  Code 
a person on  a different duty who  leaves his station before being regularly relieved should be  charged,  depending upon 
the circumstances,  under  Article 86(2),  92,  or 134.  Certain 
misbehavior  by  sentinels whioh  does  not fall under  Article 
113,  such as  loitering on  post,  should be  charged  under 
krticle 134  (see app.  6c,  - Form #168,  MCM 1951). 
193  Duelin  .--The  provisions  of  Article 1Q- are derived 
primari 4  y  ram Article of War  91 and present no  change  of 
substance to the Army  and Air  Force.  Article 14  is broader 
in scope  than Artiole 8(5), A.G.R.,  since it also covers the 
offenses of  promoting  or conniving  at fighting a duel and, 
when  having  howl  edge  of  a challenge sent or about  to be  sent, 
of  failing to report that fact promptly to  the proper authority. 
Huwever,  the general discussion which  is contained in the 1951 
Manual  is in accord with the Navy  decisions and with the defi- 
nitions of  the offense whioh  appear  in the Naval  Digest  of  1916. 
It  should be pointed  out that mutual  combat  fought with 
fists does not constitute a duel. 
194  Malingering.--Article  115  presents no  substantial change 
for the Army  and  Air Force  in xhich services the offense of 
feigning illness,  disability,  or insanity with the intention 
of  evading  duty is now  charged under  Article of War 96,  as is 
also any willf'ully and wrongfully self-inflicted  injury which 
results in  temporary  or permanent  impairment  of  ability to 
perform military duty.  Self-maiming  has  also been  held to 
constitute misbehavior  before the en-  under Article of War 
75  or mayhem  under Article of  War 93.  In  the Navy,  feigning 
sichess, physical disablement,  or mental  lapse or derangement 
for the purpose  of  escaping duty or work  is now  charged as 
malingering  under Article 22d,  A.G.W.  Section 104,  NC&B,  in 
discussing this offense states that  "To  constitute the offense 
the pretension must  have  been suocessful."  Such mill  not be 
the case under Article 115  since the essence of  the offense is 
the design to avoid work,  duty,  or service whether  or not the 
accused actually evaded  certain duties by means  of  the pretense. 
195  Riot or breach of  peace.--Artiole  116 denounces  riot as 
does  Article of War 89 but is a new  provision and deviates from 
the legislative technique found  in oiher punitive articles of 
the Uniform Code  in that it does  not define "riot"  or "breach 
of  the peace."  In the Navy,  riot and other similar offenses 
such as affray and  disorder were  regarded as offenses in vio- 
lation of  the general  article (Article 22(a),  A.G.N.),  and 
"r.iotn was  defined in Section 92,  NC&B.  The  definition of 
"riotn in the new  manual  is based  upon  the common  law defi- 
nition but has been modified so as to link riot to breach of the peace,  making breach  of  the peace an essential element 
and a lesser included  offense.  It is not required that the 
rioters complete  their entire purpose,  but they must  have 
begun  to execute it.  The  example in the second subparagraph 
of  paragraph  195a of  the new  manual  is taken from &on  v. 
City of  l?Jausau, 98 Wis.  592,  74  hW  354. 
As  a specific offense,  ''breach  of  the peace1' is a nem 
offense in military justice.  The  term "breach  of  the peace1' 
was  used  in paragraph  177 of  the 1949 Yiual to  describe pro- 
voking words  or gestures  as words  or gestures of  a na+;ure to 
induoe breaches  ofthe peace,  and Section 92,  NC&B,  referred 
to bPeach  of  the peace  as an  element  of  "riot. "  Many offenses 
proviously charged  under Article of  War 96  or Article 22,  A.G.N., 
are now  chargeable  as breaches  of  the peace  under Article 116. 
1%  Provoking  speeches  or gestures.--Offenses  similar to 
those within Article 117 are now  denounced by Article of War 
90 and Article 8(3),  A.G.oNo  The  discussion of  Article of  War 
90 in paragraph 177 of  the 1949 Manual  provides that the words 
or gestures,  to be  punishable  under that article, must  be  of 
a nature to induce breaohes  of  the peace,  and  although this 
factor is not mentioned  in Article 117 it has been  incorporated 
in the discussion of  the offense in the 1951 Manual  as a logi- 
cal test of  whether  the words  or gestures which  are used in the 
presence of  the person to  &om  they are directed are "provoking" 
or "reproachful. " 
197  Murder.--In  comparing Article 118 with Article of War  92 
and Article 6, A.G.E.,  it will  be  noted first that certain 
jurisdictional  limitations have  been deleted.  ajrticle of War 
92  limited oourt-martial  jurisdiction  in time of  peaoe  to 
murder  cormnitted  outside the geographical  limits of  the States 
of  the Union  ad  of  the District of  Columbia;  and Artiolo 6, 
A.G.N.,  similarly limited court-nartial  jurisdiotion in tims 
of  war  as well as in time  of  peaoe.  Under  Article 118 the 
jurisdiotion of  courts-martial  over  the crime of  inurder is 
no  longer  subjeot to suoh lisitations. 
Article 118 specifically defines,  as murder,  four oate- 
gories of  homicide,  wbile neither Article of  War 92 nor 
Article 6, A.G.N.,  oontained an  explicit definition.  In 
doclaring murder  punishable,  the two  last mentioned  articles 
adopted the comon law definition of  murder,  Leo, nuder is 
the unlawful  killing of  a human  being with malice aforethought, 
express  or kclied.  While  the definition in paragraph 179 
of  the 1m.  PJanual  does not  oontain the words  "express  or 
implied,  " the discuss ion therein of  ''malioe  af  orothought 
left no  doubt but that there was  recognized,  as murder,  a honicide commi-tted with express or  implied malice.  The 
imjplied malice  of  the comnon  law  encompassed  aa  intent to 
inflict great bodily ham (now  covered by Article 118(2)), 
ad  further encompassed  the so-cilled  felony murder,  i.e., 
a homicide  coimnitted  during the perpetration or attapted per- 
patration of  a felony inhersntly dangerous  to human  life.  It 
will Se noticed that felonies of  this kind are now  listed 
restrictively by  Article 118(4). 
The  other comon law  categories of  implied malice con- 
cerned cases in  which  a death was  caused while a person was 
resisting a lawful arrest or obstructing an officer in an 
attenpt to suppress a riot or affray,  or in which  the death 
resulted from an intentional and unjustifiable aot or 
oinission of  a  legal duty,  ths natural tendenoy  of  which act 
or omission was to cause death or great bodily hanu  to some 
person.  In Article 118(3) is found  a related category, 
The  substitution of  a specific definition for the common 
law definition has  brought  about another variation in the con- 
cept of  murder,  namely,  the omission of  the "year  and a  day" 
Iimitation.  While  paragraph  179 of  the 1949 Manual  and 
Seotion 53,  MCPGB,  adhered to the common  law requirement  that 
death must  result within a year md a day  of  the act or 
omission that caused it, it has  been recognized that today's 
state of  medical  science renders  the "year  and a day"  rule 
archaic.  The  decisive question is  whether  there is proxi- 
Inate  causal connection behen  the wound  and the death. 
While Axtiole  118 does  not specifically set forth 
different degrees of murder,  the differences in punishment 
prescri3ed make  a  clear distinction between  premeditated 
and  felony murder  on  the one  hand  and  the remaining cate- 
gories of  murder  on  tire  other. 
There is a marked  distinction betv~een  certain oonduct 
which may result in murder  in violation of  Article 118(3), 
such as throwing  a  live grenade toward another in jest or 
flying an  aircraft very low over  a crowd  to make  it scatter, 
and the sonavlzat  related conduct which,  if death were  oaused 
thereby,  would  support only a charge of  involuntary man- 
slaughter in violation of  Artiols llg(b)  (1),  such as being 
cu1pabl.j  negligent in discharging a pistol  (see Hyde  v. 
State,  a 1935 Alabama  c~se,  160 So.  237).  The  principal 
difference betmeen  the offenses denounced by Article 118(3) 
and Article llv(b)(l) ara found  in the nature of  the con- 
duct,  i.e.,  ~~hether  or not death was  a probable consequence 
of  the act, and  in the accused's  state of  mind,  i.e.,  whether 
or not such evidenced  a mton  disregard of  human life. The  specimen specification for murder  (app.  6c,  form #5) 
is a  short form me  of  pleading  sanctioned by  the-supreme 
Courtts similar form  of  a murder  indictment  set forth in 
Form 1  of  the Federal Rules  of  Criminal Procedure  (soe Ochoa 
v.  TJnited  States,  167  F.  2d  341).  As  previously  indicated 
the list of  lesser inoluded  offenses  in  the 1951 ~anual  is 
not all-inclus ive and  does  not mention attempted murder 
&ich  oan be  an  offense distiapishable from assault with 
intent to commit  murder. 
198  -  Manslaughter.--Article  of War 93  listed the term 
thslaughter" among  various crimes  and  therobs adopted tihe 
comon law concept  of  voluntary and  invo1-srba.r~  manslaughter. 
Article ' ll9 of  the Unif om Code  adheres to the distinction 
and  defines the tm types of -slaughter.  There is no  sub- 
stantial difference between the old and the new law con- 
cerning voluntary manslaughter. 
As  far as  the offenss of  involuntary manslaughter is con- 
cerned,  the terminology used in Artiole 119 to  define the 
offense difYers considerably from the coriunon  lam terminology, 
but in  substance the difference in  definition is not  very 
great.  Under  the common  law,  as under Article llg(b)(l), 
the first of  the two types of  involuntary manslaughter  arises 
fron culpable negligence.  The  second type of  involuntary 
manslaughter at cmon  law arises from the conmission of a 
oriminal aot malum in se but not amounting  to a felony of  a 
kind which would naturally tend to oause death or  great 
bodily harm  to another person.  The  crhinal aot must  not 
be a  felony of this kind  as  otherwise the resulting homicide 
would constitute a  felony nurder.  To  illustrate, if  a 
honicide results from a  sirnple assault and  battery,  as frm 
striking the victim with a  fist-or  with a weapon not of  a 
deadly type-in  such a way as would  not be  likely to cause 
death or great bodily ham, and the assailant has no  intent 
to kill or inflict great bodily ham, the offense is in- 
voluntary manslaughter  at common  law.  Such a  situation 
would  constitute involuutary manslaughter  also under 
Article ll9(b)(2) despite the differenoe in tsminology. 
The  phrase  "an offense,  other than those specified in 
paragraph (4) of article 118"  corresponds to  the comon 
law rule which  exoludes certaFn felony offenses,  and the 
phrase "direotly affecting the person''  is the result of  an 
endeavor to  define the distinction between malum 
in se and malum  prohibiturn.  The  phrase '"affecting the 
personn mqr  be  found  in Section 1050 of  the New York  Penal 
Law whioh  contains a  comparable provision with respect to 
involuntary manslaughter. Conference Xo.  12g 
Conducted  by 
LT.  COL.  JMJ  F.  RYDSTROIIJ 
Article 120a.--LXAPE  - 
199a  -  The  oi'fense  of  rape  as set forth in Article 120 represents 
no  substantial change  from  the offense at  comnon  law.  There  are, 
however,  some  shanges for the services,  For  example,  for the 
Army,  the geographical  linita-tions in peace  time  for a  trial by 
court-martial  of  a rape  charge,  which  used  to appear in XJJ  92, 
have  been  rmoved;  for the Coast  Guard,  it is a  new  offense since 
it was formerly held beyond  the jurisdickion of  a  Coast Guard 
court-~artial  to try (Iv~Chi, Coast  Guard,  p.  93); and  for the Navy, 
the death penalty may  now  be  imposed by  a general court-3artial 
(see Section 121,  WC &  B). 
Article 120 now  expresses in words  the principle that the 
offenses of  rape and  carnal howledge may  be  committed by  a person 
only with a  female not his wifa.  This raises the question of 
whether  a husband  could be  charged with rape  of  his wife.  If 
another person had  intercourse with her by  force and  vf~thout;  her 
consent,  and the husbmd aided and abetted him  in doing so,  he 
would be  a  principal under  article 77,  and  appendix  6a(9) provides 
that a person liable as a principal may  be  charged as-thou~h he 
himself  had  comnitted the act which  constituted the offense.  By 
the very tams of  Article 120,  hovmvor,  he  could not himself 
commit  the oi'fense against his wife,  and  there would  be  presented 
the specification in suah a case,  "that Joe  Doalcs  did,  on  or 
about a  certain date at  a certain place,  rape "arj  Doaksll'  a 
woman  whom  the proof  would  shorn  to be  his wife. 
state courts have  been  faced with this situation with 
indictments  dram under  statutes similar to ~rticle  120,  and have 
generally sustained convictions  of  the husband  as a principal in 
the second degree.  The  rationale is that a man could be  guilty 
of  such aa offense at comon law,  and  that the statutes on  the 
subject are nothing more  than an adoption of  the  integral parts 
of the common-law  definition of  rape.  In  this co=ection,  see 
State v.  Digrnan,  (w. Va.)  5  SE  2d  113;  and  the annotation in 131 
ALR  at  1325 which  discusses the criminal responsibility of  one 
cooperating in an  offense which  he  is incapable  of  committing 
personally.  Article 77  obliterates the distinction between principals in first and  second  degree,  important  at conmon-law 
both in pleading and  proof,  and it seems  to follow necessarily 
that such an offense would  proparly be  charged in the usual  form 
of  speoification,  the inconsistency being more apparent than 
real.  See  Haggerfy v.  3.  S .  ,  5  I?  (2d) 224.  - 
The  second paragraph of  l99a recognizes  the well-established 
rule that actual resistance is nzt essential to show  lack of 
consent.  Fear of  death or great bodily harm  is frequently used 
as  a testof thereasonableness of the  fear which permits  a 
'woman  to fail or cease  physical  resistance,  and  all surrounding 
ciremstmces must  be  considered.  Peo~le  v.  Yannucci,  283 NY 
546,  29  NE  2d  185.  Warton suggests (1 Cr.  Law,  12th Sd.,  Sec. 
701)  that a woman's  fear is  to be  gaged by  her capacity to resist 
under  the particular circumstances,  md gives as an  example  the 
father who  established a  "reign of  terror" in his home,  a~d  was 
held guilty of  rape  of  his daughter who  submitted passively to 
him through terror. 
199b  -  Uhile the mrds "carnal knowledge"  have  been used  in their 
generic sense in the services in the past,  they ars now  a%rm 
of  artsn  since Artiale 120b states that a person who  does  the 
acts proscribed  therein,  iz  guilty of  "carnal hiowledge. "  It 
should be noted that carnal knowledge  is defined as  "sexual 
intsrcourse under  circunstances not amounting  to rape."  In  other 
words,  if the intercourse is obtained by  force :and  without  the 
woman's  consent,  the offense is rape no  matter what  her age. 
This  thought  is emphasized  in paragraph  l99a in which it is stated 
that rape may  be  committed  on  a fanale of  azy age.  Of course, 
also,  the acquiescence of  a farnale  child who  is of  suoh tender 
years  that she is incapable of  understpnding  the nature of  the 
act is not consent,  and  the offense may  be  charged as rape  rather 
",an  carnal knowledge.  (See (3.5  233543,  TJcFarland,  20  BR  15) 
In  some  jurisdictions  the offense of  carnal howledge may 
be  committed  only against a girl of prior chasts character. 
Article 120b  is not so  limited,  and  the girl's lack of  chastity 
or the ascuzedts  ignorance  of  her age  is no  defense to him.  See 
People  v.  Marks,  130 TiYS  524. 
The  last paragraph  of  paragraph  1-b  reoognizes  the fact 
that,  although Article 120b sets at 16 ysars,  the age  of  consent 
of  a girl to intercourse Sth  persons  in the military service, 
we  still have  the general  article, 134,  under which persons  subject 
to the code may  be  tried by  courts-martial  for their acts which bring discredit upon  the armed  forces because  oommitted  in 
violation of  local statutes . Ordinarily,  the decision to 
prosecute for statutory rape should depend  upon  whether  the 
facts show a violation of  the standard set forth in Article 
120b,  but the way  is necessarily open,  however,  under Article 
1347 for the exceptional case in which  violation of a local 
statute brings suoh  discredit on  the service as to require 
prosecution by  court-mar-k  ale 
Attention  is invited to specification 88  in appendix 60 
which shows  a short form plsading of  the offenses of  rape aiid 
carnal knowledge.  As  "rape"  and "carnal knowledge"  are defined 
in  Article 120,  they are terns of  art, and when  alleged in a 
specification carry with them,  by  necessary implication,  all 
constituent elements of  these offenses.  It is as necessary to 
prove  that the female is not the accused's  wife under  such 
a specification as though that allegation were  set forth 
verbatim--otherwise,  the offense of  rape or carnal knowledge 
is not proved.  In  connection with the necessary proof  of  the 
girl's age  in the offense of carnal knowledge,  she herself can 
testify to that fact.  See  paragraph 138d.  - 
In regard to the legal sufficiency of  such short form 
pleadings under Article 120,  appendix 6a(i) which  is a  part 
of  the Executive Order,  prescribes thess forms  for use.  This 
prescription of  them by  the President pursuant  to .Article 36 
has  the force and  effect of  law insofar as th3 administration 
of military justice is concerned,  and may  be  likened to a 
statute presoribing short form  indictments  or informations. 
Such statutes are usually sustained by  the courts.  See 42  CJS, 
Sec.  9Ob;  annotation in 69  ALR  1392;  and  People  v.  Bogdanoff, 
254 NY T6,  171 NE 890,  in which  the court said,  'We  may  not hold 
that the framers of  the Constitution intended that all the 
formalities of  the old common-law  indictments must  forever remain 
inviolate." 
200a(l)  Article 121.--LARCZTY  - 
Artiole 121 closely follows the first part of  Section 1290 
of  the New  York  Penal  Law.  The  other parts of  the Mew  York 
statute further define and explain the offense,  somewhat as does 
the first paragraph  of  200a  where  it is stated that under a 
simple allegation that the-acoused  stole the property,  nay be 
charged and  proved  any of the various acts denounced  as larceny. 
Section l29Oa  of  the New  York  Penal  Law  has  a  similar provision 
that proof  OF  my act denounded  as larceny will sustain an 
indictment for stealing the prop=rty, but with an exception that 
if the stealing is  by  false pretense,  it must be  so alleged before evidence  of  the false pretense nlay  be  received*  This  exception 
appears an unwarranted  restriction.  For  exmple, a New  York 
court felt constrained to hold,  apparently in view of  the exoep- 
tion (people  IT.  Ginsburg,  84  NYS  2d  520), that if accused were 
charged with stealing property by Talse pretense he  could not 
be  convicted if, in the first instance,  he  obtained title or 
possession to the property  lawfully--an  offense which would  have 
been  embezzlement at  oommon  law. 
The  discussion of  larceny in paragraph 200a  and  specification 
89  in appendix 60  avoid this difficulty,  confoGing to  the larceny 
statutes of  many-states.  Such simplified statutes are not neces- 
sarily modera--in  fact, h?assachusetts has been  operating under 
a statute combining  larceny,  enbezzlement,  and  false pretense, 
with, a  simplified indictment  similar to the specification in the 
manual,  since 1899,  and  no  difficultfias like those  in New  York 
appear  to have  arisen in the administration of justice.  The  view 
of  Nassachusetts courts is (Corn.  v.  Althause,  200  Mass.  32,  93 
Ne  202), 
"The  Commonwealth  is at liberty to make  out  larceny 
in any way  in which  the facts stated show  that a larceny 
was  cormitted,  whether it was  a larceny at common  law, 
or by  mbezzlement,  or by  obtaining properQ by  false 
pretenses. " 
200a (2)  -  Subparagraph (2), concerning  the taking,  obtaining  or 
witholding,  sets forth a.number of  technical  considerations 
involved in larceny.  The  fact that gaining possession of  property, 
without title, is alone sufficient to constitute larceny under 
Article 121 is implicit in the article inself, and  the Xorgan 
Committee  stated the article was  specifically intended to cover 
the crime of  larceny by  trick.  This  is further discussed in 
the last subparagraph of  the discussion of  "false pretense."  This 
discussion also indicates that larceny may  be  omitted  when 
money  is borrowed with an  intent not to repay it.  It has  been 
held that  if one  is already in possession of  property,  thereafter 
acquiring title by  false pretense,  there is a sufficient "obtaining" 
to constitute laroeny,  for in such case,  the actual delivery of 
the property to the  thief is not necessary for him  to obtain 
domi~ion  over it.  See Allen v.  State,  21 Ohio  App.  403,  153 NE 
213.  That  larce~y  under  Article 121 includes  the devoting of 
property  to a use not authorized by  its OWTI~~,  was  clearly intended 
by  the Xorgan  Cornlittee,  for in its comment  to Article 132 on 
frauds against the United States,  the Committee  advised Congress 
that it had  covered misappropriation in Article 121.  The  fact that 
an embezzlement-type  la.rceny may  be  committed  even  though  the owner 
has made  no  demand  for the property  does not,  of  course,  eliminate 
the necessity for proof  that there existed a duty upon  the thief to return the property.  The  rule merely  recognizes  that the 
prosecution need not be  able to show  that the owner  demanded  a 
of  the property in order to establish that an embezzle- 
ment was,  in fact, cornniitted.  See  Fuller-t;on v.  Canal  Zone, 
8 F  2d  968.  - 
In regard to Subparagraph  (3),  ownership  of  the property, 
note the broad  language  of  Article 121 which  covers  staaling from 
the possession  "of  the true owner  or of  any  other psrson." 
Definitions of  "true owner"  and  "any  other person"  are set forth, 
but in the ordinary case,  the distirctions need  give little concern 
since it is sufficient if the person slleged as the owner  at the 
the  has  any  right to,the  property superior to that of  the accused, 
whether it be as general  or special omsr. 
200a(4)  -  Subparagraph (4) comrs the wrongfulness  of  the initial 
taking,  obtaining,  or withholding,  and  it is pointed out that 
larceny does  not result if tke one  taking the property has  a 
right to it at  least equal to the one  from whom  taken.  For  example, 
the crime  of  larceny is not'comlitted  by  a creditor who  obtains 
payment  of  a liquidated deb% from the debtor by  false pretenses. 
In  such a case,  a Wew  York  court said (people v.  Thomas,  3  Hill 
(M)  169),  ''A  false representation by  which  a man  may  be  cheated 
into his duty is  not within the statute."  An  owner may,  however, 
commit  larceny if he  takes  or obtains his property fron another 
when  that other has  a superior right at the time of  possession of 
the property,  as in  the case  of a  bailment  or a lien.  See  Hall  v. 
U.  S.,  277  Fed  19.  Eowever,  in such a case,  the value  involved 
in the offense is that of  the limited interest only.  See  last 
subparagraph of  200a.  - 
200~(  5  Subparagraph  (5) sets forth the "obtaining"  type  of  larceny, 
that by  false pretense.  In  addition to misrepresentations  of 
other kinds  of  facts which may constitute a false pretense,  the 
fact fzlsely represented by  a  person may  be  his opinion or his 
intention.  iduch  has been written as to whether  the expression of 
a false opinion or a false promise  to do  something in the future 
could constitute a false pretense.  The  earlier view was  that 
false opinions and false pronises did not amount  to false pretenses 
and  this is still the law in some  jurisdictions.  For example,  in 
a  case decided under  Section 1290 of  the New  York  Penal Law,  People 
v.  Karp,  298  EJY  213,  81 NE  2d  817,  Earp  promised  a number  of people 
that for a certain sum,  whicz vras  paid to him  in each case,  he 
would  insert their names  and  business  advertisements in a telephone 
directory to be  published  and  distributed by  him.  IIe  agparently 
had  no  intention of  ever publishing such a direotory,  and  the 
Appellate Division sustained his conviction,  holding  that the 
proof  was  sufficient to show  that Karp  had  the intention of  oom- 
rnitting a theft at  the time he  made  the false representations. The  Kew  York  Court of  Appeals,  however,  in a very brief, per 
curiam,  opinion reversed the conviction,  holcing that larceny 
could not be predicated upon  a promise,  or upon  an  expression 
of  intention not meant  to be  fulfilled. 
This  decision is  not in accordance with the modern  view 
of  obtaining by  false pretense,  for it is rather generally held 
that the state of  a man's  mind  is an  existing fact,  and  that if 
he  misrepresents that fact, he  has made  a misrepresentation which, 
other elements being present,  may  subject him  to a  conviction 
for larceny.  With respect to false opinions,  the modern view 
is perhaps best expressed  in the case of  State v.  Grady,  147 
Xiss.  LL6,  111  So.  lb8.  With  respect to the modern  view of 
false promises,  see Smith v.  Fontma,  48 F.  Supp.  55;  and Cornm. 
v.  Ealker,  108 Mass.  309,  in which  the court said,  flatly, 
"A  mants  intention is a matter of  fact,  and may  be 
proved  as such . . .  A  false pretense as to fihat  a buyer 
intends to do  with certain goodsj  would  not36 less 
material  than a  false pretense that the buyer  owns 
certain property." 
Of course,  it is  not true that every promise  to do  something 
in the future which  the promisor  fails to perform,  is a  false 
pretense,  but &en  such a  promise  is a misrepresentation of  the 
acousedrs state of mind  by  reason of  the fact that he  did not 
intend to execute the promise  at  the time  he made  it, the pronise 
may  logically and  reasonably be  held a false pretense. 
Obtaining property by  check may  constitute larceny if at 
the time  of  uttering the check  the maker  did not intend to have 
sufficient funds  in the bank to  meet  papent of  the check,  and 
the offense should be  charged simply  in accordance with specifica- 
tion 89 or 90  in appendix 60.  This  intention may  be presumed 
when  it is shown that the maer did not have  sufficient funds  in 
the bank. available to meet  payment  of  the check  upon  its presentment 
in  due  course.  See  paragraph  138a.  Tzl  this connection,  however, 
it should be  noted that only someaing of  value  can be the subject 
of  larceny,  and  if a worthless  check were  given for a past-due 
indebtedness,  there would  be  no  present value and no  violation of 
Article 121.  The  note following specification 129 in appendix 60  - 
covers this more  fully.  Further,  such an  offense under Article 
134 would  not appear to a lesser included offense  in larceny. 
200a(6)  -  Subparagraph (6) sets up  the basis for the abbreviated 
specification of  larceny,  providing  that an  "intent to steal," 
includes all the permanent-type  "intents"  of  larceny,  whether  to 
deprive another of  his property as in larceny,  or.to  defraud him of  it as in false pretense,  or to  appropriate it to  the 
thief's om  use,  as in embezzlement.  The  subtleties of 
distinction between  these intents are of little  moment  under 
the simple allegation of  stealing,  and the necessity of  former 
considerations of  "custodya,  "possession",  whether the victim 
intended to part with title as well as possession,  and the 
like, are eliminated because  an  allegation of  "stealn is  es- 
tablished by  proof  of  any of  the acts included within the  - 
Article . 
The important  consideration is  that accused must  be  shown 
to have  wrongfully and intentionally dealt with the property 
of  another in a manner  likely to  cause him  to suffer a per- 
manent  loss thereof.  For this reason,  it is larceny if the 
accused takes the property of  another even  though he  intends 
thereafter to return the property upon the happening  of a 
future contingency  (~ruslow  v.  State, 95 Tenn.  189,  31 SV 
987)  or hides the property wit'n  intent to retain it until a 
reward is  offered (~erry  v.  State,  31 Ohio  State 219). 
In regard to  the proof  of  value of  property stolen,  the 
owner  may  testify  as to its  market  value,  the circumstance 
that lie  is  not otherwise qualified to express an  opinion 
going  only to the weight  to be  given his testimony.  This is 
the Federal rule.  See  Caten  v.  Salt City Movers,  149 F (2d) 
423. 
200b  Article 121. --WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION  - 
The  offense of wrongful  appropriation is  distinguished 
from the offense of  larceny only by  a lesser intent;  i.e.,  the 
wrongful taking,  obtaining,  or withholding of  the property must 
be  done with intent to deprive,  defraud,  or appropriate only 
temporarily.  Everything said about larceny applies equally 
to wrongful appropriation,  with the exception of  the duration 
of  the intent. 
201  Article 122.--ROBBERY 
The Morgan  Committee  stated that robbery under Article 122 
conformed basically to the common  law,  but that the class of 
persons manaced  had been  enlarged.  Robbery may  be  committed 
by  putting a  person in  fear of  future injury to the property of 
a relative.  The  statute appears to closely follow Section 2120 
of  the New  York  Penal Law. 
If  you  have  considered Article 127 on Extortion,  you  have 
perhaps wondered  as  to the difference between  an attempted 
robbery,  for example,  in  which  the accused sought to obtain $100 
by putting the victim in  fear of  future injury to his son;  and extortion committed  by  communicating  threats to injure the 
victim's  son  with intent to obtain $100.  It  has been  said 
that in  order to constitute robbery,  the property must  be 
taken against the will and without;  the consent of  the  person, 
while  in extortion the property is  obtained with his consent, 
People  v.  Barondess,  16 NYS  436.  This  distinction,  however, 
while well-recognized  (e.g.,  see 46  Am.  Jur.,  Robbery,  Section 
3),  is  not quite real:  In both offenses  the victix surrenders 
his property unwillingly--if  there is consent in extortion, it is 
a consent wrung  from the victim.  Perhaps  a distinction is 
that robbery requires an intimidation of  the victim which is 
greater than  the threat in extortion;  but this would not 
necessarily be  so,  and there are probably many  cases in  which 
the particular facts would  establish a violation of  either 
article.  The  chief  thing to remember  is  that in  extortion,  the 
offense is  complete  when  the accused comunicates a threat 
with  the requisite intent, whether he  obtains anything or not, 
while  in robbery  there must be  an  actual larceny by  taking. 
It is  said that the fear of  injury to property must  be  of 
sufficient gravity to warrant  the victim giving up  his property. 
While it might appear  that if the victirn did,  in  fact,  give up 
his money  because  of  a fear of  injury to property,  the offense 
would  necessarily be  complete,  it is only reasonable  that the 
fear of  injury engendered in the victim be such as would  have 
caused a  reasonable rmn  under the circumstances to have  given up 
his money. 
Robbery  includes larceny,  but by  the te,ms of Article 122, 
it is  only one  particular type  of  larceny,  a "takingn with intent 
to steal.  If robbery were  charged,  and the evidence  showed no 
force or fear but rather that accused had  been entrusted with 
the property which  he  mithheld from  the owner,  i.e., 
the old cormon  law embezzlement,  there could be no  robbery,  nor 
the included offense of  larceny by  taking. 
It is  clear that proof  of robbery  conmitted either by force 
alone,  or through putting the victim in  fear,  is s-ufficient to 
sustain the offense.  This  ia  dernonst~ted  by  the example  given 
of  the person whose  attention is diverted by a confederate of 
a pickpocket;  in this situation,  the victim could have no  fear 
since he  had no  knowledge  that he  was  being robbed.  See People 
v.  Glynn,  7  NYS 555,  25 NE  953. 
It is  a long established rule in pleadicg robbery that it 
is  proper  to allege that it occurred "by  force and violence 
and by  putting in fear,"  but that proof  of  either force or  - 
fear will sustain the charge,  the one  not proved being dzregarded 
as surplusage.  This was  true both at comion  law and under statutory forms  of  robbery.  See  46  Am.  Jur.,  Robbery,  Section 
3;  Tomlinson  v.  United States,  93 F  (2d) 652.  Naval  Courts 
and  Boards,  Section 123,  showed  separate specifications for 
each,  whereas  the Amy  practice mas  invariably to allege both 
force and fear in  every case.  See  appendix  4,  MCM,  1949. 
In recognition of the language  of  Article 122,  however, 
model  specification 91 in  appendix 6c permits an  allegation of 
either (1) force and violence alone or  fear alone--and  proof 
one  alleged will sustain the =rge,  or (2) an  allegation 
of  both.  In charging robbery,  it is still considered entirely 
proper to allege both force and fear and  permit the prosecution 
to prove either or both without  any requirement  of  election. 
In fact,  if there is  the slightest doubt  as to whether  the robbery 
was  committed by  putting the victim in fear,  or was  codtted 
by  force,  I would. recommend  that both be  alleged in order to 
avoid any problem  of variance  between  allegations and proof. 
202  Article 123.--FORCEEY 
In the case of  forgery,  the Committee  adopted almost ver- 
batim the common  law definition which was  set forth in  paragraph 
180i,  &EM,  1949.  Thus,  there has been retained for our use 
the-common  law requirements that there be  a  specific intent to 
defraud,  and a writing which might operate to the legal,  as 
distinguished from  some  other,  prejudice of  another.  For  com- 
parison,  consider Section 22-1401  of  the DC  Code  which  requires 
an  intent to defraud or injure ,another,  and that the writing 
be  one which might  op=a-ply  to the prejudice of  another. 
Observe  that "falsity"  in forgery refers to the falsity 
of  making or altering a writing,  not to the falsity of  the 
material contained in the writing itself.  This  point was 
perhaps  best expressed in an old English case,  In re Windsor, 
122 English reprint 1288:  "Telling a lie does  not become 
forgery because it is  reduced to witing."  This point was 
recognized in Section 102,  NC  &  B,  and also in paragraph 18Oi,  -  MCK,  1949,  but the Army  manual  then obscured the point by a 
number  of  references to. "false  writings"  or "instruments"  that 
were  false.  For  a further discussion of  this,  see the wo- 
tations in 41 ALR 229;  174 BLR  1327.  In Goucher  v.  State,  204 
NW 967,  a Nebraska  court declared, 
,' 
"The genuine making  of  a false instrument is  not 
generally a forgery . . .  The  decisions are nearly 
unanimous  that the making  of  a  false instrument is  not 
within a  criminal statute directed against the false 
making  of  an instrument . . .  This  is  not a mere play on 
vmrds,  it is  a  substantive distinction." Under  a Federal  statute forbidding the alteration of a 
bond  or other writing with intent to defraud the United 
States,  in a case where  the accused argued that his primry 
purpose  was  to defraud a private citizen, it has been held 
sufficient that the acts "frustrate the administration of  a 
statute or tend to impair  or impede  a  governmental  function." 
See Head  v.  Hunter,  144 F  (2d)  449,  Such a case,  however,  is 
decided upon  the basis of  the particular Federal  statute 
involved,  and appears to  be  no  authority for a decision under 
Article 123,  which  includes the elements  of  common  law forgery, 
that a charge  of  forgery could be  sustained by  proof  less, 
or other,  than that the false making  or alteration would,  if 
genuine,  impose  a legal liability on  another or change  his 
legal right or liability to his prejudice.  Compare  CllI  318342, 
Irvin,  67  BR  253. 
203  Article 124.--MAIMING 
The  comment  of  the Morgan  Committee was  that Article 124 
is  broader in scope  than common  law mayhem;  it "inoludes 
injuries which would  not have  the effect of  making  the person 
less able to fight".  While  "mayhem"  and "maimingw are not 
synonymous,  maidng under Article 124 appears to include every- 
thing that would  have  been myhem  at comaon  law. 
Under Article 124,  in determining whether  an  injury con- 
stitutes maiming,  we  can no  longer use the common  law test that 
it rendered the victim less able in fighting either to defend 
hinself or to annoy his adversary.  Article 124 looks  only to 
maintaining the integrity of  the person,  the natural oomplete- 
ness and comeliness  of  the human  members  and organs,  and the 
preservation of their functions.  It  undoubtedly  requires 
sonething more  than the minimum  injury dich  could constitute 
"grievous  bodily harm"  referred to in  Article 128, Assault. 
The  difference is indicated by  the permanency  of  the injury 
required in maiming.  See  36  Am.  Jur.,  Mayhem  6  4,  and  for a 
collection of  the cases under the various maiming statutes, 
16 ALR  958,  supplemented in 58  ALR  13 20. 
It should be noted that Article 124 does  not appear  to 
require an intent to  seriously injure,  or  a specific intent 
to maim,  as do  some   ate statutes.  See Smith v,  State,  87 
Fla.  502,  100 So.  738.  It requires only that the injury 
inflicted,  for example,  be serious.  IIence,  it could be  no 
defense  to a  charge  of  maiming  that the accused intended only 
a slight injury,  if in fact, he  did inflict serious harm. 204  Article 125.--SODOMY 
Article 125 is  similar in some  respects to Article 740-89, 
Louisiana Code  of  Criminal Law  and Procedure,  but  the Louisiana 
Code  includes as sodomy,  any use of the genital organ,  whereas 
Article 125 is specifically limited to those cases in  which 
there is some  penetration.  Further,  Article 125 would,  by 
its terms,  appear not to include among  its subjects,  birds  or 
dead  bodies which  are specifically covered in some  sodomy 
statutes.  See  Section 690  of the New  York  Penal  Code.  For  a 
reference  as to acts which  constitute unnntural  carnal copulation, 
see Section 22-3502  of  the DC  Code. 
Model  Specification 95,  Appendix  6c,  is  brief, merely 
advising accused that at a certain time-and  place, with a  certain 
person or animal,  he  committed  sodomy,  leaving to the evidence 
a determination of  how  the pwticular offense may  have  been 
committed.  The  Army  practice set forth in  the UCJI,  1949,  was 
to allege specifically &ether  per  os  or per  anum,  and that 
it was  against the  order of  nature,  but in drawing  a specification 
for inclusion in the MCXr  1951,  a  simplified pleading was 
sought.  Model  Specification 95 is  basically that set forth in 
Section 108,  Naval  Courts  and  Boards.  The  Navy  had only a 
further particularization as to the place,  for example,  "in  the 
hold of  said ship",  a particularization which might  not be 
necessary if  a  broader allegation of  place was  sufficiently 
precise to identify the particular offense and  apprise the 
accused of  the particular act against which he  was  to defend. 
See Appendix  6a(7).  In connection with the specification,  you 
might  consider-the  annotation in 5 ALR 2d  557,  and the case of 
Kelly v.  People,  192 Ill.  119,  61 NE 527,  in which  the court 
held that an  indictment *ich  charged  simply that accused com- 
mitted the crime against nature with a named  male  person, 
sufficiently informed  him of  the offense charged,  "the manner 
of  committing the offense being too indecent to set forth*' in 
the indictment or in a bill of  particulars. 
205  Article 126a.--AGGRAVATED  ARSON  - 
205a  -  The  comment  of  the Morgan  Committee was: 
"This  article divides arson into two  categories.  Sub- 
division (a) is  essentially common  law arson,  but is enlarged 
to cover  structures other than dwellings in view of  the 
fact that the essence  of  the offense is danger to hwn 
life.  In eubdivision (b) the offense is essentially against 
the property of  someone  other than the offender." This statement points up a number  of  substantial differences 
between Article 126 and common  law arkon.  For example,  the latter 
could be  comitted only against a habitation,  and that habitation 
had  to  belong to another.  Under  Article 126b,   an^  property of 
another will suffice,  and under  12%  it may even be the arsonist1  s 
property. 
The  article requires "knowledge  of  the offendern that there is 
in a  structure other than an inhabited dwelling,  a human  being at 
the time  the act is committed.  In the absence of  a  confession, 
such matters  as the accused's  intent and knowledge inust always and 
necessarily be  inferred.  The  discussion points out tha.t his know- 
ledge may  be  inferred in the offense of  arson if a  reasonable man 
siniilarly situated must  have  known  of  the presence  of  a  human  being. 
Article 74.0-51  of  the Louisiana Code  of  Criminal Law and 
Procedure refers to setting fire to  any structure Itwherein it is 
foreseeable that  human  life may  be endangered."  While  it is said 
the tiknowledgeti required by Article 126~  may  be  inferred,  the terms 
of  that article do not permit us to say that it is sufficient under 
the Unif om  Code  that accused might have  foreseen the presence of 
a  human  being  in the structure as one  might in Louisiana.  For arson 
under  the Code,  something more  must appear--at  least,  the construc- 
tive knowledge  of  a reasonable man. 
Article 126b_-SIMPLE  ARSON 
20%  While  simple arson may  involve any property,  you will discover 
that almost every case of  arson in the books  involves dwelling 
houses or buildings,  this because of  the comon law background  of 
the offense of  arson whose  principles most  of  the  states have  adopted 
without the modernization we  have  in Article 126.  The Discussion 
does not attempt to define "another"  in regard to burning  "the  prop- 
erty of  anotheri1, for it  would  appear to be at  least as inclusive 
as the ownership  in larceny whichincludesvery nearly anyone other 
than  the thief  himself.  See  200a_(3). 
Specification 96 follows the statutory language of  Article 1263 
and permits an allegation in aggravated arson either that accused 
did Itburnw  or "set  on  firen the property.  You  will also note that 
Specification 97  for simple arson also follows the statutory law 
guage  of  Article 126b a.nd  permits either %urn1'  or Itset fire ton 
the property.  Why  there is this distinction in the statute between 
%urnt1,  Itset on  firebt, and  Itset fire  toti is not at  all  apparent.  . 
The  cases xhich discuss the burning sufficient to constitute arson 
disclose no  valid or necessary distinction between  %burningn  and 
either of  the other two.  For example,  to constitute burning a 
building it has been  held  "sufficient if fire is actually communicated to any part thereof,  however  small,"  (see Nroolsey v.  State, 
30  Tex.  App.  346);  and  l1it is unnecessary that the fire should 
.  continue for any specified timet1 (see State v.  Pisanno,  107 Conn. 
630,  1W  At1  600);  and it is immaterial whether it was  put out or 
went  out of  itself (see Miller on  Criminal Law,  3  106).  While 
there is some  authority that '%urnn and  "set fire ton are not 
synonymous,  the great weight of  authority is to the contrary.  See 
annotation in 1  AIR  1164. 
The  Morgan  Committee  commented  that their statutory arson was 
essentially that of  the common  law;  the common  law was  not troubled 
by subtleties of  distinction in this regard and  there is no  indica- 
tion in the hearings before Congressional committees  of  an intent 
to draw a distinction between  "burningtt,  Itsetting on  fire",  or 
"setting fire tot1= There appears to be  no  reason why  facts which 
would  otherwise establish arson could not be proved  under a  single 
allegation that accused Itdid burn"  the dwelling or the property. 
In this connection,  however,  it has been  held an averment that 
accused Itset fire to and burned a  certain building" was  not im- 
proper as charging two  offenses.  See  State v.  Jones,  106 Mo.  302, 
17  SW  366. 
Article 127--Z.XTORTIOM 
206  The  Article does not  specify the type  of  threat which  the 
law will consider of  sufficient gravity to constitute the crime 
of  extortion;  nor  does it specifically require that the threat be 
unlawful.  Query,  is it extortion for a  creditor to threaten his 
debtor with prosecution for failure to repay a  long  overdue  debt? 
Article I27  could not have  been  intended to constitute such con- 
duct the crime  of  extortion,  hence,  the proof  and  specification 
require that the threat be unlawful.  See  in this connection,  the 
ca.ses  cited with Section 22-2305  of  the District of  Columbia  Code. 
The  discussion sets forth the types of  threats which  are con- 
sidered sufficient to constitute the offense.  See  the annotation 
to Article 740-66  of  the Louisiana  Code  of  Criminal Law and Procedure. Conference  No.  l2h 
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Article 12th-ASSAULT 
207a  The  definition of  assault in Article 128a follows that in 
paragraph 180lc,  IvEM,  1949,  and the discussion of  assault is,  con- 
sequently,  closely patterned upon  that in the U€My  1949.  While 
the discussion in paragraph 207g makes  a distinction between an 
attempt and an  offer as  the basis of  a  charge of  assault,  an 
offer being the putting of  another in reasonable fear that force 
will  at  once be applied to his person,  this distinction will gen- 
erally be of  little concern  to an accuser,  or to the court during 
trial, for Specification 99  in appendix 6s requires merely the 
allegation of  a  "term  of  artn--assault--and  the proof  may  show 
either that accused actually intended to commit a  battery upon 
another,  or that he  put another in reasonable fear of  immediate 
bodily harm. 
The  example which  demonstrates these two  aspects of  assault, 
pointing an unloaded  pistol at  another,  has  not been unanimously 
agreed upon  by all  courts as  being an assault.  Wharton  suggests 
the true rule to be that there must be some  adaptation of  the means 
to the end,  and it is enough  if this adaptation be  apparent,  so as 
to impress  or alarm a person of  ordinary reason.  Vvharton  Criminal 
law,  12th ed.,  ~ssaults,~  802.  One  explanation of  why  some  courts 
hold that  pointing an unloaded  pistol at  another is not an assault, 
lies in the assault statute of  the particular jurisdiction.  Some 
of  these statutes provide  that an assault is an unlawful attempt, 
coupled witli the present ability,  to conunit  a violent injury on 
the person of another.  See 6 CJS,  p.  936.  Faragraph 207g does not 
require tk t present ability, and we  follow the Federal rule in re- 
gard to  assault.  See  Price v.  bnited States,  156 Fed.  950.  For 
a  holding  that pointing an unloaded  pistol at  another was  not an 
assault,  see People  v.  Sylva,  143 Cal.  62,  76  Pac.  814;  for a hold- 
ing that assault was  comitted where  the victim did not know  that 
the weapon  pointed at  hh  was  unloaded,  see People v.  Treinaine, 
222  NYS  432. In addition to an intentional attempt to commit a battery on 
another,  an assault may  arise from a  culpably negligent act or 
omi'ssion.  This is said to be so only as  to the nputting in fearn. 
type of  assault,  however,  since the intent to do bodily harm  to 
another,  an  essential element of  the nattempttt type of  assault, 
is entirely lacking when  the injury is the result of  a culpably 
negligent act. 
A  battery is defined,  in effect,  as a consummated assault. 
While  Article 128a  does not  specifically cover a battery other 
than in the statement "whether  or  not-  the atteinpt or offer is con- 
summa ted, " the President may  prescribe a  greater punishment  for 
assault consummated by the  infliction of  ham  than for the mere 
attenpt or offer,  and  such an  offense is  logically punishable 
under Article 128 rather than under  the general article.  A  battery, 
also,  may be committed either intentionally or through culpable 
negligence,  but the distinction between  attenpt and  offer which  is 
made  in a  simple assault is-not  necessary in battery because  of  the  , 
actual unlawful  infliction of  bodily harm.  See  4 Am.  Jur.,  Assault 
and Battery,  !%!  3,  5,  and 6.  For a discussion of  battery committed 
by culpable negligence,  see Commonwealth v.  Fawkins,  157 &ss.  551, 
32  NE 862;  and when  committed by motor  vehicles,  see 99  AIR 835. 
On  the basis of  culpable negligence,  there are shilar state- 
lnents  appearing  in the discussion of  several of  the punitive arti- 
cles.  Suppose Barney Fireball drives hfs yellow convertible dawn 
a  crowded  city street at  a  high rate of  speed,  weaving  from  side 
to side.  I3 the police nab  him  right away, he  might be held guilty 
of  reckless driving in violation of  Article 111,  since paragraph 
19%  defines reckless driving as that operation of  a  vehicle which 
exhibits a  culpable  disregard of  foreseeable consequences to others 
from  the act involved.  But  suppose  that he  careens toward  Mary 
Jones who  reasonably fears for her  1Ffe;  such  conduct might constitute 
an assault as  a  culpably negligent act or omission under  paragraph 
207a which foreseeably might and does cause another reasonably to 
fear that force will  at  once be applied to his person.  Now  suppose 
that Barney's  car bumps  into her-that  might be a  consuited as- 
sault, a battery comitted by culpable negligence.  And  finally, 
suppose  that the bump  kills her-that  might  be held involuntary 
manslaughter  under  paragraph  198b,  a honicide  committed  by a  negli- 
gent act or omission accompanied by a culpable disregard for the 
foreseeable consequences  to others of  such act.  Of  course,  if his 
driving were  of  a  nature which 'was  more  dangerous,  likely to pro- 
duce  death or great bodily harm,  it might be  aggravated assault, 
or,  if a  homicide  occurred,  murder. Article 128b--.4GGRAVATED  ASSAULT 
20%  Article 128Q refers to ltgrievousil bodily harm,  while Article 
118(2) on murder  refers to I8great1'  bodily harm,  and the definitions 
of  the two  words  contained respectively in paragraphs 20Q  and  1972 
both indicate a  similar type of  injury.  Grievous bodily harm  has 
been  defined to  mean  an  injury of  a graver or more  serious character 
than that inflicted in  an ordinary battery,  or a serious injury of 
an aggravated nature which,  however,  need  not be  permanent.  See 
State v.  Bowers,  178 Minn.  589,  228  NW  164;  6 CJS  p.  936.  There is 
no  indication,  in the hearings  on  the Uniform Code,  of  a Congressional 
intention to  draw a distinction between  I8greatt1  and t8grievous" bodily 
harm  in the two  articles,  words  which,  although they vary from stat- 
ute to statute in different jurisdictions,  always seen to define 
much  the same  type  of  in  jury regardless of  the particular word  used. 
Paragraph 207b(l) defines a  means  or force likely to prodtice 
death or grievous bodily harm,  referred to in Article 128b,  as  mean- 
ing a means  or force whose  use in a particular instance would  natur- 
ally  and probably result in death or grievous bodily harm.  This 
definition ties in with the discussion of  an intentional killing 
as murder  (see paragraph 1972).  That pointing an unloaded pistol 
at  another is not aggravated assault (although it  might be siaple 
assault as that offense is defined),  was  held in Price v.  United 
States,  156 F 950.  A  pistol is not dangerous as a firearm,  nor  is 
it, in itself, a means  or force likely to produce death or grievous 
bodily harm, when it is not loaded. 
Article 128b_(2) refers to intentionally inflicted grievous 
bodily harm.  To  prove this type of  aggravated assault,  the character 
of  the weapon  or means  used muld not,  of  course,  need  to  be estab- 
lished,  but evidence of  the means  used might,  however,  be very 
material,  and would  be  admissible as showing what  must  have  been 
accused's intention at  the time  of  inflicting the injury.  A  man 
is  presumed  to intend the natural and  proba3le consequences of  his 
act,  and if he  intentionally inflicts injury by  a means whose  natural 
and probable  results would  be  grievous bodily harm,  it may  be 
inferred that he  intended such result.  Accused may  not,  however, 
be  held liable under Article 128b62) for in  juries which are not the 
patural and  probable  consequences of  his act,  and therefore not  in- 
tended.  State v.  Shaver,  197 Ia.  1028,  198 NW 329,  is a case very 
sinilar to the sidewalk fight used as the example  in the discussion. 
In  specification 101,  appendix 69  a weapon  is alleged to be 
dangerous,  or the otber means  or force is alleged to be  likely to 
produce  grievous bodily harm.  The  discussion makes  clear,  however, 
that a weapon  is dangerous when  its use  is  likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm  and the elements of  proof  of  aggravated 
assault under Article 128&(l) simplify this further by merely re- 
quiring facts and circumstances which show that the weapon,  means, 
or force was  used  in a mnner likely to  produce death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
Article 129--BURGIARY 
208  Burglary as  defined in  Article 129 includes all  the common 
Law elements,  but the offenses intended to  be  committed  in the 
dwelling house were  limited to certain Articles only.  The  dis- 
cussion in paragraph 208  represents no  substantial departure from 
that appearing in the EM, 1949,  and Naval Courts and Boards. 
With reference to the penultimate  paragraph and the point 
made  that ninsertion into the house  of  an instrument,  except merely 
to  facilitate further entrance,  it has been  held that where an 
accused raised a window and thrust a  crow-bar  under  the shutter 
which was  six inches inside,  no further entry being made,  there 
was  not a  sufficient entry'to constitute burglary.  Rex  v.  Rust, 
1  Moody  CC  (Eng)  184.  But br  .:aking  into a  dwelling with an instru- 
men t and thereafter thrus  tin&  the instrument into the building 
for the purpose  of  cmitting  the ulterior crime has  been  held to 
constitute a  sufficient entry without eccusa l having entered the 
building at  all.  See State v.  Crawford,  8  ' MI  539,  80  N??l  193. 
Similarly,  putting a  gun  into a  ho3e  or window broken with intent 
to  murder,  though the hand not be inserted,  has  been held suffi- 
cient.  2  Wharton  Criminal Law,  J2th Ed.,  page  1286. 
The  breaking and entering need not be on  the same  night,  as 
was  pointed out in Section 96,  Naval  Courts and Boards,  and it has 
been  held in a  case where  a  hole was  broken  in a building by ac- 
cused on  one night with an intent to return another night and 
commit  a felony,  that the burglary was  cmpb  te when  accused did 
return on a  subsequent night through the hole so made.  People v. 
Gibson,  58 Mich,  368,  25 NW 316. 
In some  latitudes it may  be impossible to conunit  the criine 
of  burglary at  any time  of  the night.  The  Army recently had  a 
case of  alleged burglary in Alaska  in  which the proof  showed  the 
breaking and entry were attempted between  10 and 11  o'clock  at 
night.  This was  after sunset,  during a  period known  to the ex- 
perts as nastronomical twilight,"  but the evidence showed  that 
throughout the period there was  at  all  times sufficient light to 
discern a man's  face,  even up to  a  distance of  200 feet.  The 
common  law (on which  the discussion in paragraph 208 is based) limits nighttime  to the period when  there is not sufficient daylight 
to discern a man's  face.  Hence,  the Board  of  Review was  required 
to reduce  the case to housebreaking because  there had  been  no 
"nighttimen for the purposes of  burglary.  CM  343407,  9 Bull JAG 
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Article 13s-HOUSEBREAKING 
209  The  Morgan  Committee adopted the Article on  housebreaking from 
paragraph 1802,  EM, 1949,  but enlarged the scope of  the Article 
by requiring the unlawful entry to be  of  a building nor structure 
of  anotherom Most  housebreaking  statutes which use the term nstructuren 
do  so at  the end  of  a  listing of  certain kinds of  buildings,  vehi- 
cles,  or other specflically named  structures,  and under  such stat- 
utes, it is held that the meaning  of  #other structuren is limited 
by the principle of  ejusdezn neneris.  While  that principle may  not 
be  applied to Article 130,  paragraph  209  places limitations upon 
the word  nstructure" which  conf om with most  statutory enactments 
on  the offense.  For  definitions of  nstructureN  see 12 CJS 684. 
ihe word%tructureWis  one  of  the broadest words  in the English 
language  (united States v.  Warden,  29  F Supp 486).  A  Texas  court 
has  said,  na  structure is that which  is built or constructed;  an 
edifice or a building of  any kind.  In the widest terns,  any pro- 
L 
duction or piece of  work,  artifically  built up,  or composed  of 
prts joined together in  some  definite manner,"  and held to be  a 
structure within the Texas  housebreaking statute,  an edifice con- 
structed by placing two  forked poles in the ground,  resting another 
upon  them and  stretching a wagon  sheet over  the top,  closing one 
end,  and placing an old door  and some  boxes at  the other.  Favro  v. 
State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  452,  46  SYrr 192. 
The  offense intended to  be committed  in housebreaking may  be 
any act or omission npunishable by courts-martial,  except an  act 
or omission  constituting a  purely military offense.  This limita- 
tion does not appear in Naval Courts and Boards,  but has long been 
used  in the discussion of  housebreaking in the Awe  Military of- 
fenses are mentioned  but not defined in 33,  76a(6) and (7). 
There appears to be only one  published  case in the Army  or Air Force 
which  discusses this particular point,  an old case which I believe 
misinterpreted it--CM  199062,  Dobon,  3 BR 317.  The  point involved 
merits consideration.  In that case it was  alleged that accused un- 
lawfully entered the garage  of  another with intent  to ranova an 
automobile without the owner's  consent.  The  Board  stated that this 
intended offense appeared to be  joyriding"  which was  clearly a  i 
disorder prejudicial to  good  order and military discipline and therefore cognizable by  courts-martial  under  AW 96,  but reasoned 
that the offense had  also to 3e a criminal offense of  a civil 
nature at  the place were  the act occurred.  Since the offense 
of  "joyridingft was  not an offense within the particular State 
nor  the subject of  a Federal  statute of  general application,  the 
Board  concluded it was  not a criminal offense for the purposes 
of  housebreaking. 
This  decision,  it is submitted,  represented a misconstruction 
of  the definition of  "criminal  offense,"  a definition almost  the 
same  then as now  appears in paragraph 209.  That Board  assumed 
that since a  "criminal  offense"  for the purposes  of  housebreaking 
could not be  of  a purely military nature,  it had  necessarily to 
be  one  of  a civil nature at  the time and place  of  the act in order 
to constitute a  "criminal  offense"  at  all.  But note the language 
used--"any  act or omission which  is punishable  by  courts-martial, 
except an  act or omission constituting a purely military offense." 
If the act is punishable by  courts-martial  (as the Board  stated 
"joyriding" was),  and  if it is not a purely military offense  (as 
tha Board  recognized in point in^,  out that the particular state did 
not have  a  statute on  the subj~ct),  all elements of  a  "criminal 
offense"  are met  for the purposes  of  housebreaking-aad  there is 
no  need  to look further and  determine whether  the act is an  offense 
of  a civil na-Lure at  the locus delic  ti, a fac  t which  is wholly 
ir~nnatcrial  . 
Article 131-PERJURY 
210  The  discussion of  perjury in this paragraph which  is patterned 
on  paragraph 180b,  ?t,lCaS  1949,  appears  to present no  substantial 
change  in the ofTense  as it  was  set forth in  Section 115,  Naval 
Courts and  Boards,  and Article 227,  Ma,  Coast Guard.  In  the first 
paragraph it is stated that a  "course  of  justice"  includes an 
investigation conducted under Article 32.  In  civil practice,, 
hearings before grand  juries  or arbitrators are held to 30  ncourses 
of  justicetf under  somewhat  shilar  statutes.  See  Corirm.  v.  Warden, 
11  Iletc.  (~asa)  406;  %harton's  Crim.  Law,  12th Ed.,  Sec  1533. 
The  phrase  "did  not believe to be  truen is the key  to under- 
standing the Discussion and Proof.  The  second  subparagraph requires 
that the false testimony be  willfully and  corruptly given--that  is, 
that the accused  did not believe it to be  true.  Hence,  the phrase 
becomes  a  "term  of  arttf  and,  as Iten f  of  the Proof,  requires evi-' 
dence  that the testimony was  false ad  willfully and  corruptly given. 
"It is perjury where  one  swears wilfully and  corruptly to a 
matter which he,  according to  his own  lights, has no  probable cause 
for believing,  since a man is guilty of  perjury if he  knowingly 
and wilfully swears to a particular fact, without knowing  at  the 
time  %hat  the assertion is true,  supposing that his purpose  is  I 
.corrupt."  \harton's  Srim.  Law,  12th Ed.,  Perjury 8  1512.  To  prove that accused did not believe his testimony true,  i.e.,  that it 
was  false and willfully  and  corruptly given,  it is ordinarily 
sufficient simply to prove  the truth,  and facts and  circumstances 
from which it may  be  inferred that accused must have  been aware  of 
the truth.  However,  sworn  testimony by a witness  that he  knows  a 
thing to be true when,  in fact,  he  knows  nothing about it at  all 
or is  not sure about it, regardless of  the truth of  the fact to 
which  he  testifies,  has  long been  recognized as per  jury.  In such 
a  case,  proof  of  the truth alone will  not suffice.  For example, 
a  conviction of  perjury has been upheld where  accused testified 
tba t he  was  with two  parties in  a  certain field when  they made  an 
oral contract and it  was  established that the contract was made 
but that accused was  not in the field at  all  with the parties and 
had  no  personal knowledge  of  the contract.  People  v.  McKinney, 
3 Park Cr.  Rep.  (NY)  510. 
In connection with the last subparagraph of  paragraph 210, 
which covers the neath against oath" rule recognized in perjury, 
the statement that documentary  evidence directly disproving the 
truth of  the statement  charged to  have  been perjured need not be 
oorroborated,  is based upon  an old Supreme Court case which  is 
frequently quoted,  United  States v.  Wood,  39  U.  S.  430.  See also 
Hamer  V.  United States,  271 US  627.  It has been  suggested that 
the type of  official record which would  be  so well known  to an 
accused that no  corroboration of  its contents would be necessary 
to prove beyond any doubt the falsity of  accusedts oath,  is an 
official record which could not be  made  without his knowledge, 
such as his conviction by a  court of  record,  or a bond  which  he 
signed in a  judicial  poceeding.  CM 331723,  Sowder,  80 l3R  139. 
~ocwnentary  evidence -origins t  ing from  the accused himself  might 
be  a letter he  had mitten, and documentary  evidence recognized by 
him as containing the  truth might  consist of  a  letter to  him  from 
an accomplice in accordance with which  he  had  acted,  assuming  in 
both these cases that the letters existed before,  and with circum- 
stances prove  the falsity of,  the allegedly perjured testimony. 
Lf the letter were written after the allegedly perjured testimony, 
of  course,  the question of  a  confession or admission muld be in- 
vo lved . 
There is one  type  of  "inconeistent  statementst1 case which 
might be  noted.  In Behrle v.  United States,  100 F.  2d 714,  ac- 
cused made  a written statement to the police about a  certain murder, 
but at  the trial of  the murder  case  said he  '8remembered nothing". 
At  his trial for perjury he  asserted the rule that a conviction of 
perjury cannot be  sustained solely on  the contradictory sworn  state- 
ments  of  the accused;  in other words,  the rule that when a  defendant 
has made  two  distinct statements under  oath,  one  directly the re- 
verse of  the  other,  it is not sufficient to produce  the one  in evidenoe  to prove  the other to 5e false.  'ir'Ihartonls Crkinal Law, 
12th Ed,  Perjury 8  1583.  The  court said the rule was  no+ involved 
and  sustained his conviction of  psrjury for testifying that he  re- 
neril3ered  nothing;  it noted that direct proof  that he  did remember 
was  impossible,  and  held circumstantial evidence  tha-t he  did re- 
member  sufficient to prove  the falsity of  his sworn statement that 
he  did not.  The  circumstantial evidence  consisted of  hts testimony 
before  a grand  jury  in accordance with his original s-tatenlent to 
the poLide  which he  had  further amplified prior to trial. 
In  paragraph  213d(4), the offense  of  false swearing as  a viola- 
tion of  Article 134 iz  discussed.  It is shown  in appendix 12 as a 
lesser included offense of  perjury and  covers  those  cases in which 
the false testimony  is not ma-torial,  or is not given  in a judicial 
proceeding  or course  of justice.  It is alleged in accordance with 
Specification 139,  appendix  6c.  "Statutory perjury"  is covered  in 
Specification 159;  -this offenze is patterned  in 18 U.S.C.  1621, 
and  the falsity nust be  as to a material matter.  It need not, 
however,  be  given in a c-ourse of  juskice  or judicial  proceeding; 
it may  be  committed Sefore any  conpetent  tribunal,  officer, or per- 
son in any  case in which  a law of  the United States authorizes an 
oath to be  administered.  Perjury as a violakion of  Article 131 
may  be  comnitted-only in giving false testimony upon  a lawful oath, 
whereas  "statutory perjury" may  consist of  subscribing as true any 
written testimony,  deposition,  declaration,  or certification con- 
trary to such oath. 
Article 132--FRUDS  AGAINST  TI.3  SOVZDFUNT 
211a  -  ILAIIING  A  FALSE  OR  FRA',TI)USEi\JT  CLAIM 
The  Xorgan  Cornnittee  stated in part,  "This  Article has  revised 
md rearranged the coinparable  Army  and  Navy  provisions  to elimina-te 
repetitious and  superflous material . . .  The  provisions relating 
to ombezzleinent,  stealing, misappropria-Son, and  pledges  have  been 
omitted as the said offenses are now  covered by  Article 121 co arc en^) 
or Article 108  (Wrongful  Disposition of  iGlitary Property).  . .  11 
It is stated in paragraph 211a  that "making  a  claim  is a dis- 
tinct act from  presenting it.  A  ciaim may  be  made  in one  place and 
presented in another."  This  distinction is made  in Article 132(1), 
between  Section  (A),  which  covers making  any  claim,  and  Section  (B), 
presenting for appro-ml or paynent  any  clah.  As  to what  acts 
would  be  sufficient to support a charge  of  "making1' a clain as dis- 
tinguished froin  "presenting"  a claim,  a brief review of  the history 
of  these  terms  appears necessary. This same  statement has appeared  in the Manuals for Courts- 
hkrtial,  1921,  1928,  and 1949,  and appears to be based upon  a 
statement of  Colonel Winthrop in his Military Law  and Precedents 
(2d Ed.  1920 reprint,  Note  25,  p.  698): 
"That  the making  and presenting are distinct offenses under 
this statute,  so that the making  of  a  false claim may  be  completed 
in a  distant State while the presenting of  the sane may  be  committed 
at  Washington,  D- C.,--see  Ex  parte Shaffenburg,  4 Dillon 271," 
(~ed.  Cas.  No.  12,  696  (1877)). 
In that case,  the court dealt with that portion of  the Revised 
Statutes similar  to wbt is now  ,l8  U-S-C.  287,  referring to %rho- 
ever makes  or presentsw  a  false claim.  The  Shaffenburg case involved 
a marshal in Colorado who  prepared and swore  to a  false affidavit 
of  claim in  Colorado and had it approved by a Federal judge  there. 
He  then caused it to be presented to the Treasury Department  in 
lhkshington for payment.  He  was  tried in Colorado for making a  false 
claim,  and he  contested jurisdiction of  the Federal court there 
claiming no  offense was  committed  until presentment  of  the claim 
in Washington.  The  court said: 
!'The  statute distinguishes between  the making  and the pre- 
senting of  a  fraudulent account or bill.  It makes  each a  distinct 
offense.  It may be that the offense of  presenting a  false bill 
or account to  the Treasury Departaent in  Washington can  only be 
prosecuted  in the courts of  the District of  Columbia,  but the 
offense of  making  a  false bill  or account may  be prosecuted  in 
a  judicial district in which the fraudulent claim is  made.  What 
constitutes or  consummates  the making  of  a  false claim,  within 
the meaning  of  the statute,  may be difficult to define so as to 
embrace within the definition all  cases that might arise.  For 
the purposes of  the present application,  it is suff  icient-to  my 
that we  are of  the opinion  tbat the facts averred . . .  fshod 
the making,  in such district,  of  a  false and fraudulent bill, 
within the meaning  and purpose  of  the  statute." 
Waking a  claimn within the meaning  of  the Criminal Code  has 
been  judicially defined as the "asking  or demanding . . .  from 
the Government of  payment  for services."  United States v.  Bittinger 
(DC Mo.,  1875),  24 Fed.  Cas.  No.  14,  599.  The  Shaffenburg case 
does not indicate what acts alone might  constitute "making  a  claim," 
and no  Federal case has been  discovered which  supports a  view that 
a  claim can be  YnadeI1 without,  in same  manner,  presenting it or 
causing its submission,  i.e.,  without making  of  it a  In 
fact,  a  charge in one  count of  making  and presenting a  false claim 
against the United States has been  held not bad for duplicity as 
charging  two  offenses: - - 
"The  gist of  the offense Lidthe obtaining,  or  attempting 
to obtain,  money  from the Uni_ted-States  by means  of  a  fraudulent 
claim,  and the acts charged Lard  but different steps in the com- 
mission of  such offense,  although either alone is made  punishab1e.M 
Bridgeman  v.  United States,  140 F.  577. 
211b  -  PH.ESENTII'JG  FOR  APPROVAL  OR  PAYMENT  A  FALSE  OR  FRAUDULENT  CIAIM 
A  claim may  be  tacitly presented.  This proposition was  dis- 
cussed in CLt  336812,  Ydlano,  3 BR-JC  225.  It is a necessary approach 
to such cases as are sh~m  as examples,  cases in which a person de- 
frauds ths Government  by accepting money  which he  knows he  could 
not lawfully claim.  It might be said that in these cases,  accused's 
*claimtt is found in his acceptance of  the money,  for the paying 
procedures  operate on  the assumption tbat a person who  meets cer- 
tain conditions presents a recurring claim.  This claim is  automat- 
ica  lly  paid when  presented,  the acceptance thereof  cons ti  tu  ting a 
tacit representation  that the conditions for payinent  have  been met. 
Article 133--CONDUCT  UNBECOhIINS AN OFFICIB ANL,  A  GENTMMAN 
The  chief  point of  interest in Article 133 is that dismissal 
is no  longer a  ~nanda  tory punishment.  The  Morgan  Comqittee  originally 
provided  that an officer violating the  dart  icle would be "dismissed 
from the arined forces,lt  and this was  approved by the House  Subcom- 
mittee.  However,  it was  amended  in the House  of*  Representatives 
by a mot ion from the floor (congressional Re cord,  81st Congress, 
Vol.  95,  No.  79,  5 May  1949,  p.  5843).  The  Representative offering 
the amendinent  briefly stated that there were many  offenses which, 
were  relatively minor but which  could be construed as conduct un- 
Sacming an officer and a  gentlemn,  and the punishment  should be 
left up to the discretion of  the court-Lmrtial.  The  amendinent was 
adopted without further discussion. 
DISORDERS  AND  NEGLECTS  TO  THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD 
ORDM  AND DISCIPLINE  IN  THE  AF?  FCIRCES 
A  formal discussion in the Uanual  of  "breach of  as a 
disorder or neglect is new  to the Army  and Air  Force,  but is famil- 
iar to the Navy  in Section 3  of  Naval  Courts and Boards.  Such a 
discussion,  besides its applicability in this connection,  will serve 
many  useful purposes  throughout the Manual;  for example,  it assists 
in understandi ng  paragraph 143g(2) which  discusses official records 
required by law, regulation,  or custom to be kept on file in a 
public office. In United States v.  Buchanan,  8 How.  83,  the Supreme  Court 
of  the United States quoted with approval the provisions of  the 
Louisiana Code  as to custom: 
"Customs  result from a  long series of  actions,  customarily 
repeated,  which  have,  by  such repetition and by uninterrupted acqui- 
escence,  acquired the force of  a  tacit and common  ~onsent.~ 
While  %omnon  consentn forms the basis of  custom,  a  custom 
once  established has  an application more  binding than mere  consent. 
Naval Courts and Boards called custom  ncompulsory,n and paragraph 
21%  defines it as a  practice which has attained the .force of  law. 
Section 3,  Naval  Courts and Boards also contained a  discussion 
of  usage: 
Wilitary practices or usages of  service,  although long con- 
tinued,  are not  customs and have  none  of  the obligatory force which 
attaches to customary law.  The  fact that such usages exist,  there- 
fore,  can never be pleaded  in justification of  conduct  otherwise 
criminal or reprehensible,  or be relied upon  as a  complete defense 
in a  trial  by  court--martial . . .  Custom is not to be confused with 
usage.  The  former  has the force of  law--the  latter is  merely a 
fact.  There may be usage without custom,  but there can be  no  cus- 
tom  unless accompanied by usage. 
The  presumption arising from possession  of  marihuana  or a  habit 
forming  narcotic drug finds precedent  in 21 U.S.C.  174,  where  it is 
said that when  the defendant is shown  to have  had  possession of  a 
narcotic drug,  such possession shall be deemed  sufficient evidence 
to support conviction unless the defendant explains the possession 
of  the narcotic to the satisfaction of  the jury.  The  presumption 
in paragraph 213g is limited to "habit formingn narcotic drugs. 
This is for the same  reason that marihuana  has been  included within 
the presumption--because  of  its inherent characteristics: 
"The  known  deleterious effect upon  human  conduct and behavior 
caused by  its use renders its possession  prejudicial to good  order 
and military discipline.  It  Sp CU 350,  8 Sull JAG  (Army)  196.  It 
213k  CONDUCT  OF  A  NATUFtE  TO  BRING DISCREDIT  UPON  THE 
ARI'EIJ  FORCES 
This is the "catch-allll  in military law.  (See the statement 
in the first subparagraph--nSo  also any discreditable conduct not 
elseivhere  made  punishable  by any specific article or by one  of  the 
other clauses of  Article 134 is punishable under  this clause.It) This  clause of  Article 134 has a very interesting history.  It 
was  added  to the general article after World War  I,  and the then 
Judge Advocate General of  the Army  who  urged its inclusion was 
asked by one  of  the members  of  the Military Affairs Committee  the 
purpose  of  this "vague  language : 
"That  was  inserted for a  single purpose.  We  have  a great 
many  retired noncomnissioned officers and  soldiers distributed 
throughout  the body  of  our  population  and a great many  retired 
officers.  If  the re  tired officer does anything discreditable to 
the  service or  to his official position we  can  try him.  . .  for 
'conduct unbecoming  an officer and a gentlemant.  We  cannot  try 
the noncomnissioned officer or soldier under  that article, nor 
can we  try hirn  for conduct prejudicial to the good  order and  mili- 
tary discipline;  because  the act of  a man  on  the retired list, 
away from any military post,  cannot be reasonably said to affect 
military discipline.  (Revision of  the Articles of  War,  1912- 
1920,  PO  83) 
By  judicial  interpretation these "vague  wordsn have  since 
been  expanded  from  the narrow construction placed on  them by their 
author to the point where  they have  been  used as the legal justi- 
f  ication to sustain convictions for practically any offense com- 
mitted by one in tine  military service which  is not either specifi- 
cally denounced by  sone other article,  or is not a  crime  or offense 
not capital or a  disorder or neglect to the prejudice of  good  order 
and discipline.  It has been  said,  however,  that an act  which may 
be  considered a violation of  this clause must be one  which,  be 
cause of  its nature and  the  circumstances under  which it was  com- 
mitted,  directly affected the reputation or credit of  the military 
service.  CM 276559,  Francis,  48  BR  373,  dissenting opinion. 
There are,  of  course,  few wrongful acts which may  not,  in some 
wise,  be  thought to injure the reputation of  the service if a  sub- 
jective test  alone is used.  It hag  been  said that "every  case of 
viola  tion Lof  the general articled involves,  fundamentally,  a con- 
sidera  tion of  the culpability of  the conduct in question according 
to its military significance under  the circumstances of  the czse" 
(CM 283737,  Ikcintyre,  55 BR  175),  and it would  appear that the 
acts and  the circumstances must be viewed  objectively to determine 
whether  there has been,  in fact,  a direct injury to the reputation 
of  the armed  forces,  rather than a remote  injury which might  con- 
ceivably have resulted. 
CRIXES AND OFFENSES NOT  CAPITAL 
The  discussion limits ncrimes and  offenses not capitaltt to 
those which are denounced by enactments of  Congress and made  triable in Federal courts.  State laws are not included except under  the 
Federal llassimila  ting"  statute,  18 U .S-C  13.  This limitation 
does not appear in  the terms of  Article 134 itself and  caused 
some  initial difficulty in the  presentation of  the code  to the 
Senate  Subcommittee  (Seaate Report #@6,  p.  32),  but the lbitation 
is well established.  For a  suggestion of  the development  of  the 
limitation,  see CM  240176,  Frelmuth,  25 BR  379.  As to the inter- 
pretation of  %ffenses  not capitaly18  see Winthrop,  Military Law 
and Precedents,  1920 Reprint,  2d Edition,  page  721. 
VARIOUS  TYPES  OF  OFFZNSES  UNDER  ARTICLE  134 
Paragraph 2134 discusses a  few of  the offenses which may  be 
charged and punished  under Article 134.  Besides  the offenses dis- 
cussed herein there are,  of  course,  many  others which may,  in a 
proper  case,  constitute a violation of  one  of  the three clauses of 
Article '134.  Appendix  62,  in Specifications 118 through 176,  sets 
forth some  of  these,  but the mere  fact of  inclusion of  a  specif ica- 
tion for a  particular act in  ap~endix  62,  is not what makes  that 
act an  offense.  Offenses are denounced  only by specific statute 
(ACM 2927,  Jaek1ey)-those  which we  are discussing,  by Article 13C- 
and  there are necessarilymany other acts which may  constitute 
disorders or neglects,  or  conduct discreditable to the armed forces, 
which  are not discussed  or  covered by  any sample  specification. 
213g  1)  The  Morgan  Comittee noted  that Article 128,  Assault,  dif- 
fered frm present service practice in tbat assaults with intent 
to commit  specific crimes were  omitted from that Article,  and 
said,  "Such  assaults could be  punished under Article 80 (Attempts), 
or,  if the intent is doubtful,  under  this Arti~le.~  The  general 
article by its very terns,  however,  covers all  offenses "not  speci- 
f ically mentionedn in the code,  and it was  deemed  advisable to 
set forth the elements of  some  of  these particular assaults which 
are made  with intent to commit  sane  of  the more  serious crimes. 
For a discussion of  the distinction between  an assault with 
intent to commit  a specific crime and an attempt to do  so,  see 
United  States v.  Barnaby,  51 Fed  20;  Cirul v.  State,  83 Tex.  Cr. 
8,  200  SW  1088.  An  example  of  the distinction between  the two 
was  suggested by General Green  (~earings  before the Senate Sub- 
committee,  p.  277):  nA  person  can assault another (e.g.,  a  watch- 
man)  with intent to comnit  a  felony (e.g.,  a  housebreaking) without 
having  gone  far enough with respect to the  intended felony to 
constitute an attempt to commit it."  For  example,  the watchman 
might be at  such a  distance from the warehouse  that the overt*  act 
could be  held no more  than mere  preparation to commit the offense* 
See  paragraph 159. Conversely,  certain facts may  establish an attempt but not an 
assault . For example,  under  subparagraph (  c) of  this paragraph, 
a man  is said not to be guilty of  an assault with intent to comnit 
rape where  he  conceals hiinself  in a woman's  room  to await a favor- 
able opportunity to execute his intent to rape her,  but is  dis- 
covered and escapes.  Those  facts appear to establish a  violation 
of  Article 80,  Attempts,  as defined in paragraph 159.  See -VVhartont s 
Crininal Law,  (12th ~dition),  page  305. 
Uisprision of  a felony is the concealment of  a.  felony without 
giving any degree of  maintenance  to the felon.  United States v. 
Perlstein,  126 Fed  2d  789.  It differs from Article 78,  Accessory 
after the Fact,  in that the latter requires receiving,  comforting, 
or assisting the offender with the purpose  of  preventing his ap 
prehension.  See  Ned v.  United  States,  102 Fed  2d  643. 
The  definition of  misprision folluws very closely that in 
18 U:S.C.  4;  the statement that a mere  refusal to disclose the 
fact without some  positive act of  concealment does not constitute 
the offense is the  interpretation of  the Federal courts.  Neal  v. 
United Sta.tes, 102 Fed  2d  643.  It has been  said that some  meaning 
must be given to the word  %oncealU as used  in this offense,  and 
an indictment must allege something more  than a  mere  failure to 
disclose--  such as suppression of  evidence,  harboring of  a  criminal, 
intimidation of  a  witness,  or other positive act designed  to conceal 
from the civil or military authorities the commission  of  the felony. 
Bratton v.  United  States,  73 Fed  2d  795. 
Despite the broad  nature of  Article 134 and  the numerous types 
of  offenses which are embraced therein as disorders or neglects, 
or discreditable conduct,  an Amy  Board  of  Review noted that "mis- 
prision of  a misdemeanorn was  not a civil crime,  and held it not 
an  offense in viola  tion of  AW  96.  CM 203989,  Fox,  7 BR  315.  The 
Board  quoted the words  of  Chief  Justice Marshall  in Marbury  v. 
Brook,  7  [Wheat  556:  "It may  be  the duty of  a citizen to accuse 
every offender and to proclaim every offense which  comes  to his 
knowledge;  but the law which would  punish  him  in every case for not 
performirg  this duty is too harsh for man.a  This subparagraph on 
misprision does not attempt to include the  offense which was  ap- 
parently embraced  in Section 73,  IJaval  Courts and Boards,  "Appre- 
hending  offenders.It  That  section was  based upon  paragraph 17 of 
the eighth Article for the Government of  the Navy,  a  specific stat- 
utory provision which  is  not  incorporated in the new  code.  There 
may  be  cases in which mere  failure to report an  offense might  con- 
stitute a violation of  Article 134,  but those cases must rest upon 
their peculiar facts. THE  EXECUTIVE  ORDER 
AMD EX POST  FACT0 PEOBLEMS 
Conducted  by 
IdA JOR GILBERT  G.  ACY&OPD 
1.  ~e~eral..  Although  the Uniform  Code  of  Military Justice 
and  the Manual  far Courts-Martial,  United States,  1951,  become 
effective on 31 May  1951,  various provisions of  the code,  and  the 
provisos in  Executive Order 1~2l.b  promulgating  the manual,  require 
that the old provisions of  law continue  operative for certain 
purposes and  in certain cases.  Sometimes  this is dons  as a matter 
of  necessity--to  avoid the taint of  ex post facto-and  sometimes 
as a matter of  convenience for the purpose  of  avoiding confusion. 
The  purpose  of  this discourse will-  be to discuss briefly the 
various provisos  of  the Executive  Order and  some  of  the ex post 
facto problems which will arise when  the Uniform Code  and  the new 
manual go  into effect. 
2.  The  ~rovisos  of  the executive order, 
a.  First proviso.  Under  the  first proviso any investi- 
gation,  trial in  which  arraignment  has been had,  or 
other action begun prior to May  31 may  be  completed 
in accordance with the old law.  In this respect, 
action upon  the record of  trial  by  the convening 
authority is an  action separate and  distinct from 
the trial of  the case,  and review of  the record of 
trial  by the board  of  review is in turn an action 
action separate and distinct from both the trial 
and action by the convening authority.  Consequently, 
even if arraignment has been had  prior to 31 May, 
action by the convening  authority'must be conducted 
under  the new  procedure if not begun prior to 
31 Nay and  so must  review by the board  of review 
if  jt, is not begur.  prior to that date. 
b.  The  second proviso.  Under  the second proviso the 
new  law cannot make  punishable  any act done  or 
omitted pr.for  to  31  iay which  was- not punishable 
when  done  or omitted.  The  difficulties which  might 
arise under  this proviso will  be  obviated if the 
requirements of  the fourth ad  last proviso are 
followed.  This  will  be made  apparent in  the 
following discussion of  the mentioned  fourth proviso. c.  Third proviso.  In the third proviso it is  stated 
that the maximum punishment  for an offense committed 
prior to  31 May  1951 shall not exceed the applicable 
limit  in effect at the time of  the commission  of 
offense,  Several consequences  flow from this: 
In the case of  an  offense committed prior to 
31  May,  the 1imita.tions upon  punishment  in 
effect in the arrned  force concerned at the 
time  of  the commission  of  the offense will 
apply 
With  respect to an  offense  committed  prior 
to 31May,  neither the Uniform  Code  nor  the 
new  manual  can legally increase the punishment 
either in  amount  or degree.  It follows from 
this that if  the accused is convicted of  an 
offense in  violation of  the Articles of  War 
committed prior to 31 May  for which,  under 
the provisions of Article of  War  42,  he  could 
not be sentenced to confinement in  a Federal 
penitentiary,  his sentence to confinement may 
not be ordered to  be served in a penitentiary 
by reason of  the provisions of Article 58  of 
the Unifogn Code,  even though  the trial took 
place and the sentence was  adjudged  on  or 
after 31 May.  See Medley,  Petitioner (1890), 
U4  U.S.  160. 
Effect of  new  previous  conviction rule with 
respect torenlisted persons  and general 
prisoners (Army  and Air Force).  A  bad  conduct 
discharge and  the accompanying penalties 
authorized by Section B  of  the 1951 Table  of 
Maximum  punishments may  not be  adjudged, 
even  on  or after 31Bday,  for an offense in 
violation of  the Articles of  BVar  committed  , 
prior to 31  May  1951 unless such punisbent 
would  have been authorized under the 1949 
Manual,  In other words,  as to an  offense 
in violation of  the Articles of War committed 
prior to 31 May such a punishment  cannot be 
based on two  previous convictions;  nor  upon 
five previous  ccnvictions,  one  or more  of 
which may  not have been  admissible as a 
previous  conviction under  the rule in Par* 7929 
MCM,  19k9. d.  The  fourth proviso,  Under  the fourth proviso any act 
done  or omitted prior to  31 May  which  constitutes an 
offense in violation of  the Articles of  War,  the Articles 
for the Government of  the Navy,  or the discipling laws 
of  the Coast  Guard must  be charged as such and not  as 
a violation of  the Uniform  Code,  although if the trial 
takes place on  or after 31 May  the new  procedure  will 
be  used.  Since Public Law  506 is entitled an  act 
"to unify,  consolidate,  revise and  codiff'  the old 
statutory provisions pertsining to  military justice 
in  all  the armed  forces,  it might be said that the 
hiform Code  may  be  considered nothing more  than an 
amendment  to all  and  each of  those statutes,  and  thzt 
a  person would be amenable  to trial on  an appropriate 
charge and  specification laid under  the Uniform  Code 
even though he  had  committed  the acts which  constituted 
the offense prior to 31 May  1951.  See People v. 
Stevenson,  103 Cal App  82,  284  Pac  487.  It was 
thought,  however,  thzt such a  pleading would  cause 
considerable unnecessary  controversy,  would  require 
a series of  opinions by the boards of review and  the 
Court  of Military Appeals  as to  whether,  case by 
case,  psticular articles of  the Uniform  Code 
proscribed offenses which were the sane as those 
heretofore existing,  and would  mislead courts into 
inposing maximum  punishments  which  were not authorized 
at the time  the offense was  committed.  As an example 
of  the latter objection,  if a soldier had wrongfully 
obtained by false pretense property of  a value of 
more  than $50  prior to May  31,  1951,  and was  charged 
with larceny in  violation of Article 121 under a 
specification alleging merely that he  stole the 
property,  the court might,  after finding him  guilty, 
impose  a punishment  of  five years  (see the new  Table 
of  Maximum  Punishments) whereas  under  the Table of 
Maximum Punishments  in  the 1949 Mama1 for Courts- 
Martial the punishment  could  only be  three years. 
It seems  that nothing wculd be  gained by laying the 
charge under  the Uniform  Code  in the case of  offenses 
committed prior to 31 May  1951,  for it would 
ultimately be necessary to  detern;ine  the nature of 
the offense under  former  law in  order  to determine 
whether  the punishment  was  excessive. 
Also,  there is a  considerable difference,  in 
the definition of  offenses,  between  the punitive articles found in the Uniform  Code  and  those found 
in  the ?resent laws  governing  the arned forces. 
For  exanple:  Under  Article 88  of  the Uniform  Code 
the use of  contemptuous words  against the President, 
Vice-president,  Congress  and  other officials by an 
enlisted person is not made  an  offense,  whereas 
under .fLrticle of War  62  it is.  lt woulci,  accordingly, 
be  inappropriate to charge an enlisted soldier under 
Article 88  with respect to  such an offense committed 
before the 31st  of  May  1951.  Similarly,  if a person 
subject to the Articles of  War  should commit  a 
homicide while perpetrating a  housebreaking  prior 
to  May  31,  1951,  he  could be  charged with murder  in 
violation of  Article of  War  92,  whereas  under Article 
118 of  the Code  the horLci.de  could be  charged only 
as involuntary mans 1a.ughter unless it could be 
established that the perpetrator (1) had  a premedi- 
tated design  to kill, or (2) intended to kill or 
inflict great bodily harm,  or (3) was  engaged  in an 
act which was  inherently dangerous to  others and 
evinced a wanton  disregard of  human  life.  If a 
person  subject to the Articles of  'Xar  breaks  and 
enters in  the nighttime a dwellinghouse with intent 
to kidnap,  he  would be  guilty of  burglary under 
Article of  War  93,  whereas  he  could  only be charged 
with housebreaking  under  the biform Code  (see Arts. 
129 and UO). There  are probably many  more  such 
differences,  applicable to the Naw  and  Coast  G;ard 
as well as to the Army and Air  Force. 
In view of  the matters  mentioned above,  it was 
decided that all offenses in violation of  the Articles 
of  War,  the Articles for the Gavernnent  of  the Navy, 
or the discipling laws  of  the Coast  Guard,  committed 
before May  31,  1951,  should be charged as such and 
not as  violations of  the Unifor~a  Code. 
3.  Applicability  - -  of  ex post facto rule as applied to trial 
by summary court-martial  (Army and  Air Force).  If a person commits 
an  offense in violation of  the Articles of  War  orior to 31 day 
and is brought  to  trial  before a summary court-kartial  after 31 
'hy,  he may  refuse to be tried by  such court if  ,he could have 
refused trial  by summary court-martial  pior to 31 uay (see Par. 
16,  MCM 1949),  even  if he  has been  offered and has  refused non- 
judicial punishment.  See Sp  CM9,  Mc  Neely,  2. BR-JC  371;  Thom~son 
v  Utah,  170 U.S.  343,351. 
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